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ABSTRACT 
Riding the waves of decolonisation characteristic of postcolonial decades, 
the governments in Indonesia and the Philippines sponsored in the 1970s their 
respective history-writing projects: Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (SNI) and the Tadhana 
Project. One of the purported aims was to produce a 'truly' nationalist history that 
could help 'repair the damage' wrought by colonial experience. While nationalism 
provided a broad template within which the scholars and the state forged a 
partnership, the haunting problem of political legitimacy provided the two regimes 
strong reason to initiate collaboration and to see it through to a fruitful conclusion, 
if at all possible. 
The formation, contexts and contents of the Tadhana and the SNI projects are 
utilised in this study as areas for exploring the complex and varied manners by 
which embodiments of knowledge and power interact. What makes the two 
projects very fertile as exploratory grounds is the differentiated dynamics-
sometimes obvious, at other times subtle - between or among the scholars, state 
actors, knowledge itself and all other factors. There are, of course, notable 
similarities as well, and these sharpen the backdrop against which the search for a 
nuanced characterisation of the knowledge-power nexus has been pursued in this 
study. 
The primary questions that this study addresses are: (1) ,"Whose and/or 
what powers determine the shape of historical knowledge, and how?" and, (2) 
"Whose and/ or what knowledge frames whose exercise of power, and how?" The 
overall arguments may be summarised as follows: First, there is no inherently 
oppositional relationship between good scholarship and political interests. They 
could go togeth~r. Whether the relationship would be antithetical or 
complementary depends on many factors including the intention of an actor and 
the meaning or value attached to a knowledge claim. 
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Second, the scholars and scholarship are in themselves a power to reckon 
with; they are not mere puppets at the mercy of the manipulative control or 
influence of the state. They should, therefore, be factored into the analysis of the 
knowledge-power nexus. 
The third main argument addresses the question, if scholarship and politics 
are not necessarily opposites, why are they often framed as if they are? What role 
do moral judgments play in formulating such dichotomies? It appears that, aside 
from genuine moral outrage, the moral framing of the criticisms against the 
Tadhana scholars and Nugroho was not just a rhetorical device to strengthen the 
position of the critics but this also served to divert the attention of the people away 
from the apparently inherent ties between the scholarly and the political, between 
knowledge and power. 
Fourth, the relationship between knowledge and power seems to be 
captured by the mathematical metaphor of the calculus, that is, they are formed at 
the confluence of criss-crossing factors whose possible combinations are infinite 
and the process of their formation dynamic. 
Fifth, knowledge is possibly an autonomous site of power; that is, 
knowledge is not just dependent on the power of a particular agent, as imbedded 
in the popular notion of 'knowledge is power.' This autonomy possibly emanates 
from the fact that meaning, which is constitutive of knowledge, is continually being 
shaped by the interaction between the individual knower and the ~ocial forces with 
which he or she has to contend with. These forces are beyond an individual's 
control though he or she has the capability to influence the outcome of such 
interaction. 
Sixth, a similar logic underpinned the knowledge-power relation as 
manifested in the SNI and the Tadhana. It is in the logistics of power that they 
differed. This means that both projects suggest that knowledge is a function of 
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power and it is in the distribution, combinations, sources, and types of power 
where the differences between them lie. 
This study concludes with a call for an ethics of accountability. This is 
occasioned by the serious ethical problem that accompanies the notion of 
knowledge as a function of reality (rather than as a function of power). By claiming 
to be neutral or objective, scholars can and often do remove themselves from the 
responsibility for whatever consequences the knowledge they produce might have. 
Unwittingly, they become accomplices in causing, maintaining or justifying social 
injustice, inequality and violence, both physical and symbolic. These are precisely 
the conditions that, ironically, they often claim to remedy. One way to neutralise 
the problem is to expose the sources of the insidious powers that prop up 
knowledge and these include the power of the scholars and that of scholarship 
itself. It is by being transparent about such power that the scholars can help 
address the problem. 
---000000---
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STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY 
This thesis is an original work of the author, except where acknowledged in 
the text. It has not been submitted for any other degree. 
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GLOSSARY 
Abangan Nominal Muslims, follow a form of Islam that that is mixed with 
Hindu-Buddhist and animistic influences 
Asal bapak senang Indonesian for 'so long as the boss is happy;' attitude or mentality 
that predisposes an individual to do everything to please the superior 
Bagong Kasaysaysan Tagalog term for 'New History' 
Baran gay 
Biro Khusus 
Buku babon 
Caciquism 
doktorandus 
connaissance 
EDSA Revolution 
Ethical Policy 
Filipino Heritage 
Frailocracy 
Hamlyn Group 
I/us tr ados 
Indonesiasentrisme 
Istruktural 
Kati pun an 
Kumpare 
La Liga Filipina 
Tagalog word which means a village or a settlement consisting of 30-
100 families; social, economic and political unit during the pre-
hispanic and Spanish periods. 
Indonesian for 'special bureau;' a clandestine group tasked to 
infiltrate the military and propagate communist teachings 
Indonesian for 'standard text;' a book that serves as the basis of 
another books or whose importance makes it a fundamental 
reference. 
Spanish-derived term for the rule of the local chiefs or bosses 
Dutch-influenced post-bachelor's degree in the old educational 
system in Indonesia. 
Developed knowledge, as opposed to day-to-day knowledge, French. 
The uprising that toppled Marcos in 1986 
An ambitious program promulgated by the Dutch colonial 
government in Indonesia starting early 1900s 
An encyclopedia of the Philippines, a project that was contemporary 
with the Tadhana 
A term often used to refer to the rule of the friars in the Philippines 
during the Spanish period; another term is friarocracy. 
An Australian publishing company that financed the Filipino 
Heritage Project 
Educated Filipinos during the Spanish period in Philippine history. 
Indonesian for Indonesia-centric perspective in historiography 
In Indonesian historiography, it refers to the structural or multi-
dimensional approach 
Secret revolutionary society founded in 1892 in Manila which led the 
revolution in 1896 
In the Philippines, it refers to the person (male) who served as the 
sponsor in the baptism of one's child 
Spanish term which meant 'The PhilippineLeague,' a short-lived 
organisation founded by Rizal in 1892. 
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Lubang Buaya Indonesian for 'crocodile hole.' It is a village south of Halim Airbase 
in Jakarta; it became famous being the place where the bodies of 
abducted generals' were dumped. 
Malacanang The President's official residence in the Philippines 
Manila Times One of the national daily newspapers in the Philippines 
Martial Law Marcos proclaimed martial law in September 1 972 to prolong his 
stay in power. 
Pancasila State ideology in Indonesia, literally Five Principles. 
Pantayong Pananaw Tagalog term for 'We/Us Perspective,' one of the dominant schools 
of Philippine historiography. 
Pemuda Rakyat People's Youth, one of organisations affiliated with the Communist 
Party of Indonesia 
Pre-hispanic period In Philippine history, it refers to the time before the Spaniards 
arrived in 1521 or 1565. 
Propagandists Group of young educated Filipinos in Spain who campaigned starting 
in the 1880s for reforms in the Philippines 
Prosesuil In Indonesian historiography, it refers to the narrative, processual or 
chronological approach to writing history. 
Reform Movement Another term for the movement created by the Propagandists (see 
above) 
Santri Devout Muslims, following forms of Islam that are fairly strictly 
based on the Koran 
savoir French, day-to-day knowledge, as opposed to developed knowledge 
Sejarah Indonesian word for history 
sejarawdn murni Indonesian for "pure historian," a rhetorical term that sets a marker of 
qualitative difference between historians who were well trained in 
methods and those who were not 
Sikolohiyang Filipino Tagalog for 'Filipino Pscyhology,' a school of thoughts in 
Psyschology 
Statism 
Sumpah Pemuda 
Tadhana 
Tripartite view 
1898 Revolution 
An approach to knowledge/power analytics that focuses on the heavy 
role or influence of the state on knowledge production 
Youth Oath, pledge made by the participants in the youth congress-in 
Indonesia in 1928 
Tagalog word which means fate or destiny 
.In Philippine historiography, it refers to the condition during and 
division between the period before, during and after colonization 
A landmark event in Philippine history; the revolution against Spain 
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ABRI 
ADHIKA 
BTI 
DPR-GR 
EDSA 
FH 
Ge.rwani 
Gestapu/G30S 
IAHA 
Lekra 
LEKNAS 
LIPI 
LRKN 
MPRS 
MSI 
NHC 
NHI 
NMPC 
PHA 
PHC 
PHRMC 
PKI 
PNHS 
PMP 
ACRONYMS 
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
Abbreviation for Asosasyon ng mga Dalubhasa at may Hilig sa 
Kasaysayan, 'Association of Scholars and History Enthusiasts'; one 
of the major history associations in the Philippines 
Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesia's Farmers' Front 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-Gotong Royong, Indonesia's parliament 
established in 1960. 
Epifanio de los Santos A venue, one of the major avenues in Metro 
Manila, well-known as the place were the 1986 uprising took place 
Filipino Heritage, the multi-volume history writing project funded by 
the Hamlyn Group 
Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Movement oflndonesian Women 
Gerakan 30 September, The 30th September Movement, group of 
military personnel that launched an aborted coup on 30 September-I 
October 1965 
International Association of Historians of Asia 
Abbreviation for Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, Institute for Peoples' 
Culture; an association of leftist artists in Indonesia. 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research 
Lembaga /!mu Pengetahuan Indonesia, Indonesian Institute of 
Sciences 
National Institute of Cultural Studies 
Maje/is Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, Provisional People's 
Consultative Assembly 
Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia, Association of Historians of 
Indonesia 
National Historical Committee 
National Historical Institute 
National Media Production Center 
Philippine Historical Association 
Philippine Historical Committee 
Philippine Historical Research and Markers Committee 
Partai Komunis Indonesia, Communist Party of Indonesia 
Philippine National Historical Society 
Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (Pancasila Moral Education) 
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PSPB 
Pusjarah 
Serangan Umum 
SNI 
SNI-SMP 
SNI-SMA 
SOAS 
SSK 
SSN2 
Supersemar 
Tritura 
TRD 
UC 
UI 
UGM 
UP 
voe 
Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa (National Struggle History 
Education) 
Pusat Sejarah ABRI, Armed Forces History Centre 
Indonesian for 'General Offensive;' this is a landmark event in the 
struggle against the Dutch (1 March 1949). The Repubican forces 
conducted a concerted attack on Y ogyakarta and held it for six hours. 
Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, title of the 6-Volume history of Indonesia 
Sejarah Nasional Indonesia untuk Sekolah Menengah Pertama, 
'National History oflndonesia for the Junior High School' 
Sejarah Nasional Indonesia untuk Sekolah Menengah Atas, 'National 
History of Indonesia for the Senior High School' 
School of Oriental and African Studies 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, one of the branches of sociology 
of knowledge 
Seminar Sejarah Nasional II, the Second National History Seminar 
held in Yogyakarta in 1970. 
Abbreviation for Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, 'Instruction Letter of 
11 March;' this letter authorised Suharto to undertake several 
measures to restore order and enabled Suharto to wrest control of the 
government. 
Abbreviation for Tri Tuntutan Rakyat, 'Three Demands of the 
People;' after the Gestapu coup, demonstrators had demanded the 
government three things: (1) dissolution of the PKI; (2) changes in 
the Dwikora Cabinet; and (3) proper handling of the economic crisis. 
Today's Revolution: Democracy, a book that served as the blue-print 
for Marcos's plan to establish Martial Law. 
University of California 
Universitas Indonesia, University oflndonesia 
Universtitas Gadjah Mada, Gadjah Mada University 
University of the Philippines 
Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or Dutch East-India Company 
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INTRODUCTION 
KNOWLEDGE-POWER: APPROACHES AND THEORIES 
The past is never dead. In fact, it is not even past. 
-William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun (1953) 
W E live in a time of 'history wars'! In the past few decades in many parts of the world, historical interpretations have been an object of intense public contestations (Mcintyre and Clark 2003; Linenthal and 
Engelhardt 1996; Nash, Crabtree and Dunn 1998; Saaler 2005; Reedy 1999; Suny 
2005; Art 2006; Niven 2002; Berger 1995; Faiola 2005; Humlebok 2005; Aguilar 
2002; Basu and Das 2005; Hite 2005; Hein and Selden 2000). While history's 
potential and actual ability to generate controversy, not to mention its intimate 
relationship with politics, has long been recognised (Laquer and Mosse 1974; 
Unger 1993; Ferro 2003), at least two things are new in the recent phenomenon: the 
extent of involvement of the public and the level of passion it generates. This 
phenomenon seems paradoxical. While many academic historians lament what 
they perceive to be a growing marginalisation of history and the historical 
profession, observers have noted an increase of public interest in history1 
(Rozensweig and Thelen 1998; Tyrell 2005, 11-24). It seems that history has seldom 
figured more prominently in the public consciousness than it has in the recent past. 
Corollary to the increased public interest in history is a growing number of 
important studies scrutinising the historians (Brock and Wroebel 2006; Gorman 
2003; Naimark and Case 2003) and history itself, both as a form of analysis or 
1 The marginal position of history and historians is a common complaint among Filipino and Indonesian 
historians. This is not confined to historians in the developed world such as the US, as Tyrell (2005) and 
Ronzensweig and Thelen (I 998) noted. 
narrative (Fasolt 20042; Martin 2004; White 1973, 1987; Foucaut 1967, 1976, 1979)3 
and as a profession (Novick 1989; Tyrell 2005). While self-reflexive, self-critical 
examination into the practice of historiography and the character of historical 
profession have some bitter critics, sometimes even claiming that history has been 
(or is being) 'murdered'4 (Windschuttle 1994; Himmelfarb 2004), one can argue 
that it (self-critical examination) is an indication of the discipline's increasing level 
of maturity or sophistication. They who recognise their limits understand 
themselves well. 
The multi-front war over history is a complex phenomenon. It may be a part 
of a larger, ambiguous process that on the one hand accompanies the growing 
scepticism or disenchantment towards many things that represent modernity, 
including modern scholarship and the forms of rationality that underpin it.5 On the 
other hand, it may also have been occasioned by the empowerment of groups or 
individuals that modernity and democratisation has made possible. The on-going 
alignment or re-alignment of power relations within many countries6 as well as at 
transnationaF or global8 level may also have a part in it. The dialectics of 
contending forces or conflicting interests specific to a given society possibly make 
each 'war-front' quite distinct from another. There are at least two common 
features, however, that may be discernible. The first is the presence of the elements 
of the past that, owing to the present condition and/ or the aspirations for the 
2 For a highly recommended, deeply penetrating and crisply written treatise on the limits of historical analysis, 
see Fasolt (2004). Also useful, but not as compelling as Fasolt's is Martin (2004). 
3 See also Weiner (2005) for an insightful look at how different configurations of power 'within the society 
condition contrasting reactions to and consequences of offences (plagiarism, fraud, harassments, etc.) 
committed by historians in the United States. 
4 The title of Windschuttle's book is telling, The Killing of History. That of Martin's (2002) article is another 
'Clio Raped.' 
5 Philosophers associated with poststructuralism such as Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida, Heidegger and de Man 
are notable examples. For critics of this attitude, see Wolin (2004); Ferry and Renaut (1990); and Pels 
(1991) 
6 Examples include the break-up ofYoguslavia and the collapse of the former Soviet Union that gave rise to a 
number of independent states in Central Asia, Caucausus and the Baltic. Change of regime in Spain, 
Indonesia and Chile and the reunification of Germany are also notable examples. 
7 The Chinese and Korean reactions to textbook issues in Japan may be a case in point. 
8 The on-going process of globalisation, for example, and the war on terrorism, or the 'clash of civilisations' 
may have an impact. See for example Hein and Selden ( 1998). 
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future, may be forgotten, distorted, resurrected and kept alive for various reasons.9 
As Faulkner said, "The past is never dead. It is not even past" (Faulkner 1953, 83). 
The other is the change (or the perception thereof) in the structure of power 
relations in a society,10 sometimes induced or influenced by forces beyond its 
borders.11 In short, at the bottom line rests the question of the relationship between 
the structure of power and the shape of knowledge. 
The objects of analysis in this study are two history-writing projects which 
to an extent reflected a small-scale 'history wars' in Indonesia and the Philippines 
in the 1970s. These are Marcos's project, the Tadhana: A Histon; of the Filipino People 
(hereafer Tadhana), and the Suharto regime's official history, the Sejarah Nasional 
Indonesia (hereafter SNI). Because of the context in which they were made, 
however, these projects are perceived more as tools for political supremacy rather 
than as expression of a battle for history. Undertaken at a crucial juncture of the 
two authoritarian regimes' political consolidation, suspicions mounted that these 
projects were none other than vehicles for regime-justification or self-glorification. 
While it cannot be denied that these projects had features that validate such 
suspicion, this study will demonstrate that their greater importance lies in 
analysing the aspects or the extent to which they were not. Considering the 
physical proximity and the intimacy of the interaction between the embodiments of 
knowledge (scholars) and power (political leaders or their representatives), these 
projects offer quite a rare glimpse of the intersection where knowledge and power 
clash, fuse, restrict, reinforce or constitute each other. 
9 The haunting memories of past violence such as the Holocaust in Germany (Art 2006), the 1965-66 mass 
killings in Indonesia (Budiawan 2004; Zurbuchen 2005; Cribb 1989), and the Nanjing massacre and human 
experimentation of the Chinese by the Japanese (Fogel 2000) are examples. 
10 The demise of authoritarian regimes, for instance, that altered the structure of power relations paved the 
way for the interrogation of the past misdeeds. See Aguilar (2002) for the case of Spain, Budiawan (2004) 
for the case of Indonesia, among many others. The case of Japan does not involve a change of regime, but 
the perception by certain groups of the threat of the alleged remilitarisation by the government heightens the 
tensions. 
11 For Korea's involvement in textbook controversies in Japan, see Dudden (2005). 
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In contemporary academic culture, reference to the knowledge-power nexus 
may be met with a polite but jaded response. Many have moved on, or stayed 
away, perhaps thinking that this (the idea that knowledge is a function of power) is 
counter-productive or, in a theoretical and analytic sense, is already exhausted 
(Nola 1994; Roberts 2005; Jones 2000; various articles in Jenkins 1997). Others who 
opt to move along this analytic flow have adopted different approaches or 
vocabularies perhaps to reflect conceptual refinement, or to cross new intellectual 
frontiers or just to keep up with intellectual fashion. Another possibility is that 
some may think that the idea is a self-evident truth and that there is no need to 
problematise it anymore. Whatever the reason, or whatever attitude others have 
towards this idea, I believe that taking another look at knowledge-power nexus is 
of fundamental importance because, among other things, there are certain aspects 
of the relationship that have yet to be fully explored. 
This study starts with the assumption that knowledge and power are closely 
intertwined and that, following Foucault, they presuppose each other. In his 
words, "Knowledge and power are integrated with one another .... It is not possible 
for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to 
engender power" (Foucault 1980, 52). At the outset, however, I emphasise that this 
study is not another application of Foucault's knowledge/ power analytics. The 
nature of my data does not warrant such a move and while I start with Foucault, 
the questions I raise in this study are different from those addressed by him. 
The main aim of this study is to identify areas that may be utilised in 
formulating a more nuanced, differentiated and yet inclusive definition of the 
relationship between knowledge and power. As I will try to demonstrate in the 
following review of the relevant literature, while the approaches that have so far 
been tried have their own notable contributions, they tend to be either too inclusive 
and lacking in differentiation, or too generalized or too specific and short on 
inclusivity and/or nuances. Another approach, I believe, is necessary-an 
approach that in its most ideal formulation has the capacity to identify all possible 
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types of power; all possible subjects or agents who may be powerful; and all types 
of knowledge that may be produced by, and in turn frames, the configuration of 
power relations. In short, the general questions this study aims to address are the 
following: 
a.) Whose or what power/ s shape/ s whose or what knowledge, and how? 
b.) Whose or what knowledge sets the frame for the exercise of whose or 
what power, and how? 
The origin of problematic issues surrounding knowledge-power nexus may 
be coeval with the birth of authoritative knowledge itself (Bauman 1987).12 The 
Greek philosophers early on thought of related issues13 (Remmling 1967; Shapin 
1991) as did philosophers in other parts of the world (Hansen 1981; Matilal and 
Evans 1986). Central to these issues are the questions of whether or not, and if it 
does to what extent, the non-rational14 elements such as social, cultural and 
political factors affect knowledge production.15 Bacon's Theory of the Idols and 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason were pivotal (Levine 1950a, 195b)16 but it was 
12 The first chapter of Bauman 's book Legislators and Interpreters ( 1987) provides a penetrating look into the 
evolutionary process that might have taken place in primitive societies leading to the fusion between 
knowledge and power. Such an approach was particularly important in that it demonstrates the deep roots-
both social and historical-of the knowledge-power nexus. 
13 According to Shapin ( 1991) from the early Greek philosophical tradition through early Christianity all the 
way to I ih century empiricism and beyond, knowledge was considered as appropriate to the extent that its 
formulation was achieved out of the context of the practical and the political. Remmling (1967, 53-55) notes 
that the early systems of modern philosophy (referring to the European tradition) had been dominated by 
rationalist epistemology. Early forms of empiricism were discernible in Aristotle and Epicurus, among 
others, but it would take Locke and Hume to launch vigorous challenges to rationalism. 
14 I agree with Longino (2002) when she argues that the sharp dichotomy between the social and the rational 
hampers rather than facilitates understanding of knowledge. However, I use the dichotomy between rational 
and non-rational here just for convenience. 
15 Larrain ( 1979) traces to Machiavelli the early recognition of the environmental influence on cognition. 
Francis Bacon in the 17th century was also notable in his idea of the Idols of the Tribe referring to the 
distorting effects of individual perceptions. He said that it is wrong to regard the human as the measure of 
everything (cited in Dant 1991, 56). 
16 In Levine's comprehensive and incisive survey of historical development ofphilosophical views on 
knowledge as interpretation, she traced the 'modern' roots of interpretationism upon which sociology of 
knowledge was based from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Then she proceeded to Hegel and Marx down 
to pragmatism of Dewey and Lewis and eventually to Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. 
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Foucault who nailed the point when he agued that knowledge and power 
presuppose each other. 
Between Kant (or even earlier) and Foucault is a long tradition of serious 
efforts to understand the power-knowledge interface. This tradition is exemplified, 
for instance, in the importance of the notion of ideology in Marxist scholarship.17 
Durkheim provided early impetus too with his idea of social a priorism, which 
suggests that forms of knowledge such as religion and sciences all emerged from 
the confluence of social forces and one is thus not necessarily superior to the other 
(Law 1986; Bloor 1982). 1s Mannheim's sociology of knowledge was perhaps the 
earliest, most developed attempt to make sense of the relationship between 
knowledge and its social context.19 According to Remmling, writing in the 1960s, 
Mannheim provided "the most resolutely developed sociology of knowledge" 
(1967, 62). What was of particular importance in Mannheim lay in his emphasis on 
the understanding of the social context of knowledge production in favour of its 
supposed contaminating influences. He put the question of veracity of a 
knowledge claim (epistemology) at the backseat of understanding the social 
context in which the knowledge claim was made (sociology) (Dant 1991, 34-40; Pels 
1993). It was a sort of a revolution that saw social epistemology challenging the 
monopoly of philosophy as the sole arbiter of knowledge claims (Ben-David 1978, 
1981 as cited in Shapin 1995, 296).20 Seminal though his ideas may have been, 
Mannheim nonetheless lost much of his appeal as reflected in the development in 
the 1960s-1980s of the sociology of knowledge,21 especially in the sociology of 
17 For a concise overview of the Marxist tradition in the sociology of knowledge, see McCarthy ( 1996, 27-46) 
18 As noted by Law (1986), while Marx's views on knowledge-society relations was prominently picked up by 
the sociologists of knowledge, Durkheim's ideas did not receive as much attention, until recently with the 
rise of groups of scholars who developed what is known as sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) or 
social studies of science. Bloor, one of the prominent SSK scholars, is among those who 'resurrected' 
Durkheim's ideas for appropriation in the SSK. See Bloor (1982). 
19 For a book-length reconstruction and analysis of the early development of sociology of knowledge in 
Germany, where Mannheim was one of the key figures, see Frisby ( 1992). 
20 The very notion of 'sociology of knowledge' was met by strong opposition from the philosophers. (See 
Dant ( 1991, 34-40) for a discussion of the hostile responses from philosophers to Mannheim's project. For a 
book-length attempt at refuting relativism, see Norris ( 1997). 
21 1ts 'obituary,' as Coser ( 1987, 218) has noted, has been announced a couple of times already. 
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scientific knowledge, purportedly the most prominent sub-branch of sociology of 
knowledge in the past two decades.22 Through the efforts of some scholars, 
however, Mannheim's influence lingers and, lately, it seems being revived or 
revitalised (Coser 1987; Pels 1993, 1996; Kim 1994; Vandenberghe 1999). 
Between Bacon's 'knowledge is power'23 and Foucault's power/knowledge is 
not just a wide temporal gap. It also signifies a revolutionary transformation in the 
ways knowledge and power have been conceived and how the relationship 
between them is analysed. The transformation has a complex history that 
witnessed both subdued and agonistic debates among different theorists from the 
days of the Greek classical philosophers through the time of Descartes, Kant and 
Hume, Marx and Durkheim, Mannheim and Berger/Luckman, all the way to the 
present. 
One notable feature of this debate points to the changing conception of the 
relationship between knowledge and reality. Initially knowledge was thought to 
be an uncontaminated reflection of reality (rationalism), then as sense-experience 
(empiricism). Kant played a pivotal role in bridging the gap between the two. From 
that point on, the notion of knowledge as interpretation provided a common 
thread that links Kantian epistemology to certain ideas of Hegel and Marx and to 
the various schools of thoughts or methods such as historicism, pragmatism and 
sociology of knowledge (Levine 1950a, 1950b; Remmling 1967) all the way to 
poststucturalism (McCarthy 1995) and Latour' s actor-network theory (Latour 
1986). 
22 Mannheim has been the favourite 'whipping boy' ofthe sociologists of science. He is often cited in 
contemporary sociological discourse as the one who attempted to rationalise the irrational (see Stehr 1997, 
773).That he is not mentioned even once in Shapin 's ( 1995) comprehensive review of the state-of-the-
field is symptomatic ofthe continuing disregard of his legacy. This may be because of Mannheim's 
categorical declaration that 'hard' sciences were not a proper domain of sociological examination. However, 
some scholars have noted, even argued, for the centrality of Mannheim's ideas and that these ideas could 
even provide a solution for some of the problems the field faces. (See Pels 1996; Kim 1994; Vandenberghe, 
1999). 
23 Francis Bacon, a I ih century philosopher, is the originator of the adage 'knowledge is power.' By this he 
meant that by acquiring knowledge about nature-science-human beings can empower themselves by 
gaining the mastery over nature. 
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Beyond theoretical or philosophical debates, on the ground in scholarly 
practice, the two areas where the knowledge-power question often figures are in 
the analysis of the relationship between schooling and politics and between politics 
and writing history. Initially, both schooling and history writing were thought to 
be out of the domains of politics. There remain those who still insist this is so and 
de-emphasise whatever political linkage schools and historiography may have 
(Himmelfarb 2004; Windschuttle 1994), but this view seems to have long been 
superseded. In both cases in the earlier stage, it is usually the interests of the visibly 
power, the political power holders (or economic elites) that determine or influence 
the character or features of educational or scholarly output. In other words, they 
are contaminants to the otherwise pure knowledge.24 In the Marxist parlance this 
corresponds to the dominant ideology thesis. I call this approach statism-elitism 
and this will be the first approach to be discussed here. 
In Asia, Japan's case stands for decades as exemplary. The issues around 
textbook censorship, which arose in the 1960s, have refused to die down (Ienaga 
1970, 1992; Nozaki 2001; Nozaki and Inokuchi 1998; Nakamura 1998). They have in 
fact intensified since the mid-1990s when a 'movement' to revise history along 
"neonationalist and conservative lines" was formally launched (McCormack 1998; 
Gerow 1998; Saaler 2005). The battle lines between the 'liberal' critics of textbook 
censorship and the 'conservative' proponents of nationalist history have been 
drawn, and the confrontation has often been public. Likewise the contested sphere 
that used to be focused on educational settings-the textbooks-has been 
expanded to the writing of Japanese history in genera1.2s One notable feature of the 
many studies (Reedy 1999; Hein and Selden 2000) on Japan's case, in so far as the 
24 The concept of false consciousness highlights the oppositional relationship between knowledge and power. 
The underlying premise is that power distorts knowledge - that is, interests distort the truth in the direction 
set forth by a dominant group. This formulation presupposes the opposite: knowledge is free from power; it 
is objective or neutral and capable of adjudicating between competing interests. See Haagard (1997, 16-17) 
and Lukes (1974). 
25 The textbook issue has always presupposed the broader historiographic questions and in that sense it was 
not just an educational question. However, when the conservatives (see definition or elaboration below, 
footnote number 27) such as Fujioka fought back and established the Society for the Creation of New 
History Textbooks, the debates while remaining concerned with the textbook issue have also become 
largely historiographic. 
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knowledge-power interface is concerned, is the emphasis on the strength of, in 
Althusser's terms, the ideological state apparatus. That is, the focus of analysis is 
on the state's control of knowledge transmission channels and the responses of the 
foreign governments as well as domestic civil society groups to this control. There 
are of course exceptions and Morris-Suzuki's The Past Within Us (2005), which 'goes 
beyond the textbook,' is a fine example.26 Unfortunately, there are not yet many 
work similar to Morris-Suzuki's. Another prominent feature is the fairly defined 
demarcation line between the contending parties within civil society, the 'liberal' 
and the 'conservative.'27 In other words, Japan's case is noteworthy for the clarity 
of the sources of power (that is, the state and to a lesser extent civil society groups) 
that contest and define the contours of historical knowledge. 
To an extent, Japan's case is paradigmatic. Studies focusing on the state (or 
the elite that it often embodies) as the dominant player are very common. In the 
case of the Philippines, the writings of Constantino such as 'Miseducation of the 
Filipinos'(1966) and the two-volume synthesis of the Philippine history, The 
Philippines: A Past Revisited (1975) and The Philippines: The Continuing Past (1978) 
represent a clearly Marxist line of analysis that sees the state and the elites as the 
locus of the dominant influence on the mentality of the people. The highly 
regarded Limits of Educational Change by Doronila (1989) follows the same line of 
analysis. Doronila was able to rule out pedagogical (teaching-related) factors after 
finding that teachers hardly deviate from the prescribed textbooks and other 
curricular requirements. She concluded that despite the government rhetoric 
pointing to national identity formation as one of the most important goals of public 
26 Morris-Suzuki rightly pointed out that the problem with the many studies that have so far been published 
was that they focused too much on the textbook censorship. What she did was to expand the focus to 
include popular media such as manga, short stories, fims among others. 
27 In Japan's context 'liberal' refers to those who follow or are sympathetic to lenaga Saburo's crusade dating 
back to the 1960s against state censorship. They are also keen to protest against any signs of re-
militarisation of Japan and they complain about the denial of atrocities during the Second World War. The 
group of 'conservative,' on the other hand, is perhaps best represented by the Society for the Creation of 
New History Textbooks, founded in 1996. They pushed for an 'ultranationalist' history that absolves Japan 
of many wrong-doings associated with World War II and, conversely, they want to promote pride and a 
good image of Japan. For an example of how the latter depict history, see the John Nelson's content analysis 
of the textbook issued by the Society, "Tempest in a Textbook: A Report on the New Middle-School 
Texbooks in Japan" (Nelson 2002). 
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education, the goal is not achieved and the problems appear to lie in the less than 
nationalistic contents of the textbooks. Such a lack of nationalism she attributed to 
the economic and political interest of the dominant class in collusion with 
international agencies such as the World Bank. The textbooks she analysed were 
products of the project funded by the World Bank, an institution, according to 
Constantino that "we can hardly expect to be interested in helping Filipinos 
acquire education relevant to their own needs"(1982, 21). The importance of 
Doronila's book, as far as this study is concerned, lies in demonstrating how the 
public school system reproduces the interests of the dominant class. 
Studies of Indonesia likewise offer notable examples of the similar 
approach. Elder's study, Ideologies, Aims and Content in Indonesian Education (1987), 
argues that even during the period of transition from Sukarno to Suharto, 1965-
1969, contents and aims of education reflected largely the interest of the state. 
Parker's 'The Creation of Indonesian Citizens in Balinese Primary School' (1992) is 
noteworthy for providing empirical evidence of the success of the state educational 
apparatus in creating citizens according to the definition set by the state. Leigh's 
two articles 'Making the Indonesian State' (1991) and 'Learning and Knowing 
Boundaries' (1999) reinforce Elder' s and Parker's arguments. By looking into the 
contents of the textbooks and how questions in the national examinations are 
formulated, she shows not only how the school system transmits knowledge that is 
favourable for justifying the regime, but also how education practice creates among 
the students a mindset amenable to ideological conditioning. This approach is 
particularly useful for its attempt to provide a theoretical and, to a degree, 
generalisable basis for the link between educational practice and the formation of 
certain types of mentality. 
The centrality of the state also informs the analysis in Bourchier' s 'The 1950s 
in New Order Ideology and Politics' (1994) as well as in van de Kok, Cribb and 
Heins's '1965 and all That: History and Politics in the New Order' (1991). More 
recent studies by Wood, Official Histon; of Modern Indonesia (2005), and by 
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McGregor, 'Claiming History' (2002), continue more or less the same line of 
analysis. The latter is particularly notable for focusing on visual representations 
such as monuments and museums. Along with Schreiner' s "History in the 
Showcase"(1997), it provides a welcome balance to the heavy emphasis of other 
scholars on written representations. Considering the dominant presence of the 
New Order regime, a state-focused approach is neither surprising nor 
unwarranted. 
The similarity of examples from Indonesia and the Philippines lies in the 
extensive role of the state, not in the emphasis on class. While class analysis has a 
long, deep and continuing tradition in and on the Philippines, the same is not the 
case for Indonesia.28 In the case of the Philippines, the state is more clearly seen 
(especially by Marxist-inspired scholars) as subservient or subsumed to the 
interests of the dominant class. In the case of Indonesia, on the other hand, there is 
not as much emphasis, implicit or explicit, on the connection between the two. The 
works of scholars, such as those I mentioned above, do not tend to conflate the two, 
as usually done by many Filipino scholars. 
State-heavy, if not state-centric, analysis is also discernible in German's 
Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth Century Egi;pt (2003). This emphasises the 
primary role of the state in influencing the shape of historical knowledge but also 
provides analysis of the non-state historiographies. The volume edited by Hadiz 
and Dhakidae, Social Science and Power in Indonesia, contains a number of articles 
that follow a similar line of analysis. 29 In their introduction, they claim that " ... the 
development of Indonesian social science-its very nature and character :-is 
inextricably linked to the shifting requirements of (state) power over time" (Hadiz 
and Dhakidae 2005, 2). 
28 Class analysis is widely and often employed by both foreign and local scholars who deal with the 
Philippines. In Indonesia, class analysis by Indonesian scholars is almost non-existent during the New Order 
period. Even in the post-Suharto period, many scholars maintain a suspicious attitude towards it. See Farid 
(2005). Among the foreign Indonesianists, class analysis is also not as a popular as in the case of the 
Philippinists. A notable exception is Robison ( 1978). 
29 For specific examples of state-heavy analysis in this volume, see Laksono (2005) and Adam (2005). 
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The second approach, which I call pluralism for want of a better term, gives 
more emphasis to the conflicting roles or interests of various players, the state or 
the elite being just one of them. Rather than seeing the school system and historical 
knowledge as a mere reproducer of or a vehicle to advance the interests of the 
dominant class, they are seen in this approach as a battlefield where power is 
contested and power relations constituted. Thaveeporn Vasavakul's Schools and 
Politics in South and North Viet Nam: A Comparative Study of State Apparatus, State. 
Policy and State Power (1945-1965) (1994) is a very good example of this,approach. 
By looking into the 'processes by which the two school apparatuses were formed 
and expanded in order to ascertain how they reflected and effected ideological and 
economic changes' (1994, 1) it demonstrates a textured relationship between 
politics and schooling in the former North and South Vietnam. The author 
addresses the main problem with the state-focused approach exemplified above 
when she forcefully argues that it cannot be assumed a prion· that all "school 
apparatuses are state apparatuses - a premise that precludes any systematic 
discussion of the process by which statism took over the school system and of how 
the degree and form of statism changed over time" (Ibid., 9-10). 
Lee Kam Hing' s book, Education and Politics in Indonesia (1995), dovetails 
well with Thaveeporn's. Devoid of reference to theories, it is a historical study that 
plainly describes the contested character of education in Indonesia during the 
formative period from 1945 up to 1965. Clear from the author's exposition is a 
picture of several competing forces-state, communists, nationalists, teachers' 
union, and several Islamic groups-struggling to influence the shape of 
educational policies. 
The Hadiz-Dhakidae-edited volume cited above also contains a number of 
notable articles that fall into this category. Nugroho's (2005) 'The Political 
Econonomy of Higher Education,' Gahnie-Rochman and Achwan's (2005) 
"Inclusion and Exclusion," White's (2005) 'Between Apologia and Critical 
Discourse' and Farid' s (2005) 'The Class Question in Indonesian Social Sciences' are 
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notable examples. All these articles discuss the dynamic interface either between 
the interests of the state and those of the non-state actors or between different 
groups of non-state players. 
Of equal significance are the books of Phillips (1998), Nash et al (1997) and 
Boyd (1997), which, respectively, deal with the battles for history in the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Spain. They, especially Boyd, all discuss in fine 
detail, the different interests and strategies adopted by different stakeholders in the 
debates to influence the shape of the national curricula. Echoing the view of the 
other two, Boyd argues that rather than a clear mirror of a dominant ideology in 
the society, schooling is a battleground for competing forces. 
What differentiates the first (statism) from the second approach (pluralism) is 
the extent to which it recognises the influence of the state and the non-state groups 
in shaping educational policies or historical knowledge. Statism emphasizes more 
heavily the role of the state whereas the latter focuses on the multiple sources of 
influences. In both approaches, the roles of individuals seem ignored. What is 
emphasised is the process of knowledge production at the top or middle level and 
there seems to be an underlying assumption that what gets transmitted to or 
consumed by the general public is largely similar to what was produced at the 
upper-middle level. These approaches have their own usefulness. No doubt there 
are many cases when the role of the state and groups in civil society is paramount. 
However, these could also be problematic for downplaying the power of 
individuals to make a difference. The third approach aims to address precisely the 
problem. 
The third approach, which I call personalism, pays particular attention to 
how knowledge is actually consumed in public. This approach recognises the 
important roles of individuals in the analysis of knowledge production. One good 
example of this is Parker's (2002) 'The Subjectification of Citizenship: Student 
Interpretations of School Teachings in Bali.' By using various anthropological 
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techniques, Parker was able to demonstrate that "the process of creating national 
citizens in schools was, despite the homogeneous and authoritarian nature of the 
school system, an open-ended and potentially transforming one" (2002, 3). This 
study is particularly important as a corrective to the common tendency to deny 
individual students agency in the face of the seemingly monolithic school system 
in an authoritarian state such as Indonesia. That it is possible, even likely, to 
'subjectify' citizenship in a fairly controlled environment indicates that individuals 
should not be neglected in the analysis of knowledge production. 
Certain types of memory studies that have become very popular in the past 
two decades also exemplify the third approach. The idea of memory as a 
counterweight to history is underpinned by the recognition of the importance of 
the actual consumption of knowledge in the analysis of knowledge production.30 It 
also allows the shifting of the locus of power from the visibly powerful- such as 
the state, the elite, or varipus interest groups-to the individual knower. The 
notion of collective memory, while problematic, is also often invoked and in effect 
it expands the utility of the concept beyond individuals.31 In this case, however, I 
think this should be classified under the second approach which is better equipped 
to address the question, "Whose collective memory?" 
There is extensive literature on the memory-history interface.32 This cannot 
be said however of the case of Indonesia and the Philippines where, as far as I am 
aware, there are only a handful of studies.33 One good example for the case of 
Indonesia is the volume edited by Zurbuchen, Beginning to Remember: The Past in 
the Indonesian Present (2005), a collection of essays on various facets of the subject. 
One thing that is noteworthy in the volume is the simmering tensions between the 
30 By consumption, it refers to actual use of knowledge as may be manifested in one's beliefs or behaviours 
which are in accord to what one knows. Mere possession or acquisition of knowledge is not enough. It is 
just the initial stage. 
31 For a survey of the place of memory in historiography, see Chapter I of Patrick Hutton, History as an Art 
of Memory (1993, 1-25). 
32 For a comprehensive review, see Jeffrey Olick and Joyce Robbins (1998). 
33That is if we exclude the enormous quantity of personal recollections, autobiographical and biographical 
accounts published in both countries. 
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contributors who are dubious of and those who are amenable to the idea of 
elevating memory to a position side-by-side with history. Another is the uneasy 
relationship between individual and collective memory.34 
Another notable work that falls under this category is Budiawan's 
Mematahkan Pewarisan Ingatan (Breaking the Legacies of Remembrance)35 (2004). It 
addresses the difficult question of how reconcialiation between the perpetrators 
and the victims of the mid-60s mass killings in Indonesia might be achieved within 
the context where different groups or individuals are consuming competing or 
contradictory memories of the events. 
The first three approaches identified above are notable for addressing the 
question of who has the power to determine or influence the shape of knowledge. 
Equally noteworthy is that in these approaches it is taken for granted that 
knowledge is a handmaiden of power-something that the powerful uses to 
advance their own interest and something whose shape or character reflects those 
interest. In these approaches, the possible autonomy of knowledge as itself having 
power is not recognised and this lack of recognition necessarily limits the range of 
knowledge-power interaction that may be scrutinised. Another approach is, 
therefore, necessary. 
Aiming to address the limitations noted above, the fourth approach has 
been formulated. This approach may be called mutualism and it draws primarily 
from Foucault, in whose formulation, power and knowledg~ are reciprocal 
constructs whose relationship is that they presuppose and constitute each other. 
(Foucault 1980) In Discipline and Punish he declared: 'Power and knowledge 
directly imply one another ... there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose 
and constitute at the same time power relations' (cited in Simon 1995, 27). The 
reciprocal notion of power/knowledge presupposes a conception of power that is 
34 For a review of this book, see Curaming (2005c). 
35 The original title of the PhD thesis on which this book was based was 'Breaking the Immortalised Past.' 
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different from what we conventionally know (Pels 1995b, 1020). That is, the notion 
of power as coercive, negative and limiting, is common in the first, and to an extent 
in the second, approach discussed above. What Foucault was more interested in 
was the type of power that is creative, positive and liberating, which is often 
invoked in the third and also to an extent in the second approach. As a theoretical 
construct, Foucault's idea of power/knowledge exist on a conceptual plane and is 
useful in explaining how the things or the situations that we take for granted as 
given or natural-such as sexuality, madness, human nature, knowledge, power, 
body-are in fact historically contingent and are products of the complex 
interaction among various social forces. These insights provide the initial starting 
point for this study. 
What sets the Foucauldian approach apart from the three others is the 
conception of the role of the agents or subjects in the knowing process. The first 
three approaches are clear about this. The state or elite, the various interest groups, 
and the individuals are the agents or the subjects who use and produce knowledge. 
Foucault's concepts of power and knowledge, on the other hand, are non-subject, 
or non-actor based. As he told us, the subject is not the one who has power; it is 
power that makes the subject (Foucault 1980, 98). This anti-humanist stance tends 
to make Foucault's power-knowledge analytics self-refuting, which has serious 
epistemological implications. Once 'applied' in analysing empirical data, what we 
shall have is an untenable situation where power is exercised without an exerciser, 
or a knowing process (or knowledge) without a knower.36 Since this study deals 
with specific subjects such as scholars and political power holders - subjects who 
appear to 'have' power and to know willfully-Foucault's notion of subject-power 
relations can only be of limited use. 
36 For instance, he described genealogy as "a form of.history which can account for the constitution of 
knowledge ... without having to make reference to a subject ... " Foucault ( 1980, 117). 
16 
Another problem springs from Foucault's idea of knowledge as savoir (day-
to-day knowledge) as opposed to connaissance (developed knowledge)37 which sets 
the limits to the types of knowledge to which his power analytics may be 
applicable. I believe that a truly serious effort to explore fully the knowledge-
power interface requires that no type of knowledge or power should be exempted 
at the outset. It cannot be a priori assumed that one type of knowledge is power 
driven and others are not.38 
Many criticisms of Foucault emanated from the misunderstanding and/ or 
misappropriation of his knowledge/power analytics (Prado 1995, 71).39 As ably 
demonstrated by Dyrberg (1997, 85-115), Foucault's power analytics is more 
applicable to a higher-order type of analysis.40 How power is actually exercised on 
the ground or how it is acquired or distributed can be better dealt with by other 
theories or approaches (Ibid.) In this regard, the Foucauldian approach is closely 
allied to the whole poststructuralist, postmodernist project on at least two points: 
(1) through theoretical fiat they invariably tend to politicise all knowledge and 
knowledge production; and (2) they are more applicable to a higher-order type of 
37 Foucault regards psychiatry as a savoir because, he claims, of its 'dubious' scientific credentials. Organic 
chemistry and physics he considered as connaissance (Foucault 1980, 109). This suggests that just like 
Mannheim, he upholds asymmetry between 'soft' (social) sciences and 'hard' (natural) sciences in so far as 
the question of the influence of power is concerned. Such an asymmetrical approach is bound to meet 
epistemological problems that Mannheim himself was confronted with (See Dant 1991 ). 
38 This is the essence of symmetry. This term refers to the injunction to analyse all sciences, hard and social 
sciences (or all knowledge claims by implication) be they successful or not, good or bad, using the same 
yardstick. That mearts, avoiding the treatment of successful science by using the rational standpoint and 
explain away 'unsuccer.sful' science as being influenced by social forces. On the part 6fthe analyst it entails 
suspending a value-ridden evaluation of knowledge claims and instead focus on understanding the context 
in which a knowledge claim is made and used. Such a view is an extension of Mannheim's relationism 
(Kim 1994, 391 ), but this time it is closely identified with Bloor (1991 ). 
39 Prado notes that the notion of power/knowledge is often misunderstood as conflated or as identities. As he 
quotes Foucault: "The very fact that I pose the question of their relation proves clearly that I do not identify 
them." [italics original] (Foucault 1988, 43, as cited in Prado 1995, 71 ). See Nola ( 1994) as an example of 
one who misunderstood Foucault. 
40 By higher order analysis, Dyrberg means that Foucault wanted to demonstrate how power, for instance, 
come to be seen as power, as we understand and exercise it now. Foucault's denial of the subject is 
understandable in the light of his desire to eliminate all a priori assumptions about power (or anything). 
Making a knowing subjt:ct as a starting point will only favour one viewpoint over another (problem of 
relativism), thus precluding the possibility of knowing what forms of power enables 'objectivity' to be 
considered as preferable (See Appendix A for more details). As explained by Prado (1988), Foucault was 
not guilty of relativism, for it presupposed subject-object dichotomy, which Foucault rejected. 
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critique rather than for empirical analysis.41 Because of these reasons, my use of 
Foucault in this study is limited to three things: (1) as an inspirational starting 
point; (2) as a point of reference against which I consciously develop my own 
case; and (3) as a source of certain insights or ideas that are too useful to be 
ignored. 
Vis-a-vis the three other approaches, the relative strength of the Foucauldian 
approach is the weakness of the others, and vice versa. Whereas the latter is 
inclusive in the sense that it focuses both on knowledge and power as equally 
important sites of analysis, the three others put a premium on power to the neglect 
of knowledge. Likewise whereas the sites of power that the Foucauldian approach 
aims to deal with are expansive, the three other approaches focus on their 
respective domains that are restricted. On the other hand, in its inclusivity the 
Foucauldian approach seems hard pressed in dealing with nuances and 
differentiation-differentiation that can only be achieved and accounted for if the 
subjects or agents are recognised, as the three approaches do. An attempt to 
synthesise the two-inclusivity and differentiation-gave rise to yet another 
approach. 
The fifth approach that I will discuss here is best exemplified by Said in 
Orientalism. He drew inspiration from Foucault's power analytic~ but rejected its 
anti-humanist tenets. Rather than rejecting agents and subjects, Said emphasised 
their essential role in a political act, including knowledge production. In the case of 
Indonesia and the Philippines, the respective works of Philpott' (2000) and Ileto 
(1999) are very important. Inspired by Said and Foucault, these studies recognise 
the broader political context in which knowledge production WqS undertaken. At 
the same time they focus on how knowledge itself, as autonomously powerful, 
influences the behaviour or perceptions of the people. In other words, knowledge 
41 For a more detailed explication of this point, see my article "Towards Poststructuralist Southeast Asian 
Studies?" in Sojourn (April/May 2006) 
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is shaped by, and at the same time shapes, power relations between subjects or 
agents. 
This study builds on the foundation set earlier by the five approaches 
discussed above. Being a narrative and analysis of two state-sponsored history 
writing projects, it recognises at the outset the paramount power of the state (first 
approach, statism). However, in partnership with scholars who had different 
interests and as a controversial move that elicited discordant responses from the 
elements of the civil society, the two projects may also be considered as sites of 
power struggle (second approach, pluralism). Moreover, these projects having been 
done through a collective effort, under a varying degrees of restriction , the extent 
to which slippages-in the forms of fluid, inconsistent or even contradictory 
interpretations-are manifested in the final outputs may indicate the power of the 
individuals (third approach, personalism). On the other hand, the elements of the 
Foucauldian approach, the fourth approach, are best manifested in the mutuality of 
the relationship between knowledge and power that constitutes the fundamental 
starting point of this study. Finally, the fifth approach, the Saidian approach, will 
inform the analysis of how power relations between or among actors, groups, 
institutions and ideas get constituted. 
This study also aims to go beyond the reach of the five approaches 
discussed above, both in terms of differentiation and inclusivity. Wide as the reach 
of the five approaches may be, they nevertheless seem to have not yet fully 
mapped out all important sites of power play. What they miss are'the scholars and 
scholarship itself. Considering their central role in knowledge production <:md 
adjudication-being in Bauman's (1987) words the "legislators" and "interpreters" 
of knowledge-any analysis would be incomplete without them in the equation. 
Ileto and Philpott came close with their emphasis on the political act that seems 
inherent in scholarly institutions and scholarly practice, but they prove not close 
enough. One proof of this is that while they expose and bewail the political nature, 
what they call Orientalism, of the American scholarships on Indonesia and the 
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Philippines, they seem oblivious to the political nature of their own critique. They 
seem to have been infected with the /1 all-other-scholarship-except-mine-is-
political" syndrome. 
Bourdieu's stance is perhaps even more instructive of this syndrome. His 
field theory of science provides an illuminating explanation for the behaviour of 
the scholars. As interpreted by Vandenberghe (2000, 58), Bourdieu's theory posits 
that, 
The struggle that scientists wage within the field is always a struggle for the 
power to define the definition of science which is best suited to their specific 
interests which, if accepted as the legitimate definition would allow them to 
occupy with legitimacy the dominant position in the field. And given that there 
is no external and impartial arbiter, the scientific-cum-political legitimacy 
claims are always a function of the relative power of the competing groups. 
Bourdieu did not operate on the idea of power/knowledge, neither was he 
fond of the use of the term power (in the way defined here) as a starting point for 
explaining the apparently self-serving behaviours of the scholars. But his idea of 
capital (cultural, social, intellectual) could be another term for power, as an ability 
to make a difference. If Bourdieu' s views about the interests of intellectual are 
correct, then the persistence of the /1 other-scholarship-except-mine-is-political" 
syndrome along with the disavowal of relativism and, more so, its extreme form 
nihilism, can be explained with reference to the scholars' class42 interests. What 
they cannot reject on logical and epistemological grounds, they reject on the basis 
of veiled politics couched in moral and scholarly terms. As Bourdieu aptly puts it, 
it is in their interest to be seen as disinterested; it is in their politics to appear to be 
anti-political (Bourdieu 1976, 94 as paraphrased in Vandenberghe 1999, 57-58). 
If Bourdieu' s declaration has a very disturbing implication for scholars and 
scholarships, he is seemingly not disturbed enough. The reason is that he takes a 
42 The notion of class in Bourdieu is different from Marx's, but has similarities with that of Weber and 
Durkheim. In Bourdieu, a class is not economically based. Roughly, it refers to a loosely classified grouping 
that share common attributes owing to similarity in jobs, in interests, or perhaps sharing the same 
geographic space. 
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direction opposite to his ideas' most logical conclusion. Rather than conceding the 
possibility that all scholarly acts, including his own and science itself, may be 
political acts, his call for a reflexive sociology43 signifies and entails the need for 
more science as an antidote to what Pels calls "knowledge-politics" (Pels 1995a). In 
Bourdieu's view, "science is one way of constructing alternative categories of being 
that can serve as an exemplar of transgressive practices both inside and outside 
academia."44 Such a position has some merit. If science (or knowledge in general) 
nas been instrumental in setting restrictive and oppressive limits to the freedom of 
individuals (what Bourdieu call symbolic violence), then it is also the way to 
neutralise these restrictions and regain freedom. Ultimately, however, I think his 
proposal is misleading and unsatisfactory in that it re-inscribes through denial the 
power of the scholars and scholarship as the glue that creates the insidious 
partnership between knowledge and power. What makes the partnership between 
knowledge and power potentially dangerous is the aura of credibility that the 
unrecognised power of the scholars and scholarship lends to knowledge claims 
(Bauman 1987).45 Bauman further argues that the scholars and scholarship, as 
embodiments of objectivity or impartiality of knowledge, are often unwitting 
accomplices in reproducing and maintaining an unjust social order, which is 
constituted and justified through authoritative knowledge (1987, 13-20; 1992).46 The 
seductive appeal of history to leaders such as Marcos is rooted in this capacity of 
knowledge. 
43 By reflexive sociology, he means "systematic objectivation of the field as the totality of the possible 
standpoints ... and their corresponding viewpoints ... which he opposes to the partial and interested 
objectivations of the agents involved in the field 'allows one to establish the truth of the different positions 
and the limits of validity of the different standpoints."' (Bourdieu 1997, 38-39 as cited in Vandenberghe-
1999, 60). 
44 This is Schubert's interpretation of Bourdieu (1984, 1988) (Schubert 1995, I 010). 
45 According to Zygmunt Bauman (1987, 17-18), the "asymmetry of power, as factor in the structure of 
domination ... is served by concepts ... coined, or refined, or logically polished, not by the dominating side of 
the structure as a whole, but by the intellectual part of it ... Any claim to domination and superiority 
must ... pay tribute to the very factors on which the intellectuals ground their power claims." 
46 Schubert (1995, 1011 ), for his part, claims: "The emphasis on evidence in scientific research is inherently 
conservative, especially in the social sciences. By virtue of the fact that it is dependent upon the categories 
that allow for its existence, this emphasis tends to support and reaffirm the social and scientific status 
quo ... (T)he dictum 'the data suggest' masks all the discursive activity and political contestation that go into 
constituting the 'data' as an agency of knowledge or insight. .. (l)t censures other ways of truth telling." 
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Bourdieu, however, seems to deny the potential danger that inheres in any 
authoritative knowledge, and such danger precisely lies in the power embodied in 
scholars and scholarship. Suggesting more science as antidote to the problem 
created by science in the first place puts Bourdieu' s reflexive sociology in a vicious 
circle. It might end up solving problems that it in itself creates, and so the process 
goes on and on. For that, I consider Bourdieu as a good example of a scholar who, 
by failing to admit and be willing to give up the symbolic power that inheres in 
any scholarly practice, evades reflexivity's full requirement. He enjoins everyone 
but himself to fulfill this requirement, and he exonerates science and the attendant 
interests of the scholars as the primary source of the problem that in the first place 
gave rise to the need to be reflexive. Vandenberghe (2000, 60) aptly pointed out 
Bourdieu' s paradoxical position: " .. .if his move is not a polemic but a reflexive 
one ... how can he have access to the position of 'impartial spectator/ observing his 
own observation and those of others, seeing what they don't see and maybe even 
what he doesn't see." The key, it seems, is to bring the knowledge-power nexus to 
its ultimate conclusion by laying bare the nature of scholarship as an autonomous 
field of power. This is the direction to which this study points. 
Let me give another illustrative example. Perhaps as effectively and 
painfully as Bourdieu, Pels (1996b) embodies what I call the 'scholar's primal fear' 
that prevents the knowledge-power nexus to be taken to its full conclusion. Pei's 
case is very instructive because his views reflect the anxiety that animates debates 
among scholars in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), t~e field that has 
been in the forefront of pushing the frontiers of the sociology of knowledge. In his 
article 'Politics of Symmetry,' (Pels 1996b) he castigates scholars who progressiv-ely 
radicalised the requirement of epistemological symmetry as applied in the SSK.47 
47By symmetry it refers to the injunction to analyse all sciences (or all knowledge claims by implication), be 
they successful or not, good or bad, using the same yardstick. That means avoiding the treatment of 
successful science by using a rational standpoint and explain away 'unsuccessful' science as being 
influer.ced by social forces. On the part of the analyst it entails suspending a value-ridden evaluation of 
knowledge claims and instead focusing on understanding the context in which it is made and used (See Pels 
I 996b ). Such a view is an extension of Mannheim's relationism (Kim 1994, 391) , but this time it is closely 
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Convincingly, he exposes the pretensions to disinterestedness of these scholars and 
argues that the supposedly 'value-free relativism' they propound and their very act 
of pushing for it are intricately woven in the knowledge-political domain where 
they are located48 (Ibid., 284, 294-295). Latour, who blurs the boundary between 
human beings and things and between society and nature, and whose antipathy 
towards sociologism is well-known, is chided by Pels for collapsing politics and 
science together (Ibid., 293). Despite conceding that science (or knowledge in 
general) is a "form of politics 'continued by other means,"' Pels nonetheless 
rescues knowledge from the inevitable clutches of power and provides an 
unwieldy justification at the bottom line of which he re-inscribed the authority and 
autonomy of the scholarly class along with the veiled power of the scholars. In his 
words (1996b, 292-293): 
The abstract recognition that science is social, political and 'interested' through 
and through does not necessarily dictate a radical agnosticism concerning the 
boundaries of science and politics as a fonctionally-differentiated subsystems in 
the social division of labour ... (T)he scientific field is a field similar to others, 
and similarly subject to laws of capital formation and competition, but it is 
simultaneously a 'world apart' which obeys its own specific logic of 
fonctioning. 
Pel' s defence of scholarship is telling, and understandable if seen against the 
question of what may be at stake in the issue. This ambivalence dogs even the most 
famous among the poststructuralist scholars, such as Derrida and Foucault. They 
fully knew that knowledge and power are intimately linked but they seemed 
hesitant to reflect on, let alone accept, what it meant to their 'own position as 
scholars. In his review of Madness and Civilization, for instance, Derrida adro~tly 
refuted Foucault's attempt to exclude madness as a foundation for an attempt to 
form an alternative to Reason (Boyne 1990, 52-71). Many observers considered 
what Derrida did as a brilliant defense of philosophy against "unreason." 
Foucault's apparent subsequent acquiescence to Derrida's stinging rebuff 
identified with Bloor (1991 ), Barnes (1976), Law (1986), Latour (1986) and others collectively known as 
proponents of the Strong Programme in sociology of scientific knowledge. 
48 Pels is obviously following Bourdieu on this point. For Pei's discussion of Bourdieu, see Pels (l 995a). 
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reinforced the point (Ibid.) The debate was of course highly philosophical in 
nature but, as explained in details in Appendix A, Derrida's point cannot be 
upheld outside the confines of power relations that underpin the supposed 
neutrality and autonomy of the scholarly class. 
Aside from the self-interests of the scholars, there are other possible reasons 
for the hesitance to bring the knowledge-power nexus to its full conclusion. One of 
these is methodological in nature-that is, the distance or indirectness of the 
interaction between the embodiments of knowledge and power that scholars have 
utilised as objects of their analysis. In Ileto' s and Philpott' s case for instance, as in 
the case of Said, they extrapolated knowledge-power relations from the 
supposedly perceptible discursive formation around what they consider as 
hegemonic texts. Such a discursive regime was thought to be an epiphenomenon of 
the complex, socially constituted power relations. At best under such conditions, 
the link between knowledge and power can only be established through inference 
and indirection. The same is the case with Foucault who studied psychiatry, 
medicine, penology and other fields. The 'visibly' powerful, such as political 
leaders, are not directly part of the equation. What they focused on, in other words, 
was how positive or creative power, in Foucault's terms, operates. What seems 
necessary is to see a case where the actors involved include both the 'visibly' 
powerful, and the surreptitiously powerful such as the scholars. In other words, 
what happens when positive (restrictive, coercive, limiting) and negative (enabling, 
productive and liberating) powers meet and interact? This is what this study aims 
to explore. 
The cases of Tadhana and SNI seem particularly instructive because of the 
proximity and intimacy of the interaction between embodiments of knowledge and 
power, both positive and negative, that can be glimpsed from these cases. In a 
laboratory of the knowledge-power interface, I doubt if there can be a better 
representative of power than a dictator such as Marcos; of knowledge than the 
independent-minded historians such as Sartono and Salazar; and of merger of 
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knowledge and power than a figure such as Nugroho Notosusanto. They are the 
main protagonists in the story and analysis that will unfold in the following 
chapters. The interactions among them are direct and quite intimate and their 
motivations were closely interlinked. Such a combination promises a clearer look 
into how knowledge and power actually interact. If the mechanism that allowed 
scholars and scholarship to hold their own in the face of politically motivated 
pressures can be explicated, if the actual manners by which the two sides clash, 
fuse, reinforce, restrict or constitute one another can be elucidated, it may generate 
insights that have far-reaching implications on how we theorise the knowledge-
power relations. Since the question of the knowledge-power relations is central to 
the epistemological foundation of scholarship, what is at stake here is of 
considerable importance. 
The two history-writing projects that are the primary focus of attention in 
this study took shape in two Southeast Asian countries that are comparable, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. The projects germinated at about the same time and 
under the auspices of two authoritarian regimes that shared some fundamental 
similarities. Despite similarities, however, there were also essential differences in 
the context within which the two projects emerged. These included the patterns of 
colonial experience that had a bearing on the character of the two countries' 
nationalism and the trajectory of state-formation vis-a-vis the development of the 
historical profession. As these are essential for understanding the features of the 
two projects, these will be discussed in the next chapter, Chapter 2 .. 
The formation and the content of, and the responses to, the two projects \\'ill 
be the focus of the succeeding four chapters. Chapter 3 will narrate the story of 
how the Tadhana Project came into being. It will start by looking at the 
circumstances leading to the inception of the project. It then identifies the 
motivational forces for Marcos and the scholars to forge a partnership that 
produced it. Moreover, snapshots of how the project was carried out will be 
provi_ded. The aim is to demonstrate the dynamics of the relationship among the 
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actors involved in the project. Being both a political and a historical project, the 
political and the historiographic context within which the project can best be 
analysed will be discussed in Chapter 4. The 'objective is to explain how the 
interests of the scholars and those of Marcos complemented or reinforced each 
other, and how they fitted into the broadly defined existing socio-political and 
academic order. The contents will be scrutinised to demonstrate the way how 
complementarity or congruence was achieved and the extent to which these 
reflected the interests of the state and/ or the scholars. 
The case of the SNI will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Paralleling 
Chapter 3, Chapter 5 will recount the process that gave birth to the SNI from the 
moment of its inception up to the reaction of the public to its publication. Chapter 6 
will focus, just like chapter 4, on the political and historiographic context that 
makes the structure and the contents of the project intelligible. 
A synthesis of Chapters 3 to 6 will be carried out in chapter 7, highlighting 
the similarities and the differences in the features and in ways various actors and 
factors interacted in two projects. The main idea is to help map out the range of 
possibilities by which knowledge and power, and their respective embodiments, 
interrelated. It is also important to identify particular combinations of factors that 
gave rise to different forms of interaction. 
The concluding chapter will provide a summary of the main arguments. It 
will suggest some key ideas which may have important theor~tical and ethical 
implications. It will also identify some areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONTEXTUAL COMPARISON 
Indonesia and the Philippines are the same enough to be put together 
but different enough to make comparison interesting. 
-Robert Pringle (Indonesia and the Philippines, 1980) 
For a Filipino like me, living in Indonesia for the first time could be a shock of recognition.1 Filipinos and Indonesians do not just look the same. They do not just speak languages that are related. They also laugh at the same 
jokes; enjoy the same tacky ghost stories and mushy melodramas; and share the 
same propensity for religiosity and fatalism. Laid back life they love to live; they 
both seem to have an amazing tolerance for time 'wasted,' poverty, injustice and 
inequality. Despite a long history of religious and colonial differentiation, there are 
uncanny similarities in how they view and enjoy life; how they relate to people; 
how they bear suffering. I did not really feel far from 'home.' 
There were also some impressions of difference. One that stood out was the 
sense of nationalism among the Indonesians. Growing up in an environment where 
nationalism was at best confused, I felt that Indonesians were at ease with their 
nationalist sentiments. It seemed as natural and clear cut to them as it was 
contrived and ambivalent in me. It appeared that the 'nationalist project' in 
Indonesia has been more successfully accomplished than in the Philippines,2 
1 The first time I had a chance to live in Indonesia was in 2001. I stayed in Yogyakarta for I 0 months, with 
intermittent trips for days or few weeks to Jakarta. 
2 There is a tendency to confuse the intense anti-colonial nationalist expression of the Filipino intelligentsia 
with the strength of Philippine nationalism itself. Wurfel's observation as follows is typical: "The 
Philippines ... has since independence enjoyed a national cohesion greater than that found in the most 
postcolonial states." David Wurfel, The Filipino Politics ( 1988, 24 ). However, if we take a look at the 
Philippine nationalism as a whole, from the viewpoint of the common people, we may realize that what lies 
beneath the vocal and passionate anti-colonial, anti-American rhetoric is a reality that such rhetoric sought 
to efface. It may be an aspiration whose intense expression corresponds to the depth (and breadth) of the 
roots of its opposite. 
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notwithstanding the greater geographic and demographic challenges, and the 
greater ethnic diversity in Indonesia than in the Philippines. If my impressions 
were correct, I am sure there is a complex set of explanations for these. For 
similarities, ecology may be one factor. For differences, the contrasting patterns of 
their colonial experience that ultimately influenced the character of their 
nationalisms may have played a role. Pringle's observation seems to be apt: 
"Indonesia and the Philippines are the same enough to be put together, but 
different enough to make comparison interesting"(1980, 1). 
Given the wide array of pertinent comparative features of the two countries, 
I will focus on only three points that I think are most relevant to the narrative and 
analysis in the subsequent chapters. These are: (1) patterns of colonisation and the 
responses to it; (2) state-formation and state-society relations; and (3) patterns of 
development of nationalist historiography and the historical profession. A general 
background will precede discussion of these points. 
Background 
Indonesia and the Philippines are two archipelagic countries in Southeast 
Asia. Looking at the map, together they form a porous boundary separating the 
region from the vast seas of the Indian and Pacific oceans. Along with Malaysia, 
these countries constitute perhaps the most comparable subset irt the region. They 
comprise what is often called the Insular Southeast Asia. They share the same 
geographical zone with a tropical climate that nurtures broadly similar vegetation, 
topography and culture. People whose languages belong to the same Malayo-
Polynesian group and whose physical features are largely similar populate th~m. 
Just by looking at them, one group could be mistaken for another. Were it not for 
colonisation3 that saw the Philippines falling under the control of the Spaniards 
and later the Americans, Indonesia under the Dutch and Malaysia the British, a 
'pan-Malay' nation would have not been an impossibility. Alternatively, numerous 
3 As Elson (2004, 28) puts it: "The colonial period created, directly and indirectly, a fundamentally new 
Southeast Asia, one with a fundamentally diminished sense of regional identity and belonging." 
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nationalities with boundaries conforming more closely to the logic of geography 
would have taken shape.4 The fact that three different Euro-American countries-
with contrasting policies, length presence and depth of impact-colonised them is 
a ground for a potentially fruitful comparison. 
The trajectory of their more recent experience is also comparable. Both 
Indonesia and the Philippines fought anti-colonial revolutions that set the keystone 
for the master narrative of their nationalist imaginations. The Second World War 
played an important part in their nation- and state-building efforts. The experience 
under the Japanese occupation inflamed or radicalised the two countries' 
nationalisms and cast a long shadow over the political developments in the 
succeeding decades. Of equal importance, both countries gave rise to communist 
movements that were among the most active in the Third World.s Moreover, both 
have undergone 'democractic experiments,' dictatorial rule, expelled their dictators 
and had to negotiate a difficult democratic transition. There were differences of 
course in the timing, the extent, the modalities, the impact, and the dynamics of 
how these features or events actually played out. Such differences make 
comparison all the more potentially insightful. 
One stark difference lies in religion. About 80-90% of the Filipinos are 
Christians (the great majority are Catholics) while about the same figures are 
Muslims in Indonesia. Just like the Muslims in Indonesia, the Christians in the 
Philippines are highly fragmented. Various Protestant and Filipino-church groups6 
compete/ d with Catholicism for constituencies. The fact, however, that the 
Catholics comprise a huge majority makes a difference. Unlike the Muslim 
majority who were divided along orientational, if not doctrinal, lines (abangan and 
santri, modernist and traditional) and were comparatively more loosely organised, 
4 That is, Sumatra and Malay Peninsula could go together, Kalimantan and Sulawesi could form another, and 
so forth. 
5 For general treatment of communism in the Philippines, see Weekley (200 I) and Saulo ( 1990). For 
Indonesia, see van der Kroef(l965), Hindley (1964), Swift (1989) and Edman (1987). 
6 Examples are Iglesia ni Kristo (or Church of Christ) and the Aglipayan Church. The latter is more Catholic 
and the earlier is more Protestant in orientation, but neither admit their affinities to either. 
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the huge Catholic population stood under a unitary institutional presence of the 
Church. This is far from saying that the Catholics are a monolithic group,7 but their 
organisational oneness, backed by tradition, creates a reality-effect that further 
enhances the Church's long-standing enormous power. While Islam had for a long 
time been largely marginalised in Indonesia's political sphere, no aspiring head of 
state in the Philippines could take the Catholic Church for granted. Almost from 
the beginning, the tension continually brewed between the civil and the 
ecclesiastical representatives of the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines8 
(De la Costa 1969). Such tension remains a fixture in the state-church relations to 
this day (Youngblood 1990; Steven 2004). 
Patterns of Colonisation and Nationalist Responses 
It used to be considered that both the Philippines and Indonesia had 
undergone three centuries of colonisation. While subsequent qualifications 
shortened the period for Indonesia (Resink 1968), the same was not the case for the 
Philippines. The first Spanish expedition reached the area in 1521 and in 1565 the 
Spanish presence gradually began to take root, wide and deep enough. The Dutch, 
on the other hand, established themselves in Indonesia more slowly, on a 
piecemeal basis, depending primarily on their economic interests: Maluku and 
Batavia (Jakarta) regions starting from the early 17th century, the whole of Java in 
the 18th, a large part of Sumatra in the 19th and the rest in the early 20th century. 
The sheer length of time of the Spanish presence in the Philippines almost ensured 
a more deep-seated impact than was the case of the Dutch on Indonesia.9 
7 For a a concise and useful analysis of the multi-faceted character of the Philippine Catholic Church, see 
Barry (1999). 
8 This largely emanated from the structure of the colonial government. Unlike in other Spanish colonies 
where the Church was subordinated to the secular authorities, in the Philippines that was not the case. The 
Church representatives enjoyed paramount influence as partly consequent to the papal prerogatives agreed 
to by the king of Spain. 
9 Actually, there were only a few Spaniards in the Philippines. By 1840s, the number hardly exceeded 5,000 
out of the population of 5 million, and most of them were in Manila. However, the presence of only one 
Spanish missionary in a locality was sufficient to create a tremendous impact. See Corpuz ( 1957, 44 as cited 
in Side) 1994, 27). 
30 
There were, of course, other factors.10 The geographical characteristics of 
Indonesia-its enormous size and its being spread out in three time zones- made 
it so much less manageable or penetrable than the Philippines, which was not just 
considerably smaller, with land area less than one-sixth of Indonesia's, but was 
also more compact.11 Likewise, Dutch colonial activities being primarily focused on 
commerce, at least in the first two centuries, proved less intrusive to the culture of 
the indigenous population. It was not until the implementation of the Ethical 
Policy in the early 1900s that the socio-cultural life of a significant portion of the 
population was deeply affected.12 On the other hand, the missionary zeal of the 
Spaniards that resulted early on in the conversion of the majority of the natives 
ensured that the indigenous lowland cultures had been penetrated to their core.13 
Many are convinced that what made indigenous culture vulnerable to the 
onslaught of Spanish influences was the lack of cultural, material and political 
development in the Philippines before the coming of the Westerners comparable to 
those stimulated by the Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic influences in the case of 
Indonesia.14 The brand of Christianity that developed in the Philippines may have 
been infused with indigenous elements, as captured by the term "folk Christianity" 
(Phelan 1959). The fact cannot be denied, however, that it was predominantly more 
Christian than folk. 
10 For a comprehensive analysis of the process of national integration in Indonesia, see Christine Drake's book 
of the same title, published by the University of Hawaii Press ( 1989), specifically Chapter 2, pp. 16-59. See 
also Kahin's Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (1952, 1-36). 
11 The land-area of the Philippines is approximately 300,000 sq. km, compared with Indonesia's 1.9 million 
sq. km (and about 3 million sq. km of seas). There are about 7,000 islands in the Philippines while in 
Indonesia about 13,000-17,000 islands. 
12 The Ethical Policy was, in theory, an ambitious program in agriculture, education, infrastructure, health, and 
others areas undertaken by the Dutch starting in the early 1900s. One of the purported aims was to promote 
or improve the welfare of the colonised. 
13 This is with the exception of the Muslim communities in Mindanao. For a standard work on the Muslims in 
the Philippines, see Majul's book of the same title (1972). For the early process ofhispanisation, see the 
classic, John Phelan, Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses ( 1959). As 
Rafael's Contracting Colonialism has shown, however, such conversion cannot be assumed to be 
straightforward. 
14 In areas, for example, where the Muslims were already established such as Mindanao, it took the Spaniards 
hundreds of years before they could be subdued, in military terms. From the viewpoint of culture, both 
Spain and the US never really succeeded in colonising the Muslims. 
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Another main difference lies in number. The Philippines shares with only a 
few countries the experience of being under two western colonisers. What made 
the case of the Philippines quite distinctive were the length of time, the depth, and 
the ambiguity or the contrasting impacts of the colonisers. African countries such 
as Tanzania may have changed hands from one colonizer (Germany) to another 
(Britain) but the impact was nowhere near as sharp or unsettling as in the case of 
the Philippines when it passed from Spanish to American control. Given the 
different experience under the two colonial masters many Filipinos harbour 
ambivalent attitudes towards colonialism in general. The term 'binationalism' 
coined by McCoy (1981) may be helpful in describing this attitude. While Dutch 
colonialism has been almost unequivocally perceived in Indonesia as negative, the 
same cannot be said of the Philippines where the American colonial period and its 
legacies continue to be viewed by many with nostalgia and fondness.15 The 
ambivalence of the Filipinos towards their colonial experience resonates in their 
nationalisms (McCoy 1981; Abinales 2002),16 in educational policies (Gaerlan 1998; 
Doronila 1989),17 in political structures and practices (Owen 1975; Paredes 1988),18 
and even in personal views down to this day.19 
15 In 1971, for instance, a movement for "Philippine Statehood USA" easily gathered millions of members 
nationwide. (cited in Wurfel 1989, 26 and McCoy 1981, 61) For one of the reasons for the lingering positive 
reception among the Filipinos of American colonial project, see Patricio Abinales, "American Rule and the 
Formation of Filipino 'Colonial Nationalism,"' Southeast Asian Studies,39, 4 (March 2002). 
16 See Rommel Curaming, "Nationalist Discourses in the 20111 Century Philippine History Texbooks, 1900-
2000" MA Research Project, submitted to the National University of Singapore, 2001. 
17 The controversies on language policy, especially medium of instruction, are long-standing. For an incisive 
treatment of various related issues, see Gaerlan (1998) · 
18 The ambivalent character of Philippine democracy has been a topic of intense interest since the American 
period. See Hayden ( 1945) and see Abinales (2002) for an analysis of Hayden. 
19 Earlier, I carried out a study of the patterns of nationalist discourses discernible in Philippine history 
textbooks in the period 1900 to 2000 (Curaming 200 I). I have identified at least five streams of 
nationalisms: (I) mass nationalism; (2) colonial nationalism; (3) clerico-nationalism; (4) state nationalism 
and (5) indigenous nationalism. The term "mass nationalism" refers to the type of nationalism that 
champions the right of the common people for a fair share in the nation's power and wealth. It starts from 
the proposition that the real makers of history are the common people, and thus history must be seen 
through their eyes and they should be the beneficiaries of the fruits of historical change. This is often 
directed against the elite and the elite-controlled state and it is heavily influenced by Marxist ideology. It is 
also closely allied with anti-colonial radical nationalism. "Colonial nationalism," on the other hand, refers to 
a set of thoughts and practices that saw in the colonial experience - its legacies and consequences - sources 
of things advantageous for the whole nation. It is nationalist in the sense that the welfare of the whole nation 
takes precedence, and it is colonial, on the other hand, for its favourable recognition of the contribution of 
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The timing of the national revolution may have also contributed to such 
ambivalence. Whereas Indonesia saw independence after their revolution,20 the 
Philippines had to contend with the coopting and disarming policies of yet another 
coloniser soon after declaring independence from Spain in 1898. If after fifty years, 
an Indonesian scholar talked about the "heartbeat of Indonesian revolution" 
(Abdullah 1997), a Filipino counterpart grieved over an "aborted nation" 
(Quibuyen 1999). 
One of the Americans' disarming policies was the mass education program 
(May 1976, 1980). Figures put it that by 1920 nearly a million children received 
education in English and by 1938, it was twice as many (Steinberg 1987, 264-265). 
None among its contemporary Southeast Asian neighbors could surpass such 
figures. While such programs created generations of Filipinos forever grateful to 
the Americans in stark contrast with the painful memories of colonial experience 
under Spain, it also served as a breeding ground for nationalisms of varying 
shades. The emergence, for instance, of homegrown historians-educated during 
the American period-with very different nationalist temperaments as exemplified 
by Zaide and Zafra, on one hand, and Agoncillo and Constantino, on another, 
attested to the ambivalent impacts of American-sponsored education.21 The 
colonial experience. For a slightly different but related conception of 'colonial nationalism', see Anderson 
( 1983) and Abinales (2002). "Clerico-nationalism," on the other hand, refers to the brand of nationalism 
that emphasises the contribution of Catholicism in the development of the Filipino nation. This is closely 
allied to the colonial nationalism mentioned earlier and it has an uneasy relation with the radicalism of the 
Marxist-inspired mass nationalism. The state nationalism, on the other hand, refers to the type of 
nationalism espoused by the state for the purpose of justifying or strengthening its position of authority. In 
the case of the Philippines, it was most visible during the American period as well as during the Marcos 
years. And lastly is indigenous nationalism. It eschews colonial experience as pivotal to the development 
of Philippine nationalism. Instead, it tries to uncover or recover the 'truly Filipino' in the deepest past 
possible. 
20 According to Reid ( 1981, 153): "The major achievement of the Indonesian revolution was the creation of a 
united nation with an assured sense of its own identity and significance. The national idea has by 1950 
become an irresistible myth, sanctified by the blood sacrificed for it." 
21 The distinction between the two sets of historians will be discussed below. 
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American period, rather being a crucible of unity, produced still more potential for 
disputes over nationalism.22 
Indonesian nationalism is by no means monolithic. Just as in the Philippines, 
competing 'nations-of-intent' existed then as now (Cribb 2004).23 The primary 
difference lies in the distribution of power among the promoters of the competing 
visions of the nation. While the coalescing of forces allowed one dominant vision 
to emerge in Indonesia, subordinating others, that was hardly the case in the 
Philippines. Up to now, there is no one unassailable 'exemplary center' of 
nationalism in the Philippines. It is continually being disputed. A complex of 
reasons explains this but one factor is the ambivalent character of the Filipinos' 
colonial experience. 
Whereas in the case of Indonesia's nationalist movement, the "idea of unity 
has quickly acquired crucial symbolic value," (Cribb 1999, 16) and "cultural, social 
and ideological differences" did not hinder "enthusiasm for national unity" (Cribb 
and Brown 1995, 9), conflict and discord rocked its Philippine counterpart since its 
beginnings in the 1880s. In both cases the necessity of unity was certainly 
recognised but such a recognition did not as easily translate into a unified front 
against colonialism in the Philippines as was the case in Indonesia.24 The disputes 
between Rizal and del Pilar,2s the groups of Bonifacio and Aguinaldo,26 Mabini and 
~2 Before the American period, sources of disunity-regionalism and socio-economic class differences, etc.-
were already multi-layered. After the American period, another layer was added, and was more pernicious: 
the loyalty or fondness of many Filipinos towards their erstwhile colonisers. 
23 According to this article, the competing nations-of-intent identified in this article are the lslamist, the ·· 
communist, the developmental nationalist, the three strands that Sukarno wanted to synthesize into 
Nasakom, as well as that of the indigenous aristocracies and the mestizos (what he calls 'multi-ethnic 
nation-of-intent'). The visions of the latter two, and why they failed and are almost forgotten, are the focus 
of the paper. 
24 Indonesia may have been rocked by regional revolts in the 1950s but these revolts still mostly operated 
within the framework of the Indonesian nation, not as a subversion ofit. For a pithy explanation of the 
sources of unity of the Indonesian nationalist movement, see Cribb and Brown, Modern Indonesia, pp. 9-12. 
25 The dispute between the two reflected a division within the Filipino community in Spain during that time 
(late l 880s-early 1890s) 
26 This had to do with the struggle for leadership positions within the revolutionary movement, the Katipunan. 
It ended in the death of Bonifacio on the order of Aguinaldo. 
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the oligarchs27 are but a few early examples that have foreshadowed the continued 
and the continuing disputatious character of Philippine nationalism to this day.2s 
No sooner had the Americans come to the Philippines, for instance, than a number 
of Filipino elites, erstwhile very high-ranking officials in the revolutionary 
government, switched sides. The questions of who should be the national hero, 
Rizal or Bonifacio; what should be the medium of instruction, Filipino or English; 
whether to require the reading of Rizal' s writings in the schools, and a few others 
do not seem to have as sharp parallels as in the case of lndonesia.29 The division 
among the Islamists, the communists and other groups was of course serious and 
deeply rooted but time and again there emerged a locus of power capable of 
balancing, if not neutralising, such sharp divisions. Sukarno's adept, if ultimately 
fatal, attempt to synthesise the three competing ideologies of nationalism, religion 
and communism into Nasakom; the Pancasila; and the military' s decisive wiping 
out of the communists that smothered oppositions, did not have counterparts in 
the Philippines where competing interests co-existed, held only in tenuous 
equilibrium by a fragile balance of power. Despite the early beginning of 
Philippine nationalism, there was nothing comparable to Sumpah Pemuda3o or 
Pancasila, two important markers of Indonesian unity and nationalism. Marcos' s 
(1979; 1980) was the first attempt to propose what amounted to a Filipino ideology, 
but due to his unpopularity, it was dismissed as nothing but a self-serving ploy. 
27 Mabini was Aguinaldo's executive secretary, sometimes called the "Brain of the Revolution". In his 
apparently well-meaning effort to curtail the power of the oligarchs, he drafted a constitution wherein 
considerable power lay in the executive. This was vigorously opposed by a clique of landed elites who 
comprised the legislature. They were afraid that their interests might be jeopardised, and they looked down 
upon Aguinaldo as uneducated. 
28 Conflicts and rivalries were, of course, hardly absent in the case of Indonesia. Examples include the tension 
between the advocates of perjuangan (armed struggle) and diplomasi, but they did not undermine unity ii1 
the face of the colonisers in the same way as, say, the killing of Bonifacio and Luna. Another was between 
the communists and their enemies and between what Feith called the "problem-solvers" (or 
"administrators") and "solidarity-makers." (See his The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia 
( 1959). But then again, in the face of the colonisers they were less disunited that their Philippine 
counterparts. 
29 Feith's Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia presents a picture of sharp division and acute 
dispersal of power among the military, Sukarno and numerous political parties during the period 1950-1957. 
30 In 1928, in a congress attended by Indonesian students, a threefold declaration of one people, one 
motherland and one language. It became a landmark event in Indonesian history as one of the most 
important markers of unity and a symbol of Indonesian nationhood. See Foulcher (2000) for a fresh look at 
this event. 
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Thomas Megan in her PhD dissertation Orientalist Enlightenment (2002) has 
noted the 'peculiar' character of the earliest period in the development of 
Philippine nationalism. She argues that right at its very inception, Philippine 
nationalism was infused with a high level of cosmopolitanism that was difficult to 
find in many other colonial societies. According to her, whereas in many other 
colonial societies, the 'middle class' who led the nationalist movement were in 
between two poles, the colony and the metropole, Filipino nationalist leaders were 
in between multiple centers, which included Hong Kong, Japan, Germany, 
Belgium, France, etc. In her words: "They were not located between A (colony) 
and B (metropole), or even mediating between them, but instead travelling 
between multiple centers: not existing on the margins so much as existing in more 
than one place simultaneously" (2002, 4). This was made possible, according to her, 
by the fairly extensive travel experienced by these early nationalists (2000, 75-118). 
It exposed them to stimuli other than those in Spain and the colony and this 
afforded them multiple viewpoints that tamed the parochial tendencies of many 
anti-colonial nationalisms, including that of Indonesia. 
The idea of cosmopolitan nationalism as an explanatory template for the 
development of Philippine nationalism is of course preposterous. Metanarrative is 
in the mind. Conceptual order is always retrospective whereas historical processes 
are open-ended. However, as the Philippines has emerged in the 20th century as a 
'truly' global nation with more than 10 million (out of 85 million) of its people 
scattered in practically all corners of the world, this lends the idea of 
cosmopolitanism a heuristic value as an organising, as opposed to explanatory, 
principle.31 For the purpose of this study, it highlights the more than superficial 
roots of the fluid and multiple character of Philippine nationalisms. 
31 The process has accelerated since Marcos encouraged labour-export starting in the 1970s but it has been on-
going since the early 1900s when substantial numbers of Filipinos went to the US for various reasons. It 
could even be said to go back to the 1870s when many i/ustrados went to Europe in the wake of the Spanish 
crackdown following the mutiny in Cavite in 1872. 
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Viewed from the perspective of the development of Philippine nationalism, 
the degree of unity evoked among early Indonesian nationalists by the notion of 
"Indonesia" was quite remarkable. As observers have noted, 'Indonesia,' at least to 
the educated, was to the modern and the future what regional ethnic groups were 
to the feudal and the past (McVey 1996, 14). Subsuming the regional into the 
national in the Indonesian nationalist imagination did not prove as challenging as 
it was in the Philippines where regional loyalties persistently dogged nationalist 
efforts.32 Likewise, while the project of modernity in the Philippines was initially 
identified with nationalism just as in Indonesia, the American colonisation 
provided a much clearer vision and more tangible fruits of the modern. Whatever 
strength the promise of modernity could lend to the nationalist project, as in 
Indonesia, was dashed by the American colonial project. This is yet another 
illustration of the impact of having two colonisers. The cosmopolitan, the national, 
and the regional elements competed or co-existed in shaping Philippine 
nationalisms. 
State-Formation and State-Sociey Relations 
As postcolonial states, the process of state formation in Indonesia and the 
Philippines was largely influenced by their colonial experience. It is unclear to 
what extent the Indonesian postcolonial state built upon its predecessor, but there 
is no doubt about it in the case of the Philippines where governmental and other 
political structures-constitution, party-system, system of checks and balances, 
etc.-were unabashedly patterned after those of the United States. The explicit 
'trainir,g' in the 'art of democratic governance' that the Filipino leaders underwent 
within the colonial framework ensured this. 
In a contrasting fashion, Indonesia and the Philippines were declared 
independent after the Second World War. Whereas Indonesian leaders hastily did 
32 This is a continuing problem. In Cebu, for instance, there were times in recent years when the national 
anthem was sung in Cebuano rather than in Filipino. 
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so amidst confusion in 1945,33 the Filipino leaders took the mantle of leadership in 
1946 after being 'prepared' for it for decades.34 However, what happened to 
Indonesia in 1945 had a parallel in the Philippines. After declaring independence 
against Spain in 1898, also amidst uncertainties, Filipinos had to face the might of 
foreign conquerors. While the Filipinos fought against a new coloniser, their old 
colonisers confronted the Indonesians. Whereas the Indonesians held on to their 
independence after years of diplomatic and armed struggle against the Dutch, the 
Filipinos lost theirs (or they thought they had lost something they had yet to gain) 
and had to settle for decades of' democratic tutoring' under the Americans. The 
repercussions of this difference were far-reaching on the trajectories of the two 
countries' post-colonial political development, including nationalism, as pointed 
out above. 
One fundamental difference lay in the decolonisation process. Whereas 
Indonesia succeeded in divesting itself of many legacies of the colonial era - Dutch 
property ownership, political use of the native aristocracies, the Dutch language, 
among others- the neo-colonial relationship between the US and the Philippines 
lingered. As aptly described by McCoy, it was an "independence without 
decolonisation" (1981). The Americans maintained control of the vast plantations, 
military bases, mines, and businesses while the Filipino elites enjoyed preferential 
access to the American market. This set the frame that shaped the Philippine 
government's relationship with its American counterpart in the succeeding 
decades. Aside from the persistence of American popular culture and American-
flavoured education, not to mention the control of resources and territories cited 
above, the continued close collaboration between the two governments served· as 
33 In Ruth McVey's (1996, 14) words: "Indonesia's declaration of independence, instead of the high ceremony 
and ringing statement of goals that we might expect of a revolutionary state, was a bare announcement read 
before a few people, under the reluctant gaze of the Japanese." 
34 The promise of independence by the Americans was given early but was formalized in Jones Law of 1916. 
The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 stipulated that in preparation for eventual independence in 1946, there 
would be a 10-year preparatory period. After presidential election in 1934, the Commonwealth government 
was inaugurated in 1935. Aside from certain areas such as foreign affairs, finance and others that remained 
other the control of the Americans, the Filipinos were given free rein. 
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one of the fulcrums of the anti-colonial nationalist backlash.35 To the consternation 
of his critics, Marcos was able to surf on the wave of such a backlash and use 
nationalist rhetoric to justify his authoritarian rule, one clear example being the 
Tadhana project that is one of the objects of this study.36 
The roads to authoritarianism were different in the two countries. While 
both underwent forms of 'democratic experimentation,' the crucial difference lay in 
the length of time they spent on it. Whereas parliamentary democracy was 
crushed just years after it was tried in Indonesia in the 1950s, the Philippines had 
more time to develop democratic practices and institutions. The establishment of 
the Philippine Assembly in 1907, the Filipinisation as an offshoot of the Jones Law 
of 1916, the electoral practices that started early on, and the establishment of the 
Commonwealth government in 1935 all marked a gradual and progressive pattern 
of increased Filipino participation in the experiment.37 Within the 25 years after 
independence in 1946, the experiment seemed to be working, notwithstanding the 
'fiesta'38 character of the democracy that came out of such an experiment (Paredes 
and Cullinane, 1988; Anderson 1988; Golay 1998). In other words, by the time an 
authoritarian regime was installed with the declaration of Martial Law in 1972,39 
35 I specify that this nationalist sentiment is anti-colonial because in the Philippines, as explained in fn 16 in 
this chapter, there is a form of nationalism that is colonial. 
36 This will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
37 It must be pointed out that the pre-war years were characterised by the entrenchment of a small group of 
bourgeoisie and oligarchs as political elites in the Philippines. More importantly, this period was dominated 
by only two persons, Osmena before the 1920s and Quezon afterwards. Quezon had in fact showed a high 
level of authoritarianism that only Marcos exceeded later on. See McCoy ( 1989). Nonetheless, at least the 
trappings of democracy were there and the foundation of (a nominal) democratic system was laid. Elections 
for example were held in 1901(municipal),1902 (provincial), 1907 (Philippine Assembly), 1916 
(legislature) and in 1935 (presidential). Due to restrictive qualifications-literarcy and property 
ownership-the electorate was approximately limited to 1.3% of the population in 1907, I 0% in 1935 and 
15.1 % in 1946. See Jesus Manalili, "Historical Suffrage in the Philippines and Its Present Problems," PhD 
dissertation, University of Santo Tomas, 1966, as cited in Sidel 1995). 
38 Fiesta means festivity or festival. Fiesta democracy refers to democratic practices that may be ephemeral, 
skin-deep, or just for a show, such as voting during election time. It also refers to the atmosphere of fun and 
conviviality that accompany the electoral exercise. One example of this is the EDSA Revolution in 1986. 
While it was punctuated by gripping fears and tensions, there were aspects that appeared like a spectacular 
fiesta. In Vincent Boudreau's (1999, 11) words: "Filipinos moved from dictatorship to democracy with 
characteristic spectacle--color, music, emotion, and drama." 
39 For a comprehensive analysis, see Alex Brillantes, Dictatorship & Martial Law: Philippine 
Authoriatarianism in 1972 (1987). 
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the Philippines had already undergone about six decades of (at least nominal) 
democratic practice. This makes it easy for the dictatorial period between 1972 and 
1986 to appear an anomaly in the otherwise continuous evolution of the 
experiment. 
The authoritarianism of the New Order regime, on the other hand, was 
hardly an anomaly. In many respects it was a continuation of Sukarno's Guided 
Democracy and retained the feudal character of the traditional political culture as 
well as the autocratic features of the Dutch colonial government (Anderson 1983). 
If anything, the brief parliamentary experiment in the 1950s was the one that 
appeared anomalous within the broader historical scheme.40 Such a view is 
reinforced by the tendency of many Indonesian politicians since the Guided 
Democracy period to use this period as a metaphor for political chaos and 
ineptitude (Bourchier 1994; 1996, 255-256). 
Given the wider democratic latitude the Philippines had enjoyed for a 
longer period of time, it is not surprising that the state-civil society relations in the 
Philippines was more dynamic and confrontational, and the structure of power 
relations within the society more fluid and polyvalent (Headman 2001). Different 
interest groups such as labour unions, church organisations, political parties, 
professional associations and others had ample time to grow, acquire power and 
exert influence on the process, if not the outcome, of political struggles within the 
public sphere. Admittedly, Indonesia had similar experiences but its trajectory was 
arrested at a specific point.41 What happened in 1965-66 and the subsequent years 
proved to be pivotal. It installed the reign of terror that effectively put in place the 
resilient anti-communist "master narrative" that legitimated the use of 
40 Benda's thoughtful review of Feith 's book Decline of Constitutiona!Democracy in Indonesia and Feith 's 
intelligent response to it emphasise this point. (Benda, 1964/1982; Feith, 1965/1982) Anderson ( 1983, 482) 
for his part, suggested that the parliamentary form of government survived until 1957 because given the 
weakness of the civil bureaucracy and political parties, there was "no other form of regime (that) was 
possible" (emphasis original). 
41 For analysis of the dynamic interpenetration between the 'state'and the 'society' in Indonesia between 
1945 and 1965, see Anderson ( 1983, 480-486). This culminated in the 'triumph' of the state over the society 
as the New Order became entrenched (Ibid., 487-493). 
40 
"repressive measures geared to intimidate the citizenry" for an indefinite period of 
time (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005, 267, 270). This was followed by years of systematic 
mass indoctrination most clearly evident in programs such as Pendidikan Moral 
Pancasila (PMP, Pancasila Moral Education) and Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan 
Bangsa (PSPB, History of National Struggle Education) (Bourchier 1996, 227-263). 
Dissent could hardly thrive in such an environment. The lasting and deep impact is 
manifest in the much more difficult democratic transition that Indonesia 
experienced in the post-Suharto period in comparison with the Philippines in the 
post-Marcos years (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005; Hedman 2002). 42 
There is a prevailing perception that the New Order regime was more firmly 
grounded in authoritarian terms than the Marcos dictatorship (Boudreau 1999, 15; 
Abdullah 2005). That the Marcos regime tottered in early 1980s and eventually 
collapsed in 1986 whereas the New Order persisted until 1998 supports this view. 
On the whole, this is clearly the case. However, in the first five-seven years of the 
two regimes' existence, the period particularly relevant to this study, this may not 
have been so. The considerable strength and durability of the New Order regime 
rested significantly on a sudden reversal of fortune ("luck?") associated with the 
1965-66 events. That the communists were decimated hardly demonstrated an 
enormous power of the military or the emerging New Order. Perhaps the reverse 
was truer: the military and the regime became dominant because the communists 
were wiped out. As Ariel Heryanto (2006) vividly shows in his book State Terrorism 
and Political Identity in Indonesia, the strength of the New Order partly derived from 
the hyper-reality effect of its power, made possible by the overriding state of fear 
among the people-fear rooted in the events of 1965-66. 
42 Heryanto and Hadiz's article cited above provides an illuminating three-way comparison of Indonesia, 
Philippines and Thailand. In their view, the absence of events comparable to the I 965-66 events in the 
Philippines and Thailand makes democratisation Jess formidable. See also Hadiz (2003) for the case of 
Indonesia specifically. 
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Marcos, on the other hand, was able to install dictatorship on the basis of 
accumulated strength of will- and fire-power.43 Whereas the communists in 
Indonesia were disempowered by the sharp turn of public opinion in the days and 
months following 1 October 1965, which prevented them from putting up a strong 
opposition, Marcos faced throughout, from the 1960s to 1980s, a coalition of 
forces, including armed ones.44 This dictatorship was installed and maintained as a 
product of long, arduous, calculated and skilful manipulations of competing and 
complementary forces and interests. Hardly was there luck in it. If the New Order 
was empowered by the weakness of the opposition,45 the Marcos regime thrived 
despite strong and continued resistance. In other words, by the early-mid 1970s 
when the two history writing projects were carried out, the Marcos regime was 
more or less of equal strength as the New Order. As the 1970s wore on, however, 
Suharto's formidable rise contrasted sharply with Marcos' s continuous descent. 
Historiography and History Profession 
The early development of nationalist historiography closely followed that of 
the nationalist movement in general. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
nationalist historiography in the Philippines took shape earlier than in Indonesia 
considering that it was there where Southeast Asia saw the rise of the earliest anti-
colonial nationalist movement. Nationalist historiography here refers to a set of 
ideas and practices adopted by historians or history enthusiasts in their efforts to 
write history with the result, intended or not, of recognising or justifying the 
existence of a nation-state as well as of defining and/ or maintaining an identity 
deemed fitting for such a collectivity46 (Curaming 2005a, 62). 
43 For a comparison of the patterns of consolidation and resistance between the Marcos and Suharto regimes, 
see Boudreau (1999, 4-7). 
44 The Marcos Diary contains passages that show how worried Marcos was about the coalition of these forces, 
specifically entries for early January I 970. 
45 Sukarno and his hordes of loyal supporters, both civilian and military, were of course a formidable 
challenge. But the events of 1965-66 considerably disempowered Sukarno. With the communists 
neutralised, and Sukarno sidelined, the military and the regime did not have any effective opposition. 
46 Klooster, for his part, defines it as: " ... written for the purpose of cultivating love and esteem for the 
fatherland, by telling stories of common prosperity and adversity in the past from which the common fate of 
the nation through the ages must be evident. Once this common fate has been clearly demonstrated, the 
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As early as the 1880s, Propagandists like de los Santos,47 Paterno,48 Tavera,49 
Palma,5o delos Reyes,51 and more notably, Rizal, 52 produced pioneering works 
which constituted the earliest formulation of the nationalist interpretation of 
Philippine history (Thomas 2002, 147-178; Schumacher 1979). Some of their works 
were notable for the fairly sophisticated methods (by the standard of the time) 
employed in the synthesis and/ or analysis of data. Rizal' s Annotations of Morga' s 
Sucesos de Las Filipinas53 and Isabelo de los Reyes' s El Folk-Lore Filipino54 are good 
examples. Palma's Historia de Filipinas (1935), which may be regarded as perhaps 
the best one-volume survey of history of the Philippines in the first five decades of 
the 20th century (Agoncillo 2003, 26), is another. While none was a trained historian, 
they laid the foundations upon which future efforts at 'modern' nationalist 
scholarship would be built.55 
Indonesia would have to wait decades later for an at least nominally similar 
phenomena. Starting from the 1920s or 1930s, the germ of nationalist 
historiography was planted through the fictional writings or speeches of Yamin, 
Sukarno, Sanusi Pane and other nationalists (Klooster 1982, 54). The succeeding 
feeling of togetherness which emerges from it can be used also to safeguard unity in the future'(Klooster 
1982, 48). 
47 For an analysis of life and works of de los Santos see Agoncillo (2003). 
48 For a rare scholarly analysis of Patemo's works, Reyes (2006). 
49 For life and work of Tavera, see Ocampo, J. (I 959). 
5° For an appreciative assessment of the works of Palma, see Zaide ( 197 4 ). 
51 For a fascinating discussion of the career of lsabelo de los Reyes as a folklorist, see A~derson (2000). 
52 There are perhaps hundreds of books and articles analysing Rizal and his works. For a one-volume 
comprehensive and yet penetrating treatment ofRizal's writings, see Quibuyen (I 999). For article-length 
studies, see lkehata ( 1968) and Quibuyen ( 1998). Anderson expressed astonishment with Rizal's writings, 
especially the two novels, Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo. In his view, Indonesia would have to 
wait more than half a century, with the advent of Pramoedya Ananta Toer on the literary scene, for a 
comparable example (Anderson 2004, 99). 
53 For an in-depth analysis of this work, see Ocampo's ''Rotten Beef and Stinking Fish: Rizal and the Writing 
of Philippine History" ( 1998). 
54 See Anderson (2000) for an insightful analysis of this work. 
55 One decided advantage of the Philippines was that, in the words of Anderson, it "was the only colony in the 
nineteenth-century Southeast Asia to have a real university ... " (Anderson 2000, 61 ). This university was 
the University of Santo Tomas, run by the Dominicans, founded in 1611, starting conferring degrees in 
1624 and became a university in 1645 ("History of the University of Santo Tomas," 
http://www.ust.edu.phisitelinksiinsideust/geninfo/historv.asp, accessed on 13 June 2006) 
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decades of the 1940s and 1950s saw the publication of historical works56 whose 
hagiographic, overly nationalistic character prompted some observers to regard 
these as pre-scientific in methods and in interpretations (Klooster 1982, 47; 
Notosusanto 1965, 2). Perhaps Djajadiningrat's thesis in 1913 that critically re-
assessed the sources pertaining to the history of Banten stands alone in the period 
prior to the Second World War for observing 'modern' historical methods.57 The 
theme of this thesis, however, was at best tangential to nationalist historiography. 
In other words, whereas Filipino historians as early as the pre- Second War War 
era already had a foundation to build upon, their Indonesian counterparts had 
almost nothing. They had to "start from scratch," as Nugroho Notosusanto 
emphasized in 1965.58 
Historical studies following standard methods done by professionally 
trained Indonesian historians did not appear until after the establishment of 
history departments at the University of Indonesia (UI) and Gadjah Mada 
University (UGM) in 1950 and 1951, respectively,59 (Sejarah FIB UI 2004; Kompas 
56 See for example Yamin's 6000 Tahun Sang Merah Putih (1951) [6000 Years of the Red-and-White], and 
Gadjah Mada: Pah/awan Persatuan Nusantara (1953) [Gadjah Mada: The Unifoing Hero of the Nation]. 
57 Sartono Kartodirdjo regards Hoesein Djajadiningrat as the 'father' of modern history writing in lndonsia. 
See his Critische Beschouwing Van De Sadjarah Banten: Bijdrage Ter Kenschetsing Van De Javaansche 
Geschiedschrijving (Haarlem: Joh. Enschede en Zonem, 1913). What I consulted was the Indonesian 
version Tinjauan Kritis Tentang Sajarah Banten: Sumbangan Bagi Pengenalan Sifat-Sifat Penulisan 
sejarah Jawa(Jakarta: Djambatan, 1983). Nugroho Notosusanto has a different view. For him Abdul 
Pringgodigdo and Muhammad Yamin signal the beginning of modern Indonesian historiography. 
Notosusanto ( 1965, I). ' 
58 He claims that whereas the fields of law, medicine and technology had already made progress in the earlier 
decades of the 201h century, history was different. "Our study of national history has never been running;jt 
has just started to run" (Notosusanto 1965, 2). This observation is concurred with by Clifford Geertz's 
report published in 1971 on the state of the social sciences in Indonesia. Geertz ( 1971, 2) noted that in the 
first twenty years of independence, the focus of skill-building efforts was economics. All other social 
sciences were neglected. The Dutch scholars, of course, had done a good deal of work on history (See 
Abdullah, 1975: 89-95) but the absence of institutional mechanism for transfer of knowledge, as in the case 
of the History Department in the University of the Philippines, left the pioneer Indonesian historians with 
not much to stand on. 
59 
"Sejarah FIB UI." Fakultas llmu Pengetahuan Budaya, Universitas Indonesia (2004). 
http://www.fib.ui.ac.i(l/index I .php?id""View news&ct news"'27 (accessed on 18 May 2006). UGM's 
Department of History celebrated its 55111 Year anniversary in February 2006, which means it was founded 
in 1951. "Peringatan 85 Tahun Prof. Dr. Sartono Kartodirdjo: 'Mesu' Budi vs Ultraliberalisme, Kompas, 16 
February 2006. 
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2006) and after a number of Indonesians went abroad for graduate studies.60 In 
contrast, formal institutionalization of historical studies in the Philippines was 
accomplished much earlier, with the establishment of the Department of History at 
the University of the Philippines in 1910 (Apilado 1993, 90). Despite being the 
initial seat of of colonial historiography, it was also there where nationalist 
historiography germinated, nurtured and bloomed fully later on.61 
Indonesia produced its first professional historian only in 1956, in the 
person of Sartono Kartodirdjo. He is widely believed to be the first to obtain a PhD 
in history;62 he received it in 1966 from the University of Amsterdam. By the time 
the history writing project, the SNI, was underway in the early 1970s, there were 
only four PhDs of history in Indonesia but only two were of consequence in so far 
as Indonesian history writing was concerned.63 Aside from Sartono, the other one 
was Taufik Abdullah who obtained his PhD from Cornell in 1970. The case of the 
Philippines was vastly different in that before the Second World War, several 
Filipinos had already obtained PhDs abroad and there were even a few who 
obtained theirs £tom a local university, the University of Santo Tomas (See Table 
2.1). 
60 Examples are Sartono Kartodirdjo who studied at Yale and Amsterdam, Taufik Abdullah at Cornell, Prof. 
Onghokham also at Yale and the late Prof. Kuntowijoyo at Columbia. 
61 Two of the most important products of UP History Department during the American period were Gregorio 
Zaide and Teodoro Agoncillo. The clerico-colonial-nationalist orientation of the former and the radical 
nationalist tendencies of the latter are symbolic of the range of ideological orientations Filipino historians 
of this period assumed. The presence in the department of an American historian who was sympathetic to 
the nationalist cause, Austin Craig, may have provided an impetus for the early growth of nationalist ·· 
historiography within the strictures of the colonial framework. 
62 It is a common knowledge among Indonesian historians that Sartono was the first to get a PhD in history. 
Lie Tek Tjeng, however, graduated from Harvard in 1962 with specialization in Japanese history. Perhaps 
because his area is not Indonesian history, he is often forgotten by other historians. In the list made by 
Sartono ( 1963) in 1963, Lie Tek Tjeng was not included. 
63 The two others were Lie Tek Tjeng and Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro. The first finished his PhD (1962, 
Harvard) and wrote a dissertation about early modem Japanese history while the latter wrote about France-
Poland relations in the l 91h century (1968, Sorbonne). Abdullah (1975, 123, 156) These two are not 
particularly prominent within history, perhaps because their area of specialisation is not Indonesia. Lie Tek 
Tjeng did not take part in the SN! while M. D. Poesponegoro acted supposedly as one of the main editors. 
However, she served no more than a ceremonial function (to be discussed further in Chapter 5). 
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When the Department of History64 at the University of the Philippines 
opened in 1910, all members of the teaching staff were Americans. Two years later, 
the first Filipino historian, Conrado Benitez, was appointed. Progressively, more 
were appointed so that by 1920, all teachers in the Department were Filipinos, all 
with advanced degrees (or studying for them) from the Department or from 
abroad (Apilado 1993, 90-91). 
Table 2. 1 
Filipino and Indonesian Historians 
FILIPINO EDUCATION 
HISTORIANS 
INDONESIAN 
HI~TOJ{IANS ... 
EDUCATION 
~.\·" 
Fonacier, Tomas MA History ( 193 1) Sartono Kartodirdjo BA/Doktorandus - UI 
( 1888-198 1 ) 65 PhD History ( 1933) - Stanford ( 1921- ) (1956) 
MA- Yale ( 1962) 
PhD-Amsterdam ( 1966) 
Fernandez, MA History(l913)- u. Taufik Abdullah67 .ijA' -{JGM:·('l 96 l) 
Leandro ( 1889- Chicago ( 1936- ) MA.:.;;:eorrieU (1?67) 
1948)66 PhD History ( 1926) - MNPhD-Comell (1970) 
Columbia U. 
De la Costa, Horacio BA ( 1935) Ateneo Adrian Lapian BA/Dokt.- UI 
( 1916-1977)68 (VIA (Sacred Heart College) (1929- ) PhD - UGM ( 1987) 
Ph D History ( 1951) - Harvard 
Benitez, Conrado MA Social Sciences ( 1911) Ibrahim Alfian ·BA-UGM 
( 1889-1971 )69 J>hD Chicago70 (1915 or 1916) MA· 
PhD, ~UGM (1980) 
Alzona, MA History (1918) UP Djoko Suryo BA (1965)- UGM 
Encarnacion 71 MA History ( 1920) Harvard ( 1939- ) MA ( 1970)-UGM 
I'hD History ( 1922) Columbia PhD (1983)-Monash72 
Alip, Eufronio ( 1904~ .a,A (19i7) UP . ·.. .. :: Leirrisa, Riclif\id (!938,. B~(t965),'-Ut. · •i 
1976)73 .· . MA (1928) Uni. of Marilla A/~' ··M:;;to914);(fiJ.waii 
PhD (UST. .PhD (1990)~VI'4 • 
Agoncillo, Teodoro BA Philosophy (1934) UP Nugroho Notosusanto BA 
64 Initially, the Department of History was merged with Sociology and Economics. In I 917, they became 
autonomous units. (Churchill 1993, 11) 
65 J. Custodio, "Biographies of Historians: Fonacier, Tomas," PESS, Vol. 2, History, PNHS, pp. 143-4. 
66 F. Gealogo, "Biographies of Historians: Fernandez, Leandro" PESS, Vol. 2, History, PNHS, pp. 143. 
67 
"Taufik Abdullah: Sejarawan dan Peneliti," http://;vww.tokohinclonesia.com/ensiklopedi/t/taufik-
abdullah/bio~rafi1ir1dex.shtml (accessed on 12 June 2006). 
68 J. Custodio, "Biographies of Historians: De Ia Costa, Horacio," PESS, Vol. 2, History, PNHS, pp. 141-2. 
69 J. Custodio, "Biographies of Historians: Benitez, Conrado," PESS, Vol. 2, History, PNHS, pp.139-40. 
70 B.S. Salamanca, "State ofthe Art: The American Period," PESS, Vol. I, History, PHA, p. 32. 
71 M. Camagay, "Biographies of Historians: Alzona, Encarnacion," PESS, Vol. 2, History PNHS, pp. 136-8. 
72 
"CV Prof. Djoko Suryo," http://www.tanap.net/content/universities/counterparts.dh1? Article!D== 194 
(accessed on 11 June 2006). 
73 J. Custodio, "Biographies of Historians: Alip, Eufronio," PESS, Vol. 2, History, PNHS, pp. 135-6. 
74 
"CV Dr. Richard Zakarias Leirrisa," 
http://www.tanap.net'content/universities/counterpa1is.cfin? ArticlelI}0 225 (accessed on 11 June 2006). 
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FILIPINO EDUCATION INDONESIAN EDUCATION 
HISTORIANS HISTORIANS 
( 191'2-1935)75 MA History ( 1939), UP (I 93 1-1985) PhD ( 1978) Ul 
Ganzon, Guadalupe J3SE History ( 192,9) UP Onghookham BNDokt-. ui~ 1968 
(1908-1985)76 ~A Education (1940) UP · d933- ) PhD (1975)· Yale 
h;) History(l949) Stanford 
Zafra, Nicolas ( 1892- BA (1916) BSE (1918) Kuntowijoyo ( 1943- BA ( 1969) UGM 
1981 )'' MA History ( 1920) 2005) MA ( 1974) Connecticut 
PhD ( 1980) Columbia 
Zaide, Gregorio BA (l929)UP Merwati Djoened BA~ Stanford 
(1907-1986) MA History 093,1) UP Poesponegoro (1910- . MA- Connecticutt 
PhD History (1934) '-JST 7)78 •.PhD( l968f9-. Sorbonne 
>(U P~rts) · 
Foronda, Marcelino80 BA History ( 1950) UST Lie Tek Tjeng PhD (1961 or 1962) 
MA History ( 1951 ?) UST ( 1931- ?) Harvard81 
PhD History? ( 1954) 
Salamanca 
One indicator of the seriousness of the professionalisation effort was the 
opening of the MA in History program in 1916 (approved in 1915). By 1918, it had 
already produced graduates who would become important historians later on, 
such as Encarnacion Alzona and Nicolas Zafra (Apilado 1993). Teodoro Agoncillo 
and Gregorio Zaide, two of the biggest names in the Philippine history profession, 
were also products of the same program (See Table 2.1). Alzona went to the US to 
pursue PhD in Columbia University and she earned in 1922 the distinction for 
being the first Filipino woman with a PhD in history. She was well known for 
writing the critically acclaimed History of Education in the Philippines (1932) among 
other titles. She and Leandro Fernandez, who also did a PhD in Columbia and who 
wrote The Philippine Republic (1926), are considered to be the Filipino pioneers in 
employing 'scientific' history writing methods (Agoncillo 2003). The three others 
did not pursue further studies abroad but they nevertheless emerged among the 
75 1. Medina, "Biographies of Historians: Agoncillo, Teodoro," PESS, Vol. 2, History, PNHS, pp. 131-4. 
76 J. Custodio, "Biographies of Historians: Ganzon, Guadalupe," PESS, Vol. 2, History, PNHS, pp 144-5. 
77 J. Custodio, "Biographies of Historians: Zafra, Nicolas," PESS, Vol. 2, History, PNHS, pp. 152-3. 
78 From the blurb of the book by Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro, Tokoh dan Peristiwa Dalam Sejarah Eropa 
(Jakarta: Penerbit UI, 1988). 
79 Taufik Abdullah, "The Study of History," Social Sciences in Indonesia, Vol. I, edited by Koentjraningrat. 
Jakarta: Indonesian Institute of Science, 1975, p. 123. 
80 
"Directory of Contemporary Historians," PESS, Vol. 2, History, PNHS, p. 166. 
81 According to Abdullah (1975, 123) the year he finished was 1961. I checked the Harvard library catalogue 
and it indicates 1962. 
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most prominent and important historians for the period 1940-1980s, 
overshadowing many of the foreign-trained historians. This seems to suggest the 
quality of training they received from the local institutions. 
Again, the same thing cannot be said in the case of Indonesia. Most 
prominent Indonesian historians were trained abroad (at least partially), with the 
notable exception of Adrian Lapian82 (See Table 2.1). The local departments of 
history encountered difficulties in the professionalisation effort. A severe shortage 
of teachers plagued the two departments of history during the first decade of their 
existence; and the teachers were most mostly philologists and lawyers, not 
historians (Abdullah 1975, 123). According to Nugroho (1965, 3), both these 
departments were "(o)n the brink of being closed (for) lack of teachers." Students 
complained about the lack of courses offered due to acute shortages of teachers. 
Some students who were initially interested in history moved to Archaelogy and 
other courses because of the problem.83 While it was not as bad in the following 
decade, it was still bad enough to prompt Nugroho Notosusanto to complain in 
1965 that the lack of professionally trained historians remained an acute and basic 
problem. He put the problem this way: "It has been a vicious circle: we want to 
train a great number of historians because we now have too few; and because we 
have too few at the present time, we cannot train new historians as quickly as we 
should like to do" (Notosusanto 1965, 2-3). In Sartono's (1963, 26) article surveying 
the state of history profession in Indonesia in the 1960s, he described it as "still in 
(its) infancy." The purge of leftist historians in the wake of 1965 events further 
shrank the pool of already limited intellectual resources (Djoko Suryo 2005). Local 
universities did not produce their first PhD in history until 1977, in the person of 
Nugroho Notosusanto himself. Progress was slow from that point on. By 
82 Nugroho Notosusanto was also such an exce, but he studied for two years in SOAS, without getting a 
degree. Anhar Gonggong is another example. If his supervisor, Nugroho, had not diec\ in 1985, he would 
have received the PhD then. He was instead conferred the degree in 1990. 
83 That the history department at UI was struggling may be glimpsed from the account of Adrian Lapian 
(2005). He recalled that the department was almost non-existent then. Only through accident that he got to 
know of the 'existence' of the history program: when he read in a newspaper that Sartono Kartodirdjo 
would graduate as the first history major. See also Nugroho Notosusanto ( 1965, 3). 
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Nugroho's count, by 1980 there were six PhDs in history in Indonesia (Sinar 
Harapan 1980c) while Abudullah put the number at ten84(Kompas1980b). 
Professional organisations for historians were also established much earlier 
in the Philippines than in Indonesia. The Philippine National Historical Society 
(PNHS) was founded in 1941.85 A break-away group formed in 1955 another 
organization called the Philippine Historical Association (PHA). There has been 
both tacit and open competition between the two groups since then.86 Another 
group was formed in 1989 from among the members of the Department of History, 
University of the Philippines. It is called Asosayson ng mga Dalublzasa at may Hilig sa 
Kasaysan (ADHIKA) (Association of History Professionals and Enthusiasts). There 
were other small groups that were formed, but these three are the largest, the most 
active and/ or the most established. In Indonesia, their lone counterpart, Masyarakat 
Sejarawan Indonesia (MSI) (Association of Historians of Indonesia), was founded in 
1970. 
A number of contrasts between these organizations should be noted. 
Whereas its Philippine counterparts were either less dependent on or practically 
independent of the government, the MSI relied on the government for its 
sustenance. The Philippine Historical Association may have had a fairly close 
relationship with the government. Since its inception in 1955, the President of the 
84 It seems that Nugroho did not include Lie Tek Tjeng. The ones I can identify are only eight: Sartono 
Kartodirdjo (Amsterdam, 1966), Taufik Abdullah (Cornell 1970), Onghokham (Yale, 1975), Kuntowijoyo 
(Columbia, 1980), Nug:-oho (UI, 1977), Poesponegoro (Paris, 1968), Abraham Alfian (UGM, I 980) and Lie 
Tek Tjeng (Harvard, 1962). 
85 Smaller, less known organisations preceded the PNHS such as the one founded by Felipe G. Calderon in 
1905, the Asociaci6~ Hist6rica de Filipinas and the one established in 1916 or 1917 by Carlos Sobral and 
his group, the Sociedad Hist6rico-Geografica de Filipinas( Bauzon 1993, 93). 
86 For instance, when the Philippine Social Science Council initiated the Philippine Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences Project, it was quite odd that history would be allotted two volumes, whereas other disciplines had 
one each. One version was done by members of the PHA (Volume 1) and the other, by PNHS (Volume 2) 
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Republic was invited as an honorary president of the organisation. 87 However, the 
extent of its dependence on the state for sustenance was not as much as the MSI. 
Whereas the MSI held national conferences, funded by the state, only 
occasionally (1957, 1970, 1981, 1985, 1991, 1996, and 2001) in the Philippines almost 
every year, the PNHS, PHA and ADHIKA hold their own national conferences 
aside from a number of regional ones. 88 Most of these conferences were held with 
minimum financial support, if any, from the government. The bulk of the funding 
usually came from the registration and membership fees. 
In both countries, the government established institutional infrastructures 
specifically for promoting historical consciousness. In the Philippines, the National 
Historical Institute (NHI) was founded in 1972. It traces its history, however, to the 
Philippine Historical Research and Markers Committee established in 1933, which 
in 1936 was superseded by the Philippine Historical Committee. The basic function 
of these committees focused on the identifying, marking and safe-keeping of 
historic sites and antiquities. In 1967 this committee was replaced by the National 
Historical Commission. Another re-organisation took place in 1972 to form the 
NHI whose function was not just the marking and preservation of historic sites but 
also the active promotion of history through education, public campaigns and 
research (Gealogo 1993, 95). 
In Indonesia, there is the Direktorat Sejarah dan Nilai Tradisional (Directorate 
of History and Traditional Values) that is functionally similar to the NHL Unlike in 
the Philippines, however, there are other government agencies that promote 
historical research and public awareness. These include the Armed Forces History 
87 Esteban De Ocampo, "A Record of Achievement: The PHA, 1955-1975," Historical Bulletin, 4, 1-4 (Jan-
Dec 1975), pp. 332-333. See also G. Fabella, "The First Seven Veers," Historical Bulletin, 3, 1 (1963), pp. 
73-86. 
88 Since 1978, PNHS has held a regular annual national conference, aside from regional conferences. Since 
1958 when it held its first national conference, it held conferences regularly; not only national in scope but 
regional as well (De Ocampo 1975, 313). For instance, the five regional conferences in 1975 were held in 
Baguio, Cagayan de Oro, Tagloban and two in Manila (De Ocampo 1975, 324-330). In 1976, it was held in 
Dagupan, Lucena, Iloilo, Manila, Tuguegarao and Cebu (De Ocampo 1975, 317). 
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Centre, which does not have a parallel in the Philippines and a section of the 
Indonesian Institute of Sciences or UPI (specifically the former National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research, LEKNAS, and National Institute of Cultural 
Studies, LRKN) (Abdullah 1975, 139). The Armed Forces History Centre, founded 
in 1964, is by far the most active and most productive history-related institution in 
Indonesia having published about 50 books by 1972 (Abdullah 1975, ibid.). 
Conclusion 
While the Philippines and Indonesia share some broad similarities, there 
have also been considerable differences. The differences are particularly 
pronounced in the impact of the colonial experience, state-civil society relations 
and the development of the historical profession. In preparation for the narrative 
and analysis in the succeeding chapters, a number of points ought to be 
highlighted. First, the contrasting patterns of colonial experience in the two 
countries prefigured forms of nationalism that were more fluid in the Philippines 
and hegemonic in Indonesia. Such forms of nationalisms simultaneously 
influenced and were reinforced or affected by the shapes of nationalist history 
writing in the two countries. 
Second, the relationship between the state and civil society was far less 
constrained in the Philippines than in Indonesia. The polyvalent character of 
power relations in the former allowed a greater space for different interest groups 
to operate. While centralisation of power in an individual or an institution was the 
norm in postcolonial Indonesia, the reverse, to an extent, was' the case in the 
Philippines. Marcos' s dictatatorship appears anomalous within the Philippine 
political matrix. The longer tradition of political contestation made opposition 
easier to mobilise. 
Third, the historical profession in the Philippines developed earlier and 
under a freer environment compared to that in Indonesia. By the time a strong, 
manipulative state emerged in the early 1970s with Marcos's declaration of martial 
law, the profession had already reached a relatively high level of advancement-
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advancement that would be tested in the historians' encounter with Marcos. Their 
Indonesian counterparts, on the other hand, had to to develop under the aegis of a 
restrictive state from the Guided Democracy era up to the New Order. To this day, 
they struggle for professional respectability, something that its Philippine 
counterpart had already achieved decades back and which by the 1970s the 
historians already took for granted. 
Finally, while the New Order was, on the whole, more authoritarian than 
the Marcos regime, and thus was in a stronger position to impose what it wanted, 
this seemed not to be the case in the early to mid 1970s when the two projects were 
undertaken. The two regimes were more or less on an equal footing. 
The last two points are particularly salient. It is commonly assumed that 
there is an inverse relationship between the strength of the scholarship and the 
extent to which scholars may be influenced by political power. To the extent that 
scholarship is 'scientific' it is less manipulable. Observers of Indonesia, for instance, 
usually attribute the weaknesses of the historical profession to the strength of state 
manipulation. Historians were (and still are) seen as powerless in the face of 
societal and political pressures. As emphasised above, the strength of the two 
states was more or less comparable; it was in the level of advancement attained by 
the history profession that the two cases significantly differed. One may expect, 
therefore, that Filipino historians, given the level of their scholarly achievement, 
would fare significantly 'better' in their encounter with a political power holder. 
We shall see in the succeeding chapters if, or to what extent and in'what ways, this 
view might be correct. Or, we shall find out if we need to rethink our assumpti<?ns 
and ask a more appropriate question. 
---00000---
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CHAPTER Ill 
THE TADHANA PROJECT: THE MAKING 
"Clio ... to thee, 0 Muse, has been vouchsafed the power to know the hearts of 
the gods and the ways by which things come to be." 
- Valerius Flaccus, Argonautica 3.15 
hen exactly the idea was conceived cannot be told for sure. But it was 
in an extemporaneous speech delivered in 1967 when Marcos 
declared in public perhaps for the first time his desire to write history 
(Marcos 1967). Before an audience of historians and history teachers, he articulated 
a wish to be able to do so once his stint in politics is over. It did not hav·e to wait 
that long. Inspired by Churchill's multi-volume A His ton; of the English-Speaking 
Peoples (1956-58), he forged a partnership with a group of young Filipino scholars 
and embarked beginning in 1973-1974 on an ambitious project to write a multi-
volume Philippine history. The purported aim was to write a 'truly national' and 
'genuinely Filipino' history covering the earliest period (geologic times) 'up to the 
Martial Law years in the 1970s.1 In terms of scope, targeted output and financial 
and brainpower requirements, the project was as enormous as it was 
unprecedented. It stands out in the history of Philippine scholarship not only as 
the most ambitious, but easily the most controversial history-writing project ever 
undertaken. 
1 By national, Marcos meant a history not just of the people in Luzon and Visayas who were under the 
sovereignty of the Spaniards but of all people in the archipelago. By genuinely Filipino, he meant "a history 
which is not distracted by the deluge of colonial intervention ... " It is a "history concerned with the 
indigenous as a principle of assimilation and growth" ( Marcos J 982a). (Note: It is relevant to mention that 
while this was published in 1982, it was originally a keynote address delivered at the Annual Seminar on 
History, sponsored by the Philippine Historical Association on 29 November 1976, just a few months after 
the first Tadhana volume was published). 
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In the context of post-colonial Southeast Asia, the Tadhana Project as a state-
sponsored history-writing project is hardly unique. What lends it some distinction 
is the partnership between Marcos and the scholars that gave fruition to the 
project. The dy11amics of their partnership, both the process and the output, 
provides an exemplary opportunity for exploring the intersection where politics 
and scholarship meet and constitute each other. Pertinent questions include: What 
was the condition- social, political, economic and intellectual- that made the 
partnership between Marcos and the scholars possible? How did the project take 
shape and unfold? How can we characterise the dynamics of the relationship 
between Marcos and the scholars? What insights can we derive from such 
characterisation? In addressing these questions, this chapter will, first, reconstruct 
the circumstances leading to the birth of the Tadhana Project. Second, it will 
identify and discuss the possible motivations that drove Marcos to initiate the 
project as well as the features of the project that enticed the scholars to participate 
in it. And finally, it will provide some snapshots of how the project actually ran 
with the aim of looking at the interaction between different actors. 
Genesis 
Amidst heightened awareness of the problems in Philippine historiography 
during Marcos's first term (1966-1969), an idea was floated among board members 
of the National Historical Commission to establish a commission to write 
Philippine history. This history was meant to correct 'errors' and expunge the 
existing narrative of its colonial hangover. Riding perhaps on the wave of reformist 
' 
and progressive images he wanted to propagate, Marcos picked up the idea and 
initially sought the participation of the two biggest names in Philippine history 
then, Teodoro Agoncillo and Horacio de la Costa, to spearhead the project. The 
choice of these scholars with polar characteristics may be instructive of Marcos' s 
evolving interest in history-writing. Agoncillo was a home-grown historian (read: 
did not study abroad) who gained fame through his books Revolts of the Masses 
(1956), Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic (1960) and the very popular textbook A 
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Short History of the Filipino People2 (1960) that had seen reprints and revisions (in the 
slightly different title of History of the Filipino People) even after he died in 1985. 
These books occupied a seminal position in promoting a radical anti-colonial form 
of nationalism that was brewing since the 1960s.3 He studied at public school 
through and through and dominated for decades, both by dint of personality and 
by strength of his scholarship, the country's most important deparhnent of History 
-that of University of the Philippines (UP) at Diliman. De la Costa, on the other 
hand, stood in stark contrast, ideologically and academically. He was a Jesuit who 
received a PhD from Harvard and he reigned over Ateneo's History Deparhnent 
for some time. He was well known for his book Jesuits in the Philippines, 1571-1768 
(1961) as well as for the textbook popularly used in Catholic schools, Readings in 
Philippine History (1965). If Agoncillo was thoroughly secular, De la Costa was 
proudly sectarian. If Agoncillo promoted radical nationalist history, De la Costa 
championed what some would derisively call a 'clerical history'. 
According to Agoncillo, Imelda Marcos approached him twice about joining 
the project. The first was in 1968 and the second was in 1971.4 He was reportedly 
offered generous financial support as well as freedom to decide the administration, 
structure and content of the project. On both occasions, he declined, mustering all 
the polite gestures and alibis he could think of.s While he maintained a friendly 
2 It had gone its 81h revision in 1990, through the initiative of Agoncillo's family and through the combined 
effort of Agoncillo's former students and colleagues, Samuel Tan, Bemardita Churchill and Isagani 
Medina. 
3 According to Ileto, the publication in 1956 of Agoncillo's Revolt of the Masses was a turning point in 
Bonifacio studies as well in the development of a discourse on 'unfinished revolution.' " ... (I)t transgressed 
the proper meaning of the revolution at that time" and by doing so proved instrumental in altering the _ 
consciousness required for the student movement to take off. (Ileto I 998a, 185, 188-189). 
4 Aside from Agoncillo's own testimony (See transcript of interview with Agoncillo published in Solidarity, 
March 1976 issue, and reprinted in Ocampo Talking History. Manila: DLSU Press, 1995, hereafter referred 
to as Agoncillo 1976/ 1987), corroborating information was provided by Quiason who in my interview with 
him recalled that he was present (sometime in 1968) when Imelda Marcos was talking to Agoncillo and de 
Ia Costa about the President's desire to invite them to a history-writing project (Quiason 2004). 
5 Agoncillo recalled of the first attempt, in 1968: "She (Imelda) told me that perhaps it was a good idea for me 
to write the history of the Philippines, from the Republic, July 4th 1946 when we became independent, to 
Marcos." Then Agoncillo replied, " ... mahirap ito, Mam ... (it's difficult, Ma'm) if I were to write, people will 
not believe me ... because people will suspect that you paid me, and it will boomerang on you ... And the 
President realized it was correct" (Agoncillo 1976/1987, 150-151 ). Regarding the second attempt, in 1971, 
Agoncillo quoted Imelda as saying that the Marcos Foundation has invested I 0 million and "we don't know 
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stance towards the Marcoses, he seemed too conscious of the possible adverse 
consequences once he became an 'official historian' and this weighed heavy on his 
decision to turn down the overtures. In his words: " ... the day I do that (write 
history for Marcos), finished, I am finished!" He said further that if he accepted the 
offer he would "not just be a fiction writer but a prostitute" (Agoncillo 1976/1987). 
In the case of Horacio de la Costa, the number of times he was invited to the 
project cannot be established, but the earliest verifiable attempt was made in 1968. 
As late as June 1973, the Marcos couple was still trying to win his nod. Just as in the 
case of Agoncillo, however, they met no success.6 Their refusal to join the project 
was, among others, a testimony to the sharp political division in the Philippines 
during that time. On the other hand, that Marcos went a long way to convince the 
two to lead the project, offering generous support and promising unhampered 
movement, says a good deal about Marcos' s evolving and complex motivations in 
pursuing a history-writing project. It cannot be easily assumed, as often is, that 
undiluted, naked politics was all there was. For if that was the case, why should he 
approach two people whose reputations make them difficult to influence or 
manipulate? 
Not the type to give up easily, Marcos continued to seek people who could 
help him realise his dream history-writing project. Meanwhile, a project called the 
Filipino Heritage (FH) was underway. Under the stewardship of Alfredo Roces as 
the editor-in-chief, the Filipino Heritage (FH) was an initiative of the Hamlyn Group, 
an Australia-based publishing company. Conceived months before Martial Law 
was declared in September 1972, the Hamlyn Group entered into a partnership 
with the Manila Times, a leading daily newspaper. The original plan, according to 
how to spend the interests. And so, perhaps a multi-volume history of the the Philippines could be financed 
out of the profits and we thought of you as the Editor··in-Chief. You can get the men you want and maybe 
there is money in this." In his attempt to get away, Agoncillo said that he was teaching at UP and was 
handling courses that no other professor could teach. Then, he said, Imelda realised that he didn't like the 
job and so she immediately changed the topic (Agoncillo 1976/1987, 149-150). 
6 In the Marcos Diary, an entry on June 5, 1973 indicates that on that day Imelda and Ferdinand Marcos 
asked Fr. De la Costa to 'participate in a commission to write Philippine history'. As to his response, there 
was no mention.( see page 177, Volume 4 ). 
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Roces, was to produce 100 articles on Philippine history and culture. Well-known 
experts were to be commissioned to write these articles and these would be 
serialised in Manila Times for 100 weeks or two years. However, when almost all 
newspapers including the Manila Times were shut down in the wake of the 
declaration of Martial Law on 21 September 1972, the project was repackaged into 
a ten-volume opus with public schools as one of the projected markets. Given the 
altered political landscape, the FH team had to ask for an official approval from the 
Malacanang. As part of their effort, they sought an audience with the President to 
present the initial outputs of the on-going Project.7 Marcos was reported to have 
exploded in rage upon seeing someone surnamed Roces heading the list of 
editorial board members and advisers. Apparently, Marcos's furious reaction 
relates well to his widely known loathing for his staunch critic Joaquin 'Chino' 
Roces, the owner-editor-in-chief of the Manila Times. He might have mistaken 
Alfredo Roces for Joaquin 'Chino' Roces who were in fact first cousins. Or Marcos 
simply could not trust any of the Roceses who just like the Lopezes he might have 
considered among his enemies. Not long after the incident, the head of the Hamlyn 
operation in the Philippines, Kevin Weldon, received a letter from the Malacanang 
Palace. Juan Tuvera, the Presidential Assistant, signed the letter which stated that 
Marcos would take over the position of editor-in-chief from Alfredo Roces. In 
addition, the FH manuscripts should be submitted to Malacanang for evaluation. 
Despite Roces' s offer to give way so as to keep the economic viability of the project, 
Weldon did not budge under pressure from Malacanang. The FH manuscripts 
were submitted as per Malacanang's instruction but after the negative appraisal 
came out a few weeks later, Weldon instructed Roces to pack the PH-related 
materials. In due time Roces found himself and his family in migratory flight to 
Sydney where (alongside with Singapore) he worked for the completion of the 
7 Alfredo Roces (2001)admitted that he can not be sure of the date when it happened, but he said it should be 
about two years after the start of the FH so the most likely estimate is 1974. 
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project. It eventually saw publication in 1978 (Roces 2004).s But that is shooting 
well ahead of the story. 
For a few weeks upon submission of the FH manuscripts, a group of 
scholars had been busy poring through the pages and preparing critical reviews of 
FH's scholarly worth. To this group belonged young, scholars who were from the 
University of the Philippines and whose PhDs (or Masters) were from prestigious 
universities in Europe and the United States. Leading the group was Serafin 
Quiason. He obtained a PhD in history from the University of Pennsylvania and 
was the director of the National Library from 1966 to 1986. Before taking a post at 
the National Library, he was a lecturer at the Department of History of the 
University of the Philippines. His stint in academe before working as bureaucrat 
prepared him for the role of intermediary between Marcos and the group of 
scholars who took part in the Project. He acted as the Assistant Project Director. 
Upon his shoulder fell the task of recruiting participants-a task in which he 
happily noted, he was allowed free rein (Quiason 2004). 
Initially, he gathered around him four other scholars, all young assistant or 
associate professors at the University of the Philippines - Samuel Tan, Zeus 
Salazar, Alex Hufana, and Cesar Hidalgo.9 Together they constituted the group 
whose initial task was to review the FH manuscripts. As later events would have it, 
they would form the core group of the Tadhana Project. Like Quiason, Tan and 
Salazar were historians by training. Hufana, on the other hand, was a writer and 
Hidalgo a linguist. By the time Tan was initiated into the group sometime in 1973-
74, he had just returned from Syracuse University armed with the latest multi-
disciplinary approach to historical analysis. Salazar, on the other hand, had 
completed few years earlier a PhD at the Sorbonne in Paris. He trained in 
anthropology and history and he gained fluency in a number of European and 
8 Unless otherwise stated, the data for this paragraph were culled from a series of author's email exchanges 
with Alfredo Roces dated 11-12, 22 March 2004 (Roces 2004) and Nov. 19, 200 I (Roces 200 I). 
9 According to Romeo Cruz, he was asked by Quiason to join the project as early as 1973-74 but he had to beg 
off because he became the dean of the UP Clark. He could have been a member of the core group had he 
opted to join then. He eventually joined the project in 1980 (Cruz 1989, 200). 
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Austronesian lang:iages, a feat rare for a Filipino scholar then as now. Hufana for 
his part was an accomplished, multi-awarded writer in English. He undertook 
Masters degree at Columbia University while Hidalgo obtained a PhD in 
linguistics from Georgetown University. Hidalgo's early departure in 1976 from 
the group set the stage for the entry into the core group of another scholar, Rodolfo 
Paras-Perez. He was an established painter and a premier art historian who trained 
at Harvard University for a PhD in art history. Like the rest, he was a lecturer at the 
University of the Philippines. The choice of people whose academic expertise and 
background varied was no accident. The intention was to produce history that was 
multi-dimensional - a kind of history that transcends the traditional, politics-
focussed narrative. Bonds of friendship and other personal ties, however, also 
informed the choice of people to be invited as it was thought to enhance the quality 
of working relations (Tan 1993, 85). Tan, Salazar and Hufana, for instance, were all 
Quiason's close friends. Hidalgo was a friend of Hufana as Tan and Paras-Perez of 
Salazar. In addition, Quiason was Salazar's kumpare.10 
The task of reviewing the FH manuscripts came as annoying or a 
bothersome puzzle to the group. It seemed there was no adequate understanding 
as to why they were doing it. Tan (2004a) recalls: 
... I was actually surprised, I was reacting, "Bakit naman 
(why) we have to review this? We don't have time ... ang 
dami-daming folders na babasahin ... (so many folders to 
read) 
For Salazar, he recalled rather vaguely that Marcos had to decide whether FH 
should be given official endorsement for use in the public schools, ostensibly_ its 
main target market, and Marcos needed a group of scholars to help him reach a 
decision. Salazar also believed that the group was formed precisely as a 
counterweight to FH (Salazar 2004a). Quiason for his part claimed he did not recall 
a project called Filipino Heritage (Quiason 2004). None in the group apparently 
knew that Marcos had the intention to wrest the editorship of the FH from Roces 
10 Quiason stood as sponsor, or as godfather in the baptism of Salazar's eldest.child. 
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and that they were tasked to evaluate the FH in preparation for a possible take-
over. Based on their understanding, they were recruited to write history, not just 
evaluate or review it. 
The verdict was not long in coming. It was decidedly unfavourable. One 
complaint, as recounted by Salazar, was that the perspective adopted was 
inappropriate - that it was not Filipino enough. It seemed bent on 'pleasing the 
foreigners' rather than demonstrating the 'internal dynamics' within the 
Philippines or among the Filipinos. Another complaint was the absence of unifying 
framework to tie all the articles written by various contributors together. In his 
words (Salazar 2004a): 
... What we can see is the point of view of the foreigners. It seems that the 
objective was to please the foreigners. It's like the Wow Philippines11-type of 
mentality that we did not like. In addition, it lacked coherence! Filipino 
heritage? What heritage?! Snakes, birds, languages ... There was no direction 
from which you can show pride in the Philippines! To whom do you show that 
we have the most poisonous snakes in the Philippines? The deepest ... That's not 
the way, because Philippines is not a geography. It's a people. 12 
One may ask what would have happened afterwards had the outcome of 
the reviews been more favourable. It can be surmised that one of the following 
scenarios was possible: there would have been no Tadhana for there was no need 
for an entirely new project. As FH would fall under the editorship of Marcos, with 
its framework already set and substantial progress already made in writing 
manuscripts, it was likely that only fairly limited changes, or additions, would be 
-
11 Wow Philippines refers to the tourism program of the Macapagal Administration whose aim has been to 
attract tourists to the Philippines by exhibiting the supposedly unique and endearing characteristics of 
Filipino culture. 
12 Salazar's critique was a logical consequence of the problem of perspective he saw in many attempts to write 
Philippine history, including FH. His Pantayo perspective (to be discussed in greater detail later) made him 
dismissive of FH r.otwithstanding the fact that it also tried to operate within what may be called Filipino 
perspective (the various types of this perspective will be discussed in Chapter 6). In this sense, Salazar, in 
stating that the point of view adopted by FH was that of foreigners, may have exaggerated FH's weakness. 
In my own assessment, FH's more serious weakness, which Salazar also pointed out, was its lack of 
coherent, organizing framework. As admitted by Roces himself, the editor-in-chief, the FH was 
"presentented not as continuous story but (as) a mosaic of diverse topics" (Roces, 1977, Introduction to 
Volume I) 
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made to accommodate Marcos's interest. Another possibility was that Tadhana 
would have pushed through just the same, as people behind FH were firm in their 
resolve not to allow Marcos to take over the FH. 
In hindsight, however, it may have been naive to expect that FH could ever 
receive sympathetic reviews from the group of scholars tasked by Marcos to 
undertake the evaluation. There was a generational gap in the scholarly 
orientations of the major members of this group and that of the scholars who 
worked with the FH. The historians for instance who worked for the FH such as de 
la Costa, Agoncillo, and Corpus represented various streams in what some would 
dismissively call the 'old schools' in Philippine nationalist historiography. On the 
other hand, Salazar and Tan seemed eager to assume the role of Young Turks, 
brewing with new ideas and keen to offer alternative historiographic views and 
approaches to address what they saw as problems that had long bedeviled 
Philippine historiography.13 The outlet for their pent-up intellectual energy 
precisely came when Marcos broached the idea of a history-writing project. 
Between acting as editors or evaluators for an on-going history-writing project, on 
the one hand, and as trailblazers of the still uncharted historical terrain, on the 
other, the choice was obvious. 
It was also possible that at some point the group got a hint that the review of 
FH was somehow related to a possible take-over of the project. In which case, there 
was even less a chance for a favourable review of FH. Given the group's 
13 It is noteworthy that some of those who worked for FH also worked for Tadhana (e.g. Paras-Perez, Tan, 
Dery, among others). There is therefore an overlap in the composition of the teams that worked on the two 
projects (One of my anonymous thesis examiners should be acknowledged for pointing this out) I should 
clarify, however, that those who made considerable difference in the designs of the two projects belonged to 
two significantly different groups, in generational (established versus 'Young Turks') and in historiographic 
terms. Tan and Salazar defined the shape ofTadhana and they had a very different view of Philippine 
history as to be spelled out in Chapter 4. Tan may have been a contributor to FH, thus, constituting one of 
the overlaps, but his historiographic agenda-what matters to the analysis here-hardly figures in the over-
all scheme of FH. Paras-Perez was an Associate Editor in FH, and thus, contributed significantly to the 
design of FH, but having joined Tadhana rather late, he did not have as much impact on the original, over-
all design of Tadhana. Dery served as contributor to FH and research assistant in Tadhana that afforded 
him a fairly limited role in the overall design of the projects. In short, notwithstanding the overlap in the 
composition of the members, such overlap hardly mattered in defining the distinguishing characteristics of 
the two projects, or in smoothing the differences between them. 
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(Tadhana's core) avowed rationale for taking part in the Tadhana Project (see 
discussion on possible motivations below), it would better serve their interest to 
start a clean-slate project, a project that would afford them maximum freedom, 
rather than take over one whose parameters had already been defined more or 
less. This is particularly clear in Tan's wonderment as to why they 'wasted' time 
reviewing FH while he, for one, already had a clear idea how to proceed with the 
writing project. Like Salazar, he had a well-defined historiographic agenda (Tan 
1976; Salazar 1974). It was just the opportunity to write that he was waiting for. 
Giving FH a favourable review might have been interpreted to mean a lesser 
opportunity for them to accomplish their objectives as Marcos might be enticed all 
the more to take over FH. 
As Marcos lost interest in FH owing perhaps to Weldon's obstinate stance as 
well as to the group's patently negative appraisal of it, the way was paved for the 
birth of an entirely new project. This time, he was not content to act as a patron or 
a sponsor of a commission. Neither was he interested in merely becoming the 
editor-in-chief, as was the case for FH. He wanted no less than authorship, in fact, 
the sole authorship of the books. What initially started as a modest desire to help 
advance scholarship on Philippine history by sponsoring a commission to write it 
ended in an ambitious, others may call it delusional, appropriation of the role and 
the power of the scholars. The attempt to fuse knowledge and power was 
unmistakable. 
Motivations 
Marcos's desire to embark on a history-writing project emerged fror:i a 
confluence of several factors. In popular imagination, however, what easily 
dominates is the perception that the project was part of Marcos' grand design to 
perpetuate himself in power, made possible by his declaration of Martial Law in 
September 1972.14 The timing of the project -- having taken off in 1974, not far 
14 One of the many scholars who share this view is Veneracion. According to him, what motivated Marcos to 
sponsor the Tadhana Project was his anxiety about his mortality and growing vulnerability in the midst of 
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removed from the time other books with a clear propaganda purpose appeared15-
tended to reinforce this view. Moreover, the trajectory of Philippine historical 
development as outlined in the Tadhana (see discussion on this in the next chapter) 
coincided almost perfectly with Marcos' interest to present Martial Law and the 
New Society it spawned as a natural or a necessary part of the evolutionary process 
in the development of the Filipino nation. The choice of the title Tadhana which 
means "destiny" says it all: that the Philippines was destined to see the rise of a 
New Society characterised by peace, prosperity and national pride. Not only that, 
much of the reform package offered to justify the declaration and maintenance of 
Martial Law was anchored on 'history concerned with the indigenous as a 
principle of assimilation and growth" -exactly the kind of history that the 
Tadhana was designed (Marcos 1982a, 6). 
Notwithstanding all these considerations, however, the situation appears to 
be more complex. For one, Marcos was already toying with the idea of a history-
writing project years before Martial Law was declared or seriously thought about, 
or long before his regime was seriously challenged by the radicals. His 
extemporaneous speech in 1967 shows him rather ambivalent as to whether he 
would in fact write history, similar to what Churchill did, but he was categorical 
about his 'wish' to do so at some point in time (Marcos 1967).16 His offer in 1968 to 
Agoncillo and de la Costa to spearhead the commission to write history, promising 
the unrestricted movement, also points to his early desire for a history-writing 
project. For another, an elaborate network of excuses backed by well-oiled 
propaganda machinery had been in place to address the need to rationalise Martial 
Law.17 A 19-volume history seemed too difficult, too time-consuming, too 
heightening opposition against him and this drove him to do something to justify himself before the 
judgment of history. See Veneracion (1993). 
15 For example, Democratic Revolution in the Philippines ( ! 974), Notes on the New Society of the 
Philippines, I & II ( 1973, 1976), Five Years into the New Society ( 1978) Towards Filipino Ideology ( 1979), 
An Ideology for Filipinos ( 1980). 
16 There are of course some who believe that even during Marcos's first term ( 1966-1969), he was already 
planning something to stay in power for long as he could. See for example De Quiros ( 1997, 42) 
17 For a useful overview on this, see Brillantes ( 1987) Rosenberg ( 1979) and Doronila ( 1985). For more 
personal accounts see Teodoro (200 I), Yambot (200 I) and Apostol (200 I). 
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unwieldy and perhaps because of all these reasons not too effective a medium if 
the sole or primary purpose is justification of his continued stay in power. A 
political agenda was certainly there but there must be other factors to consider as 
well. 
One other factor to consider is Marcos's deep personal interest in history. 
Practically all informants who had had a chance to engage with Marcos at close 
range have attested in glowing terms the keenness of his knowledge of and interest 
in history. As Tan (2004a) recalls: 
. . . he was a very fantastic reader of history. I noticed that for a president, 
mapapahiya kayo sa questions nya (trans: you might get embarrassed with his 
questions). Like details about Genghis Khan ... he is somebody you cannot 
tinker with your expertise kasi mapapahiya ka doon (trans.: because you might 
be embarrassed). He reads a lot. There were incidents that some of us were 
medyo mayabang (a bit haughty) only to find out, to admit in the end ... 
Quiason (2004) for his part has this to say: 
... you can feel that his sense of history is very pronounced ... he has read a lot 
of books, biographies of leaders ... Sometimes he would regale us with the lives 
of these guys I never read about. ... Bismarck, Napoleon .... and then 
war ... war ... the Pacific War, Europe during the war. He knew a lot about the 
Third Reich ... He was at heart and mind a scholar-historian ... The study of 
history was what interested him most and this was the main motivation behind 
his writing of Tadhana in which he shared his views on Philippine history, 
destiny and all that. He is a voracious reader whose prodigious memory was 
indisputable. 
They all remembered, some of them with fondness, their nocturnal 
discussions about wide-ranging historical topics with Marcos - discussions that 
sometimes lasted until early in the morning. They all said that Marcos had a 
developed sense of history and that he exuded a deep respect for historians and the 
historical profession. Cynics would be quick to wonder how they could have easily 
allowed themselves to be captivated, or conned, by Marcos. Coming however from 
professionally trained historians, with PhDs at that, there could be something more 
than superficial impression in such observations. 
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A corollary to this was his awareness or appreciation of the usefulness of 
history for administrative purpose and, of course, for personal aggrandisement. 
Typical in his speeches, for instance, is a declaration like: "I am interested in 
history not only for the wisdom and the book learning it conveys, but also for its 
value as a basis for actual decision, policy-making and implementation" (Marcos 
1973b, 3). While one might say that such a statement is no more than empty 
rhetoric common among Filipino politicians, informants have confirmed his 
voracious appetite for historical researches as part of routine decision- or policy-
making process.18 He rationalised his penchant for this type of research by saying 
that the best advisers inhabit the pages of history who, because they were long 
dead, had no interest to protect or advance (Marcos 1982a, 13-14). While one 
expects that he would be less than forthright about history's self-aggrandising 
function,19 he was candid enough to admit on one occasion that "it is sometimes 
convenient to be able to write down your own side of history." This was after 
quoting Winston Churchill as saying: "If they won't write history the way it should 
be written after making history, I will write history" (Marcos 1982a, 5). At the very 
least, Marcos was well aware of what history can do. As he said, referring to 
history, " ... no matter what others say, the written word is still a powerful 
instrument and the pen is still mightier than the sword. Words will always be able 
to achieve what the bullet cannot" (Marcos 1982a, 26). 
18 For instance, one informant relates that before Marcos undertook a state visit to China in mid-late 1970s, 
she was tasked to undertake research on the technological contributions of China to world history as well as 
Chinese influences on the Philippines (See Boquiren 2004). Another recalls that he/she worked on the 
historical basis of claims on Sabah and the US bases agreement (Mangahas 2004). General Ileto related that 
in 1969 when he was Pittsburg-bound, he received instruction purportedly from Marcos himself to do 
research on Martial Law. He thought 'This guy must be up to something.' But I dismissed it then'" (cit~d 
in de Quiros 1997, 295). Still other examples: Blas Opie was told to go to Soviet Union and among other 
things, make notes on the Soviet experience with authoritarian government, specifically, how the single-
party system worked. Jose Almonte, for his part, was told to study how martial law was implemented in 
Pakistan. (De Quiros 1997, 338) 
19 Chapter 5 of McCoy's book Closer than Brothers: Manhood at Philippine Military Academy includes an 
interesting discussion of the central role of a military historian, Colonel Uldarico Baclagon, and his 
historical work in Marcos's success in perpetuating himself in power through Martial Law. While it seems 
to me that McCoy has exaggerated Baclagon's importance, I think he rightly identified Baclagon's 
contribution in constructing the matrix within which Marcos's claims to heroism would be propagated and 
defended. For McCoy, his writing was "no mere matter of 'relics' or 'rectification', but was in fact the 
warp in the regime's ideological fabric" (1999, 167). "(B)y placing the imprimatur of a historian's authority 
on (Marcos's) claims, he strengthened Marcos's grips on power" (1999, 178). 
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Still another possible factor is the perceived prestige that goes with 
authorship of a scholarly work. It seemed that Marcos was very much interested in 
promoting himself as an intellectual or as a scholar! y president. An informant 
claimed that of few thousand copies of the first published volume of Tadhana, only 
about 500 circulated in the Philippines (Tan 2004a). The rest had been earmarked 
for distribution abroad, to be given as personal gifts from Marcos to ambassadors, 
heads of state and other high-ranking officials, friends and acquaintances whom he 
met in his fairly extensive travels abroad. He also seemed desirous of 
immortalising himself through the Project. As Tan quoted Marcos as saying in one 
of their meetings: "You know, after the end of my term, the people will forget 
everything that I have done, my infrastructures, etc ... but the only thing that will 
last is this (showing a copy of the first printed volume of Tadhana)" (Tan 2004a). 
Perhaps another side to Marcos's apparent genuine interest in history was 
his anxiety about it. Marcos' diaries contain passages that indicate his nagging 
sense of unease as to how he and his regime would be judged in history. An entry 
dated Oct. 8, 1970, for example, states (Marcos Diary, n.d., entry for 8 October 
1970): 
I often wonder what I will be remembered in history for. Scholar? Military 
hero? Builder? The new constitution? Reorganization of (the) government? 
Uniter of the variant and antagonistic elements of our people? He brought light 
to a dark country? Strong rallying point or a weak tyrant? 
The diary also indicates that Marcos was fearful and distrustful of 
I 
historians. After reading Bailey's book Presidential Greatness which Marcos notes 
"explains the bias of historians and how they get it," he concluded that "history 
should not be left to the historians," (Marcos Diary, entry for 19 December 1971). 
This was corroborated by what Marcos declared in the 1967 speech whereby he 
rationalised his desire to write history by citing the need to correct what he thought 
to be erroneous and overly negative picture of him in the media. Perhaps Marcos 
was thinking that through the Tadhana, he would be able to 'straighten' what he 
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believed to be a distorted history perpetrated by his detractors, including 
historians some of whom he described as 'contentious' (Marcos 1982a, 1). 
According to Adrian Cristobal, one of Marcos' s closest aides and the one 
whom Marcos asked to write a memo that served as the germ of the Tadhana 
Project, the project was undertaken primarily as Marcos' s vehicle to explain 
himself and the declaration of Martial Law to the Filipino people, not of the 
contemporary period, but a century hence. Given the highly fractious political 
sphere in the 1970s, Marcos knew full well, Cristobal avers, that the public would 
not take the project seriously. In a hundred years, so Marcos believed, people 
would already be far removed from the political contentiousness of the 1970s and 
they would be in better position to judge without bias whether what he did was 
right or wrong (Cristobal 2005). 
Still another possible factor is Marcos' s sense of nationalism. Marcos 
routinely utilised nationalist tropes to serve his personal agenda and so cynics 
would be justified in doubting the sincerity of his nationalism. However, for many 
in his generation who grew up "in a period which took special delight in the 
culture and history of other country" and consequently developed a "sense of 
alienation from (their) country's past," at least some of them probably longed for 
redemption from such a "crisis of identity" (Marcos 1976b, ii). Marcos may be one 
of them. The truth is, even if we grant that Marcos was not one of them, succeeding 
generations were well aware of such a crisis of identity and their commanding 
presence called for a kind of history that would address such a crisis. In other 
words, there was a fairly broad constituency to whom the writing of a 'tn1ly' 
nationalist history would appeal, and Marcos was quick to respond. 
On the part of scholars who took part in the Project, their motivations varied 
depending on their academic standing and personal circumstances at that time. 
Tan and Salazar claimed that what attracted them to the project was the 
opportunity to do what they loved doing - scholarship- under an atmosphere 
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unhampered by day-to-day concerns. Both of them had a rather well-defined 
historiographic agenda the opportunity for realising these they saw in the Project. 
Tan, for instance, wanted to address the long-standing neglect of the Muslims and 
other cultural communities in a traditional historical narrative which, almost 
without exception, were badly skewed towards the numerically dominant 
Christian populace. He had particular interest in demonstrating the interaction 
· between the 'great' traditions of Christianity and Islam, on the one hand, and the 
'small' traditions of the tribal groups on the other. Furthermore, as a reaction to 
the predominance of descriptive political history, he wanted to inject into historical 
narrative a multi-disciplinary analytical approach whereby, as appropriate, the 
analytic tools of the social sciences were woven into historical narrative (Tan 
2004a). This he believed would enable him to emphasise the dynamism of history 
as counterpoint to the rather static images that gathered around traditional 
historical approaches. 
Salazar, on the other hand, wanted to develop a more holistic, or complete 
picture . of the Philippine history. This was understandable in the context of 
seriously inadequate historical scholarship that 'silenced' various periods, notably 
the centuries spanning the pre-hispanic era and the first 200-250 years of Spain in 
the Philippines. Asked if it did not bother him to work for Marcos who was 
despised by many, he put it strongly in these words (Salazar 2004b): 
IfI'd be offered by anyone-even by a criminal-a whole institute to allow me 
to write my history [referring to complete Philippine history], I'd accept. I 
wouldn't mind even if he's a criminal. The important thing is that I be able to 
do it. After all this is more important than one single individual. So for me 
there's no moral issues here because one of the attainments of historiography is 
that you no longer judge in moral terms. 20 
20 In his own words: " ... kung bibigyan ako ng isang buong institute upang masulat ko ang aking kasaysayan, 
mamamatay tao man ang magbigay sa akin ... wala akong pakialam sa kanya. Ang importante maisulat ko 
ito. After all, this is more important than one single individual. So wala akong moral issues involved dito 
because one of the attainments of historiography is hindi ka na naghuhusga ... " 
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Salazar also wished to employ and experiment with new perspectives 
aimed at correcting the long-standing approaches heavily tinged with a colonial 
hangover. That Salazar and Tan had in fact succeeded in pushing their agenda can 
be seen in the framework that underpins the whole project. Through their 
combined effort that the original outline of the Project was drawn (Tan 1993, 86). 
After the outline was drafted, it was discussed by the group and was presented to 
Marcos for discussion. As Quiason said, Marcos accepted it without asking for 
revision. In Quiason's words, "Marcos swallowed it hook, line and sinker" 
(Quiason 2004). Not long after, in 1976, it was circulated in public as a 62-page 
pamphlet simply entitled The Tadhana Outline (Marcos 1976c). 
The nationalist packaging of the project certainly made it attractive. It was 
in fact the upsurging of Filipino nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s, with its 
meanings and defining parameters no doubt contested, that provided a pliable 
template upon which Marcos' s partnership with the scholars materialised. Marcos 
was bound to strike very sympathetic chords not only among increasing numbers 
of scholars but common people as well when, in justifying the Tadhana Project, he 
declared: "The need to refresh one's perspectives on the past is particularly acute 
for a people whose written history is mainly the legacy of nation, or nations that 
once subjugated them"(Marcos 1982a, 3). Salazar recalled that when Quiason 
approached him and invited him to the project, the latter described it as a 'very 
important, nationalist undertaking'.21 Cruz who joined the project much later in 
1980 echoed the same words as Quiason' s time-tested bait to entice potential 
prospects. Cruz added that one thing that lured him to the Project was the 
impressive manner by which topics which were seemingly difficult to situate 
within a nationalistic framework (such as geological issues, pre-hispanic period) 
have in fact been successfully interpreted along this line. He cited as an example, 
the chapter on Adam in the Philippines (Cruz 1989). Paras-Perez, for his part, while 
21 As Quiason was quoted by Salazar as saying: "napakaimportante nito ... ang gagawin natin ay makabayang 
gawain. Bibirahin natin ang mga Australyano ... " [trans.: "this is very important ... what we shall do is a 
nationalist undertaking. We will hit back at the Australians ... ", the latter refers to the Australian-funded 
Filipino Heritage Project. See Zeus Salazar (1989). 
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similarly attracted to the nationalist intent of the project, felt disturbed by the 
overly politico-economic conceptualisation of nationalism that informed much of 
the Philippine nationalist history. He bewailed the common practice of treating 
culture like an appendix to the politics-centred narrative, if included at all. In 
joining the project, he felt he was being given an opportunity to help correct the 
imbalance. Specifically, he was interested in showing the centrality of culture and 
in weaving into historical narrative the cultural, values-centred aspects of the 
development of Filipino nation (Paras-Perez 2004). 
Another factor was compensation. Whether this carried heavy weight in 
their decision to participate, however, depended much on their personal 
circumstances during that time. For someone like Paras-Perez who already had a 
name as an established artist (painter) and thus had a reliable source of decent 
income, it was easy to be cavalier in attitude toward compensation.22 Others, 
however, were not as fortunate. Those who served auxiliary functions such as . 
research assistants and part-timers, readily admitted that the compensation 
package was an attraction. Dery, for instance, claimed to have received from the 
Project a salary which was more than double of his salary as Instructor at the UP 
Baguio. He claimed to have received 2,500 pesos per month from the Project as a 
research assistant, compared with 900-1000 pesos as an Instructor at UP. Without 
his work at the Project, he claimed, it would have been much more difficult to 
accumulate savings that enabled him to pursue doctoral studies while at the same 
time providing for the needs of his family. He admitted he o~ed much to his 
participation in Tadhana (Dery 2004). 
Another participant who worked briefly on the project attested that what he 
received from the Project as honorarium (around 600 pesos) for editing a 'badly 
written chapter' was a substantial addition to his salary of about 1,500 pesos per 
22 Paras-Perez as-a-matter-of-factly stated that he already had a name, and a career as an artist and so he did 
not have a need for high salaries to be attracted to join the project. He related that in fact, when Salazar 
asked him how much salary he wanted just for him to accept the invitation, he casually asked his assistant 
how much should he charged and he said in jest that his assistant sold him cheaply (Paras-Perez 2004 ). 
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month as Asst. Professor at UP. He said he was very happy to have been paid 
well for that piece of work and he believed that "for most of those who took part in 
the project, the pay was the big attraction" (Ileto 2004). 
In talking about salaries, core members such as Tan, Quiason and Salazar 
invariably took a different view from from that of minor players. If the latter 
happily emphasised the substantial difference, the former tended to downplay the 
financial factor in the project, underscoring that the difference between UP pay and 
that of Tadhana hovered "only" at around 20-30% (Quiazon 2004; Tan 2004a; 
Salazar 2004a). In the absence of exact figures, which they refused to give, this is 
not easy to verify. It is very likely however that they were being modest about it. If 
Dery' s claim was true - that he was getting more than twice his UP salary- those 
who occupied more senior positions such as Salazar and Tan were probably getting 
at least proportionately as much. Given that a UP Asst. Professor was getting 
Pl,500/month, and an Assoc. Professor about P2,000/month, it seems unlikely that 
the senior researchers were getting only P2,000 to P2,600 (following the 20-30% 
differential claimed by Tan, et al) while Dery who was only a research assistant 
received P2,500. On the other hand, even if what they claimed was accurate, the 
difference could still be substantial considering that they received fringe benefits 
such as travels abroad to gather materials to which they were the only ones 
entitled as members of the core group. 
The attitude of Tan et al can best be understood in the context of widespread 
rumour that they had received handsome amounts of money 'just to join the 
project, a claim they all summarily rejected. In jest, laughing heartily, Tan said 
"How I wished I got that much!." Then rhetorically he asked , "If that was true, 
how come I was driving a car handed down to me by my brother?" (Tan 2004a). 
Salazar's retort was more stinging. He said that those who were spreading the 
rumour, as well as those who believed in it, were perhaps thinking of themselves, 
"they are too inferior ... they would accept it because of the money. (For) they 
would not be asked otherwise ... " (Salazar 2004a). 
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Still another attraction was the opportunity provided by the project for 
professional or academic advancement specifically access to valuable historical 
documents. For young historians such as Rowena Boquiren, a fresh graduate in 
history, and Luis Dery, a PhD student, being able to gather data while having 
gainful employment was an opportunity one can hardly refuse (Boquiren 2004; 
Dery 2004). 
Finally, a variety of pragmatic reasons also played a part. Salazar for 
example candidly admitted that Quiason convinced him to join the project by 
saying, among other things, that participating might pave the way for rescinding 
the travel ban imposed upon him by the Martial Law regime (Salazar 1989). This 
ban, alongside detention, Salazar claimed was a penalty for mocking or criticising 
Marcos's book Today's Re11olution: Democracy (Salazar 2004a).23 He was incarcerated 
for three months and was released through the help of a friend, Leticia Ramos 
Shahani who was Gen. Fidel Ramos' sister. It was Ramos, one of the main 
implementers of Martial Law as the Philippine Constabulary Chief, who worked 
for his release. 24 His release, however, carried a condition that he was not to leave 
the country, nor the vicinity of Metro Manila. This prevented hiin from accepting 
invitations for conferences or fellowships abroad, which irritated him considerably 
as he had, among others, a standing offer from the French government. His desire 
to regain his freedom of movement proved strong enough that any opportunity to 
restore it was enticing. 
Fe Mangahas, for her part, was a breadwinner. She had a child to feed and a 
husband who, because of his painful experience in jail during Martial Law, cotl.ld 
23 In a separate interview, Salazar offered a different story. According to this version, he was arrested not for 
mocking Marcos' book but as a consequence of widespread arrests by the military upon the implementation 
of Martial Law in September 1972. Gaerlan ( 1998, 255-6) citing the interview with Salazar by his students, 
Bernadette Abrera, Elena Gonzales and Suzette Lopez, the text is appended to their unpublished paper, Ang 
Kasaysayan ng Departamento ng Kasaysayan ng Pamantasan ng Pilipinas, 1963-1986 (1988).[The History 
ofDeparment of History of the University of the Philippinse, 1963-1986] 
24 Tatad's version as cited in De Quiros's Dead Aim (1997, 332) is quite different. According to this version, 
friends of Salazar approached Tatad and he briefly discussed with Marcos the circumstances surrounding 
Salazar's arrest and detention. Upon being informed of the rather amusing grounds for Salazar's arrest, 
Marcos 'magnanimously' ordered his release. 
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not work and had to be taken care of. She too was detained for involvement in 
political activism and her release carried the condition that she should work for a 
government agency (Mangahas 2004). For a lecturer in history whose chance of 
getting a teaching job anywhere was slim, a job with a history-writing project with 
a good salary proved irresistible. 
In sum, the partnership between Marcos and the scholars was made possible 
and was sustained by mutual needs- economic, political, intellectual, even 
psychological- they had for each other. It was nurtured by the rising wave of 
nationalism that engulfed the atmosphere in 1960s and 70s. To understand this 
partnership, its products and its implications more deeply, we shall look into 
various aspects of the project as it unfolded. 
Dynamics 
After the outline has been completed and approved, the members of the 
core group divided the tasks. For practical reasons, the group initially focused their 
effort on Vol. II covering the periods from 1565 to 1896. They figured out that they 
had as yet insufficient resources to tackle Vol. 1 (Geologic times up to early 1500s) 
whereas they had enough for Volume II. So Salazar was assigned to Part I 
(Encounter) encompassing the period 1565-1663. Part II (Reaction) covering the 
period 1663-1765 was given to Hidalgo, whose early departure from the group in 
1976 paved the way for the entry of Paras-Peres. Part III (Transition) which spans 
the period 1766-1815 was assigned to Hufana. Part IV (Transformation) was 
allotted to Quiason while Part V (1872-1896) was the responsibility' of Tan. This will 
be discussed in depth in the next chapter. 
Each of the core members was assisted by two or three research assistants -
usually graduate students-whose tasks included scouring for books and 
documents in the archives as well as, in certain instances, writing manuscripts. 
There were also those who worked on a part-time, per project basis. They were 
hired on the basis of their specific expertise. It was on this account that the likes of 
Ben Austria who did a PhD in Geology at Harvard and Reynaldo Ileto, who 
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studied at Cornell, were invited.The composition of the group was fluid at most 
times wherein some people were hired, stayed for only few months and then 
disappeared, to be replaced by new hirees or none at all. 
From a formal administrative viewpoint, the Project was under the 
jurisdiction of the National Library, then under the directorship of Serafin Quiason. 
It was classified as a 'Special Research Project.' According to Tan, the Project was in 
effect a special research arm of Marcos, a description with which Quiason did not 
concur (Tan 2004a).25 The group was assigned the top floor, 5th floor, for their 
workplace where almost every working day for about 11-12 years (1974 to 1985), 
the Project gradually took shape. Every morning, there was a shuttle service that 
ferried the participants from their abode at UP-Diliman and elsewhere to the heart 
of Manila where the National Library was (and still is) located. At the end of the 
day, sometimes extending to the early hours of the morning, the same shuttle 
service brought them back to their residences. 
The importance Marcos attached to the Project can be clearly seen in the 
quality and quantity of resources he made available to 'his' researchers. Informants 
described with nostalgia the working environment as 'ideal'. The group was 
provided with efficient clerical and technical staff who allowed the group to 
concentrate on their scholarly pursuits. All the materials in the National Library 
were made available to the group and staff were specifically tasked to bring in 
whatever they needed from the collection. They also did not have to do typing, one 
thing very much appreciated by the participants. Once a handwritten manuscript 
was completed, they just gave it to the typists and on the following morning, or in 
the afternoon of the same day, it is on the desk ready for editing. Even when some 
required materials were found only in other libraries or institutions, and access to 
them was not normally easy, they said it took only one call from Malacanang (by 
Tuvera) to facilitate release and delivery of such materials to the workplace (Tan 
25 Quiason did not concur with Tan on this point. For him, the Project was under the National Library and thus 
was not Marcos's special research ann (Quiason 2004). 
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2004a). As echoed by one informant, there was nothing like that in his experience 
as a scholar in the Philippines. In his words (Salazar 2004a): 
For the first time in my life, I could read the entire day, write the entire day and 
have one or two assistants and a typist. Sino bang historiador sa Pilipinas ang 
mayroong ganyan. Sa Alemanya, kahit isang istupidong historiador na naging 
propesor sa isang unibersidad, merong ganyan. Sa Pilipinas (kahit magaling 
ka), wala. (Who among historians in the Philippines have experienced that? In 
Germany, even a stupid historian who became a professor in a university 
enjoyed such amenities. In the Philippines, even if you're good, none!) 
He added that he had a taste of such an ideal working environment only when he 
was invited as Visiting Researcher at the Australian National University way back 
in the 1980s. 
Reinforcing the 'ideal' working environment was the almost unlimited 
financial support for expeditions to gather data abroad. This allowed the Project to 
amass an impressive collection of documents, pictures and other historical 
materials hitherto unavailable in the Philippines. Dery describes the collection in 
following terms (Dery 2004): 
How impressive the Tadhana collections were!! Rare microfilms of William 
Howard Taft Papers, Alexander Robertson Papers! .. .It was really well-funded! 
3-4 times they (members of the core group) went abroad ... to gather materials. 
We had complete photocopies of dissertations about the Philippines that were 
not available in local libraries ... everything was latest ... Even before Gate's 
Schoolbooks and Krags and Lynn's US Army in the Philippines were published, 
we had already used them! The documentation was massive ... however, because 
they did not install an airconditioning system in the National Library, those 
microfilms 'melted' and were rendered useless! What a waste! It cost millions! 
Just imagine one set of William Howard Taft Papers, how many hundreds of 
reels were that? There were probably 600 reels ... 26 
26 In Dery's exact words: " ... Ang ganda ng collection ng Tadhana, mga rare na mga microfilms, complete ng 
William Howard Taft Papers, Alexander Robertson Papers ... Talagang ginastusan! 3-4 times ... nag-a-abroad 
yong mga (members ng core group) ... para kumuha ng mga dokumento ... Kompleto ang mga xerox ng 
dissertations about the Philipines na hindi available sa library (dito sa Pilipirias) ... latest lahat ... Hindi pa 
napa-published ang Schoolbooks and Krags ni Gates, yong kay Lynn(?) US Army in the Philippines, 
ginamit na namin yon ... massive ang documentations ... kaya lang hindi ipina-aircon ang National Library 
kaya hayon, nagkadikit dikit ang mga microfilms ... sayang yon. Milyon ang halaga non! lsipin mo na lang 
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Tan attested that Marcos did not seem to entertain second thoughts in 
approving their proposal to visit archives and libraries in Europe and the United 
States to collect relevant materials. The decision quickly came down only after a 
few days (Tan 2004a). Marcos's full support was apparent not only in quick 
approval of the proposal but also in the fact that no limit was set on the amount of 
money that they could spend in buying these materials. As Tan happily recounted, 
so long as the materials were deemed useful, there was no question about the cost 
(Tan 2004a). Considering Marcos's well-known tendency to be stingy, the generous 
provisions he allowed the scholars was a testament to the importance he attached 
to the Project. Perhaps, such amenities for historical research remain unequalled in 
the history of Philippine historical scholarship up to the present. It is no wonder 
then that Tan described the provisions as the "(t)he most rewarding part of the 
project" (Tan 2004a). 
How much of the contents of Tadhana could be attributed to Marcos is not 
easy to determine. The problem is made even more daunting by the fact that 
someone did editing (some say 'just' style editing) for Marcos, Juan Tuvera, the 
Executive Secretary /Presidential Assistant.27 Tuvera stood as the overall Project 
Director. He was the only one trusted to edit, as he had a very intimate knowledge 
of Marcos's writing style, among other things. Through his consummate hand 
passed all the manuscripts before they were given to Marcos for final scrutiny 
before publication. If asked, the four core members-Tan, Salazar, Quiason and 
Paras-Perez-unanimously declared in the strongest term that Marcos did not have 
anything to do with the substantive content of the Project. It was only on two 
occasions, so Salazar (1989, 199) claimed, that Marcos intervened and such 
intervention involved alteration or inclusion of very minor details. He 
accommodated Marcos' s request, Salazar recalled, just to humour him and also 
his own self. Tan for his part concurred with Salazar's view. In his words: "Marcos 
ang isang isang set ng William Howard Taft Papers, ilang daang reels yon ... siguro 600 reels ... "(Dery 
2004). 
27 At a certain point in Tuvera's service to Marcos, he was the Executive Secretary. At another time, the 
Presidential Assistant. 
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did not influence Tadhana, ideologically or theoretically. The only participation he 
had was when he read the manuscripts and ... had marginal notes ... and questions 
asked. But more on factual parts of history ... " (Tan 2004a). He even boldly claimed 
that "(i)n fact it was the other way around ... the Tadhaha (was) the one that shaped 
Marcos views of history ... and later on his perception of future itself ... "28 (Tan 
2004b). 
Notwithstanding the strong protestations of Tan, Quiason, Salazar and 
Paras-Perez that Marcos did not intervene in the Project, there are indications to the 
contrary. Fe Mangahas, a research assistant who was asked to write about the 
Marcos's years 1966-1972, attested that she was told to revise her manuscript, the 
contents of which apparently did not sit well with Marcos' s interest. As she 
recounted the incident (Mangahas 2004): 
... one day, ... somebody from Malacanang and Dr. Quiason asked me to join 
them in a closed-door meeting. I saw the manuscript...somebody from 
Malacanang whose name I cannot recall but he came from the office of Tuvera, 
sabi niya (he said) the problem with my contribution was with perspective. 
According to him, Marcos did not like the idea of all voices speaking and one of 
these is his voice, and at the end somebody-the writer-makes conclusion he 
did not agree with. Sabi niya (He said) if I could revise and make it one voice 
and which the president speaks .. .I said 'I cannot do that because that's the way 
it happened! ... But sabi nya (he said), "But this is a history of Filipino people 
by Fedinand Marcos, the author is Marcos! ... I think what he (Marcos) didn't 
like was, pag left ang nagsasalita, medyo sympathetic ako (if the one speaking 
is the left, I was a bit sympathetic) .. . pag siya, sini-center ko siya nang kaunti (if 
he, I put him towards the center) . Pag rightist naman, hindi. naman ako 
sympathetic kasi nakikita ko naman talaga ang kanilang color. (if the rightists, I 
wasn't sympathetic because I can easily their see true color) It wasn't that bad 
dahil hindi ko naman siya completely in-identify here at lalo namang hindi dito. 
(It wasn't that bad because I neither completely identified him here, nor there. 
[Hand gestures pointing to the left and the right, meaning the leftists and the 
rightists, respectively])." 
28 Such a confident declaration seems not totally unwarranted. The influence of the Tadhana framework is 
manifest for instance in Marcos's book Introduction to the Politics ofTransion (l 978b). Compared with the 
framework of history laid out by Marcos in the diary (entry for 17 February 1973) before the Tadhana 
Project took shape, the difference was very clear in that this followed the traditional periodisation (pre-
hispanic, Spanish-, American and indendenc period). 
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Dr. Quiason, relates Mangahas further, asked her if she was willing to 
revise and the latter's response was "Sir, if you can get somebody to re-write it, 
please just have it re-written."29 The impasse was resolved when Dr. Quiason said 
to the man from Malacanang not to worry, that he would fix the problem 
(Mangahas 2004). 
There are a number of things worth noting in this incident. First, that despite 
maximum level of freedom Marcos allowed the scholars to do as they pleased, 
when it came to certain historical question or a period that was utmost in his 
political design, he would really insist to have his way. Second, that Mangahas 
could say no, at the risk of losing her job which was very dear to her considering 
that she was the breadwinner,30 bespoke array of possibilities but these certainly 
included her sense of responsibility to uphold measures of historical methodology. 
She in a sense "spoke truth to power." Third, that Quiason did not pressure her, 
despite his avowed duty as the Deputy Director of the Project to uphold or 
represent Marcos' s interest, could also mean a lot of things but one possibility was 
that being a scholar himself, he shared with Mangahas an understanding of the 
historical context that served pretext for Mangahas's defiance and he did not dare 
cross the line of such an understanding. 
Even Salazar, who on several occasions strongly affirmed that Marcos did 
not have anything to do with the content of the Tadhana, did in fact admit that 
Marcos on at least one occasion explicitly showed desire to influence its shape. He 
claimed that they were given instruction to emphasize the negative images of the 
Catholic church and such an instruction was reversed when there was a thaw in 
29 Her exact words: "Sir, kung may makukuha kayong mag-rire-write, pa-rewrite nyo na fang. " 
30 She related that her husband, like she, was an activist and they were both incarcerated in the wake of 
crackdowns on activism that accompanied declaration of Martial Law. Upon release, one of the conditions 
set by the government was that she should work for a government agency. Her husband, on the other hand, 
sustained injuries, both physical and psychological, as consequence of incarceration. He could not work 
upon release. Fe Mangahas, therefore, had to earn a living for the family (Mangahas 2004). 
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the icy relationship between Marcos and the then Cardinal Sin.31 In Salazar's 
words (Salazar 2004b): 
He anticipated the church's resistance. He seemed bent on attacking the church 
during that time, and we too were recruited for that. For a while in the first 
volume that I and others were writing, the emphasis was on the abuses and and 
irregularities of the friars. But after a while, Sin __ (garbled) and showed 
friendly gestures towards Marcos. You will see that in the history between 
1975 and 1979. When Sin mellowed, that was when we were advised to tone 
down ... that's what's political, which I did.32 
The overall progress of the Project turned out to be slow. By 1980 only four 
volumes had been published. These were Part I Vol. 1 (Archipelagic Genesis, 1980) 
and Part II Volume 1 (Encounter, 1976), Volume 2 (Reaction, 1978) and Volume 3 
(Transition, 1979). Cruz claimed that much progress had already been 
accomplished in the remaining volumes (Parts III and IV, books 11-19) and the 
manuscripts had been submitted to Tuvera for editing (Cruz 1980, 201).33 But it was 
Tuvera and Marcos, as Quiason (2004) attested, who proved to be the bottleneck. 
Tuvera's duties as Executive Secretary /Presidential Assistant were simply 
too much, Quiason averred, that he hardly had time to devote for editing the 
manuscripts (Quiason 2004). Asked why Marcos did not employ somebody to 
help Tuvera, Quiason said he was the only one trusted by Marcos (Quiason 2004). 
To compound the problem, Marcos was already getting ill starting in the early 
1980s and it could only mean further delays to the Project. That no more than four 
of the originally planned volumes saw print despite the fact that t~e drafts of most 
31 Cardinal Sin occupied the highest position in the hierarchy of the Catholic church in the Philippines. He was 
well-known for, among other things, his active involvement in politics. He was a staunch critic of Marcos. 
32 Salazar's exact words (2004a): " ... Na-anticipate niya ang resistance ng simbahan. Medyo gusto niya na 
birahin ang simbahan at that time, and we were also recruited for that ...... for a while, yong first volume na 
sinulat ko at sinusulat ng iba, ang emphasis doon sa kabulastugan ng mga praile. Pero after a while, nag-
__ (garbled) si Sin, eh. At medyo nakipag-kaibigan kay Macoy. You will see that in the history 
between 1975 and 1979. Noong umano na si Sin, eh di we were advised to tone down ... yan ang may 
pulitika, which I did. 
33 Cruz ( 1989) claims that the manuscripts for book numbers 11-19 have been completed and he contributed 
significantly to the writing of all these except books 14 & 18. 
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other books had already been written (Cruz 1989), indicated that Marcos would not 
allow publication without sufficient scrutiny by Tuvera and himself. 
Realising the improbability of completing the 19 volumes, Marcos asked the 
group to produce a two-volume abridgement. The first volume covered the period 
up to 1896 and the other one spanned the period from 1897 to the Marcos years in 
the early 1980s. As Tan related, the team set aside their work on the still 
unfinished volumes and to concentrate on the abridgement. They merely 
summarised, he said, what was already written to come up with the abridged 
versions (Tan 2004a). The first volume was published in 1982 and the other one 
was almost ready for publication when the EDSA Revolution in 1986 swept the 
Project away. The second volume never saw print, and the loss of the manuscript 
has been a source of deep bewilderment and amusement among those who were 
involved in the Project. Piecemeal and sometimes contradictory accounts of the 
whereabouts of the manuscript in the last days of the Marcos regime circulate. 
According to Tan (2004a), the page proofs were given to Tuvera for Marcos' final 
approval. In turn, Tuvera turned it over to National Media Production Center 
(NMPC), the printing arm of the government. Quiason, for his part, claimed that it 
was in the office of Tuvera in Malacanang which was reported to have been 
ransacked by anti-Marcos elements in the dying days of the Marcos regime 
(Quiason 2004). Mangahas, on the other hand, claimed that she went to the NMPC 
office after the EDSA event and asked the clerical staff about whereabouts of the 
page or galley proof of the manuscript, but the staff said they did not have an idea 
(Mangahas 2004 ). 
Questions arise as to the original agreement regarding the disclosure of the 
role of the scholars. According to Tan, there was in fact an intention to 
acknowledge and publicise the names of scholars, but it was to be done in the last 
volume completing the project. Since the events at EDSA took over and swept the 
still unfinished project away, there was simply no opportunity to do so (Tan 2004a; 
Quiason 2004). It raises another question, however, why wait until the project was 
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completed. Tan's explanation leaves one wondering if there was indeed such an 
intention. According to him, as the composition of the group was fluid, 
acknowledging the scholars before the project was finished might cause a problem 
of inaccuracy in acknowledging all the individual contributions. Why should that 
be the case is not clear, considering that the volumes appeared one after another 
and the group knew very well who and to what extent each participant had 
contributed to the work on each volume. If there was indeed an intention to reveal 
the identity of the researchers, it would better seem to do so as each volume 
appeared, for the problem of inaccuracy would loom much larger if they waited for 
the completion of the entire project. This is due to the difficulty of accurately 
keeping track of the contributions of various participants within the span of ten 
years or more. 
The more intriguing question is why Marcos installed himself as the author 
while he could have opted to serve as the editor, or just a patron. It is a puzzle even 
to those who participated. If his primary intention was to provide a 'scholarly' 
justification for his hold on power, the project would have been more credible and 
effective had he stayed on the sidelines and let the scholars carry their by-lines. To 
recall, couched in the offer extended to Agoncillo and de la Costa was his apparent 
intent to act as mere patron or sponsor of the project. What caused the sudden shift 
in his mood can only be surmised. Perhaps, in the case of the offer to Agoncillo and 
de la Costa, he inferred that given their stature the chance that they would write 
for him (Marcos) as the declared author was minimal. Whereas asking them to lead 
a commission as editor-in-chief stood some chance. It seemed that he really liked 
the project to prosper so to avoid the danger of nipping the project in the bud-he 
opted to take the safer route. Marcos' s initial intention in pursuit of history writing 
appeared more scholarly or academic and if there was political intent in it, it was 
not paramount. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that what he considered as success in 
his early foray into 'writing' thoroughly gratified him and consequently 
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emboldened him to do more daring things, as 'authoring' a 19-volume Philippine 
history. Today's Rez1olution: Democracy (TRD) was the first major book-length work 
that was supposed to have been authored by Marcos and it appeared in September 
1971.34 Entries in his diaries shortly thereafter showed him overjoyed with the 
alleged ripples 'his book' had made. He stated that there were many people, even 
those not given to reading books, who "insist(ed) on having my book and 
discussing it." He relished that "(e)verybody (was) talking about the book" 
(Marcos Diary, entry for 11September1971). Other books followed the TRD such 
as Notes on the New Society of the Philippines (1973), Introduction to Politics of 
Transition (1978) and Towards A Filipino Ideology (1979), to mention but a few. All 
these were written for Marcos by a stable of intellectuals or in-house ideologues or 
propagandists, as critics were wont to call them. Against the backdrop of the 
wondrous things that Marcos had wanted the people to believe he was --the most 
bemedalled war hero, bar top-notcher, author of various books, saviour of the 
nation, the best president the country every had-authoring a 19-volume 
Philippine history seemed not unlikely for him to lay claim on too. More than 
anything else, perhaps it was his enormous capacity for self-deception, (de Quiros 
1997, 331) or what Rempel calls as Marcos's delusional tendencies (Rempel 1993), 
that enticed him to install himself as the author of Tadhana and believed that 
people would take him seriously for it. 
At any rate, Tadhana was a scholarly undertaking. What prompted Marcos 
to opt for a partnership with professional historians, with impressive credentials at 
that, points to his desire to produce a scholarly history, presumably a history that 
carries authority - authority that emanates from its pursuit of objectivity or truth 
(Cristobal 2005). He could have resorted to 'lesser academic mortals,' like Baclagon 
who some people considered as Malacanang' s resident military historian, (McCoy 
1999, Chapter 5). They would have not been credible or authoritative, however, for 
34 Today's Revolution: Democracy was written for Marcos by Adrian Cristobal, one of young, brilliant 
intellectuals who worked intimately with/for Marcos. He admitted it to me during the interview on 23 
February 2005. 
82 
they did not have the expertise and the imprimatur of PhDs or universities that 
certified and embodied human beings' capacity to know. Questions arise then, 
what need did Marcos perceive for a scholarly history? From what source did such 
a need arise? Who or what created the source, to begin with? Popular notions, as 
already noted, simply see Marcos' s overriding concern to perpetuate himself in 
power and to find lofty justification for it. Marcos, so this notion goes, seemed too 
aware that 'power is empty without knowledge to back it up.' And what better 
way to buttress his claim to authority than by producing a history that could 
withstand critical scrutiny? It is however pertinent to ask, considering Marcos' s 
apparent lack of intention to disclose the identities of his researchers, as he wanted 
this scholarly history to be presented as his own, who might be his target 
audience? For ordinary Filipinos who could barely negotiate day-to-difficulties, 
much less read English in which Tadhana was written, a 'comics history' 
presumably would do, or worse, any or no written history at all would. Many 
scholars and members of the educated elite and middle-class, both outside and 
inside the country, proved to be among his bitterest critics. Perhaps it was they 
whom Marcos had in mind. However, it is precisely these people who would not 
believe that Marcos actually wrote the work. 
Perhaps Cristobal was right. Marcos wanted to use the Tadhana as a 
medium to convince future generations of Filipinos that what he did was right. A 
history that is necessary to serve the purpose-a history that could withstand time 
and critical scrutiny-could only be written by an army of brilliant scholars. What 
Marcos' s case was and how he planned to explain himself will be the focus of the 
next chapter. 
Finally, could it also be because of deep-seated anxiety, as noted by some 
observers. They said that Marcos was overly anxious about the ultimate judgment 
of history: the abstraction that acts like a secular god dispensing reward or 
punishment for a life lived well or ill. This does not seem farfetched. Fastidious as 
Marcos had shown to be in so many instances, it should not surprise that he would 
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seek no one but the best to help him argue, and win, his case before the judgment 
of Clio. If that was indeed the case, so be it. But what seems to have compelled 
Marcos to argue and try to win his case? Why was there a 'case', in the first place? 
And why should history be invoked? These are questions whose possible answers 
may bear pregnant implications on the over-all import on this study to which I 
shall return to in Chapter 7. 
--0000000--
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CHAPTER IV 
THE TADHANA: CONTENTS AND CONTEXT 
History is past politics and politics present history. 
-Sir John Robert Seelay 1 
A s a partnership between scholars and a dictator, the Tadhana Project could be seen as fraught with ambiguities and contradictions. While some of the scholar-participants seemed to regret their participation, 
others insisted on G.omesticating the partnership, claiming that it was only natural 
for them to take part in it. Something in such insistence however betrays their 
conscious or unconscious grasp of the contentiousness of their position. 
Notwithstanding their pronouncements to the contrary, among their peers in the 
Filipino scholarly community the widely accepted definition of 'true' and 'good' 
scholarship requires success in insulating oneself from politics (Yabes 1965). 
Anyone thus who consorts with politicians may be seen with suspicion.2 The fact 
that Marcos has been very unpopular, even hated, provides a backdrop that makes 
such a partnership particularly distasteful in the eyes of many. 
Tempting as it is for analysts to fall into Manichaean trap, this I will try to 
avoid in this Chapter. It is I think more productive to analyse the context that made 
such a partnership possible and, more importantly, to understand the driving 
forces that made it dynamic.3 Despite differences in motivations and interest, not to 
mention the disparate types or bases of powers that facilitated and rationalised the 
pursuit of those interests, they (both sponsor and scholars) nonetheless realised an 
1 Original source not specified, taken from 
http://www.arts.adelaide.cdu.au/h istorypol itics/ug/resources/pol/politics quotcs.htm I (access 20 July 2006) 
2 Agoncillo's studious refusal to write history under Marcos's sponsorship, discussed in Chapter 3, can be 
fully appreciated against this background. 
3 As I will explain in Chapter 7, the ethical dimension of scholar-politician relations is among the stumbling 
blocks to a thorough understanding of the knowledge-power nexus. That it is often invoked is precisely part 
of the effort to hide certain sources of power that prop up knowledge. 
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indubitable need for each other. The malleable nationalist template provided them 
the necessary ground that fused their powers and resources together so as to 
enhance their chance of winning the battle against their perceived contenders-
contenders who, among other things, upheld competing versions of Philippine 
nationalisms. What was at stake, it seemed, was the support of the Filipino people 
without which their claim to power would not be validated. 
In the first section of this chapter, I will examine the historiographic 
landscape within which the Tadhana Project tried to find a niche. I will try to 
demonstrate how, in their attempt to advance their historiographic agenda, the 
scholars were not just exercising their power but were at the same time in pursuit 
of a greater power. The second section, on the other hand, will focus on how 
Marcos appropriated the scholars' output for his own political ends, with or 
without the awareness or concurrence of the scholars. 
Historiographic Context 
In the history of Philippine historiography, there are a number of areas that 
have traditionally been the focal points of contestation. These served as nodal 
points through which some of the most important defining characteristics of 
historical scholarship in the country took shape. As a project wanting to be 
recognised as important and scholarly, the Tadhana cannot but locate itself at the 
cutting edge of historiographic development. At the same time, however, it had to 
show engagement with the enduring traditions. There are many areas where the 
Tadhana engaged Philippine historiography. Due to space constraints, however, I 
will discuss only aspects that appear vital both to the historiographic agenda of the 
prime movers of the Tadhana and to the political interests of Marcos. The first is 
the prehistoric and pre-colonial origins of the peoples and cultures of the 
Philippines. This issue often relates to the supposed autonomy and strength of 
local culture vis-a-vis foreign elements as the engine of historical change. The 
second deals with perspective and the concomitant issues related to periodisation. 
And finally, the disputed character of Philippine nationalisms that is manifested in 
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different though related questions pertaining to the ensemble of events and ideas 
surrounding the 1896 Revolution. The aims of the whole exercise are: (1) to 
demonstrate the historiographic terrain within or beyond which the Tadhana as a 
scholarly project can best be understood; (2) to lay bare the procedures or 
approaches the scholars have adopted in their effort to secure a niche for the 
project and for themselves; and (3) to prepare the groundwork for analysing in the 
succeeding section how Marcos tried to appropriate the contents of Tadhana to 
advance his own political interests. 
Prehistoric, Pre-colonial Origins 
As planned, the Tadhana was remarkable for the depth and breadth of its 
scope and for the conceptual coherence through which it wanted to weave together 
the entire stretch of Philippine history. It may not be too much to say that to this 
day it remains unparalleled for aiming to cover the widest span of time and for 
trying to provide a more solid or more detailed treatment of each period. The 
approach was particularly noteworthy in its attempt to deal with the pre-Hispanic 
periods (pre-1500s) that for long had constituted a massive black hole in Philippine 
historiography. Hampered by the severe scarcity or almost total absence of extant 
pre-Hispanic written sources,4 as well as by the persistent belief that Philippine 
history began only with the arrival of the Spaniards, the little interest in pre-
Hispanic periods can be gleaned from general surveys of Philippine history 
published up till the 1970s, even 1980s. As shown in Table 4. 1 the standard 
surveys of Philippine history allotted no more than a few pages, if any, to this 
period, and covered only a short stretch of a hundred years, or even less, before the 
coming of the Spaniards, or even shorter. Thus, the fact that Tadhana devotes over 
a quarter, or five of the projected 19 books, to these periods and that it goes to as 
far back as hundreds of thousands of years before Spain came, is by any measure 
4 In Scott's intimation, as of 1968 only "Philippine archaeology, two medieval Chinese accounts and a 
comparison of Philippine languages are ... valid pre-Hispanic source materials available for the study of 
Philippine history" Scott ( 1968, 139). It is widely believed that the Spanish missionaries carried deliberate, 
if not systematic, efforts to destroy written document on account of their supposed un-Christian forms and 
contents. 
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noteworthy.s Of course, one is justified in saying that the ten-volume Filipino 
Heritage (1978) with three of its volumes devoted to pre-hispanic period has 
preceded Tadhana in giving comparable emphasis to this period. A number of 
things, however, set the Tadhana apart. The projected contents of Tadhana's first 
five books were unprecedented for theoretical unity and sophistication; refreshing 
for the novelty of their approaches; and provocative for the implications they 
carried. They cohered in their paramount aim to demonstrate, on one hand, the 
participation of the ancestors of the Filipinos in a broader, universal process of 
evolutionary development and, on the other, the particularisation process that was 
supposed to lend deep roots to the identity of the Filipino nation. On the other 
hand, the FH remained stuck in the fairly coventional framework that did not pay 
explicitb attention to the depth and continuity of the influences of the pre-hispanic 
period in the development of the Filipino nation. 
Table 4. 1 
Coverage of Pre-Spanish Period in Some Textbooks 
. YEAR NO.OF . TOTAL NUMBER OF 
TITLE AND AUTHOR OF PUBLICATION CHAPTER/PAGES/ CHAPTERS/PAGES/ 
VOL.FOR VOLUMES 
PREHISPA~IC 
PERIOD 
Zafra, Readings in 1947 & 1949 0 300 pages 
Philippine History (Mimeograph) 
Zafra, Philippine Riston; \1967 '····•Lessthana> '·336pages 
Through Selected Sources . chapter (6pages), ·. 
Zaide, Philippine Political 1949, 1953 5 chapters 46 chapters 
and Cultural History, 2 (64 pages) (812 pages) 
vols. 
Alip, Political and Cultural 1949,1952 3 chapters··> . 3~Chapter~r 
History of the Philippines, 2 ( 65 p11ges )' · (~3;pa~es> 
vols. 
Benitez, History of tlze 1954 Less than a 24 chapters 
Philippines: Economic, chapter (less than (533 pages) 
Social , Cultural, Political 6 pages, mainly 
geographical and 
climatic) 
Roces, ed., The Filipio 1978 3 volumes 10 volumes 
Heritage 
5 Two popular textbooks, Zafra's (I 956a) Readings in Philippine History( I 956a) and de la Costa's Readings 
in Philippine History ( 1965) started their coverage with the arrival of the Spaniards in 1521. One notable 
exception was the I 0-volume Filipino Heritage (I 978) which devotes 3 volumes to pre-hispanic period. 
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The first book, entitled Archipelagic Genesis, was the only one in Volume I 
(supposed to consist of five books) that saw actual publication. It covers the period 
from the Big Bang to ca. 250,000 BC. It deals with cosmological and geological 
processes that made possible the formation of the universe and the archipelago 
which in due time would be called the Philippines. The planned second book, 
provocatively entitled Adam in the Philippines, was supposed to cover the period 
250,000 BC to 9,000 BC and it focused on hominisation-pertaining to the 
evolutionary process of becoming human-as it played out in Philippine territory. 
Not long before the Tadhana took off, artefacts were unearthed suggesting the 
existence of the yet-to-be-found remains of a homo erectus, comparable to the famed 
Jmia Man. For some reasons, Marcos readily shared the enthusiasm of 
archaeologists about the find (Marcos 1976c, 1,6).6 Salazar, who was responsible for 
conceptualising and outlining this portion of the project, admitted that these two 
earliest periods were no doubt too remote to have a direct impact on the formation 
of a historic community which later would serve as the foundation of Filipino 
nation (Salazar 1974, 189). The first volume was important nonetheless not just to 
set the physical stage wherein the Philippine drama would unfold later on but also 
to suggest that the elemental geologic, geographic and climatologic processes had 
conspired to produce a unique environment that would nurture the formation of a 
distinctly Filipino national identity (Marcos 1980b, 5).7 In other words, Filipino 
identity was thought not just as an outcome of historical imaginings; it was 
anchored on the land and this lent it a resilience that the appearance of 
primordiality can provide.8 The second, on the other hand, carries a subtle 
6 One may also find in Marcos Diary (entry for 24 Apri I 1971) lengthy entries showing Marcos' s ecstatic 
reaction to archaeological finds in Cagayan Valley. Exaggerating the significance of the finds, he writes 
erroneously, "The discoveries proved the existence of man with a civilization long before the western 
world could boast of any culture." 
7 In the introduction of the Tadhana, Vol. 1, Part I (Archipelagic Genesis), it is stated that the "peculiar 
location of the Philippines at the western edge of the Pacific and Australian landmass" is one of the primary 
sources of the unique characteristics of the Philippine archipelago (Marcos 1980b, 5). 
8 Such a view of the deep roots of Filipino identity is a 180° turn away from previous articulation. Ileto notes, 
for instance, that in Today's Revolution: Democracy (TRD), Marcos believed that "Filipino identity would 
be found, not in the recovery of an illusory precolonial past, but in the people's struggle for liberation." 
(Ileto 1998, 178). The Tadhana offered a different view. 
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message that being participants in the universal evolutionary process, the ancestors 
of the present day Filipinos share with the rest of humanity commonalities that 
should form the basis for racial equality (Salazar 1989, 188). Against the backdrop 
of the long drawn struggle against the inferiority complex wrought by colonialism, 
it is hard not to detect the subtle nationalist intent immanent in these formulations. 
Given likewise that a significant part of what had been paraded as glorious 
Philippine pre-history (or pre-Hispanic history) proved to be no more than 
romanticised myths and even hoaxes, one can appreciate the level of sophistication 
employed in this attempt to use available scholarly resources to ground the 
promotion of national pride and unity on a firmer foundation. The succeeding 
three books were supposed to pursue this effort to a fruitful end. But before we 
proceed to Books 3 to 5, let me clarify the context within which the first five books 
tried to locate themselves. 
One major problematic m Philippine pre-Hispanic scholarship long 
revolved around the effort to portray Filipinos favourably vis-a-vis their 'others' 
(neighboring Asian countries and more significantly their Western colonisers, the 
Spaniards and the Americans). Having been colonised by two Western powers; 
having a culture considered perhaps 'the most western' in Asia; and having no 
ancient cities to show off, not a few Filipinos felt a sense of wholesale inferiority 
and insecurity.9 Efforts thus were focused on convincing Filipinos that they had a 
civilisation, a glorious past prior to the coming of the Spaniards, and that they were 
not inferior to their 'others' despite notable absence of urban centers like Funan, 
Champa, Angkor, Srivijaya and Pagan.10 Consequently, generations upon 
generations of Filipinos well into the 1980s, even up to 1990s, devoured a set of 
information about Philippine pre-Hispanic history that was meant to massage the 
9 Marcos, for example, in TRD (1971, 91) bewails the absence of ancient cities which could 'remind the 
intruder of his insolence.' lleto ( l 998a) seems convinced of the deep seated impact on the psyche of 
Filipino intellectuals of this lack of a 'great tradition.' 
10 In explaining how a compilation of erroneous information could have been thoroughly accepted as 'truths' 
by generations of Filipinos. Scott opines that there seemed to be a 'deep yearning' for ideas that might fill 
a void in their psyche battered by colonial experience. Scott ( 1968, 130). 
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sense of their national self-worth.11 These include (1) Beyer's Wave Migration 
Theory which explains the peopling of the Philippines, the diversity of ethnic 
groups therein and the early cultural development allegedly brought long before 
the Spaniards came by various migrant groups -- Negrito, Malay, Indonesian;12 (2) 
the purported 'membership' of the Philippines to Srivijaya and Majapahit empires 
to show that Philippines was not a political and cultural blank slate before Spain 
came; (Hassel 1953) (3) the existence of the supposedly pre-Hispanic documents, 
the Codes of Kalantiao and Maragtas, which were supposed to prove the existence 
of written laws before the Spaniards came.13 All these were meant to dispel the 
notion that the ancestors of the Filipinos did not have a developed culture or that 
they were barbarians and therefore were inferior to other people, especially vis-a-
vis their colonisers. As more and more researches since the 1950s and 1960s 
seriously questioned the bases for these suppositions, there arose a need for a new 
anchor to which pride in pre-Hispanic past could be tied. While not a few 
historian-textbook-writers ignored advances in research so that some textbooks as 
late as the 1990s still clung to the old, discredited lines, others rose to the occasion 
and suggested ways to at least alleviate the problem. Scott (1968), for his part, 
pointed to the existence of a wealth of evidences that were ignored. He also 
reminded us that despite the absence of documents written by early Filipinos there 
are 'cracks in the parchment curtains,' that allowed us to get a glimpse of the lives 
of the natives. Left with nothing but the writings of early missionaries who tended 
to be biased, Scott claimed that by reading intuitively between the lines of these 
Spanish documents one can gather some bits of information that can help 
reconstruct at least the broad outlines or trends about the early history of the 
natives (Scott 1982). Still another approach was to shift the focus away from the 
11 Despite the fact that as early as 1968 (See Scott 1968) , an authoritative study had debunked there myths, 
some textbooks in as late as the 1990s include them as though they were historical truths. 
12 For a refutation of this 'theory' see Jocano (1975). 
13 As succinctly and sardonically noted by one scholar, "The popular texts present a picture of law codes, 
membership in Asian empires, and political confederations projected against a background of250,000 years 
of migrating waves of Filipino progenitors, almost complete with points of departure, sailing dates and 
baggage" Scott (1968, 139). 
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very distant past, towards the 'glorious revolution of 1896' which served as a 
wellspring of nationalist pride. While these were no doubt helpful in their own 
specific ways, they seem inadequate in comparison with the problem. By a stroke 
of brilliance, Tadhana offered arguably the most comprehensive and trenchant 
solution to the problem. The keys, as will be shown below, lie in the creative 
application of advanced research done abroad on the Austronesians and in 
interrogating and discarding the taken-for-granted adoption of the urban-centered 
setting as the measuring rod in comparative analysis of cultural development. The 
task was arguably executed in a magisterial fashion, if not a tour de force. 
Whereas previously historians had relied heavily on Beyer's wave migration 
theory to explain the cultural development and peopling of the early Philippines, 
the scheme adopted by the Tadhana in Book 3 (Austronesian in the Philippines) 
interestingly reversed the positioning and put the Philippines in an enviable 
position as a possible intermediate staging point for the 'epic peopling' of the 
Austronesian world covering wide areas as far as Hawaii, New Zealand, 
Madagascar and of course the Inda-Malayan realm (Marcos 1976c, 1, 6-7). I should 
note that this was not a mindless, procrustean distortion of known facts to fit into 
nationalist mould, which has been quite common in nationalist writing almost 
everywhere. Rather, it was a creative application of researches done in Europe 
(where Salazar studied) and elsewhere - which for the most part had not yet been 
applied to the case of the Philippines.14 This resulted in a refreshing, hard to 
dismiss, effort to demonstrate the affinity and equality of the early Filipinos with 
the rest of the Austronesians, more specifically the Malaya-Polynesians. At the 
same time, it underscores the primacy of internal factors-the internal dynamics-
in the development of culture within the area. 
14 Salazar (1974, 193-196) relied on the works of H. Fischer, H. Bohme, G, Coedes, A. Kruijt, G. Ferrand, R. 
Heine-Geldem, A. Keene, G. Carter, I. Dyen. 
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While the theme 'universalisation,' in the sense of primacy of universal 
history,1s runs through the heart of the first two books, it is with the 
particularisation process that the Books 3 to 5 were supposed to be preoccupied. 
This process is seen as a logical outgrowth of man's interaction with the natural 
environment whose variety set the stage for the formation of cultural communities 
distinct from one another. Thus, Book 3 identifies the Austronesians as an entity 
distinctive from the other groups such as Indo-Europeans, Hamito-Semites and 
Sino-Tibetan while Book 4 (Southeast Asia: The World Between) intends to narrow 
further the particularisation process by showing the gradual formation of the 
"Indonesian world" distinct from that of Austronesian kin, the 'Oceanic world' 
(Micronesians, Melanesians and Polynesians), and even more so from that of non-
kin, such as Indians and Chinese. Finally, in Book 5, the "Philippine Forms" 
gradually took shape roughly from AD 200 to AD 1565 as various differentiating 
factors came into play including intensification of inter-island (both intra-
Philippines and intra-regional) trades and the centrifugal pull of the Sinic and Indic 
civilisations on parts of the Southeast Asian world that left the Philippines on 
trajectory different from that of the rest of the region (Marcos 1976c, 1, 6-12). It was 
during this period, so the Tadhana suggests, that the 'proto-Filipino cultural 
identity' began to crystallise and by the end of this period, "the Philippines was on 
the verge of transforming herself from an "ethnographic entity into an 'historic' 
polity ... "(Marcos 1976c, 12). Implied in this formulation is the assertion of the 
primacy of internal factors and the rejection of the deeply entrenched views that 
cultural development in the early Philippines was brought about by foreign traders 
or waves of migrants. As a side note, this echoes the efforts of scholars such as van 
Leur, Smail and Benda who dealt primarily with the case of Indonesia. 
Likewise, this period coincides with the emergence of 'ethnic states', which 
in Salazar's view constituted one stream in the parallel development of comparable 
socio-cultural forces operative in different parts of Southeast Asia (Salazar 1974, 
15 This follows from the assumption that despite ecological and cultural differences in the global and local 
scale, peoples in different parts of the world are subject to more or less common set of historical forces. 
93 
189-190). Such a masterstroke in effect puts the pre-Hispanic baranganic16 
communities, composed of roughly 30 to 100 families or sometimes more, in the 
same league, say, as the famed ancient states, or ethnic states as Salazar prefers to 
call them, such as Champa, Funan, Srivijaya and Angkor. The stark difference in 
the levels of their development and what such difference may signify had been de-
emphasized as inconsequential. As the Tadhana framework asserts, comparative 
evaluation showing the superiority of Champa, Angkor and others and the 
backwardness of the barangays is based on a dubious yardstick that derives from a 
flawed assumption. The difference, it claims, owes much to the variations in the 
outcome of the interplay among commercial, environmental and socio-cultural 
factors unique to each locality as it interacted with a broader regional forces 
(Marcos 1976c, 10-11). As a process of state formation, which seems to be of major 
importance to the makers of Tadhana, they (various ethnic states) were a parallel 
response to a more or less common set of factors. There is, by implication, no 
reason why should Filipinos feel less about the ability of their ancestors and of 
themselves vis-a-vis that of other Southeast Asians. 
In short, while the absence of Angkor- or Borobudur-like monumental 
structures in the early Philippines pained many Filipino nationalist intellectuals, 
the framework adopted by the Tadhana rejected the basis of their worries. 
One other contribution of Tadhana's treatment of the pre-Hispanic period 
lies in its intent to find an acceptable basis for national unity that is rooted deeply 
in time long before the arrival of the Spanish. This attempt eschews the historical. 
orthodoxy that regards the nation-formation as an offshoot of the Spanish colon.ial 
project. From the viewpoint of the Tadhana, this is tantamount to settling for a 
superficial basis of unity that, precisely because it is superficial, cannot adequately 
address the persistent problems of disunity. Parenthetically, secessionism in 
Mindanao began to brew heatedly at about the same time the Tadhana was being 
16 This word is a derivation of the term barangay and is possibly used only in academic discourse on the 
Philippines. 
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conceptualised. By insisting on affinity with the Austronesian, Malaya-Polynesian 
world, and by underlining the particularization process that set the Philippines 
apart from it, the Tadhana found in the supposedly common base culture a 
unifying thread among Christian, Muslim and tribal Filipinos. Their particularities, 
Tadhana insists, were no more than skin-deep primarily because these emerged 
only as consequences of more recent historical developments (Tan 1976). This 
coincides with the idea that by the time the Europeans came, the base culture was 
sufficiently developed such that foreign influences that henceforth flooded in could 
not but be assimilated into the indigenous cultural matrix. Alternatively, they 
formed layers of trapping on top of a resilient indigenous culture.17 The key, 
Tadhana implies, lies in re-discovering and recuperating the indigenous 
foundation of Filipino identity and unity upon which the future structures of the 
nation would be built. 
Perspectives and Periodisation 
The search for deep roots not only of Filipino identity but also of the 
Philippine nation-state had a concomitant result of de-centring the colonial 
experience that for so long has served in Philippine historiography as the fulcrum 
of historical development. For so long, historical writings on the Philippines took 
the colonial experience as pivotal in the unfolding of the nation's history. This was 
the case of scholarship initially by Spanish scholars and chroniclers (from 1500s to 
early 1900s), then by the Propagandists and their immediate heirs (1880s-1920s), as 
well as by professionally trained historians from the generations of Fernandez and 
Benitez (1920s-1940s), to those of Zafra and Alip (1940s-1960s), and finally to the 
heyday of Zaide, Agoncillo and Constantino (1960s-1980s). There were major 
differences of course in the rationale, in focus as well as in tenor of evaluative 
17 The Tadhana declares: "When the Spaniards arrived ... the process of state construction was already 
underway, and instinct of wisdom moved them to build the colonial state upon the beginnings of the native 
edifice ... (T)he colonial state enlarged itselfon the foundation of the barangay, promoting acculturation and 
pursuing trade and political expansion on the same principal route the native logic and tradition had 
established ... " (Marcos, I 982b, iii). 
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assessments and interpretations, but they all agreed that the colonial period was the 
defining moment in Philippine history. 
That was not the case with the Tadhana.18 Although it concedes that it was 
during the colonial period that the transformation to become a 'political entity' was 
achieved, the colonial impetus was by no means a necessary ingredient. Such 
transformation, Tadhana avers, could have been attained anyway without 
colonisation because the complex of forces operative within the broader regional 
context was sufficient to consummate the transformative process. Besides, the 
colonial experience, as far as Tadhana is concerned, was little more than a thin 
glaze on the indigenously defined core, as already noted. The singularly most 
important defining thread or pivotal hinge, in its view, was the development of a 
Filipino nation-state (actually, more skewed towards development of the Filipino 
state than of the Filipino nation) whose roots originated, the Tadhana makers 
insist, in the distant pre-Hispanic past and whose future headed towards full 
realisation of a New Society. The use of nation-formation as a pivotal point is not 
unique to Tadhana. Agoncillo, and a few others, also used that as the anchoring 
device. The main difference, however, was that Agoncillo and others traced the· 
origin of the nation-state to the Spanish colonial period. As periodisation of the 
Tadhana shows, while the formation of national community (Vol. 2) corresponded 
neatly to the Spanish colonial period, the 'Philippine Forms' (Vol. 1, Part 5) had 
already taken shape by the time Spain came. Tadhana wants to shows that colonial 
structures could not but build upon the template defined by indigenous elements. 
Toward this end they made a meticulous effort to maintain, among other things, 
the quantitative balance in the coverage between Spanish and pre-Hispanic· 
periods. Both were allotted five books each. Seen from the vantage point of Zafra, 
Zaide, Alip and many others who devoted a disproportionately large space for the 
18 Veneracion noted that Tadhana's main difference from other histories previously written was its 
periodisation. In his words, "Whereas the thematic stress of previous historians was colonialism, Tadhana 
envisioned the emergence of the nation-state as a long process of development that went beyond 1565 ... " 
See Veneracion (1993). 
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Spanish period,19 on one side, and Agoncillo who deliberately allotted only three 
short chapters for this period20, on another, Tadhana obviously represents the 
middle ground. One can also easily see the heavy emphasis on the nation-state 
formation that seems to be the paramount concern of Volumes 3 and 4. On this 
point, Tadhana seems unique. Its recognition of the tension between nation and 
state as well as its emphasis on the state-formation, as distinct from but closely 
related to nation-formation, is not found in other approaches hitherto attempted in 
Philippine historiography. 
Periodisation is affected by the perspective or point of view adopted by the 
authors.21 Early on, spirited discussion focused on the dichotomy between colonial 
and Filipino viewpoints. At various times these terms assumed different meanings 
but they remain framed as might be expected within the us-versus-them matrix. 
The Propagandists led by Rizal, for instance, countered the Spaniards' pejorative 
bipartite view of history with a tripartite view. The bipartite view considered the 
time before Spain came as the 'age of darkness' that was superseded by the 'age of 
enlightenment' with the onset of Spanish period. The tripartite view on the other 
hand reversed the prism and viewed the time before Spain came as the 'golden' 
age; the Spanish colonial period, the 'age of darkness' and Spain's departure the 
redemption or the beginning of a new era. Just as the bipartite view informed the 
morally loaded evaluative framework adopted by Spanish scholars all through the 
centuries of colonial period, the tripartite view casts a very long shadow even up to 
some historical works by Filipino scholars up to this day. The good and the bad 
were clear-cut and were central to the analysis. 
Table 4. 2 
19 Zaide, for example devotes 28 out of 53 chapters in his two-volume opus The Pageant of Philippine History 
( 1979) whereas Zafra, 19 out of 29 in his Philippine History Through Selected Sources ( 1967) to the 
Spanish period. Zaide allots five chapters to the Pre-Hispanic periods, whereas Zafra has only a few 
scattered pages of reference to Pre-Hispanic era. 
20 His celebrated textbook A Short History of the Filipino People, the first edition of which was co-authored 
with Oscar Alfonzo, created a stir when it first appeared in 1960 for compressing more than three centuries 
of Spanish period to only three chapters. 
21 For a useful overview of explanations of the different logics behind the use of various periodisations of 
Philippine history, see Francis Gealogo, "Periodizations in Philippine History" (I 993b ). 
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Volume 1 
Part I 
Part 2 
Part 3 
Part 4 
Part 5 
Volume 2 
Part 1. 
Part 2 
Part 3 
Part4 
Part 5 
Volume 3 
Part I 
Part 2 
Part 3 
Part 4 
Part 5 
Volume4 
Part I 
Part2 
Part 3 
Part4 
Part5 
Outline ofTadhana 
.. TITLE 
The Roots of Filipino Heritage (Up to 1565 AD) 
Archipelagic Genesis (Pleistocene-Glacial Periods) 
Adam in the Philippines (ca. 250,000 BC-ca. 9000 BC) 
The Austronesians in the Phil. (ca.9000BC-1500 BC) 
The World Between (ca 1500 BC-200 AD) 
Philippine Forms (ca. 200AD-1565 AD) 
The Formatism ofa, NationatCommunity (15§5-1896) 
En~ounter; 1565-16()3 ·· · · · · · 
R~~ctioris, 1663-1765 
:rtansition; 1765-1815 . 
Transformation, 1816-1872 
Triumph, 1872-1896 
The Promised State: A Nation in Travail 
Birth of a Nation, 1896-1907 
Participation and Partnership, 1907-1921 
Crisis and Consolidation, 1921-1930 
Ferment and Control 
Conflict and Direction 
Search a.11d Synthesis; Towards the New Society ( 1946-
Present) · · ·· 
· Dilemmas ofNatiotfuqod,,l946:;]9~( 
Natie>nalism and Refortns, 1951-1966 
Radical Alternatives, 19()6~ 1972 . . .. ·.· 
National SY!lthesis: The New Society; 1972~ 
Source: Ferdinand Marcos, The Tadlzana Outline (1976) 
Subsequent assessments of American as well as Spanish colonial projects 
proved to be ambiguous. For generations of scholars appreciative of the legacy of 
Spanish and American colonisers-e.g. Christianity, education, public health, 
science and technology, democratic institutions -the colonial experience cannot be 
an undiluted curse. While such scholars as Fernandez, Benitez and Zaide have 
been branded as advocates of colonial scholarship primarily for their sanguine 
views of American colonisation, one can also find an avid proponent of the Filipino 
viewpoint, no less than Agoncillo,22 who was as appreciative of American legacies. 
In the same vein, one can find in Zaide (1957; 1979) and Joaquin (1988), to mention 
but two, who were sympathetic to the Filipino viewpoint and at the same time 
22 Cruz in his attempt to make typology of approaches to the study of Philippine history categorised 
Agoncillo's as 'pure nationalist history'. See Cruz ( 1982). 
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admiring and approving of the legacies of Spain. In other words, the terms colonial 
and Filipino viewpoints ceased to be a marker for a dichotomy between those who 
had respectively a favourable and unfavourable view of the colonial legacy. The 
issue on viewpoint became more about the question, who is at the centre-stage and 
who at the margin of the historical narrative? The earlier emphasis on moral 
judgment gave way to methodological issues. In this, Agoncillo' s very provocative 
pronouncement that there was no Philippine history before 1872 came to the fore. 
In a lecture delivered by Agoncillo in 1958, he made public the idea that he 
said he had told his students since the 1940s (Agoncillo 1958). That is, that 
Philippine history must be rewritten because much of what claimed to be as history 
of the Philippines was in fact not a history of the Philippines, but a history of Spain 
in the Philippines. He boldly asserted that the history of the Philippines proper 
began only in 1872 with the martyrdom of Gom-Bur-Za23, which also marked the 
beginning of Philippine nationalism. Before then it was the foreigners who wrote 
about the Filipinos and because of the writers' skewed perspective, the Filipinos 
can hardly be seen in their own narratives. Agoncillo was of course reacting to the 
common tendency of his contemporaries to include much materials of tangential 
relevance to the Filipinos. In his words (Agoncillo 1958, 6): 
Filipino historians ... discuss with alacrity such irrelevant subjects as Spanish 
expeditions to the Mollucas (or Moluccas), the Marianas, French Indo-China 
and other places, in which the Filipinos' only role was that of 
rowers ... (S)ubjects not related to the development of the Filipino nation, I 
dismiss in a few words ... 
Agoncillo has been recognized in standard, mainstream accounts Jor 
pioneering the push for and the introduction of the "Filipino viewpoint" in the 
writing of Philippine history. This brand of Filipino viewpoint while it can be 
subsumed under the tripartite view discussed earlier is in important ways different 
from it. Rather than being primarily concerned with the question of whether an 
23This is shorthand for Gomez, Burgos and Zamora, the three priests who were garroted by Spanish 
authorities in 1872 on charge of complicity in the Cavite Mutiny. 
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event or a period was good or bad for Filipinos, it is more interested in whether it 
is relevant to the formation of the Filipino nation. Otherwise, it falls under the 
rubric of colonial historiography and it deserves to be relegated to the background, 
if not left out altogether. Efforts to demonstrate the internal dynamics among the 
Filipino people, and to foreground them as the prime movers of historical change 
were all offshoots of this type of Filipino viewpoint. 
Zaide, complicating the picture, can be said to have his own version of the 
Filipino viewpoint. Despite being politely or bluntly dismissed by many historians 
for his 'colonial' and 'clerical' tendencies, his idea of what is a Filipino viewpoint 
could be resonant with the views of the silent public. The fact that his many 
textbooks were best sellers since the 1950s well up to years after he died in 1986, 
may indicate wide reception, or endorsement, of his approaches and ideas. In his 
revealing article "The Rewriting of Philippine History," he explicitly rejects the 
anti-foreign element in the Filipino viewpoint. He writes: "One can really love his 
fatherland without hating other nations. One can glorify the achievements of his 
nation without denigrating the achievements of other nations. And one can praise 
his own people without slandering other peoples" (Zaide 1973, 174). He also 
warned historians not to be "embittered by anti-foreign bias" (Ibid.). This is an 
obvious reaction to what he perceived to xenophobic, anti-colonial proclivities that 
began to permeate historical scholarship since the 1950s. Having enjoyed the 
orthodox status24 since pre-war years, Zaide may have found the atmosphere in the 
post-war decades, which was fertile for promoting heterodox views, 
disconcerting.25 To note, aside from the attitude towards the foreigners, the 
demarcating line separating Zaide' s from Agoncillo' s brand of Filipino viewpoint 
lies in Zaide' s emphasis on what he thought was good for the Filipinos, not on 
24 In the history of Philippine historiography, Zaide's books dominated the market before and after the Second 
World War. In that sense, he represented the 'orthodoxy' 
25 There is an extensive literature explaining the resurgence of Filipino nationalism since the 1950s. However, 
Agoncillo's brief article "Postwar Filipino Nationalism and Its Anti-American Posture" stands out for 
vividly capturing the sentiments, not just the logic of the nationalist response. His very effective prose may 
have much to do with it. 
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whether the Filipinos were at the foreground of historical narrative as was the case 
of Agoncillo. 
Meanwhile, the upsurge in influence of the radical, left-leaning groups 
coincided with the rise of yet another slant on the Filipino viewpoint. Cognisant of 
the widening gulf separating the small, highly westernised, rich and powerful elite 
from the vast majority of impoverished Filipinos, observers claimed there was a 
need to redefine relevance and perspective on the basis of social equity and social 
justice. Citizenship alone ceased to be the primary basis of the 'Filipino' in the 
Filipino viewpoint. The socio-economic class to which the majority belonged 
became the principal determinant. Believed to be the true makers and bearers of 
history, the 'masses,' however defined,26 became the proprietary claimant to 
Filipino viewpoint. Agoncillo' s revolt of the masses thesis helped paved the way 
for this, but it was Constantino's articulate and forceful advocacy that pushed it 
towards the center of historical discourses.27 For Constantino, the measure of 
relevance rests on the extent that knowledge helps liberate the 'masses' from the 
shackles of poverty and oppression. As far as he is concerned, "Filipino resistance 
to colonial oppression is the unifying thread of Philippine history" (1975, 9). 2s 
The sharp elite-mass dichotomy in Constantino's formulation found 
historiographic expression in the rejection of the great men's style of history or 
'history from above' in which the common people are hardly seen in traditional 
historical narratives, which is usually dominated by the stories about presidents, 
rich families, diplomatic policies, etc. Since the great majority of Filipinos were 
26 Schumacher notes rightly that one of the problems that bedevil studies on the Philippine revolution is the 
imprecision and "looseness of class terminology." Terms such as elites, ilustrados, caciques, principales, 
proletarian, middle class, upper-middle class, the people, and the masses are all problematic. For clear 
· explication, see Schumacher (1991a) Earlier, Guerrero expressed similar observation (1977, 22-25). 
27 Glenn May hit the mark when he described Constantino's book as a 'semi-sacred text' among Filipino 
intellectuals. It was precisely its enormous popularity, despite what May saw as its gross transgression of 
every canon of historical methodology, that disturbed him. See his article "A Past Revisited, A Past 
Distorted,"(1983) a hard-hitting critique of Constantino's The Philippines, A Past Revisited (1975). 
28 In Constantino's view, a relevant history is that which "can serve as guide to present and succeeding 
generations in the continuing struggle for change. Such a history must deal with the past with a view to 
explaining the present." Constantino ( 1975, 9) 
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(and still are) poor peasants and workers, it seemed scandalous to many observers 
that they hardly figure in historical accounts. To rectify the situation, what is 
variously called 'people's history,' 'history from below' or 'history of the 
inarticulate' became the aim of a growing number of historians.29 In this quest, 
Constantino played an important role. By imputing to the collective mass of people 
the power to act as an engine of historical change, he in effect put them at the 
centre of the historical enterprise. Notwithstanding his contribution to 
historiography, the Marxist provenance of his formulation, with its accompanying 
analytical and political rigidity, laid him open to harsh criticisms.3° Among other 
things, he was castigated for glaring bias and for leaving out or distorting facts to 
sustain his Marxist framework. A critic also pointed out that for all of 
Constantino's zealous promotion of a people's history, the people in his history 
hardly think, feel, speak and decide for themselves. Someone, or certain groups 
such as the elites, have had to do these for them (Ileto 1979, 5). In spite of all the 
criticisms, Constantino's writings, notably his two-volume synthesis of the history 
of the Philippines, have been immensely popular. Perhaps they constituted the 
single most influential set of work among the Filipino young intellectuals of the 
1970s and 1980s. 
Unhappy with a people's history where the 'real' people are almost muted 
or left out, historians devoted their efforts to allowing the masses to 'really speak 
for themselves.' Ileto's Pasyon and Revolution was a landmark product of this 
project. Among other achievements, it has demonstrated that despite the tyranny 
of the archives, so to speak, it was in fact possible to write history by using unusual 
texts -e.g. songs, folk tales, prayers, poems, pasyon - that were produced by the 
inarticulate masses. By allowing the 'masses' to speak, the Pasyon recognises the 
existence and autonomy of their worldview - a worldview that if seen from within 
its own logic is valid in its own right. Their perceptions and behavior can thus be 
29 For a brief overview of the concepts as applied in Philippine history, see Gealogo (1993c) 
3
° For critical reviews of Constantino's book A Past Revisited, see Schumacher (1975, 1991 b) May (1983) and 
Guillermo (1994) 
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understood on their own terms, not as an irrational variant of or an aberration from 
the elite-defined code of thoughts and conduct (Ileto 1979). Through Ileto's rather 
essentialist formulation (Hau 2002), the conceptual gap that divides the 'elite' and 
the 'mass' was made virtually unbridgeable, a formulation that would be refined 
almost to perfection and elevated almost to a dogmatic position by the Pantayong 
Pananaw. (We/Us-Perspective) (thereafter referred to as Pantayo School) The 
Pantayo School31 emerged from the sustained effort of a group of historians from the 
University of the Philippines. It is a philosophically sophisticated project and its 
methodological ramifications are in many ways path-breaking, within the context 
of nationalist historiography in the Philippines. Among its manifold contributions 
to historiography are the formulation and use of concepts and analytic categories 
that are believed to be primal and indigenous and thus supposedly faithful to the 
worldview and aspirations of the 'true' Filipino people. The purportedly 
indigenous elements, of which the masses are thought to be the repository, proved 
to be the most salient dimension in their formulation of a Filipino perspective. 
Begun in the 1970s, the Pantayo School rose to a dominating position by the 1990s 
in the country's largest and most important history department, that of the 
University of the Philippines. It does not mean that competing versions of Filipino 
viewpoint were obliterated inside and outside of the University of the Philippines. 
Like other elements of nationalist discourses in the country, they coexisted, albeit 
31 Pantayong Pananaw:' literally, 'we/us-perspective.' In Tagalog, the pronoun 'we' has two equivalents: tayo 
and kami. The first is used when the speaker includes the addressee and all other members of a group, real 
or imagined, to which both of them belong. The latter is used when the addressee is not included in the 
group the speaker refers to in a certain discourse. This differentiation has far reaching implications when 
applied to historiography. It identifies with whom the speaker (or the historical narrative) is engaged in a 
discourse. In the pantayo perspective, the discourse is between or among members of a group who may · 
constitute a 'nation.' In the pang-kami perspective, on the other hand, the speaker (or the historical 
narrative) is addressing people other than members of his/her own group. Corollary to the question with 
whom one is engaged in a discourse is the question whom and what is historical knowledge/or. From the 
pantayo perspective, historical knowledge is for the consumption of the members of one group or nation 
and it is for their better understanding of themselves. In the pang-kami perspective, on the other hand, the 
knowledge is designed to enable one group to present itself to another, probably as their equal or their 
superior. Knowledge, therefore, is for the consumption primarily of the one spoken to, and it is for the 
addressee to understand the group being presented to him/her. The presenter (of knowledge) gains a sense 
of fulfillment from having successfully presented oneself as either equal to or better than the addressee. (By 
far the most comprehensive and serious attempt to map out the history of Pantayong Pananaw can be found 
in Reyes (2002) For an accessible account, see Salazar (2000). For a well-thought out attempt to explain and 
critique Pantayong Pananaw, see Guillermo (2003) 
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uneasily, with the concurrently dominant school of thought. Having laid down a 
broad historiographic map, we must then ask where does the Tadhana fit in? 
The Tadhana to an extent constitutes a transition in the evolving quest for 
the definition of the Filipino-viewpoint. By pioneering the search for the deep, pre-
Hispanic roots of the Philippine nation-state, it prefigured the emphasis on the 
indigenous that would find eloquent expression in the '80s and '90s in the Pantayo 
School and in Bagong Kasaysayan (New History). By de-centering the colonial 
experience as pivotal to the nation's historical development, it foreshadowed what 
in due time would be recognised (at least in some quarters) as a landmark 
historiographic achievement: the cutting of the analytics of nation-formation from 
the hitherto colonial ties. Interestingly, it paralleled even anticipated certain 
important aspects of what has been trumpeted in the West as postcolonial theory. 
At the University of the Philippines, however, it exemplified the indigenisation 
movement epitomised best by the Pantayo School and Sikolohiyang 
Pilipino32(Filipino Psychology). By eschewing Constantino's and refining 
Agoncillo's formulations, and by rejecting orthodoxies espoused by Alip, Zafra, 
Zaide and others, the Tadhana was searching for an alternative that its makers 
believed to be more appropriate to address the problems of the time. What these 
problems were will be explored further in the next section. 
The transition role of the Tadhana can be partly explained by the fact that 
Salazar, one of the main players in it, was also the prime mover of the Pantayo 
School. The early formative period of the Pantayo coincided with the first five 
years of the Tadhana project, the same period when Salazar figured prominently in 
that Project.33 Upon leaving the Project tdwards the end of 1979, Salazar continued 
his historiographic crusade, gathering fellow travelers at the UP along the way 
until they established themselves by 1990s as the dominant faction within the 
32 Siko/ohiyang Pilipino (Filipino Psychology) is a parallel effort to indigenizethe study of psychology. It 
rejects, among other things, western conceptualization of the self. 
33 In Portia Reyes's dissertation (2002), what may be regarded as an 'official' history of the Pantayo school, 
she points to 1974 as the starting point of the development of the Pantayo School. 
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country's most important history department (Gaerlan 255-260). Their dominance 
would not last as Salazar and practically all his very close associates were purged 
out of the department in the late 1990s-early 2000 in the wake of a very complex 
intra-departmental politics. But that is another story altogether. What is important 
is that despite the physical purge of the Pantayo group, their historiographic 
influence lingers, notwithstanding the avowal to the contrary by the now dominant 
group. Even more significant, however, is the fact that despite the downright 
rejection of the Tadhana Project, dubbed as undiluted propaganda, the early seeds 
of the Pantayo ideas which heavily informed Tadhana' s framework have survived, 
and even risen to a prominent position. 
Vis-a-vis the Marxist-inspired notion of a Filipino-viewpoint articulated 
most eloquently by Constantino, the Tadhana was explicitly reactive and 
dismissive. The reason was not just political, as will be discussed in the next 
section. It was historiographic as well. The long tradition of framing historical 
questions along a dichotomous Filipino/ foreigner matrix provided an 
unfavourable context, which required more than subtle ideological conditioning 
for historians to transcend. The act of fragmenting the Filipino into various groups 
defined along social class, linguistic affiliation, and so forth was viewed as 
weakening its purportedly united front vis-a-vis the foreigners. Despite being more 
at home with Agoncillo' s version, the Tadhana group were not happy with this 
either. Though sympathetic to Muslims in his books, Agoncillo's concept of the 
Filipino remained for the most part focused on the Christian majority. It was, in 
other words, not sufficiently inclusive to address the concerns or aspirations of 
cultural minorities. As a corrective to Agoncillo, Tadhana offered a conception: of 
the Filipino nation wherein cultural diversity is constitutive of, rather than a 
problem in, the process of nation-formation. Tan's idea of tri-sectoral communities 
- Christian, Muslims and tribal - walking side by side with one another comprises 
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one of the salient contributions of Tadhana in historiographic development. 34 In 
Tan's (2004) words: 
Actually, the idea of the three sectoral community was inspired by Wolf, from 
my point of view fang. (only) Matagal na iyan ... (That's nothin.g new) (But) 
(a)ll previous history works (in the Philippines) did not look at that perspective 
!aging (always) based on the treatment of the Muslims and the tribal as 
peripheral. That categorized almost all the historians, from Spanish to 
American. There was no balance given to the three communities ... always 
dominantly Christian. Now, one idea of Marcos' nationalist vision is precisely 
to correct that perspective. So I was very happy that (they) kept my view ---
meaning to give equal treatment. The Tadhana was the first historical work that 
gave importance to these three - not in terms of one is superior to the other but 
one is distinct from the other. However small you are, you are important. The 
numerical existence was not the criterion for determining your importance. 
On the issues of histories from above and from below, the Tadhana exhibits 
a seemingly unresolved tension of combining the two strands that in some ways 
are fundamentally conflicting. On one hand, Tadhana puts a premium on state 
formation as the crux of historical development, the process that is essentially 
'from above'35 (Veneracion 1977). On the other, it traces the origin of national 
identity, even the state itself, to a past as distant as possible, calling the bedrock 
indigenous and taking the masses 'from below' as its true bearers. Tension such as 
this seems inherent in any effort to combine the nation and the state into the 
hyphenated nation-state. This is especially true in cases where geographic 
34 It is interesting to note that Tan's views ran counter to Salazar's on this point. The differences were clearly 
spelled out in Tan (1976). Despite non-reference to Salazar, Tan's article is obviously reacting to Salazar's 
conceptualisation of the pre-Hispanic periods in the Outline of the Tadhana. In Tan's formulation, the . 
unitary approach (apparently the one preferred by Salazar) is based on the assumption that there existed in 
the pre-Hispanic period a common cultural or historical unity. The bases for this unity are, in linguistic 
terms, Austronesian- Polynesian language, and, in cultural terms, the base-culture, which may be classified 
as Malay. The approach is to search for a "common thread in the maze of ethnic diversities and 
complexities ... ".[p. 5] The pluralist approach (Tan's view), on the other hand, assumes that "there are 
indefinite numbers of events or circumstances in the historical process which do not necessarily form into 
an inter-related whole". In the case of the Philippines, this means that before the coming of the Spaniards, 
communities in the islands were independent and isolated from one another and that the only kind of unity 
or cohesiveness was imposed from the outside. Unity was mainly political (ibid.). 
35 In a rare independent review of the Tadhana, specifically Vol. 2 Part I (Encounters) Veneracion expresses 
dismay that the volume, and the whole project, is conceived from the viewpoint of the 'big men,' in other 
word, 'from above'. 
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heterogeneity and cultural and socio-economic diversity are paramount, of which 
the Philippines is an example. What the Tadhana does is to recognise and confront 
the tension by attempting to synthesise the two strands with as one might expect 
uneasy and tenuous results. 
By insisting on the ethnic, pre-colonial origins of the Philippine state, 
Tadhana posits that in the distant past, there existed an indigenous Philippine state 
- a state that was a product of the intimate relationship between indigenous 
Filipinos and their environment; a state that supposedly came from the bosom of 
the Filipino 'nation.' It is another way of saying that before, there was no hyphen, 
no tension, between the nation and the state. The wide gap between the two that 
characterised the colonial and the post-war periods emanated from the long and 
divisive colonial experience. The Tadhana recognized it as a problem that had long 
been ignored by scholars and all politicians alike, until Marcos came and decided 
to do something about it. This smells of politics, as will be discussed in the next 
section, but from a historiographic standpoint, it has it own pragmatic value. For 
one, the polarity between histories "from above" and "from below" drains itself of 
the seemingly intractable friction. The issue ceased to revolve around the questions 
whether it was deliberately written from the viewpoint of either pole or whether 
inconsistency has been committed in its attempt to combine the two. The most 
pertinent questions become: (1) Which aspect of the Tadhana framework adopts a 
top-down perspective and which employs bottom-up viewpoint? (2) Why should 
this be so? and (3), at what point, if ever, might they merge as one? In Tadhana's 
formulation, the persistence of diverging perspectives is but a reflection of socio-
economic, political and historical reality and this calls precisely for the realisation 
of the New Society that, among other things, would smooth away such 
divisiveness. Apparently, the New Society was not just the culminating point of 
Marcos' effort to re-combine the nation (people) and the state (government) in a 
politically creative and harmonious synthesis. It also represents historiography's 
Holy Grail. From this vantage point, the use of state formation as an overarching 
framework is not just consistent with the emphasis on the indigenous or on 
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people's history; it is precisely the constitutive device for realising such a kind of 
history. As an initiative of the state, the Tadhana conjures up the future when a 
"true" people's history shall finally write itself, at which point, there would be no 
more need for state sponsorship. Until then, however, the state is justified in taking 
the initiative. 
1896 Revolution and Contested Nationalisms 
Another important area, though not as passionately treated as the previous 
two, revolves around the 1896 Revolution and the accompanying questions about 
Philippine nationalisms. Ileto considers the events surrounding the 1896 
revolution as a cornerstone of modern Philippine history and the founding myth of 
the Philippine nation-state (Ileto 1998b, 61). The centrality of the 1896 Revolution in 
historical discourses may be seen in the persistence since the 1950s of the 
discourses on the 'unfinished revolution' which various groups of opposing 
ideologies employ to make themselves seem relevant. As Ileto succinctly put it: 
"Without great monuments or a court culture to serve as an alternate focus or 
center of national aspirations the ensemble of events and ideas called 'the 
revolution of 1896' has had to serve as some sort of charter or as the legitimising 
principle for subsequent calls for unified action" (1998a, 195). Like many other 
events or ideas of monumental significance, its meanings are contested. It is 
problematic and ambiguous, as Mojares (1996, 263) observes, for it generates a 
surplus of meanings, which may be hostile, ambivalent and inassimilable. 
The Tadhana's treatment of the 1896 revolution is patently reactive to the 
sharply polarised debates about the 1896 Revolution and about the 'true' meaning 
of Filipino nationalism. As these debates are multi-layered and multifaceted36_ we 
shall focus for the purpose of this study only on the overall attitude towards the 
Revolution (especially vis-a-vis the Reform Movement) as well as on the extent of 
36 The exceedingly complex debates on Philippine nationalism may be gleaned from the fact that just within 
the left-leaning sector, Abinales has identified at least four streams that bitterly contested the 
interpretation of the 'national question.' (See Abinales 1999; Churchill 2001; Guillermo 1994). For 
controversies on Bonifacio, see Glenn May ( 1991, 1997) In response, see Determining the Truth (1997) 
edited by Churchill. 
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the role of the elite and the 'masses' in this landmark set of events. The primary 
reason for this is that among the Revolution-related issues, these questions are of 
the greatest relevance to Marcos's political blueprint. 
Agoncillo's assertion that it was a 'revolt of the masses' was a watershed in 
this debate. Spelled out in his controversial book of the same title, published in 
1956, it transgressed the orthodox meanings ascribed to the revolution.37 At various 
times until then, the Revolution had been seen as a handiwork of the ilustrados or 
the elites. Observers also claimed that rather than a movement driven by 
nationalism, it was a reaction against the abuse of the friars38 and against the 
excesses of feudalism or caciquism (Le Roy 1906 cited in Veneracion 1971, 33-34). 
The unity among the Filipinos, masses and elites, in their struggle against the 
Spaniards was also commonly posited.39 For casting doubts on these beliefs about 
the Revolution, he earned the ire of the establishment scholars.40 As evidence of the 
paramount importance of this work, a number of succeeding works explicitly or 
implicitly reacted to Agoncillo' s thesis, either by further developing it, by refining 
it, or by rejecting it altogether. Constantino, for instance, took off from Agoncillo 
and elevated the masses not just as prime movers of the revolution but also as the 
37 One characteristic of early studies (American period) on the Philippine revolution was to emphasize that it 
was a response to the oppression of the friars. Another was that it was a product of 'international Masonic 
conspiracy.' Nationalism hardly figured out as a cause. Another, as exemplified by Teodoro Kalaw's The 
Philippine Revolution, is to overlook regional or class conflict within the ranks of Filipino revolutionaries. 
Cited in Schumacher (I 99 I a I 80, 252). 
38 According to Schumacher ( 199 I a) the Americanistas among Filipino ilustrados in the early 201h century 
tended to downplay the notion of nationalism and instead focused on anti-friar sentiments in explaining the 
Revolution. He gave as an example de Tavera ( 1906). 
39 Zafra echoes a popular, monolithic view of the revolution when he asserted, in response to Agoncillo, that 
"the revolution was truly national in scope and in character. The persons who participated in it were moyed 
and inspired by a genuine love of country. They came from all classes and elements of the population." 
(I 956b, 502). The tendency in the post-Agoncillo/Constantino era is to reiterate this monolithic view. See 
for example various articles compiled in Llanes (1998) especially the synthesizing chapter by Ambrosio 
(I 998, 333-343). 
40 The fact that the publication of the book was delayed by 8 years, and it required presidential intercession 
before it finally appeared, indicated the level of controversy it generated even before it was published. The 
controversy broke out on two levels. First, the perceived anti-Catholic stance of the book. For this, 
Agoncillo found himself in a running debate with the spokesperson of the Catholic Church and a scholar in 
his owi1 right, Hernandez of the University of Santo Tomas (Agoncillo (1958). And second, concerning 
Agoncillo's class bias and other methodological issues. This is exemplified by the interesting exchange he 
had with his colleagues at the University of the Philippines (See Zafra (I 956b). For an overview and 
analysis of the debates and and other controversies, see Hila (2003). 
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engine of historical change. In his view, the hinge on which history turns is the 
struggle of the masses for greater freedom from colonial bondage and from 
oppression by the elite. Guerrero, for her part, has assaulted Agoncillo' s revolt of 
the masses thesis by demonstrating that it was the provincial and municipal elites 
who led the revolution in northern Luzon while the masses, abused by the Filipino 
elites and burdened by the policies of the Aguinaldo government, had every 
incentive not to support the revolutionary struggle, and even rose against the elites 
and the elite-led Philippine republic (Guerrero 1977; 1982). Glenn May who 
conducted research on the Southern Tagalog province of Batangas concurred with 
Guerrero. He claimed that patron-client relationship accounted for the involvement 
of the 'masses.' That is, it was the elite who led the fight against the foreigne:rs and 
the retinue of their underlings merely followed suit, either urider duress or in 
deference to the wishes of their patron.41 
Rather than pitting one against another, the Tadhana opted to combine the 
mass and the elitist elements as necessary ingredients of the revolution. It explicitly 
denied that it was a revolt of the masses. Rather than a manifestation of class 
struggle, it was presented as an "expression of the national community," and as a 
"product both of ilustrado and mass ideologies" (Marcos 1976c, 38). Painstakingly, 
it provided a smooth transition from the elitist Propaganda movement to the 
founding of La Liga Filipina (hereafter Liga)42 to the formation of the Katipunan. 
Whereas Agoncillo and Constantino drew a sharp contrast between the intent and 
the methods preferred by the Propaganda Movement and the Katipunan, and saw 
Katipunan as a necessary offshoot of the failure of the Propaganda Movement, the 
Tadhana endeavored to blur the line separating the two. This was done -by 
underscoring the mixed membership, meaning both elite and 'mass,' of the Liga as 
well as its transitory role in giving birth to the Katipunan. Short-lived as the Liga 
41 For perhaps the most direct attempt to revise Agoncillo's thesis, see May's article "Agoncillo's Bonifacio: 
The Revolt of the Masses Reconsidered" (1991). See also May's various articles in the collection A Past 
Recovered ( 1987). 
42 Rizal, realizing the futility of reformist efforts in Spain, returned to the Philippines and founded the La Liga 
Filipina on 3 July 1892. Three days later, he was deported to Dapitan and the Liga died a natural death 
shortly thereafter. On 7 July 1892, Bonifacio founded the Katipunan, in effect supplanting the Liga. 
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was, the Tadhana seems to overstate its importance by claiming that it was a 
"milestone in the effort of the reformers to link the ilustrados with the masses" and 
that it constituted the "marriage of strong social forces in a new dynamic ideology 
of national community" (Marcos 1982b, 432). In its effort to downplay the class 
element in the transition from Propaganda to Katipunan, the Tadhana declares: 
"The (Katipunan) movement was not so much a class takeover as an effort of the 
Filipino masses to take the leadership away from the ilustrados, who they felt, 
moved too slowly and too uncertainly" (Marcos 1982b, 431). With such a 
formulation whatever differences existed in their methods and objectives, and 
which to an extent reflected class differences, have been elided or effaced. This 
seems to pave the way for the view that partnership and complementarity, rather 
than contrast and oppositionality, should characterise the relationship between the 
Propaganda and Katipunan movements. 
The Tadhana established a complementary relationship between the 
Propaganda Movement (elite) and the Katipunan (mass) by several means. First, it 
insisted that the ideology of the nascent national community drew both from the 
liberal ideas propounded by the Propagandists as well as from the 'populist-
messianic sentiments of the masses,' an organized expression of which is the 
Katipunan, according to Tadhana (Marcos 1976c, 58). Second, it claims that the 
united front that made the Revolution possible was achieved when the ilustrado 
and mass elements were fused together and this was made possible through the 
combined efforts of the propagandists and the Katipunan. The Tadhana thus 
claims "Where Rizal and del Pilar represented the ilustrado reaching the masses in a 
common struggle against the frailocracy,43 Bonifacio stood for the masses 
struggling from below to reach the ear of the principalia-ilustrado" (emphasis 
original) (Marcos 1982b, 437). In other words, the "revolution represented the 
convergence of all the classes in Philippine society" (Marcos 1982b, 438). 
43 Frailocracy or friarocracy refers to the rule of the Spanish friars. It seems it is used only in the Philippine 
academic discourse. A search on the web reveals that only sites related to the Philippines contains this word. 
Many dictionaries also do not recognise it. 
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This erasure of whatever class or regional differences or conflict that existed 
within the revolutionary movement seems deliberate. In the extended outline44 
explaining the contents of Volume 3, Part (1896-1906), covering the Revolution up 
to early American period, no mention was made of the internal conflicts that 
dogged the revolutionary effort. The Outline focuses on the 'pragmatic and 
restrained' reaction of the Filipino nation toward the American incursion, stressing 
the cooperative stance of the Filipino leaders towards the Americans who 
promised them a 'Filipino State' (Marcos 1976c, 40-42). The silencing of the 
internal factional strife or class or regional contradictions in the analysis appeared 
to have been completed when the Tadhana blamed the 'feudal orientation of the 
Katipunan' for the downfall of Bonifacio and for jeopardising revolutionary efforts 
(Marcos 1982b, 438).45 The anti-foreign, anti-colonial aspects of the revolution are 
highlighted to the extent that internal or class-conflict elements are downplayed. 
Ironically, the Tadhana re-asserts some fundamental views on the Revolution 
propounded in earlier studies, considered as belonging to colonial historiography, 
such as Kalaw's (1925) and Fernandez's (1926). 
In fairness to the Tadhana, it was not alone in eschewing the Agoncillo-
Constantino formulation. Trenchant, if sometimes only implied, criticisms came 
from a number of scholars such as Ileto (1979), Guererro (1977) and Schumacher 
(1975), but their views were easily engulfed by the overwhelming popularity of 
Agoncillo-Constantino views. More recently, Quibuyen (1998; 1999) offered a 
deeply penetrating analysis of the whole gamut of pertinent issues and 
conclusively demonstrated the continuity between and the complementarity of the 
Propaganda and the Katipunan, affirming to a certain extent Tadhana's line of 
analysis. 
44 Because the second volume of the abridgment that covers the period 1896 to 1970s has not been printed, in 
fact the manuscripts or galley proof are deemed to be Jost, the only extant documentary basis are the 
extended outline, published as The Tadhana Outline plus a few other documents such as speeches and 
prefaces where brief references were made 
45 Interestingly and ironically, this echoes the view of some American colonial writers such as James Le Roy 
who emphasised the feudal character of the Katipunan. 
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The contentious character of the 1896 revolution is only a reflection of the 
multifarious nature of Philippine nationalisms on the whole.46 In earlier research 
carried out by the author, I examined the contents of 16 Philippine history 
textbooks published and/ or used in public schools from the early 1900s up to 2000. 
I found out that it was only among textbooks used during the American period 
(Barrows 1907; Fernandez 1919/1932; and Benitez 1926) that fairly clear and 
consistent images of nationalism were discernible. That is, the parameters of a 
hegemonic nationalist discourse were rather well defined. In the post-war period, 
in contrast, clarity and consistency gave way to and was easily overwhelmed by 
ambiguity, uncertainty and confusion (Curaming 2001 ). 
Clio in the Hands of Power? 
That the Tadhana is a political project cannot be denied. Notwithstanding 
the scholars' strong protestation to the contrary, Marcos did in fact intend to use 
the project for his own political interest. Despite the maximum latitude he allowed 
the scholars in designing the project, Marcos seemed to have a fairly clear set of 
ideas as to how he might utilise its output. He was even said to be confident that 
the final shape of the project would coincide with his overall designs (Cristobal 
2005). Most of the participant-scholars would vehemently deny this but the fact 
was Marcos had successfully, albeit partially, appropriated the "scholars' history" 
for his own political purpose, whether or not the scholars liked it or were aware of 
it. How and why it was achieved is a testament not only to knowledge's malleable 
character as a handmaiden of power but also, and of equal importance, to 
knowledge's ability to set the parameter for the exercise of power. 
In Marcos's own intimation the problems of national identity, national 
unity, and national self-determination are among the 'principal national problems' 
that must be addressed in any governmental efforts and such efforts included the 
46 In Ileto's article "History and Criticism: The Invention of Heroes," a thoughtful response to May's 
incendiary book The Invention of Heroes, there is a portion where he referred to the contested terrain of 
Philippine nationalisms. Interestingly, he challenged May to locate himself within it, rather than keep his 
(May's) pretensions of being a disinterested outside observer. See Reynaldo Ileto ( 1998, 231-234). 
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writing of history (Marcos 1982a, 5). To most Filipinos in the 1970s, including the 
scholars who joined the project, these were reasonable, even desirable goals to 
pursue. It is no surprise then that the Tadhana as designed largely, and allegedly 
independently, by Salazar and Tan precisely fitted into this mould. Apparently 
there was a meeting of the minds between Marcos and the scholars, and that is 
probably one reason· for Marcos' s full acceptance of the Outline when it was 
presented to him. 
As noted in Chapter 3, the Tadhana is popularly perceived as a political 
project that forms part of Marcos's effort to rationalise Martial Law. Despite 
reasons for believing that the truth is more complex, this perception has a prima 
fade validity to it. In declaring Martial Law and thereafter maintaining it for a 
decade,47 Marcos summoned a host of justifications foremost among which are (1) 
his alleged effort to 'save' the Republic from an impending take over by the leftist 
radicals and (2) his desire to reform the society and establish a new one where 
gross inequality is mitigated, oligarchic control neutralised and colonial legacies 
eased. That Marcos' s version of history as depicted in the Tadhana coincides 
considerably with these justifications lends credence to such popular perceptions. 
We should suspect, however, that we might be underestimating Marcos in 
supposing that that was in fact his only, or primary, purpose in mind. Considering 
Marcos' s track record of propensity for the impressive and the heroic, there may 
have been something grandiose in his overall plans. 
As noted in the previous chapter, contrary to a commonly held belief, 
Marcos did not wish to appropriate the project as a medium to convince,_ to 
respond to or to argue with the people of his own time. He knew too well that 
there was no way his contemporaries would interpret the Tadhana other than as a 
self-serving political project. He pushed through with the project just the same 
because he had set his sights on the distant future. He wanted to address the 
47 Officially, the Martial Law did not last beyond a decade but Marcos's grip on power did not ease even after 
it was formally lifted in 1981. So until Marcos was removed from power in the 1986, the Martial Law 
atmosphere reigned de facto. 
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people yet to be born, Filipinos and otherwise, who perhaps in a century hence, 
unencumbered by the bitter polarisation of contemporary politics, would judge 
fairly and would acquit his actions and appreciate the wisdom of his decisions 
Cristobal 2005). In other words, he was setting an eye to arguing his case before the 
altar of history and he was staking a confident claim to a vindication. 
Several factors are relevant in understanding the fit between Marcos' s 
political interest and the design of the Tadhana. First is the radical politics, brewing 
since the 1950s, that saw the mounting effort to bring down the establishment. 
Second is the growing disenchantment with the liberal representative democracy 
that Marcos and others saw as having degenerated to become a rule by the 
oligarchs. Third is the upsurge in Filipino nationalism, and the escalating 
contestation for its definition. And lastly is Marcos's faith in the power of 
scholarship as a legitimating tool. 
Politics of lndigenism 
Earlier sections in this chapter have demonstrated that the Tadhana is 
particularly emphatic in its treatment of the pre-historic and pre-Hispanic periods. 
It proudly declares, not without justification, that it is the "first work on Philippine 
history that conceives prehistory as a necessan; part of history." (italics mine) 
(Marcos 1980b, blurb) It also concedes, as already noted, that the indigenous 
principle permeates much of the framework of the project.48 From the point of view 
of scholars who participated, this is purely an act of filling a huge historiographic 
void. There is nothing political about it for, as they would rhetorically ask, "How 
can rock formation or human evolution or development of early settlements be 
political?" Salazar, for instance, adamantly declared that it was his personal policy 
to work only on topics as far removed from the Marcos years as possible. He 
believed that by focusing, say, on the prehistoric or pre-Hispanic period, he bore 
48 In Marcos's words: Tadhana is a "history concerned with the indigenous as a principle of assimilation and 
growth ... It became necessary for me to find out what were the native and indigenous structures that we 
could adopt for renewal in our New Society. How can we utilize the past in order to fortify the present and 
to assure the future" See Marcos (I 982b, 6, 12). 
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no responsibility for whatever political intent ascribed to the Tadhana Project 
(Salazar 2004a; 1989, 198). Self-satisfied as Salazar was, he could not be more naive 
in his supposition. It was precisely in the indigenous buried in the very distant past 
that the spectre of Marcos' s political project lurks. 
The deeply political colour of the Tadhana' s emphasis on the indigenous can 
best be understood and appreciated by looking into the conditions that gave rise to 
the Project. Ileto convincingly demonstrates in one of his articles that the radical 
politics starting from the 1950s well up to the 1980s provides the 'discursive frame' 
through which Marcos' s effort at history writing could be understood. He argues 
that the challenge mounted by radical students not just against the Marcos regime 
but also against the entire ideological bedrock upon which it rested had prompted 
Marcos to wrest the revolutionary initiatives from the young radicals (Ileto 1998a, 
177-201). The memory of the siege of Malacanang in January 1970 by the radical 
student activists seemed too frightening for Marcos to ignore (Rempel 1993). One 
prong in his multi-faceted response was to offer a supposedly revolutionary 
ideology designed to counter Marxism/Maoism/Leninism whose foreign 
provenance, among other things, purportedly made these ideologies inappropriate 
for the Philippines. At the same time, he could not hide his contempt for the liberal 
representative democracy, which like Marxism and its variants was of foreign 
origin (Marcos 1971, 64). 
On this point, Larkin's observation may be instructive. According to him the 
disenchantment with the failure of Western-inspired representative democracy as a 
means to improve the lot of the people may be one possible reason for the sJ:iift 
towards the search for the indigenous (Larkin 1979, 9-10). The problems began to 
appear not merely as systemic that may be remedied by changing one Western-
inspired system (capitalism and liberal democracy) for another (socialism/ 
communism). The critics grew more convinced that the roots of the problem went 
deeply back to Western mentality itself. More than systemic, the problem was 
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civilisational and the solution lay in recovering the indigenous elements to serve 
as the basis for creating a new system. 
In Today's Revolution: Democracy (TRD, 1971) we can see Marcos's early effort 
to lay the groundwork for rejecting foreign models and finding a Filipino 
alternative. He offered the Filipino version of democracy, what he called the 
democratic revolution from the center, as this alternative. As though to implement 
this alternative immediately, soon after declaring Martial Law, he altered the 
political landscape in the local areas by making the barangay the basic political unit. 
This would serve, at the same time, as the socio-economic structure of the New 
Society. One of the purported aim of the New Society was "to strengthen the 
baranganic culture and retrieve its cultural elements ... " (Marcos 1976b, vii). The 
New Society thus constitutes a return to or a re-recreation of the pre-Hispanic past 
where the barangay was thought to be the primeval core of nascent Filipino 
communities. Marcos rationalised this move by highlighting barangay's 
indigenous credentials: the barangay having emanated "from the traditions of our 
race (and) (t)herefore it draws on spiritual strength" (Marcos Diary, entry for 9 
January 1973). Hard to please as Marcos was known to be, it was likely that he felt 
less than satisfied; he needed a more compelling set of justifications. Enter the 
Tadhana. What the Tadhana does, with all its emphasis on the indigenous, is to 
formally encode in a historical, scholarly, and presumably authoritative template 
what otherwise would seem to be an obviously political move. By doing so, the act 
seems domesticated and naturalised and was made to appear truthful and more 
acceptable, or so Marcos hoped. At the same time, as Ileto noted (1998a) the 
position of history as a battlefield in his multi-cornered struggle against leftist and 
rightist adversaries has been highlighted. 
There is something in history, and all other disciplines dealing with the past, 
that seems to makes it prone to contestation. Distance or remoteness is a fertile 
breeding ground for uncertainty that is one factor that fuels disagreement. In the 
absence of a broad platform upon which to base contrary or alternative views, the 
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few who have access to 'expert knowledge' tend to monopolise debates among 
themselves, to the effective exclusion of the general public. From this vantage 
point, the Tadhana's emphasis on the distant past, and the employment of highly-
credentialed scholars to provide 'expert knowledge' about it, are, perhaps with or 
without meaning it, strategic. To the extent that the past is lost, it is manipulable. 
The dexterity by which Tadhana knits the pre-Hispanic periods into a 
coherent whole, from the onset of the Big Bang, to the geologic formation of the 
archipelago and the evolution of Adam in the Philippines, all the way to the 
formation of Filipino identity with its deep roots in the Austronesian past; all these 
lend a patina of credence only serious scholarship can give to otherwise patently 
self-serving political motives. Besides, without such a master stroke, rejecting 
foreign models and talking about Filipino ideology seem hollow, for what was 
commonly thought of as Filipino was nothing more than a concoction of 'three 
centuries in the convent and forty years under the spell of Hollywood.' By 
anchoring the Filipino in a very distant past, it makes some sense to eschew foreign 
models and consider a 'genuinely Filipino' alternative. 
One challenge, however, was how to present a consistent image of a 
'genuinely Filipino' alternative, considering that the Philippine state itself, as 
almost everyone takes for granted, was a child of the Philippine Revolution which 
in turn was inalienably linked to Spanish colonisation. Tenuously, the Tadhana 
confronts the challenge by tracing the origin of the New Society government not to 
the Spanish colonial state but to the supposedly autochthonous ethnic states that 
emerged long before the Spaniards came. As earlier noted, the Tadhana asserts that 
the colonial state established by the Spaniards could not but build upon the 
existing framework defined by ethnic states (or the barangays), making it some 
kind of an indigenous state (Marcos 1976c, 10-11). By such a stroke, the continuity of 
the ethnic states with the contemporary government is thus forged and the 
genuineness of its claim to Filipino-ness is affirmed. It becomes seemingly easier, 
then, to present the New Society as an appropriate vehicle for searching the 
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"Filipino identity to solve the centuries of ambivalence in national attitudes, values 
and action ... " (Marcos 1976b, vii). In the end, the Tadhana drove home the 
message that Marcos wanted every Filipino to imbibe: that the New Society is the 
tadhana, the destiny of the Filipino people. With the use of such a metaphysical 
idiom, Marcos seemed bent on strengthening his deposition before the judging 
eyes of Clio. Whether that would ultimately help, we have yet to see. But so far, he 
has not succeeded. 
The choice of the title Tadhana was ominous. Tadhana is a Tagalog word, 
probably derived from Sanskrit, whose close equivalent in English is destiny or 
fate. It carries a connotation that things are beyond one's control, as God or the 
celestial forces predetermine their course. As a nationalist project, Tadhana is 
expected to be teleological. It appears, however, to be more than that. By tying 
history to destiny, not just to the nation's destiny but also to that of Marcos's, the 
triumvirate-history, destiny and Marcos-became inextricably linked in the 
metaphysical transcendence of time and space. It was a combination that was 
potentially formidable, and it certainly was not lost on Marcos. In his own words, 
"History is destiny. For long before you and I were born, history dictated the 
future of our country" (Marcos1982a, 12). By eliding the past and the future, the 
present-Marcos, New Society, constitutional authoritarianism, whatever it was-
became a fait accompli, a fate every Filipino must enjoy or endure as a necessary 
bridge to the glorious future. 
Known rightly or wrongly for fatalism, the Filipinos were'the obvious and 
vulnerable targets of the rhetorical device that was tadhana. It was an index to 
Marcos' s political acumen to frame his life, his political career, and the life of the 
nation using a metaphor that was not unlikely to appeal to many Filipinos. 
Predating the Tadhana Project was a host of commissioned biographical works in 
which the foreboding of greatness and inevitability of Marcos' s achievements was 
encoded. As noted by Rafael (2000, 128), in reading or viewing Marcos' s 
biographies, one cannot fail to sense that "biography merely confirms destiny." 
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The bio-film Iginuhit ng Tadhana (Destined by Fate or Written in Stars), which he 
utilised as powerful campaign material in the 1965 presidential election, cannot be 
more transparent. What the Tadhana Project did was not just to cap all previous 
efforts but also to inscribe Marcos's personal ambitions in the supposedly 
foreordained historical trajectory. 
Homogenizing Politics 
As already noted, the Tadhana rejects the class-based perspective, best 
exemplified by Agoncillo-Constantino, as well as its concomitant analytic approach 
to the Revolution. Such a move fits very well within the ambit of Marcos's political 
interests. Marcos may have had an intense hatred for the oligarchs, but he refused 
to take the side of the 'people' by viewing things exclusively from their viewpoint. 
That would have been tantamount to upholding the views of his leftist adversaries. 
Instead, he saw the oligarchs as the rent-seeking intermediaries that set the masses 
apart from the state, thus hampering national unity (Marcos 1971). Just as the friars 
who mediated between the colonial state and the people had to be eliminated, so 
did the oligarchs. If and when that was accomplished, much progress towards 
national unity would have been achieved. This is another way of saying that the 
Tadhana favours the homogeneity of the nation-homogeneity that, the Tadhana 
was careful to emphasise, is deeply rooted in the pre-Hispanic past. Thus any 
divisive elements-class-based conflicts, regionalism, and secessionism-are seen 
to be anomalous and the state must deal with them by all means possible, 
including the use of force. In this, Marcos's multi-faceted and at times violent 
struggles against the leftist radicals, the oligarchs, the liberal politicians, the 
Church, the press, the Muslim separatists and others found justification. He 
seemed to say, it was not just called for by an instinct for self-preservation; it was 
necessary for the survival and security of the nation. 
The effacing of any conflict or internal difference is best showcased by the 
Tadhana's treatment of the Katipunan and the Revolution. As already noted, the 
Tadhana excises or silences any conflict or differences between the 'masses' and the 
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elite, Bonifacio and Aguinaldo, Caviteno and the rest, to mention but a few. 
Considering Marcos' s desire to draw parallels between the 1896 revolution and his 
democratic revolution, this is not just understandable, but also expected. Faced 
with ever sharpening division on all fronts- social, political, ideological and 
cultural-the Tadhana in its articulation of Marcos's definition of the usable past 
had to emphasise history's homogenising, unifying function. 
On a side note, in the context of the scholars' strong protestation of their 
independence, the treatment of the Katipunan and the Revolution seems to be 
rather curious. Considering that the scholar-participants were invariably from the 
University of the Philippines, and that a good number of them were even jailed for 
their nationalism and anti-Marcos activism, it is rather unusual that the Tadhana 
was so clearly designed in stark contrast to Agoncillo-Constantino' s formulation. 
Not only that, it re-inscribes parts of 'colonial historiography' on the Revolution in 
a way long rejected by the scholars who wished to be identified with the 
'nationalists.' It was the Agoncillo-Constantino line of nationalism, buttressed by 
Amado Guerrero, that informed significantly the whole anti-colonial, anti-state 
nationalist movement in the 1960s and 1970s in which the University of the 
Philippine was the undisputed centre.49 One can surmise that had the core scholars 
in fact had their way, the Revolution would have not been treated in a fashion that 
would make Agoncillo and Constantino turn over in their grave. While it is true 
that there are different shades of Philippine nationalisms, and that different 
stakeholders were scrambling to assert their own definitions, the Tadhana' s 
I 
treatment of the revolution may be taken as indicator of the triumph of Marcos's 
political interest over that of the scholars. 
On the other hand, one cannot totally rule out the possibility that the 
Tadhana-makers were in fact consciously going against the tide of Agoncillo-
49 As observed by lleto, the radicalisation of the youth followed and borrowed strength, at least in part, from 
the shift in historical consciousness marked by displacement of the reformist Rizal by the revolutionary 
Bonifacio. Such a shift, he further noted, owed much to the revisionist historical interpretations of the 
events of 1896 as proffered by Agoncillo and Constantino as well as by Amado Guerrero. See Reynaldo 
lleto (I 998a) 
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Constantino tradition. From the vantage point of the post-Tadhana historiographic 
landscape, it is clear that the Agoncillo-Constantino tradition had spent much of its 
force, at least from the viewpoint of certain groups, and has given way to a more 
indigenous version of nationalism, the version pioneered by the Tadhana. In a 
sense therefore, the Tadhana constitutes a transition in the development of 
indigenism in Philippine historiography. 
Other Indicators 
Aside from the emphasis on the indigenous and on the homogenizing 
aspects in the perspective and treatment of the Revolution, other clues about the 
political character of the Tadhana may be found in the presentation of the book as 
well as in the rhetorical styles employed. For instance, in the preface of the first 
volume of the abridgment, Marcos writes: "History is nothing if it is not an orderly 
account of events in chronological sequence ... From (geologic past to) the barangay 
to the modern state runs the thread of a narrative that must be told in a 
comprehensible and orderly manner, if it is to be told at all" (italics mine) (Marcos 
1982b, ii-iii). This passage forms a part of what was reproduced in the blurb 
usually reserved for the catchy and juicy tidbits to whet readers' interest. In the 
context of deeply entrenched tradition where lucid written expression and linear, 
orderly narrative are taken for granted, one can only wonder what was the need 
for being over-emphatic about it. Recalling, however, that clarity of message is an 
absolute requirement in any propaganda, lest the message gets distorted or lost, 
the emphasis becomes comprehensible. 
Likewise, efforts have been made to domesticate the idea of a new society. 
While Marcos took pride in having a proprietary claim (through the TRD) to the 
idea, he nonetheless emphasizes in the Tadhana that the New Society he wanted to 
establish in the 1970s was just the most recent in the series of societal renewals that 
recurred throughout Philippine history. In his words: "(M)ankind, not least of all 
Filipino, is continually reborn in an endless recurrence of creation that has set upon 
the planet a succession of new societies" (Marcos 1982b, iv). He also believes that 
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"(e)very distinct epoch ... entailed a 'new society,' so that our history may be 
viewed as essentially a series of new societies, each bringing change, if only in 
texture, mood or pattern" (Marcos 1976b, viii). By locating the New Society within 
the familiar, he seems to encourage everyone to accept on-going changes and to 
participate in and share with the birth pangs of a supposedly 'natural' 
transformative process. Probably wanting to offer additional inducement, he 
dignifies such participation as" ... perhaps the most historic act of all" (Ibid.). 
Conclusion 
To sum up, the Tadhana was both a reaction to and an accommodation of 
the rather fluid nationalist traditions in Philippine historiography. It was at the 
same time an attempt to push back the frontiers of these traditions. As a reaction, it 
was mindful of the problems that had long haunted Philippine historiography and 
it aimed to offer alternative solutions to these problems. As an accommodating 
move, it framed its narrative within the long-familiar nationalist, anti-colonial 
template but only occasionally carelessly fell into old cliches that had been quite 
common among nationalist writings in the Philippines. As indications of its 
conscious attempt to raise the historiographic benchmark, it offered among other 
things a framework that was refreshing for its scope and theoretical coherence and 
for the novelty and boldness of its approaches and interpretations. It was also 
remarkable for the richness of the historical databank it was able to set up-a 
databank that enabled it to fill in some important gaps that had long existed in the 
historical narrative.so Though not without its shortcomings, the Tadhana Project 
arguably constitutes a quest for a higher degree of sophistication in Philippine 
historical scholarship. Its progenitors intended it to be so. While working on it, 
they were conscious of the increasing competition in the marketplace of historical 
ideas and approaches within and beyond Philippine historiography. They may not 
50 Marcos correctly noted that the unsatisfactory state of historical studies in the country owed much to the 
fact that 'reconstruction of the past is still incomplete ... We get by with certain romantic generalisation 
about the past and about its relevance to the contemporary times, but in fact whole scores and even centuries 
of our history have not merited enough study and analysis from our scholars in order to prove or disprove 
these conclusions' (Marcos l 982a, 4). 
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have been forthright about what was at stake in the whole enterprise, but 
considering the 'logistics and logic'Sl of power relations within and beyond the 
scholarly community, the Tadhana and the scholars who took part in it, appear to 
be staking a claim to social acceptance, to academic accolade, perhaps to political 
patronage as well, but most importantly, to the symbolic power that goes with all 
of them. By striking a partnership with a powerful state, they probably thought it 
was strategic for gaining the broadest 'market share' for the version of history they 
propounded. 
The fact, however, that the Tadhana was also a political project proved 
disastrous to such aspirations (both for the scholars and for the project as a whole). 
It seems precisely because of the Marcos signature that the Tadhana has been off-
handedly dismissed as undiluted propaganda. Whatever scholarly value the 
scholar-participants may have invested in it hardly mattered in the face of the 
adverse political fall out. Then as now, only a handful of scholars out of the 
Tadhana circle realised and appreciated its scholarly value. Clio and her disciples' 
quest for greater power appears to have backfired. Or perhaps, that is a premature 
judgment as only time can tell. 
That Marcos sought the service of Clio's disciples cannot be adequately 
explained by his desire for more power. The other side, points to its limits. Anyone 
it seems to whom history matters has not much choice but to play by its rules, 
which incidentally can be bent only so much.52 It is easy to see individual (or 
group) effort to sway history to their side as a sign of the absolute manipulability 
(or powerlessness) of knowledge. Easily overlooked is the more deep-seated is_sue 
of why the effort was made in the first place. Pointing to the quest for power is 
only half the equation. For one does not seek more power if he has enough. Who or 
51 I borrow the phrase from Vicente Rafael's engaging article, "Patronage, Pornography, and Youth."(2000, 
123). 
52 The case of Suharto regime's (specifically military's) manipulation of history seems to pose a challenge to 
the line of thought I am trying to develop here. But as I hope to demonstrate in Chapters 5 & 6, Indonesia is 
interesting not because it negates the idea of dialectical relationship between power and knowledge but 
because it offers contrasting case that can illustrate the range of possibilities within the same frame. 
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what causes, then, the feeling of inadequacy that necessitates the quest for more? 
Anyone's access to the real world is mediated by the knowledge he/ she has about 
it. In the case of Marcos whose sense of history arguably finds not many peers 
among political leaders, the mediatory role of history can be easily posited. Against 
the risk of reifying history, however, it must be underscored that Marcos' 
understanding of it, as anyone else's, is highly personal. To the extent, however, 
that one wants to utilise history for the purpose of gaining more power, one cannot 
but contend with the sociality of historical understanding. At the heart of such 
sociality lies the 'autonomy' of knowledge vis-a-vis power of certain groups or 
individual. I hope that by comparing the case of the Tadhana with the Sejarah 
Nasional Indonesia (SNI) we can gain deeper understanding of how knowledge 
and power interact. 
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CHAPTERV 
THE SEJARAH NASIONAL INDONESIA 
It has been said that although God cannot alter the past, historians can. 
It is perhaps because they can be useful to Him in this respect that He tolerates their existence. 
- Samuel Butler, Erewhon Revisited ( 1949 [ 190 I]) 
T he idea of writing national history through a collective effort was conceived rather early in Indonesia. Barely had the ashes of the war for independence settled when a committee was appointed in 1951 to 
undertake a history-writing project (Sartono 1975; Surjomihardjo 1987b). The 
committee consisted of the most prestigious scholars of the time-Poerbatjaraka, 
Yamin, Djajadiningrat, Soekanto and Resink. For unknown reasons, however, the 
plan did not materialise (Abdullah 1994).1 Another proposal was put forward in 
1957 during Prijono's stint as Minister of Education and a committee was formed in 
1963 (Sinar Harapan 1976).2 Perhaps due to the strained political atmosphere during 
that time, however, nothing came out of it too.3 Only in the wake of the Second 
National History Seminar (Seminar Sejarah Nasional, hereafter SSN2) held on 26-29 
August 1970 that concrete results would eventuate. The product would be a six-
1 Abdullah ( 1994) speculates on possible reasons: ( 1) they could not agree on the concept of national history; 
(2) they were too prominent to find time to write a textbook; or (3) academic or ideological -
incompatibilities. In the case of the second attempt in the 1960s Nugroho Notosusanto ( 1969, 4) claimed 
that the government during the Guided Democracy was not willing to entrust the writing of history to 
historians whom they thought were not "politically correct." 
2 The surat keputusan (letter of decision or instruction) dated 13 March 1957, issued by the then Minister of 
Education, Prijono, stipulates that one of the main objectives of the seminar was to collect materials that 
will be used to compile a national history, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia. See Laporan Seminar Seqjarah 
(1958, 8). 
3 Taufik Abdullah succinctly captured the impact of Guided Democracy atmosphere on historical studies in 
Indonesia in these words: "The emergence of the Guided Democracy marked the waning of the pluralities of 
expressed ideas. The meaning and understanding of history was no longer to be continuously searched for, 
but rather something to be supplied the 'revolutionary' nationalist regime" ( 1975, 99.). 
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volume opus simply entitled Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (National History of 
Indonesia). 
Like Tadhana, Sejarah Nasional Indonesia (SNI) was a partnership between 
two forces that some people believed contain contradictory elements. While both 
projects were laboratories of tensions between politics and scholarship, they 
nonetheless offer illustrations, in different shades, of a symbiotic relationship or a 
creative fusion of powers emanating from each domain. 
In the following section, I will attempt to narrate a story, or pockets of 
stories, about the inception of the SNI. The context and the driving forces for the 
Project will also be noted as a prelude to a more detailed discussion in the next 
chapter. To be provided likewise are snapshots of the implementation of the project 
with particular emphasis on the dynamics of the relationship among the 
protagonists. The last section will focus on responses to the Project which will lay 
the groundwork for an in-depth investigation of the context and the content of the 
SNI in the next chapter. 
Inception and Driving Forces 
While the Seminar Sejarah Nasional II (SSN2) is commonly perceived to have 
given birth to the Project, lending it an aura of a consensual decision,4 it was in fact 
conceived and was given official imprimatur several months before the national 
seminar. On 4 April 1970, more than four months before the SSN2, the Minister 
of Education and Culture, Mashuri, issued a decision lette~ (No. 0173/70) 
designating the Committee for the Writing of the Standard Book on the National 
4 Abdullah (1994) for instance noted that one of the resolutions emanating from the SSN2 was the decision to 
write a standard history book and that the government took over such decision and formed a committee to 
oversee its implementation. (p. 14-15). In contrast, an article in Sinar Harapan (I 970b) published a few 
days after the Seminar noted that Professor Sartono in his closing remarks categorically stated that the just 
concluded national seminar opted not to identify specific resolutions. Surjomihardjo (1980) for his part, in 
rejecting Nugroho's claim that the government chose the people who would be involved in the project, 
declared that he had observed the process at close range, from the formation of the committee that would 
oversee the SSN 2 and thereafter the SN! and he could say that the decision on who to invite came from the 
historians themselves. Even Sartono, in my interview with him (22 June 2005 and 15 December 2005) 
insisted that it was a collegial decision of the community of historians that emerged as an offshoot of the 
SSN2 and the formation of Masyarakat Sejarawan Indonesia (MS!, Association of Historians of Indonesia) 
in August 1970. 
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History of Indonesia. Stipulations in the letter included the following: (1) that the 
book be based on Pancasila; (2) that it could be used in the universities; and (3) that 
it could be utilised as the basis for writing textbooks for elementary and high 
schools (Zain 1976). The appointment of the Committee was preceded by meetings 
among historians and between the historians and the Minister himself. In short, the 
idea was already being "cooked" by the time it was presented to the SSN2 in 
August 1970 for the acclamation of the whole community of historians. Only the 
details would have to be spelt out later. Unknown to the historians who took part 
in the seminal meetings, the germ of the controversies that were to haunt the 
Project once it saw print in 1975 and beyond had been planted at that very early 
stage.5 
Sartono, who would spearhead the Project, admitted that he was "dubious" 
about the idea of writing a national history at that time. Asked about the reasons, 
he carefully couched his words in very polite terms saying to the effect that the 
experience or the abilities of the prospective members of the team in writing 
history were "so uneven" (Sartono 2005a). Underneath such polite words was the 
fact that by that time there were hardly sufficient intellectual resources to carry out 
the project successfully.6 By 1970, there were, for instance, only two scholars with a 
PhD in History (with Indonesia as their expertise) in Indonesia, both still fresh 
from overseas: Sartono who completed his PhD degree in 1966 in Amsterdam, and 
Taufik Abdullah who obtained his in 1970 from Cornell. The first homegrown PhD 
in History would not be produced until Nugroho Notosusanto "':"as conferred the 
degree by the University of Indonesia in 1977. According to Sartono, the same 
scepticism was shared by other scholars who attended the initial meeting, but 
5 The earliest documented effort ofNugroho to convince the Indonesian historians happened sometime in 
February I 969. On the occasion of"Scholarship, Reunion and Graduation Week" (Pekan Kegiatan Ilmiah, 
Reuni Sarjana dan Wisuda) of the Faculty of Arts and Culture of the UGM, Nugroho delivered a lecture 
entitled "Sedjarawan Indonesia dan Sedjarah Indonesia." (Indonesia Historians and Indonesian History) In 
this lecture, he proposed that it was about time that the community of scholars undertook the writing of a 
"standard" Indonesian history. (Notosusanto 1969). 
6 In an article that appeared in Kompas the day before the start of the SSN 2, Sartono's assessment was 
agreed with by an undisclosed observer who noted that with few exception, one cannot but admit the bitter 
fact that in terms of quality and quantity the output of the existing generation of Indonesian historians was 
still inadequate (be/um memadai). See "Menjonsong seminar sedjarah nasional ke II," Kompas (l 970a). 
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Nugroho Notosusanto firmly believed otherwise (Sartono 2005a). He forcefully 
argued that one cannot say that they were not yet ready until they did it and saw 
the results. He said that for too long Indonesian historians had been engaged in 
discussing abstractions as how should history be written, it was thus about time 
that they focused on the concrete, and they could best learn and develop clear 
concepts and methods while in the process of writing history itself (Notosusanto 
1969, 8-9). Steadfast in his conviction, he won the day, as he often would in the 
course of the Project? Well placed in the government, and a friend of the then 
Minister of Education, Mashuri, he facilitated the release of the decision letter and 
convinced fellow historians to undertake the Project. 
Before we move on, let us take a look at the contrasting background of the 
two main protagonists of this story: Sartono Kartodirdjo and Nugroho 
Notosusanto. Sartono is a towering figure in Indonesian historiography. He holds 
the distinction of being Indonesia's first professionally trained historian and his 
academic achievements were impressive. He graduated (doktornndus8 in History) 
from UI in 1956, took his MA at Yale under Harry Benda in 1963, and opted to do a 
PhD in Amsterdam, through the encouragement of Benda himself. He obtained the 
degree in 1966.9 He has a well-deserved international reputation for a number of 
his publications and he has dominated at least the "academic" history landscape in 
Indonesia for decades. Now in his 80s, almost blind but still sharp and lucid, his 
achievements, if not also influence, remain unsurpassed. To many among his peers 
in and outside of the country, he embodies 'scientific history' as opposed to 
'politicised history' for which much of Indonesian contemporary history-writing is 
known. 
7 Sartono recalled that at the time there were exchanges between those who supported and those who opposed 
the idea, he received a small note (he did not specify from whom) indicating that the Ministry of Education 
had already agreed upon the plan and that the Ministry would fund the project. It was at that point that he 
acceded to the proposal (Sartono 2005a). 
8 Patterned after the Dutch system, doktorandus in Indonesia in the I 950- I 960s roughly corresponded to a 
Master's degree. After about 3 years of Bachelor's degree (Sarjana Muda), some students study for about 2 
more years and write a thesis to get the doktorandus degree). 
9 According to Sartono, it was Benda who suggested to him to do a PhD in Amsterdam for the simple reason 
that that archives were there (Sartono 2005a). 
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Nugroho stood in notable contrast to Sartono. He used to be a fairly well-
known literary figure, an author of short stories, in the 1950s before he opted to 
become a historian. Academically his credentials as historian were not as 
impressive despite holding the distinction of perhaps being the first homegrown 
PhD. Some observers, friends and critics alike, would tend to harp back to his 
literary background, his not being a "pure historian" (sejarawan murni), for his 
putative "sins against history."10 By that, it refers to his well-known reputation as 
an apologist or an ideologue of the New Order regime. He went to SOAS in 1960 
on a Rockefeller fellowship purportedly to do a Master's degree in philosophy of 
history11 but he left in 1962 before the degree was completed.12 While he went on to 
obtain his PhD in History from the University of Indonesia (UI) in 1977, the 
circumstances surrounding the conferment of the degree tends to cast doubt on its 
merit.13 He became the Department of History's first professor of history in 1980.14 
10 A running joke, for instance, between Taufik Abdullah and Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo was that Nugroho 
was like that because he was not from the Department of History but from General Studies (also in UI). 
That is, in the 50s and 60s, the Faculty of Arts allowed students who were still undecided to stay in the 
General Studies program and decide later on what specialisation to pursue. Nugroho was one of those 
students. He used to be much more interested in literature and only in later years he opted to move to history 
(Abdullah 2005). Adrian Lapian likewise expressed more or less similar view. In his words, "(Nugroho) 
started in literature and then majored in History. So he didn't have a full course of History. Only one 
year ... " (Lapian 2005). 
11 While informants from :ndonesia all attested to this information, Wang Gungwu offered a different view. 
According to him, Nugroho and he were both Rockefeller grantees in SOAS in 1960-62, but not as degree 
students. Instead, they both were doing research. He said that ifhe remembered it right, Nugroho worked on 
the question of British involvement in the Indonesian revolution (Wang Gungwu 2005). 
12 The reason for prematurely returning to Indonesia remains unclear. His wife, Irma Notosusanto(2005), who 
joined him in London, related that at the height of the crisis on lrian in 1962 Nugroho all ofa sudden told 
her that he wanted to go home saying that war was breaking and he didn't like to be overseas when there 
was war in Indonesia. So off they went. Later, however, she thought that the real reason could be related to 
the problem of severe lack of lecturers in the Faculty of Arts at UI as well as to the increasing polarization 
of campus politics that left no one interested in occupying the position of Dean of Student Affairs. 
13 Sartono related that, sometime in 1977, Nugroho approached him after completing in Japan the draft ofhis 
PhD thesis. Nugroho asked Sartono to be promoted to PhD. Sartono found the draft inadequate and so he 
turned down the request for promotion. Revisions had to be made before he could approve the thesis. 
Apparently, Nugroho did not want to revise. After quite some time, Sartono was notified by UI that there 
would be a change in the composition ofNugroho's thesis committee. That is, that Harsha Bachtiar would 
be willing to act as the promoter (main supervisor) and Sartono would become just a co-promoter. The 
promotion day was set but mysteriously, Sartono was not properly informed. He said that he asked the Ul 
personnel where and when the promotion would be done, but he never got a clear response from them. 
Meanwhile, Sartono had to go to Istanbul for a conference and while he was away, Nugroho's promotion to 
PhD was done (Sartono 2005a). That a plot may have been hatched may be glimpsed from putting together 
Sartono's story and some relevant information from an anonymous informant. This informant said that 
some people in the Faculty of Arts and the History Department had interpreted Sartono's refusal to promote 
Nugroho as an indication of brewing professional jealousy on the part of Sarto no. During that time, Sartono 
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He was a towering figure in the Department and his influences cast a long shadow 
over it, even after he died in 1985 (Irsyam 2005). His shadow actually extended 
beyond academe into the society at large as some would go as far as crediting him 
for enormous contribution in popularising history among the common people 
(Suryanegara 1985, 6).15 He was invited to join and lead the Armed Forces History 
Center (Pusat Sejarah ABRI, thereafter Pusjarah) in 1964 and began almost two 
decades of loyal service to the military.16 His military service formally ended only 
when he was installed as Rector of the University of Indonesia (UI) in 1983. While 
in the military, he maintained his ties with the UI as a lecturer/professor in, even at 
some point the Head of the Department of History. Many are convinced that his 
devoted and loyal service to the military earned him military commendations and 
was the only Professor of History in the whole of Indonesia and he was with Universltas Gadjah Mada 
(UGM), a rival university of UI. They thought he was being unreasonable in preventing Nugroho from 
getting a PhD, to the continued disadvantage of the UI Department of History vis-a-vis UGM's. The same 
informant also said that to his/her surprise, Harsha Bftchtiar, the promoter, gave Nugroho's thesis the lowest 
passing grade, just enough for Nugroho to be conferred the PhD. He/she then asked Bachtiar, "Why did you 
give Nugroho the lowest passing grade. You're his promoter. A promoter usually should give the highest 
grade?" This person quoted Harsha Bachtiar saying that that was what Nugroho's thesis deserved. This 
suggests that Sartono's assessment was right on the mark; and that he was not being unreasonable in 
preventing Nugroho from obtaining the PhD, as some in UI suspected. Perhaps, Bachtiar was only being 
generous to Nugroho when he gave him a passing grade. There were reasons to believe that Bachtiar, like 
Sartono was a tough nut to crack too. That he was no fan of Nugroho's approach to writing history may be 
glimpsed from the story of Anhar Gonggong's tedious climb to his PhD. He related that by 1985, after 5 
years of work under Nugroho's supervision, he had already completed the draft of his thesis. He expected it 
would not be long before the promotion. Unfortunately, Nugroho died in June 1985 few months before 
Gonggong's expected promotion. So he had to change supervisor and it was Harsha Bachtiar who took over. 
To his dismay, Bachtiar told him to revise everything. It would take him another 5 years, in 1990, before he 
could finally graduate. That Bachtiar was tough was clear in that it would take Anhar Gonggong one and a 
half years to write, to Bachtiar's satisfaction, his introductory chapter (Gonggong 2005). 
14 Nugroho was appointed professor on 6 January 1980 (Kompas 1980, 1) That he was the first Professor of 
History at UI needs clarification. Only a professor can supervise and promote a PhD. In the 1970s, only· 
Harsha Bachtiar held that rank in the History Department ofUI. That explains why he was the one who 
promoted N ugroho to PhD, after Sartono who was the original supervisor appeared to have been 
unceremoniously sidelined (more on this later). Harsha Bachtiar's PhD however was in Sociology, not in 
History, so he was often not considered a Professor of History. Nevertheless, since he taught Social History 
(Sejarah Masyarakat) he was with the Department of History. So strictly speaking, as Nugroho himself did 
declare publicly, (Sinar Harapan l 980c) there were only two professors of history in Indonesia up to the 
early 80s, that is, Sartono and himself. 
15 Suryanegara notes that Nugroho's controversial historical works may have contributed greatly to 
popularising (memasyaratkan) history. The uproar, he further noted, over PSPB that ensued after the death 
ofNugroho in June 1985 indicated his success. 
16 For details about Nugroho's life and service to the military, see McGregor (2002, Chapter 4; 2005). 
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apparently political appointments in the government as well.17 On the other hand, 
these government appointments made many people doubtful of his integrity as an 
intellectua1.1s He ranks perhaps among the most controversial personalities in 
Indonesia's postwar history as, some would say, an exemplar of the 'intellectual 
prostitute.' As far as orientation in writing history is concerned, he favoured a 
more conventional chronological-narrative approach with heavy emphasis on 
military and political aspects. 
What gave rise to the Project was a confluence of factors. At the broadest 
and the most fundamental level, the nationalist atmosphere provided a template 
that brought all the participants together, as in the case of Tadhana. With the 
perception of the colonial orientation of existing history books,19 the scholar-
participants shared a desire to contribute towards countering or neutralising the 
legacies of a 'colonised history.' They all believed they were doing something 
good, something they could be proud of, because it was a nationalistic 
undertaking. They believed that what they were doing was a historic act; they 
were not just writing history, they were at the same time making it (Sinar Harapan 
1970a). 
Beyond the limited circle of scholars, encouraging support for the Project 
came from various segments of the society. Press coverage of the SSN2, for 
instance, focused heavily on the supposed main objective of the conference. That is, 
to take stock of researches in history with the view of producing a national 
history.20 This level of interest was not surprising considering that the 
17 Many of my infonnants believe that Nugroho's appointments first as Rector of UI and later as Minister of 
Education were a sort of'reward' for his loyal service to the military. Even one of his very close former 
adjutantsin the Pusjarah believes so. 
18 Saraswati Barkah, for instance, in his article in Sinar Harapan (I October 1985, pp. 5, 7) noted that now that 
Bung Kamo was dead, he (Nugroho) attacks him whereas in 1966 Saraswati said she could attest to the fact 
that Nugroho wrote articles praising Bung Kamo. She was implying that the change in Nugroho's tone may 
well indicate his doubtful integrity as intellectual. 
19 Examples include Vlekke 's Nusantara (1945, 1959). 
20 See for instance the following newpaper articles: "Seminar Nasional Kedua di Jogya," (Kompas I 970d) 
"Sorotan Pedas Terhadap Bidang Sejarah" Kompas ( l 970b); "Menjongsong Seminar Sedjarah Nasional ke-
11," Kompas (1970a); "Menteri P & K Oper Rentjana Penulisan Buku Standard Sedjarah Nasional," Kompas 
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decolonisation effort was mounting in Indonesia as elsewhere in Asia and Africa, 
and history was seen as among the most important areas that badly needed 
decolonisation. Even Sartono, who doubted the timing and the chance of success of 
the project, could not but be carried along the currents of the time. He was 
persuaded to lead the project. In his opening remarks in the SSN2, he justified the 
conference by stating that there had not yet been a coordinated effort to write a 
national (non-colonial) history and that the existing history textbooks he described 
as "chaotic" and afflicted by too much commercialism (Sinar Harapan 1970a; 
Kompas 1970b). He also noted that Indonesia was being left behind by 
neighbouring countries in its efforts to write national history. Apparently this 
realisation came from his participation in the International Association of 
Historians of Asia (IAHA) conference, held in Kuala Lumpur in 1968 (Sinar 
Harapan 1970a). 
From a political standpoint, the 1970s was auspicious for the Indonesian 
state to undertake a history writing project. It was going through a period of 
consolidation. Sponsoring a history-writing project, and installing the output as the 
'standard history' to which all history textbook writings would refer, appeared to 
be a politically strategic act. 
It was not clear whether it was Nugroho's original idea to undertake the 
project or it was an order that came from the higher authorities. What was certain 
was that he gathered and convinced a small group of historians/ scholars who 
would eventually form the backbone of the project.21 
Nugroho recalled that prior to the idea of forming a team to write national 
history, an idea was floated to have a nation-wide history-writing contest whereby 
worthy entries would form various chapters in the projected book. After due 
(l 970c); "Kesan-Kesan Dari Seminar Sejarah: Penjusunan Buku Standard Sedjarah Nasional Indonesia" 
Sinar Harapan ( l 970b ); "Buku Sejarah Nasional Dekati Chaos," Sinar Harapan( l 970a), 2 September 1970. 
21 The earliest documented effort ofNugroho to persuade the scholars to undertake the project is clearly seen 
in a lecture he delivered in UGM in early 1969 on the occasion of the "Scholarship, Reunion and 
Graduation Week." His lecture is entitled "Sedjarawan Indonesia dan Sedjarah Indonesia" (Indonesian 
Historian and Indonesian History) Notosusanto ( 1969). 
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consideration, however, they realised that entries· to the contest might not 
guarantee the quality of the prospective book. It was then that the option to form a 
team of writers was taken up instead (Zain 1976).22 The shape of the team readily 
followed the six panels in the conference: prehistory, ancient period (Hindu-
Buddhist period), Islamic kingdoms (1500-1800 AD), colonial period, national 
awakening and the Japanese period up to New Order. The heads of the various 
panels became the respective editors of the six volumes (Lapian 2005). For details, 
see Table 5.1 
Volumes 
I 
Il. 
III 
IV 
v 
VI 
Table 5. t 
Outline of Sejarah Nasional Indonesia 
Covera~e ... Member& of.th~ '.f ea1n 
Prehistory (Prasejarah) 
Hindu-BuddhistPe:dod 
(I M-1500M) " 
Islamic Kingdoms 
(Kerajaan Islam) (1500-
1700) 
1&1h..19th century (Abad 
18th -19th) 
National Awakening 
(Kebangkitan Nasional) 
(1900-1942) 
Japanes~New qr~er 
Periods. Gaman · 
Jepaµg~Orde Batu}' 
,(1942-:~970s) 
Soejono (editor), T, Asmar, DD Bintarti, 
Hadimulmuno, T. Yacob, I.M. Sutaba 
Uka Tjandrasasmita (Editor), Hassan Ambarry, 
AB Lapian, MPB Manus, Sagimun MD, Tujimah 
Sutjipto (Editor),>Djoko Suryo, Sartono . 
Ka.rtodirdj(), Thee Kian Wie 
Abdurachman Surjomihardjo (Editor), Deliar 
Noer, Taufik Abdullah, Yusmar Basri 
N ugroho N otosusaoto. (Editor), Ari:wi~di, Emilia 
B; Wiesmar,.M:'.. Marbup, ~o~hmaniSfintoso;Saieh 
As'~d Djaniliati ··. · · ·" · ·· · · · 
22 
"This was corroborated by a candid assessment of the SSN 2 published in Kompas, 16 September 1970, 
whereby the author observed that in general the papers presented at the conference fell short of expectations 
as only a handful were products of original, empirical research. Mostly, papers were summaries or synthesis 
of previously published works (Siswadhi 1970). 
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The team was led by three main editors, Sartono Kartodirdjo, Merwati 
Djoenid Poesponegoro, and Nugroho Notosusanto. Sartono23 occupied the highest 
post being the Editor Umum (General or overall editor). This was in obvious 
recognition of Sartono' s leading position in the community of historians in 
Indonesia. Merwati Poesponegoro, on the other hand, was appointed to the core 
group primarily because of seniority.24 Her expertise was in European history, and 
she would play a mostly ceremonial role as one of the main editors.25 If Sartono 
earned his place in the leadership for his academic reputation and Merwati for 
seniority, it seemed that Nugroho was assigned to the core group because of the 
combination of the two reasons. He was among the most senior and he also had 
some standing in the academic community. Among historians interested in 
contemporary history at that time he was perhaps among the most productive, if 
not also the most senior. This put him in the editorship of Volume 6, which dealt 
with the contemporary period. Besides, the project seemed to be his personal 
initiative so it does not surprise that he occupied one of the key positions. 
Implementation 
The available details about the implementation of the project are at best 
fragmentary. Djoko Suryo had a vivid memory of the early stage when Sartono 
was conceptualising the project. Being Sartono' s protege, Djoko had observed him 
at close range. He said he was the first to know the design because, being Sartono' s 
assistant, he typed the manuscript. He recalled the procedures by which Sartono 
meticulously drew up a grand plan, starting from identifying the general questions 
and specific themes, justifying the perspective, drawing up periodisation, 
23 Note: Sartono Kartodirdjo is more popularly known simply as Sartono, so he will be referred to here as 
Sartono, including i"' citing references. While Kartodirdjo is his family name and many libraries even in 
Indonesia would enter his works under this surname, reference to his name here would be under Sartono. 
24 Note that by this time Poespoenegoro was in her 60s, having been born in 1910 (Poesponegoro 1988, 
blurb). Taufik Abdullah recalled that when they were assigning specific tasks for the committee, they 
merely followed the hierarchy of officers in the MS! in determining the main editors. Since Sartono was the 
Chair, therefore, he was the General Editor, Merwati Poesponegoro was the First Vice Chair Nugroho was 
the Second Vice Chair thus they were assigned general editors as well (Abdullah 2005). Merwati 
Poesponegoro studied in Stanford and the Sorbo me (Abdullah, 1975, 130; Poespoenegoro 1988, blurb). 
25 Merwati Poespoenegoro was supposed to act as the style-editor but apparently she did not in fact do the 
job. In Adrian Lapian's words, Merwati "didn't contribute anything" (Lapian 2005). 
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identifying the methods of processing materials, up to projecting the substance of 
the written output.26 Djoko claimed that the "arguments, theories and perspectives, 
everything was there" and that he learned so much that he used the experience as a 
model for his own future research-design undertakings. Sartono also envisioned, 
so Djoko recalled, training the writers in theoretical and methodological 
approaches. The whole idea was "very, very idealistic," according to him (Djoko 
Suryo 2005). 
By November 1970, the conceptual framework worked out by Sartono was 
completed (Sartono 1972). A few meetings were then held among the members of 
core group (volume editors and main editors) as well as within each volume-team 
to formalise division of labor and discuss the suggested outline and the 
framework.27 The first task was to survey and gather available published materials 
for the respective periods (Surjomihardjo 1987a). Meanwhile, Soedjatmoko who 
was an enthusiastic supporter of the project suggested to Sartono that an intensive 
six-month preparation overseas be undertaken (Sartono 2005a; 2005b).2B Through 
the intercession of Soedjatmoko, then Indonesian ambassador to the United States 
(US), funding was secured from the Ford Foundation to allow Sartono and the six 
volume editors to go to the US and the Netherlands. The objectives were to 
undertake a 'crash course' on various aspects of social science theories and 
historical methodologies, as well as to gather materials. The trip materialised in 
November 1971. Sartono envisioned that after the intensive training overseas, they 
would revise or refine the framework that he had drawn up (Sartono 1972). He 
26 I was not able to find an extant copy of the detailed framework entitled "Kerangka Konseptuil Sejarah 
Nasional Indonesia."[Conceptual Framework of Indonesia's National History] Sartono said it was 
published in an Indonesian journal but my search did not produce any result, even the indexes of journal 
articles published in Indonesia does not include such a title. However, one can get a glimpse of some of 
Sartono's ideas and suggestion in a paper he presented in the workshop at Tugu, Bogor in June 1972. See 
Sartono ( 1972). 
27 As noted for instance by Sagimun MD, one of the members of Vol. II I team, their team met on 11-15 March 
1971 in Tugu, Bogor and on 28 April 1972, to to discuss plans of action of the team. See Sagimun MD 
(1972). 
28 Soedjatmoko had a strong interest in the project. This was manifested by his encouragement and assistance 
in securing funds for the team to have an intensive training in historical methods overseas. This may be a 
reflection of his desire to 'save' history from the pervasive influence of the political environment, as he 
wrote in late 1950s to Kahin.See Kahin & Barnett ( 1990). 
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recounted that, prior to the group's departure, he initially went to the US alone to 
look for an appropriate university with which they could affiliate. He visited 
Cornell, Wisconsin, Yale, Berkeley and another one which he could not recall. He 
finally decided to choose UC-Berkeley. He said that the primary reasons were that 
(1) the weather in Berkeley was appropriate to the tropical sensitivities of the 
member of the group, most of whom have not been overseas yet; and (2) that 
Berkeley's Department of History, in Sartono's assessment, was very strong in 
social history, the approach very much preferred by him (Sartono 2005a; Ford 
Foundation 2003, 123). 
Almost every day from November 1971 up to March-April the following 
year they spent reading and discussing, among themselves and with historians 
from Berkeley. Mornings and afternoons were for reading and evenings usually for 
discussion. Things they read and discussed included the social science approach to 
history writing, social science theories and methods, recent research abroad about 
Indonesia and the experience of other nations in writing national history (for more 
details see Tjandrasasmita 1972). In Sartono's count, they had 99 sessions in all 
(Sartono 2005a). Uka Tjandrasasmita, one of the volume editors, recalled the 
experience as pleasant and very intellectually productive and satisfying 
(Tjandrasasmita 2005). He was quoted by Sartono as saying that" (I have) never 
read so many books in so short a time" (Sartono 2005a). Others, however, 
complained of being overwhelmed. Trying to know so much, they said, in so sh9rt 
a time could result in an overload (as recounted by Djoko Suryo 2005). They were 
' 
also able to buy quite a lot of books, about 20-30 each per person, from the 
apparently generous per diem provided by the Ford. In April, they moved to the 
Netherlands primarily to gather materials. They stayed there for a month and in 
early May 1972, as Sartono recalled, they went back to Indonesia (Sartono 2005a; 
Ford Foundation 2003, 123). 
Perhaps as a portent of what to come, this early part of the project 
encountered difficulties. The preparation in Berkeley did not go as smoothly as 
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Sartono hoped. Nugroho, for instance, could not complete the 'program' because, 
as the Head of the Pusjarah, he had other heavy responsibilities. He stayed for only. 
two months (Ford Foundation 2003, 123). Buchori, the editor of Vol. 2, stayed in 
Cornell for unspecified reason rather than join the group in Berkeley, and only for 
two-three months (Sartono 2005a). Another one joined only in the Netherlands 
(Sutjomihardjo 1987b).29 In the view of Abdurrachman Sutjomihardjo this was a 
very early indication of the inability of the group to work together well (Ibid.). 
About a month after returning from overseas, on 6-10June1972 they held a 
semiil.ar-workshop in Tugu, Bogor where all the members of the team attended. At 
this meeting, each group reported on the progress of their work as well as on the 
problems so far encountered.30 Sartono also discussed the multi-dimensional 
approach to history and how this might be applied (Surjomihardho 1987a; Sartono 
1972). The succeeding plenary meetings alternated among Bogor, Puncak and 
Jakarta and were held at least once every 6 months, coinciding with the semestral 
break from teaching in the university (Sartono 2005a). For each group, meetings 
were held more frequently, as needed (Sagimun 1972).31 
Taufik Abdullah described plenary sessions as involving intense scrutiny of 
each team's plans for their respective volumes. He recounted that having just 
returned with a PhD from Cornell (in his words "fresh from the oven") he was 
eager to display what he knew. He earned the annoyance or fear (or both) of 
several in the group for his stinging criticisms. He particularly remembered his 
unforgiving critiques of Nugroho' s presentation, wherein the latter proposed what 
Taufik considered as an eschatological emplotment of Indonesian history. What 
was worse, according to Taufik, Nugroho proposed that the group should decide 
29 Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo's version is slightly different from Sartono's. He said that of the six volume 
editors, only three fully joined Sartono. One only stayed for a month (apparently Nugroho), the other one 
(apparently Buchori) joined only at the fourth month in the US, and the last one, only in Netherlands. 
3
° For details of what were discussed during the Workshop, see the three volumes of proceedings: Lokakarya 
Buku Standard Sedjarah Indonesia, Jilid I-III. (1972) 
31 Sagi mun M.D ( 1972), noted that they (the Volume 3 team) met a number of times before and after the 
volume editors went to Berkeley in Nov. 1971. 
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then on how to regard Sukarno, that is, whether he was a traitor or a hero. Taufik 
recalled that, admitting a lack of wisdom owing to youthful impudence, he 
lambasted Nugroho reminding him that in writing history, empirical data should 
decide the conclusion and not the other way around. Nugroho, Taufik surmised, 
was deeply hurt by having been humiliated in front of the whole team, which 
included his young associates in the Pusjarah. Taufik believes that Nugroho never 
forgave him for what he did (Abdullah 2005). 32 
Djoko Suryo' s recollection was consistent with that of Taufik' s. He 
remembered that plenary discussions were an exhilarating experience, especially 
for someone as young and as eager to learn as he was. He recalled learning a lot 
from the sessions. He also could not forget memories of his contemporaries who 
were then working under Nugroho in Pusjarah and were assigned to Volume 6. 
These young proteges and protegees of Nugroho' s, so Djoko recalled, had to 
endure panic attacks whenever they had a presentation and Taufik Abdullah was 
there, always ready with loads of biting criticisms or difficult questions. While the 
rest of the team pitied them, they were also a constant source of amusement for the 
group (Djoko Suryo 2005). 
The membership of each group was based mainly on the area of expertise. 
Each volume editor, however, seemed to have enjoyed de facto freedom to decide 
who to invite to become part of his team. Nugroho for instance chose to employ his 
proteges from Pusjarah who were all young and inexperienced, fresh from 
undergraduate (or doktorandus) studies at the UI Department of History. Against 
the backdrop of high hopes and expectations for the Project, at the early stage_no 
one suspected, or no one voiced suspicion if there was any, that such a move was 
32 Yusmar Basri, one ofNugroho's close aides in the Pusjarah who himself was present during the workshop 
said that although Nugroho was not the type of person who divulged what he felt, it was possible that 
Nugroho was indeed offended by Taufik's broadside (Yusmar Basri 2005). 
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part of an undisclosed political motive behind the Project. Suspicion would arise 
only at a later stage (Djoko Suryo 2005; Sartono 2005a).33 
Most members of the team shared Sartono' s avowal of the freedom they 
enjoyed while writing their respective assignments (Lapian 2005). Under no 
circumstances, Sartono strongly emphasized, were any government officials to 
watch over the proceedings, nor were there to be guidelines from the government 
as to what they could and could not write about or how specific events should be 
interpreted (Sartono 2005a).34 This freedom, however, seemed to apply only to 
volumes in which the government only had remote interest. As far as Volume 6 
was concerned, that appeared not to be the case. As one of the members of Volume 
6 team has confirmed, the way how they wrote the volume was in compliance with 
a "military mission." That is, "to shear (the nation of) Sukarno" (Saleh As'ad 
Djamhari 2005a).35 As this will be discussed in depth in the next chapter, suffice it 
to state here that this statement refers to the effort to cleanse the collective national 
memory of anything good that Sukarno did or stood for. The regime seemed to 
believe that it was only by doing so that the nation could move on. 
The framework drawn up by Sartono was based on a "multi-dimensional" 
approach to history. Sartono pioneered this approach in Indonesia and for decades 
it has been considered as sort of methodological 'holy grail' among many 
historians. The framework was discussed thoroughly during the plenary meetings 
but as actual outputs would show, it was not faithfully followed by the writers. 
There may be three reasons why the framework was not satisfactorily 
followed. In terms of academic preparation, Sartono was well ahead of most of the 
other members of the team. Not only was the multi-dimensional approach 
33 Djoko Suryo (2005), for instance, said that other members of the team were too engrossed with their own 
tasks to be concerned about whatever political motive there might behind the composition of the Volume 6 
team. Sartono concurred (2005a). He claimed at it was only much later when they began to sense that 
Nugroho was up to something. 
34 It seems that Sartono dict not consider Nugroho a government official. 
35 While the interview was primarily in Bahasa Indonesia, it was sometimes interspersed with phrases in 
English. This was one of those English phrases he uttered. In his words "To shear Sukarno ... " 
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demanding, it was also very unfamiliar to practically all other members who were 
either absolute neophytes or were reared in the conventional narrative approach to 
history.36 Likewise, by 1970, it was barely fifteen years since history departments in 
Indonesia had begun turning out graduates of history. In terms of actual 
experience, therefore, even in conventional narrative or antiquarian history-
writing, the reservoir was insufficiently filled.37 The second possible reason was 
Sartono' s personal leadership style. Maybe because he was so gentle, soft-spoken, 
diffident and unassertive, he said he did not or could not bear to push hard enough 
for the implementation of the framework (Sartono 2005a). As already mentioned, 
right from the very start, he doubted the overall readiness or capability of the team 
to undertake such a project. Perhaps upon seeing his fears being realised, he felt 
helpless about it and just let things be. The third possible reason is political, and 
this especially applies to Volume 6. One of the members of the Volume 6 team, 
Saleh As'ad Djamhari, Nugroho's very close adjutant, has admitted that since 
their primary purpose in writing volume 6 was to fulfill what he called a 'military 
mission,' the narrative approach would serve the job better than Sartono's multi-
dimensional or structural approach. With a narrative approach, the 
propagandistic messages, he hinted, would have a better chance of being 
understood by the target audience (Saleh As' ad Djamhari 2005). This view seems 
corroborated by the move to expunge the succeeding edition, starting with the 1984 
edition, of the use of the structural approach in favour of the narrative approach. 
Other problems plagued the project. One was leadership accountability. 
' 
While Sartono was supposed to be the main editor, there were many indications 
that Nugroho was in fact running the project. In setting timetables, for instance,· he 
earned the ire of some members, even eliciting mutinous reactions from them. This 
36 According to Sartono, one can have a glimpse of the framework he had drawn from the way how he wrote 
the two-volume Pengantar Sejarah Indonesia Baru. Jakarta: Gramedia. He said that had what he wished for 
SNI been followed by the writers, it would closely look like this book, and that thus there would have been 
no need to write it. For a favourable review of the book, see G. Moedjanto (1988). 
37 Even by I 980s, the output of historical research still left much to be desired. This was the main conclusion 
of the survey undertaken by Adrian Lapian and Sedijono 'Historical Studies in Indonesia in the 1980s' 
(1992). 
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happened when he proceeded to print unfinished manuscripts. He justified his 
decision by saying to the effect that the deadlines have been moved back twice or 
thrice already and so those who remain unfinished had lost the moral authority fo 
complain (Irma Notosusanto 2005; Manus 2005; Zain 1976). He claimed that there 
should be no problem as the books would undergo revisions later on. As far as he 
was concerned the most important thing was that the project had to be completed 
sooner than rather than later. 
Some details of this incident deserve to be spelled out to allow us a glimpse 
of the dynamics between Nugroho and the other members of the team. In an article 
based on an interview with Nugroho in 1980, he claimed that the original deadline 
for manuscripts was set for June 1973. Because a number of groups were still not 
finished, it was decided in the last plenary meeting (possibly also in June 1973) to 
move back the deadline to September 1973. He also claimed that in this meeting, it 
was decided, among others that he would be the one to act as "Pelaksana 
Penyiapan Penerbitan" (implementor of the preparation for publication) with the 
duty of finalising the drafts which were supposed to have already been examined 
by Sartono (for scholarly aspect) and Merwati (for writing style).38 By September, 
however, so Nugroho continued, certain groups were still not finished and so the 
deadline was moved back once again to April 1974. By then, however, there 
remained an unfinished group (not clear in the article but possibly he was referring 
to the Volume 5 group). Nugroho averred that on 8 July 1974, Sartono, being the 
over-all editor, decided that printing should proceed after 31July1974. Any new 
manuscript, or any revision in old manuscripts, submitted after that date would no 
longer be accepted. That is, whatever was in Nugroho's hand by 31 July, would· be 
printed (Sinar Harapan 1980b).39 
38 Apparently, such plan was not carried out. Sartono did not have a chance to examine the manuscripts and 
Merwati Poerspoenegro did not style-edit them. (Sartono 2005a; Lapian 2005) 
39 What is really very puzzling in these pronouncement was that why would Nugroho write a letter to the 
Minister of Education, dated 17 May 1975 stating to the effect that by April 1974, all the manuscripts were 
already polished and ready for printing whereas he himself attested that the ultimate deadline was reset for 
31 July 1974 precisely because there was still a group that was not finished by April 1974. Abdurachman 
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Asked whether he in fact concurred in the publication of the still 
unpolished, even unfinished manuscripts, Sartono was embarrassed to admit that 
he could not prevent Nugroho from doing so. He quoted himself telling Nugroho 
"Well, according to you this should be, then go ahead." What he wanted was that 
after finishing all the manuscripts, they would assign three persons or more to 
proof-read, edit and style-edit them before printing. He also thought that in cases 
of historically controversial questions, they had to offer "various conclusions." On 
both counts Nugroho did not assent and did as he pleased (Sartono 2005a). 
This incident was telling. It showed who was in control. Anyone who knows 
Sartono can infer that Sartono' s personality may have much to do with it. That is, if 
he had had a personality as forceful as Nugroho's, he could have put up a stronger 
resistance. On the other hand, Nugroho's standing or the position he occupied in 
the military-dominated scheme of things during the New Order, not to mention 
that the project was his initiative, exerted a strong influence on how others dealt 
with him. Sartono' s subservience boded ill for the stance of the scholarly 
community that he represented vis-a-vis the state power that Nugroho signified. 
This interpretation gains support if we look at how the tougher Taufik Abdullah 
and Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo would fare in their encounters with Nugroho. 
Nugroho' s obstinacy and the hastiness of his decision to print the 
manuscripts puzzled many.40 He justified his decision by saying that the time and 
the money allotted by the sponsor of the project, the Ministry of Education, had 
already been well exceeded. He seemed to have felt embarrassed about the delays 
for he held himself personally responsible to the Minister, who was his personal 
friend (Lapian 2005; Manus 2005; Irma Notosusanto 2005). The truthfulness of this 
justification cannot be set aside. Those who knew him closely would attest as to 
how faithful he was to his promises. If he said such and such would be done by 
Surjomihardjo thinks that it indicated Nugroho's asal bapak senang mentality (so long as the boss is 
happy) See Abdurachman Surjomihardjo (1980). 
40 My informants such as Taufik Abdullah, Adrian Lapian, Djoko Surjo, Sartono Kartodirdjo and others 
claimed they cannot comprehend such behavior ofNugroho. 
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this and this time, he really worked hard, or pushed his assistants to do so, to be 
able to deliver what he promised (Irsyam 2005). Since he believed that the deadline 
had been moved back already for a number of times, it should not be transgressed 
once again. 
The trouble was, Nugroho's notion of a 'deadline' seemed not to have been 
shared by others in the group. Sartono claimed, for instance, that Nugroho's 
timetable was not something agreed upon by the group (Sartono 2005a). He 
seemed to have imposed his own timetable and expected that others would follow. 
When Taufik Abdullah for instance failed to meet the 'absolute' deadline, Nugroho 
sent the manuscripts to the printery and Taufik was shocked upon hearing that the 
volume had already been printed. Abdurrachman Surjomiharjo, editor for Volume 
5, joined Taufik in protesting at not being consulted in the publication of his own 
volume. What further enraged them was that the chapter written for Volume 5 by 
their colleague Deliar Noer was unceremoniously removed from the printed 
version. It turned out that this was due to Deliar Noer's critical remarks about the 
New Order regime that incensed Suharto. As a consequence he earned for himself 
expulsion from the IKIP where he was serving as a professor, aside from being 
banished from the Project. Combining their sympathy for their friend with their 
resentment for Nugroho's rash judgment, Taufik and Abdurachman both 
withdrew from the project and renounced any responsibility for Volume 5 
(Abdullah 2005). Their contributions, however, were not taken out and the 
succeeding printing (the one that actually circulate widely in public) carried the 
name of Yusmar Basri giving the impression the he was the real editor as well as 
the writer. Yusmar Basri was one of Nugroho's young proteges at the Pusjarah. -
That Taufik and Abdurachman resigned in protest indicated they would not 
tolerate Nugroho's transgression of their principles. They stood by their desire to 
protect their integrity as scholars and as individuals. That Nugroho however was 
undeterred, had his way, made use of their contributions under somebody else's 
name, and got away with it (at least for a time) indicated the seemingly stronger 
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constellation of power within which he was inserted. The relatively weaker 
position of Abdurrachman could be seen for instance in that it would take another 
five years, in 1980, before he could get back at Nugroho in the open and gave a 
voice to a muted contempt he had for the latter (Surjomihardjo 1980).41 The details 
about this incident will be discussed below. 
Nugroho's impudence had yet to peak. When a later edition of the SNI 
appeared sometime in 1980-198342, the public was startled to see only two names of 
editors printed on the cover of the books. Sartono' s name no longer appeared. 
Rumours circulated that Sartono, following Taufik and Abdurrachman, had also 
withdrawn from the project.43 Both vocal and silent critics of the New Order 
history readily applauded his 'withdrawal.' They speculated that Sartono could no 
longer bear to feel responsible for the books that they felt in many ways did not 
uphold scholarly standards (Soeroto 1980; Atmakusumah 1992). That was a fairly 
logical explanation so it is no wonder it persisted as a widely upheld truth. 
Contemporary observers such as Syamdani (2001 xii-xiii), for instance, would refer 
back to that incident to emphasise the very problematic character of the SNI.44 Even 
historians who are still alive and closest to Sartono such as Djoko Suryo (2005), 
Adrian Lapian (2005) and Taufik Abdullah (2005) did not have an idea about what 
really happened. 
41 This was not the first time he wrote a critical piece about the SNI or Nugroho's role in it. He wrote a 
politely critical and subdued short piece in Kompas on 17 November 1976. ("Penulisan Sejarah Mutakhir," 
reprinted in Surjomihardjo (1978b: 98-100). However, the 1980 piece was decidedly fiery and was directed 
at Nugroho himself, although Nugroho was not named. 
42 Designating the year each edition appeared is not straightforward. One reason is that as they appeared in the 
title page, edition and reprinting numbers are mixed up. The first edition clearly appeared in 1975, the 
second in 1977, the third in 1980 and the fourth in 1984. However, in between 1975 and 1984, and beyond 
1984, reprints appeared that were indicated also as 'edition'. Say, 1976 edition (which was just like 1975) 
and 1990 edition Gust a reprint of 1984 edition). I didn't see any 1981-1983 editions, but Klooster (1985) 
mentioned that they were very similar to the 1980 edition. 
43 This is widely believed both in Indonesia and abroad. In a number of times when I gave presentation both in 
Indonesia and in Australia, in mentioning this incident there were always participants who asked for 
clarification of the matter because the common belief is that Sartono withdrew from the project. In a slightly 
different vein, Reid noted that the SNI "apparently went to print without the blessing of Professor 
Sartono" (2005, 88, fn 25). 
44 See Syamdani's introduction to Kontroversi Sejarah di Indonesia (2001, xii-xiii). A journalist from 
Kompas once asked Sartono, in May 1987, why did he withdraw from the SNI project. Sartono politely 
evaded the question. See Kompas (I 987a) 
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Sartono categorically stated that he never withdrew, he was ejected (Sartono 
2005a).45 He recounted that he found the idea of putting the names of the three 
main editors in front cover of all volumes of the SNI objectionable. He believed that 
ethics demanded that those who actually wrote the volume should be credited by 
printing their names in· front and the names of the three main editors should be 
put somewhere inside. He told his misgivings to Nugroho but Nugroho did not 
agree.46 When Sartono opted to stand by his position, Nugroho removed his name 
without any explanation or warning whatsoever (Sartono 2005a). That Nugroho 
had the temerity to do such a thing could mean many things. But one thing was 
clear: he plainly showed who was the boss. 
All these incidents, however, were far from being a crass display of power 
on the part of Nugroho. In the world where Nugroho, Sartono and other 
protagonists existed, there were subtle ways and means to smooth the rough 
edges of the power play. In fact, despite what he did, even his bitter critics such as 
Taufik Abdullah and the mildly critical Sartono described him as a likeable or a 
good person (Abdullah 2005; Sartono 2005a). It would thus be inaccurate to depict 
Nugroho as a power-wielding individual who would flaunt his power at every 
turn. Perhaps, hls conduct, sometimes at the expense of ethical principles, may 
suggest that he felt lacking in power and that he was in pursuit of more of it. It is 
pertinent to address where Nugroho stood in the topologies of powers during that 
time. 
45 As everybody believed that he withdrew, I initially thought that he might have just forgotten or made a 
mistake. I asked him again about this incident six months later (in December 2005) and he confirmed it. 
When I asked why he kept quiet about it for so long, he said that nobody asked him about it. Actually, 
sometime in 1987, a journalist from Kompas asked Sartono why did he withdraw from the SN! project. 
Sartono politely evaded the question. See Kompas (I 987a). Perhaps, Sartono simply did not like to make an 
issue out of it or that he did not I ike to be pitied. 
46 In an article in Sinar Harapan (I 980b) ('Setuju konsep Sartono, Kecuali yang 'Hahahaha"), which was 
based on the interview with Nugroho, he confirmed that Sartono indeed expressed contrary view on where 
to put the names of the editors. However, he was silent on the 'ejection' ofSartono. Instead, he made an 
impression that Sarto no indeed withdrew ("keluar") from the project by confirming the journalist's 
assumption that Sartono did so. 
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Taking the lead from a declaration of his adjutant, Nugroho had a military 
mission to accomplish. Instances cited above thus may be understood as suggestive 
of his determination to overcome all possible obstacles to accomplish the 
'mission.' 47 One can speculate that his effort to railroad the publication of the 
manuscripts, his refusal to subject them to thorough editing, could mean that not 
only was he concerned about the time (deadline) but also about more importantly 
about the content of the books. He seemed very careful not to subject especially 
Volume 6 to scrutiny by other members of the team. That could also be one 
important reason why he rejected Sartono' s plan to assign three or more 
proofreaders and editors through whom all manuscripts should pass before 
printing. Other interpretations are of course possible. 
Adrian Lapian, Nugroho's close friend, recalled that he asked Nugroho why 
he published Volume 5 ahead of the rest while it was still unfinished. Nugroho's 
reply was that it was okay. "It's alright! It's good!" Lapian quoted Nugroho as 
saying. Lapian said that Nugroho really seemed to think that the volume was good 
and he wanted to show the people, the Ministry of Education especially, that a 
good output was forthcoming from the Project. Considering that "accuracy was not 
one of (Nugroho's) strong points" such a judgment on Nugroho's part seemed not 
surprising, so Lapian (2005) averred. 
Another possible reason lay in the dynamics between Nugroho on the one 
hand and the members of Volume 5 on the other. Taufik Abdullah was puzzled as 
to why Volume 5 was printed first whereas there was a prevailing perception 
among members of their team that by that time, if any volume was ready for 
publication, it was Volume 1 (Abdullah 2005). Lapian said that Nugroho might 
have suspected that Taufik and Abdurrachman were deliberately delaying the 
47 Another possible indication that Nugroho was really in a hurry may be glimpsed from a perceptive 
observation of an author of an article that appeared in Kompas (I 970d). He noted that the Seminar Sejarah 
Nasional 2 appeared to be hastily organised. He attributed such haste to the fact that the seminar was moved 
four months earlier. He noted that it was originally planned for December 1970 and he wondered why it was 
moved to August 1970. The interesting thing was that he expressed a suspicion that political reasons 
('alasan2 politis') might be behind it. I cannot of course prove that such a move was on the behest of 
Nugroho. But the relevant point is that there were people who might have carried such a suspicion. 
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project. Afraid, thus, of the impact of delays on the overall success of his 
brainchild, Nugroho launched what amounted to a preemptive strike by 
publishing the volume hastily. When the two were enraged and at once withdrew, 
Nugroho averted a potential crisis (of accountability for volume 5) by putting the 
name of Yusmar Basri as a replacement for the Abdurachman Surjomihardjo, the 
volume editor. 
It is possible that a combination of these considerations prompted Nugroho 
to do what he did. However, once we examine in the next chapter the contents of 
the books, especially Volume 6, we would be in better position to decide. At this 
point, what is important is to underline that Nugroho, aside from being a historian, 
regarded himself as a soldier who seemed to aspire for recognition as a good, 
dutiful one. 
Reactions 
Despite the tumultuous episodes involving some members, the SNI had 
finally been published. It was officially launched on 15 December 1975, 
purportedly as a 'New Year's gift' to the Indonesia people. Apparently elated at the 
completion of the project, Nugroho declared that it constituted a "national pride." 
He also proudly claimed that the book proved beyond doubt that Indonesians 
could write their own history (Zain 1976). Moreover, he declared that SNI was the 
best Indonesian history yet written (Kompas 1976). And as if to sharpen further the 
significance of the occasion, he juxtaposed the publication of SNI with what he 
called the 'failure' of two previous attempts during the Sukarno period (Zain 1976). 
Nugroho's self-congratulatory tone was unmistakable 
The importance accorded to the book may be glimpsed, among others, from 
the ceremony held on 18 March 1976 whereby the books were formally presented 
to President Suharto. The event hit the headlines of major dailies the following day 
(Kompas 1976; Zain 1976, in Sinar Harapan) and it was also televised nationwide on 
TVRI (cited in Surjomihardjo 1980). In attendance during the formal presentation 
were the Minister of Education (Sjarif Thayeb) and the three main editors along 
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with the each volume's respective editors.48 Suharto took the opportunity to 
emphasise his call for increased attention to the teaching of national history in 
schools. The books were heralded by Nugroho, the Minister and the President alike 
as the 'buku babon' (standard book) of Indonesian national history. 
Notably absent in the immediate press coverage was Sartono's categorical 
pronouncement in his preface to the books that /1 none among the members of the 
team regards this book as a standard, far from it"49 (Sartono 1975, n.p.). Like a call 
in the wilderness, Sartono' s voice dissipated amidst the noise of political power as 
the media and the public school system expectedly obeyed Suharto and regarded 
the SNI as the standard basis for writing history textbooks. The injunction lasted all 
throughout the New Order, even beyond. The SNI was officially withdrawn from 
circulation only in 2002 when the government could no longer resist the mounting 
public clamour (Kompas 2004).so 
That the government conferred on the SNI the status of being the /1 standard 
history book" and maintained it for decades notwithstanding its serious 
shortcomings may be considered as an act of political power trying to define 
historical knowledge.51 The crudity of it all did not escape some observers, but just 
like Sartono's pronouncement, theirs could only find muted concurrence among 
small segments of the population, if noticed at all. It would take a long time, and in 
gradual little steps, before sufficient pressures built up to undermine what 
48 Actually the picture in the headline of Kompas ( 1976) shows clearly only the three main editors, the 
Education Minister and Suharto. According to the Atmakusumah, however, the 5 other; volume editors were 
also present. (see Footnote No. I of Siswadhi, Leirissa and Atmakusumah 1976, 87) 
49 BM Diah (1976), however, in his passionate review in Merdeka (more on this later) repeatedly 
underscored, even praised, Sartono's declaration. About two months later, another observer, Atmakusumah 
(1976) would not leave Sartono's declaration uncited in his article "Mengamati 'Sejarah Nasional 
Indonesia". 
50 The Minister of Education in 2002 took a decision to pull the books out of public circulation (cited in 
Kompas 2004), 6 September 2004, "Penulisan Sejarah Indonesia Masih Menunggu Berbagai Masukan 
Baru") 
51 Actually, the question whether to consider the SN! as a standard work was raised at the early stage of the 
project. Uka Djandrasmita noted in his paper for the Tugu workshop the problematic character of the term 
'standard.' He mention~d that in their discussion with foreign experts in Berkeley and the Netherlands, it 
was repeatedly raisecj and he urged for a reconsideration of the intention to consider it a standard work. See 
Tjandrasasmita ( 1972). 
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appeared to be a monolithic and overpowering presence of official history. Upon 
the collapse of the New Order, the lid was lifted and the pent-up doubts about 
official history exploded pushing the pendulum of scepticism to the opposite 
extreme. What stood for decades as almost a monolithic truth crumbled under the 
weight of public scrutiny. The public perception has considerably shifted away 
from credulity for any official pronouncement. Parts of the official narrative, 
however, still stand, especially that which deals with the communists. What used 
to be almost a monolithic history has been transformed to become a veritable 
theatre of conflict among competing powers in the post-Suharto period. Let us see 
what preceded this explosive reaction. 
Hardly had the books entered public circulation, and barely three weeks 
after the presentation to Suharto, the SNI began its travails in the hands of critics. 
BM Diah, a well-known journalist and owner of Merdeka, one of the national 
dailies, launched the first major salvo. He wrote a passionate and lengthy critique 
of the books in his newspaper. Most of my informants readily remembered Diah's 
piece, at least vaguely, indicating the lasting impression it left on the reading 
public. In the article, Diah lambasted the SNI for many reasons. First, it was grossly 
biased against Sukarno. Second, he bewailed that contrary to its purported aim of 
writing a truly Indonesian history, significant parts of it remained largely 
dominated by 'Western viewpoints" and filled up by Western sources. Third, 
historical methodology was inadequately employed (Diah 1976). He even went as 
far as calling for the withdrawal of the book from circulation (Ibid.).52 The reasons 
for these criticisms will be discussed further in the next chapter in conjunction with 
the overall historiographic and political terrain. At this point, however, if is 
important to note one thing. Diah keenly observed that the biased treatment of 
Sukarno in volume 6 cannot seem to be accounted for by a simple problem of 
innocent subjectivity on the part of the writers, Nugroho specifically. He suspected 
52 Actually, by that time the book was not yet widely circulated. It was still in the first printing, in special 
paper (kertas /ux) and hardbound, appeared in late 1975. The books presented to Suharto in March 1976 and 
those reviewed by Diah were of this quality. The special edition set was not meant for public circulation. A 
plan was afoot to print in cheaper paper that was meant for public circulation (Sinar Harapan 1976). 
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that it emanated from a more deeply felt desire to assert one's personal beliefs at 
the expense of methodological imperatives. He particularly hinted at the position 
of Nugroho in the scheme of things in Indonesia and he implied that there was 
nothing innocent or accidental in the treatment of Sukarno (Diah 1976/1987, 17-18). 
Diah would prove to be perceptive. 
In June, Atmakusumah (1976) wrote for Kompas a mildly critical review of 
the SNI. This review prefigured an article which would appear in Prisma two 
months later. He identified the editorial weaknesses of the book. These included 
the notable absence of illustrations or photos in some parts, and inappropriate, 
misplaced or unlabelled photos in others; numerous typographical errors; 
inconsistent terminologies; and inappropriate lay-out. More important, however, 
was his observation that many of the SNI' s controversial assertions were 
haphazardly formulated, without sufficient effort to provide evidence, much less 
critical evaluation of competing possibilities. Another one was that the authors of 
volume 6 wrote as if they were journalists, in a hurry to finish a deadline and 
delivering information that they subconsciously 'knew' to be good only for the 
day. Atmakusumah wondered what could be driving the authors to be in such a 
hurry. That the entire project was finished in 4 years was an extraordinary feat, he 
mused. He speculated that the authors (especially referring to the Vol. 6 team) 
perhaps wanted to reconstruct recent history while evidence, both written and oral, 
was still fresh but may soon be lost forever (Atmakusumah 1976). I am not sure if 
he was exceedingly perceptive and that, in the subtlest manner, he wanted to hint 
that something irregular was going on with the Project. It is also possible, however, 
that it was just a plain, guileless observation. 
Two months later, a review appeared in Prisma written by the trio of 
Siswadhi, Leirissa and Atmakusumah (1976). It was subdued, and politely 
appreciative although forthright about some of its notable weaknesses. 
Corroborating many of Atmakusumah' s observations cited above, they pinpointed 
the weaknesses as follows: (1) editorial inconsistencies and other editorial 
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problems such as absence of or faults in documentation; (2) contradictory 
interpretations; (3) one-sided interpretation or interpretations based on highly 
selective treatment of evidence; (4) apparent absence of an overriding theoretical 
and unifying framework; (5) grossly inadequate research on some periods. The 
reviewers were invariably quick to forgive the authors for these lapses saying that 
this was a first time attempt and that revisions would follow as promised by the 
authors. The title of the review is quite interesting: "Buku Babon Sejarah nasional 
Indonesia: Objektivitas yang Ideal?" ("Standard Text of National History of 
Indonesia: Ideal Objectivity?") The question mark (for the word objectivity?) 
makes one wonder what lay beneath the circumspect and appreciative tone of the 
reviewers. It does not categorically uphold Diah' s critique but it obviously made an 
impact on the reviewers, especially Atmakusumah who did the review of the 
controversial Volume 6. 
Towards the end of 1976, on 17 November, Abdurachman Surjomihardjo 
published in Kompas what seems to be his first in the series of candid and 
sometimes fiery critiques of the SNI that would not abate until the late 1980s. This 
first statement was so much milder than what he wrote in the 1980s, but it gave a 
foretaste of what was to come. He noted, for instance, the irregular circumstances 
surrounding the 'birth' of the SNI and alluded vaguely to broken goodwill and 
ethical norms that were transgressed in the process. He also quoted an unnamed 
historian who was supposed to have used a metaphor of a "retarded or defective 
child" (bayi yang cacat) to refer to the SNJ.53 What was more, he did not hold back 
saying that it was just a draft and that the word "standard" was a very smug way 
of describing it (Surjomihardjo 1978b). 
In the succeeding two decades, from 1977 to 1997, the SNI only occasionally 
figured in the media. Some notable instances when the SNI was talked about 
53 Actually, it was Sartono who said that. Having said that, it would haunt him to this day as he wonders 
whether the words hurt Nugroho so much that he (Nugroho) expelled him from the project as a reprisal. In 
Sartono's thinking, because Nugroho himself has a slightly "defective child," Nugroho must have thought 
that Sartono meant to insult him. (Sartono 2005a) 
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coincided with the announcement of the plan to revise it or a new edition came 
out.54 They also cropped up at around the same time the National History 
Seminars were held or when a government-initiated history-related idea project 
was being mulled over.55 
In 1980, for instance, an initial exchange between Sartono Kartodirdo and 
Taufik Abdullah, on the one hand, and Nugroho, on the other, ended up rousing 
an indignant rejoinder from Abdurachman Surjomihardjo. This encounter was set 
off by mischievous responses by Sartono and Taufik Abdullah to a journalist from 
Sinar Harapan who asked what they could say about the on-going efforts (in 1980) 
to revise or improve the SNI-6. Sartono responded: "I can only laugh. Hahahaha". 
Taufik Abdullah, on the other hand, responded that if Prof. Sartono said that, then 
he might as well say, "Hihihihi" (Sinar Harapan 1980a). Nugroho appeared to have 
been offended as evident in an interview that appeared in the same newpaper 
eleven days later. The title of the interview was telling: "Setuju Konsep Sartono, 
Kecuali Yang 'Hahahaha."' This means:" Agree with Sartono's concept, Except the 
'Hahaha" (Sinar Harapan 1980b). 
In this interview, Nugroho mentioned numerous things that impelled 
Abdurachman Surjomihardjo to respond. The response appeared in a feature 
article in the same newspaper fifteen days later. It was a scathing critique of an 
unnamed person but it was obvious that Abdurachman referred to Nugroho. His 
pent-up anger palpable, he lambasted Nugroho for his 'asak bapak senang' (so long 
as the boss is happy) mentality and for lying56 (Surjomihardjo 1980). He described 
the history writing in Indonesia as being in 'crisis' (kemelut) and he categorically 
54 For example, in 1992, the then outgoing Minister of Education announced that there would be a revision of 
the SNI. See Taufik Abdullah (1994, 203-204) for an overview of different views expressed in the media, 
seminars and private conversation about the plan to revise the SNI in 1992. 
55 For instance, in 1987 Suharto declared the need for taking another look at the period 1950-65 and to come 
up with an 'honest and objective' re-assessment of the period. (Kompas l 987a; l 987b; Abdullah, H. I 987a) 
56 As disclosed by Sudjomihardjo, Nugroho wrote a letter to the Minister of Education, dated 17 May 1975 
stating to the effect that by April 1974, all the manuscripts were already polished and ready for printing 
whereas he himself attested the ultimate deadline was reset for 31 July 1974 precisely because there was 
still a group that was not finished by April 1974. Abdurachman Surjomihardjo thinks that it indicated 
Nugroho's 'asal bapak senang' mentality (tendency to please the boss) See Surjomihardjo (1980). 
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stated that the Volume 6 did not satisfy the requirements of scholarship. It was, he 
claimed bitterly, a humiliating chapter in the history of history writing in Indonesia 
(Ibid.). What appeared to be an overheating altercation led to an editorial from the 
same newspaper, with a view to dousing the fiery exchange. 
Not long after the 1984 edition came out, a front-page article in Kompas 
appeared, pointing to the persistent and new problems57 with the latest edition of 
the SNI. Due to the problems, observers expressed bemusement or doubt about the 
status of the SNI as "buku babon" (Sinar Harapan 1985). 
Surjomihardjo proved to be a persistent and a hard-hitting critic. Joining the 
public discussion aroused by Suharto's call in May 1987 to formulate an official, 
'objective' history of the period 1950-65, Surjomihardjo rekindled the controversies 
surrounding the SNI. On 20 May, he published in Kompas a translation of selected 
parts of Klooster' s book Indonesiers Schrifven Hun Geschiedenis. [Indonesians Write 
Their History) (Surjomihardjo 1987a). The book was published only two years 
earlier (1985) and it documented and analysed the process and the outputs of the 
efforts of Indonesians writing their own history covering the period 1900 to 1980. 
Taufik Abdullah, in a separate article, described it as the "most comprehensive and 
exhaustive study" of Indonesian historiography and despite some notable 
problems is a "real contribution to our knowledge" (Abdullah 1988, 334). 
What Surjomihardjo opted to translate were portions detailing the process 
and the problems encountered in making the SNI. In his introduction, he noted 
that Klooster' s being a foreigner and an outsider (in the SNI) made him an 
objective observer and thus his analysis, despite some problems, should be paid 
due attention (Surjomihardjo 1987a). Considering some highly critical observations 
of Klooster, what Surjomihardjo in effect seemed to have in mind was to reaffirm, 
even intensify, his earlier critique by proxy. This becomes clear when he wrote a 
sequel to it a few weeks later whereby he used a number of Klooster' s observations 
57 An example of the new problems cited was the inclusion of index and bibliography that were replete with 
errors and of photos without appropriate annotation and sources. 
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as a springboard for furthering his critique (Sujomihardjo 1987b ). These 
observations point to problems such as a lack of research, uneven writing abilities, 
failure to observe the prescribed approach, just to mention a few (.Klooster 1985 as 
summarized in Surjomihardjo 1987b, 13). 
In 1992 a number of more openly critical articles appeared. This was again 
in consonance with the reported plan to revise the SNI. In the two articles written 
by Masduki Baidlawi in the news magazine Editor, the more candidly critical tone 
was readily seen in the titles: 'Looking at History that Smacks of Politics'(1992a) 
('Meninjau Sejarah yang Berbau Kekuasaan') and 'Negligence that goes on and on' 
(1992b) (Kealpaan yang Terus Berulang'). The third was even more direct: 'SNI VI: 
A Political Book.' (SNI VI: Buku Politik) It was written by Atmakusumah, whose 
articles in 1976 have been discussed above. 
In the first article, Baidlawi cited the declaration of the then Minister of 
Education, Fuad Hassan, that the SNI-6 would be the primary focus of revision 
because it had numerous weaknesses and that it received considerable attention 
from the critics owing to its controversial character. It is significant that such 
declaration came from a high-ranking government official. 
The second article, on the other hand, reiterated the problems-factual 
mistakes and skewed interpretations -that persisted in the SNI and the history 
books based on it, despite already having undergone several editions or revision. It 
calls for the books' total overhaul (perombakan total). Significantly,, it concluded by 
identifying one lesson, that is, "it is important to separate political interest from 
historical interpretation" (Baidlawi 1992b). Against the backdrop set by -all 
previous articles that dealt with SNI, these two articles are notable for their 
candour, specifically in linking political interests with the shape of history. Even 
Diah and Surjomihardjo who were both strident critics of the SNI from the start 
were not as explicit in their reference to the political character of the SNI. That the 
time and the things may have indeed changed seems evident in the third article 
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where the previously cautious Atmakusumah had shed much of the inhibitions 
evident in his 1976 critiques of the SNI. Without mincing words he declared that 
"the editor of Volume 6 no longer played the role of an observer of history but 
rather a politician" and that the SNI-6 gave the impression that it is not a historical 
but rather a political book (1992, 30). Perhaps these candid critiques may have been 
occasioned by the atmosphere of openness ('keterbukaan') that was seen in early 
1990s, which proved to be shortlived. 
As declared earlier by Nugroho, the SNI did undergo revisions to address 
the problems or weaknesses. However, the way revisions were undertaken left 
much to be desired and to be suspicious about, as will be discussed further in the 
next chapter. Out of the seven or eight editions, there were in fact only 2 major 
revisions, in 1984 and in 1993. Those that appeared in 1977 and 1980 were only 
very slightly different from the first edition (1975). These little differences 
consisted of improvement in language use, adding a glossary, index or 
bibliography, and correction of typographical errors. Editions that appeared 
between 1985 and 1991 are almost the same as the 1984 edition. The 1993 edition 
was also very similar to the 1984 edition. The primary difference lay in having an 
additional volume (Volume 7) that was specifically devoted to the New Order 
regime.ss Likewise, the chapter about the Japanese period which was originally 
part of Volume 6 was moved to Volume 5. Thus, the coverage of Volume 6 had 
been shortened to the period from the onset of independence in 1945 up to the end 
of Guided Democracy. 
Another important thing to note about revisions is that, of the six volun:les 
only Volume 6 underwent substantive changes. A few chapters of Volumes 2, 3 
and 4 were also re-written and some materials were added but the changes did not 
58 A foreword of the Volume 7 indicates, the decision to form a separate volume specifically for the New 
Order period emanated from decision of the Minister of Education in 1992 upon the recommendation of a 
working committee tasked to take another look at history writing (Leirissa & Ghazali 1993, ix-xiii). This 
appears to have a link to the clamogr raised sometime in 1987 for a new history book on the 1950-65 and 
New Order periods. See Kompas (1987), 27 May 1987, p. 16. 
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go anywhere near the scope of Volume 6's. Changes in Volumes 1 and 5 were less 
consequential.59 (See Appendix E for the description of the changes.) 
Conclusion 
This chapter constitutes a counterpart of Chapter 3 where the making of the 
Tadhana was discussed. I should note that the structure of the two chapters are not 
strictly parallel. Because the public responses to the SNI have for three decades 
been sharp if not always spirited-in great contrast to that of Tadhana that seldom 
figured in public discussion-this chapter devotes a specific subsection to 
discussing these responses. 
This chapter has tried to outline the processes that gave rise to the SNI. 
Particular emphasis has been laid on specific instances that can demonstrate the 
dynamics between or among key protagonists such as Nugroho Notosusanto, 
Sartono Kartodirdjo and other scholars. Such emphasis was meant to find out 
what happens at the intersection where scholarship and politics meet. 
To wrap up this chapter, let me note a number of observations about the 
critical responses to the SNI. First, the criticisms of the project were hardly muted, 
but their relatively small number, and the sporadic character of their criticisms 
ensured that their impact would be limited. 
Second, the criticisms had been narrowly focused on the first edition (1975) 
of the SNI. The fact that the succeeding two editions, 1977and 1980, were almost 
mere reprints may have misled critics into thinking that other editions were also 
not much different. Had they looked at the 1984 edition, they would have b~en 
startled at the considerable changes and wondered as to what those changes may 
signify. As a consequence, the general perceptions or images of the SNI as an 
official history crystallised from a highly skewed glance at the 1975 edition. That 
Diah decided to re-issue in 1985, in Merdeka, (and in 1987, reprinted as a chapter in 
59 I have not found a copy of the 1993 edition of Volume 5. This state refers only to up to 1990 version. 
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a book) his 1976 review of the SNI without any change attests to this. Had he 
looked at the 1984 edition, he would have been more infuriated. 
Finally, perhaps partly as a consequence of the singular focus on the SNI, 
other sources of more blatant propaganda escape the critics' notice. The most 
notable of these were the versions of the SNI that Nugroho and his team wrote for 
high schools. These were purportedly mere summaries of the original (SNI 1975 
edition). The titles of the textbooks were Sejarah Nasional Indonesia untuk SMP 
(1976) (National History of Indonesia for Junior High School) and Sejarnlz Nasional 
Indonesia untuk SMA (1979). (National History of Indonesia for Senior High School) 
That no critical articles appeared in the media about the highly propagandistic 
contents of these textbooks until the late 1980s may be partly attributable to the 
critics' singular focus on the SNI. They, like the general public, seem to have 
believed in Nugroho's pronouncement that these textbooks were just summaries of 
the SNI, adapted to suit the pedagogical needs of the high school students. As will 
be shown in the next chapter, this was not so. 
--000000--
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CHAPTER VI 
SNI : CONTENTS AND CONTEXT 
"Clio, the muse of history, is as thoroughly infected with lies 
as a street whore with syphilis." 
- Arthur Schopenhauer1 
Just like in the case of the Tadhana, a complicated configuration of the social, historiographic and political forces influenced the shape of and the responses to the Sejaralz Nasional Indonesia (SNI). Unlike the Tadhana, however, that never 
for any extended period of time enjoyed the public appreciation that its makers 
had hoped for, the SNI experienced vicissitudes of fortune depending on the 
shifting public political climate. From the status of being the 'standard text' for 
more than two decades since the mid-70s, exalted by the government (Kompas 
1976) and apparently trusted or believed in by many Indonesians,2 it became an 
object of almost thoroughgoing scepticism and fierce public criticism in the post-
Suharto period.3 Eventually, as already noted in Chapter V, it was officially 
withdrawn from public circulation in 2002. 
The volatile responses to the SNI were understandable against a backdrop 
of reversals in political alignments in the post-Suharto period. However, the fairly 
limited level of development that the scholarly community (especially that of the 
1 From De Kunst van het Beledigen, translated by Cyril Lansink, as quoted in Hartman, J. (2005, 75) 
2 There is admittedly no way of finding out how many Indonesians at any one time believed in or trusted the 
version of history propounded in the SNI. However, the reported uproar about historical issues immediately 
after the demise of the New Order-uproar that involved teachers, students and parts of the general 
public-could indicate that there were many people who might have believed in the 'official' version of 
history and perhaps felt cheated when reports about deliberate attempts to manipulate history began to 
circulate. Besides, for more than two decades, there was only one version of history taught in schools and 
while attempts to transmit and the actual absorption of knowledge should not be confused, the two could 
also coincide to a significant degree, especially under the fairly restricted atmosphere as that which 
prevailed in Indoesia under the New Order .. 
3 In October 2002, it became the object of book-burning campaign in Jakarta. (Kompas, 3 October 2002, 
cited in Vickers and McGregor (2005: footnote 13) 
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historians) in Indonesia has achieved so far may also have something to do with it. 
Their ability to withstand political pressures and to arbitrate in a number of 
contentious historical issues has been hamstrung by the relative weakness of the 
historical profession in general. If the Tadhana exemplifies a case of a relatively 
strong scholarship meeting strong politics head-on, the SNI, as shown in this and 
the previous chapter, represents a case of a relatively weak scholarship that had to 
contend with strong politics. In Vickers and McGregor's words, "The dominant 
view of history .. .is that it is a raw tool of politics" (2005, 44). This is far from saying 
that the historians were powerless. There were notable instances when the extent of 
their power, as a generalised capacity to make a difference, was manifest. These 
instances may be few and not so obvious but these are no less important for the 
purpose of this study. 
Historiographic Mapping 
From the historiographic standpoint, there are at least two areas from which 
SNI drew its clearest defining characteristics. These are (1) the attempt to carry-out 
Indonesia-centric perspective (Indonesiasentrisme) and (2) the effort to implement 
the multi-dimensional, social science approach. The Indonesia-centric perspective, 
to note briefly, refers to the way of looking at history and the manner of writing it 
that foregrounds the native Indonesians in the historical narrative of their own 
country. This constituted an effort to correct the long-standing approach that 
presented Indonesia and its people merely as an appendage, if seen at all, to the 
history of the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies.4 It also sought to change the 
' 
perspective: instead of foreign scholar looking in from the outside, the 'native' 
scholars could present a perspective from within. 
4 See for instance Volumes 2 & 3 of Stapel, Geschiedenesis van Neder/andsch Indie which Resink (I 968a, 16-
17) described, banking on van Leur's review of Stapel, as "through-and-through Neerlandocentric." See 
also Bernard Vlekke's Nusantara that first appeared in 1943 and H.J. de Graafs Geschiedenis van 
Indonesia that came out in 1949. In Resink's view, Vlekke's Nusantara "had little of the Neerlandocentric 
left about it; it was only not yet lndocentric enough" (I 968a, 19). Vlekke's book underwent important 
changes from one edition to another. The 1959 edition for instance was marked by reversals of what used to 
be heavily Dutch-leaning interpretations. See Harry Benda's review of the 1959 edition in the Far Eastern 
Survey ( 1960). 
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The multi-dimensional, social science approach, on the other hand, refers to 
a method that requires use of various social science analytic tools in an effort to 
understand events or actors involved in them. This shuns the traditional tendency 
to focus on the political dimensions and instead refracts attention to various 
aspects such as the social, economic and cultural, alongside the political. The 
ultimate aim is to capture the multiple dimensions of reality. 
The multidimensional approach and the Indonesia-centric perspective 
actually go hand in hand. The effort to present the natives as dramatis personae and 
to foreground internal development within Indonesia lay at the heart of Indonesia-
centric perspective. On the other hand, the use of various tools from the social 
sciences was the means to create a holistic picture of such internal development in 
Indonesia as corrective to the highly selective (skewed towards politics, the Dutch, 
the big-men and Java) accounts in colonial historiography. It was also meant to 
account for the integration of various groups within the archipelago- the elite and 
the common people, Javanese as well as other ethnic groups, Muslims and other 
religious groups. Such integration was not seen to be merely in terms of political 
integration, manifested in the formation of the Indonesian state, but also in 
cultural, social and economic terms (Kartodirdjo 2001a). 
Indonesia-Centrism 
Writing a history of Indonesia from the point of view of Indonesians is one 
of the most pressing objectives of the SNI. This was, however, not actually the first 
time that this perspective was employed. As noted by van der Kroef, it was 
actually pioneered by Dutch' colonial' scholars or scholars of Dutch origin, sue~ as 
van Leur, Berg and Resink. s Van Leur, as early as 1930s for instance, bemoaned the 
tendency of colonial historiography to look at Indonesia from the" deck of the ship, 
the ramparts of the fortress, the high gallery of the trading house" (cited in Smail 
1961, 76). Indonesian writers (Rangkuti 1951; Soetjipto Wirjosuparto 1957; Anwar 
Sanusi 1953) tried to do it but the early efforts were replete with problems. They 
5 See van der Kroef(l 958) for a review of the contributions of van Leur, Berg and Resink. 
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merely inverted the positions of the coloniser-colonised so that the local actors 
described by the Dutch as rebels or insurgents were now called heroes. While such 
a tendency persisted, it was soon deemed to be grossly inadequate or 
inappropriate (Abdullah 1975, 121-122).6 Showing the natives as the real prime 
movers in their own history became the primary goal (Sartono 2001a). 
One fundamental concept that underpins Indonesia-centrism was the 
process of integration. Sartono Kartodirdjo very well emphasised the need to 
demonstrate how various cultural, political, social and economic elements come 
together to form a unity that served as a bedrock of Indonesian identity and the 
nation-state. The overwhelming diversity of Indonesia-in ethnic, religious, 
economic and linguistic terms- poses a considerable challenge to the scholar who 
aims to present such a huge and diverse area as a unified entity. Integration as the 
unifying framework was a logical response to such a challenge (Sartono 1982; 1975; 
1987; 1991; 2001a). 
In Sartono' s framework, all the forces, processes, acts or tools that 
stimulated or facilitated interaction of the people, cultural diffusion and economic 
exchange all contribute to the process of integration and thus they deserve 
considerable attention in historical analysis, starting from the prehistoric period up 
to the present (Sartono 1975, xiii-xxiii). As noted in the previous chapter, Sartono's 
framework was a tall order and we shall see how the SNI authors struggled to 
carry out such a prescription. 
In the case of SNI-1975 Volume 1, the decision to do away with the 
technology-based traditional periodisation of Indonesian pre-history--Paleolithic, 
Mesolithic, Neolithic, etc. - was partly attributable to the imperative of setting a 
6Soeroto ( 1972), one of the respected Indonesian scholars in I 960s- I 970s, claimed that when he was being 
asked by foreign friends for a ready reference about Indonesian history, he felt so embarrassed because he 
couldn't mention a book that was written by an Indonesian. He said that the sad truth is that by that time 
(1972) what can be considered as the best history book was Vlekke's Nusantara. He didn't have the heart 
to recommend it, however, because its perspective is biased towards the Dutch and against the Indonesians. 
Taufik Abdullah admitted that notwithstanding colonial biases, "these books did provide enlightening 
reading materials for students of Indonesian history" (Abdullah 1994, 206). 
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framework more sensitive to the peculiarities of local conditions. One perceived 
problem with the use of the lithic-based periodisation was that it was 
disproportionately concerned about advances in technological development and it 
was primarily based on European cases, which needless to say emanated from 
conditions different from that in Indonesia (Soejono 1972). The writers of the 
volume endeavoured to plot Indonesia's pre-history using what they call a social-
economic model whereby the basis of periodization was broadened to include 
economic and social problems alongside technological development. Thus, the 
periodisation was divided as follows: hunting and gathering stage; farming and 
domestication of animal-stage; and tool-using or technology-based specialisation 
stage (perundagian). The importance of technological development, as reflected in 
the lithic-based periodisation, was by no means set aside. It was incorporated into 
a model that reflects the socio-economic needs of the people at various stages of 
development (Soejono 1972; Moelyadi 1990). 
As actually implemented, however, there was much to be desired. The 
absence of an explicit elaboration of the link between the socio-economic 
archaeological model and Indonesia-centric perspective seems to betray a lack of 
intention on the part of the authors to pursue seriously the Indonesia-centric 
perspective. One has to exert some effort to see the link between the two. While the 
things discussed are almost all about what was supposed to be going on in various 
parts of Indonesia during the pre-historic period, there seemed to be no discernible 
effort to connect them to the Sartono-defined framework that was anchored in the 
process of integration. Each chapter is a hodgepodge of accounts about prehistory, 
accounts whose internal logic seems only faintly linked to the over-all framework. 
Moreover, as Taufik Abdullah observed, the contents of Volume 1 were more like a 
"description of the history of prehistoric investigations rather than an attempt to 
describe life during the prehistoric era" (Abdullah 1994, 213). While such an 
observation may be hyperbolic, there was more than a kernel of truth in it. 
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It is understandable that the prehistoric period is hardly the time-frame one 
should look to for early signs of integration . At the very least, however, the 
authors could have pointed out explicitly that the enormous amount of diversity 
in the archipelago that was clearly demonstrated in each chapter set the backdrop 
against which later efforts at integration would be carried out. Or, they could have 
stressed that the more or less common set of climatic and environmental factors 
provided a frame that stimulated the formation of some fundamental similarities 
(ecological-cultural), amidst overwhelming differences occasioned by the 
archipelagic nature of the area. That was done in the Tadhana. Unfortunately, that 
was not the case here? 
There was even an instance in Volume 1 when the Indonesia-centrism was 
violated. In the discussion on Chapter 5 (Agriculture-stage) about the Neolithic 
remains of humans, the authors noted that there was no study yet done on the case 
of Indonesia, unlike that of Thailand, Indo-China and Malaysia. Then they went 
on to describe the findings of these studies and moved to conclude that based ori 
them, it can be expected (or hoped, bisa diharapkan) that during the same stage of 
development in west Indonesia, the case was the same (Sartono et al Vol. 1, 1975, 
154-155, hereafter SNI-Volume Number and year edition). The authors might have 
meant well in doing this, that is, they did not want to leave that aspect totally 
uncovered despite the absence of study yet done. Ironically, however, this was an 
instance when Indonesia was seen through the eyes of other countries. In so far as 
Indonesia-centrism is concerned, it may have been better to keep silent about it. 
Notwithstanding problems, the socio-economic model that the Volum~ 1 
writers had adopted enabled them to include elements of Indonesian prehistory 
that did not fit well with the more conventional and Europe-based periodisation. 
That in itself constituted an attempt to assert Indonesia, rather than Europe, as the 
yardstick. More importantly, the socio-economic model gave space for 
7 In an article Soejono wrote for Dynamics of Indonesian History (1979) he did what he did not do in SNl-1. 
In his concluding paragraph, he stated that the material evidences about Indonesian pre-history point to the 
depth and richness of tradition upon which later Indonesia cultures would develop (1978, 1-29). 
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demonstrating the peculiarities of the Indonesian case as it underwent the 
successive stages of hunting and gathering, farming and animal domestication and 
technological specialisation. In the process, if only inadvertently, the Indonesia-
centric perspective was affirmed. 
In Volume 2, the attempt to adopt Indonesia-centrism was more explicit.8 
This volume covers the period when Hindu-Buddhist influences arrived and were 
assimilated in the archipelago. In the discussion on the process of the coming of 
Indian influences, the supposed passivity of Indonesia as the recipient was 
summarily rejected. Emphasised was the supposed active role of 'Indonesians'9 in 
assimilating Indian influences. Citing scholars such as van Leur and Bosch, the 
authors argue that it was Indonesia that set the initiative and the manner by which 
the process went along.10 They further asserted, unfortunately without due 
substantiation or elaboration, that the push-factor did not just come from the 
Indian traders arriving in Indonesia but also the natives visiting India and seeing 
the condition there (SNI-2 1975, 23). The initiative by indigenous actors to 'invite' 
the Brahmans supposed to have emanated from having seen the situation in India 
and having a desire to develop culture as high as what they saw there.11 It is 
notable that the word invited (diundang) is repeatedly emphasised. Likewise the 
fact that many cultural features of India, such as the caste, cannot be found in the 
8 This drew praise from Siswadhi, one of the authors of the review ofSNI that appeared in Prisma. (See 
Siswadhi, Leirissa and Atmakusuma 1976, 82) 
9 The use by authors of the Volume 2 of the terms 'Indonesia' and 'Indonesian' is noteworthy. As if by that 
time, India was already India and Indonesia already Indonesia, and as if a small group of people in 
Sumatra, in Bali or Java could stand as a representative of the whole population of the archipelago. 
1° Considering the contribution of other scholars such as Berg, Rassers, Stutterheim, in understanding the 
process of Indianisation, it is curious that the volume writers did not bother to include their works. For an 
overview of Rassers and Stutterheim' s contributions see van de Kroef ( 1951 ). Others such as Goris, 
Damais and Moens were also not consulted. For a more comprehensive treatment that included Goris, 
Damais, Berg, Moens and many others, see Casparis ( 1961 ). It covers the development of historiography 
from 1770s to 1956. I should note that the works of most of these scholars were utilised in the succeeding 
chapters which described the lndianised states. It seems to indicate lack of coordination between the writer 
of the chapter or section on Indianisation and those of other chapters. 
11 The efforts of the authors constituted an explicit attempt to give a 'nationalist' twist to a trend in the study 
of early Southeast Asia, whereby the region was no longer seen as a mere extension of India and China. For 
a comprehensive and useful review studies on early Southeast Asia, see Bentley ( 1986). 
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same form in Indonesia, if at all, was used as evidence that in the interaction 
between the two cultures, Indonesian culture was dominant (Ibid., 26-27). 
It is striking that the straightforward manner by which the authors asserted 
the Indonesia-centric perspective was not accompanied by effort to demonstrate 
such a perspective. The thinness of evidence was arresting. In a few pages (six or 
seven pages) where the coming of Indian influences was discussed, they merely 
deliberated on the merits and demerits of selected views of different authors 
(Krom, van Leut, Bosch, Coedes) and concluded from there that the Indonesian-
side was in fact active, not a passive recipient of Indian influences (SNl-2 1975, 20-
27). It appeared that the views of these scholars were enough as evidence. 
Illustrative examples, save from mentioning the caste system, were not discussed, 
not even mentioned, and the process of differentiation or divergence from Indian 
cultural patterns was not even hinted at. The whole treatment was strikingly 
mechanical, and at best contrived. One can hardly see the native Indonesian as the 
dramatis personae (except as supposedly the one who "invited" the Brahmans) in 
their interaction with the Indian cultures. Moreover, there was no explicit effort to 
illustrate how this period relates to the process of gradual integration of the 
Indonesian nation. In the succeeding chapters, the authors were content in 
describing the contents of Chinese dynastic records and many inscription that 
pertain to various cities such as Kutai, Tarumanagara, Srivijaya, Majapahit and 
small kingdoms in Sunda and Bali. The Indonesia-centric perspective is easily lost 
in the preponderance of information borrowed from the eyes of Chinese travellers 
or chroniclers as well as in the attributions to the Indian influences. Here and there 
statements12 are found asserting Indonesia-centrism, but they are far too isolated to 
really sustain the perspective. 
12 For instance, in the subsection about 'Hinduisation' ritual (upacara penghinduan), the text states that a 
certain Kundunga, described as possibly the first person to be 'touched' by Indian influence, was able to 
maintain his Indonesian character, but there are no reinforcing details, and the rest of the subsection is 
devoted to the images of how powerful and influential Indian cultural influences were (SNI-2, 1975: 34-35). 
166 
Multi-dimensional Approach 
The main driving force behind the multi-dimensional approach is the need 
to formulate a multi-faceted explanation for a historical phenomenon. It posits that 
history covers much more than what is happening in the king's palace, in the 
courtrooms, in rich men's houses, in trading house. It is much more than about 
inter- or intra-elite rivalries, wars, laws, diplomatic manoeuvrings. History, in 
short, is about the totality of human experience. 
The fundamental assumption that underpins the multi-dimensional, often 
also called structural (struktural), approach is that everything that happens occurs 
as it does because of multiple factors or multi-faceted context. Given a different 
context, or different combinations of factors, things would have unfolded 
differently. Full understanding of the whole context thus is the key to 
understanding an event or individual action. In academic discourse among 
Indonesian historians, the structural, multi-dimensional approach is often sharply 
differentiated from what they call processual (prosesuil) or chronological approach. 
The latter being a straight-forward exposition of what supposed to have transpired. 
As far as this approach is concerned an event is important because it is a part of a 
story that needs to be told. Explaining why an event or an action occurred as it did 
is less important than formulating a clear, straightforward narrative. If the 
structural approach aims to explain, the processual approach seeks to narrate or 
describe. If the earlier requires use of different theoretical or analytic tools in the 
social sciences the latter dispenses with those tools. In institutional terms, the 
difference between the two approaches finds expression in that the History 
Department in the Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) has been well known for the 
structural approach whereas that in the Universitas Indonesia (UI) adheres to the 
processual-narrative approach. While the perception of difference remains to this 
day, it appears not as sharp in practice as it used to be. 
Under ideal circumstances, the structural (synchronic) and the processual 
(diachronic) approaches complement each other to form a neat, lucid and 
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comprehensive account. Sartono showed how it might be done in his Pengantar13 
(1987, 1992) and other critically acclaimed works such as Peasants' Revolt of Banten 
in 1888. (1966) In the case of the SNI, however, the lack of experience of the authors 
was clearly manifested in the often disjointed and strained relationship between 
the two approaches (Klooster 1985, 122-125, 127-128 as translated by Surjomihardjo 
1987a). 
Sartono' s effort at formulating and employing the Indonesia-centric, multi-
dimensional approach was a conscious attempt primarily to address a set of well 
identified historiographic problems. Such an effort went well with his reputation as 
an exemplar of a highly academic and an apolitical person. However, political 
elements seemed to have had an influence or a consequence, advertent or not, in 
his undertakings. One can say that the multidimensional approach was in a sense 
rooted in his personal effort to deal with certain shades of the political, and it 
carries within itself not only political elements but in itself may have a potential as 
a neutraliser of political interests. Just as most Indonesian observers of 
historiographic development are keen to emphasise, Sartono Kartodirdjo was 
aware that Indonesian historians are in a highly-charged political environment. No 
longer is it a question, he declared of whether, but to what extent, Indonesian 
historians would allow themselves to be affected by such an environment in their 
effort to dispense their role as a historian (Sartono 2005a). 
As implied by Sartono, the multi-dimensional, social science approach 
(hereafter MDSSA) was a reaction to the political, in a double senses of the term. In 
the first sense, he claimed that he began the early stage of his effort to formulate _the 
approach against a backdrop of a personal and intellectual struggle against the 
increasingly Marxist atmosphere in the mid-late 50s and early 60s in Indonesia 
(Sartono 2001b; 2005a; 2005b). For one, he claimed that he considered the economic 
determinism of the Marxist approach untenable. For another, the political 
pressures coming from leftist acquaintances who were wooing his cooperation or 
13 See G. Moedjanto (1988) for a useful review ofSartono's book. 
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collaboration egged him to resist forms of ideological determinism and to uphold 
the multidimensionality of historical understanding ( Sartono 2001b). In the second 
sense, and this is more historiographic but subtly political as well, he was aware of 
the need to unsettle the primacy of colonial historiography that put a premium on 
the political approach to history writing. He bemoaned the tyranny of the colonial 
archives that tended to reduce Indonesian history to a chronicle of the activities of 
Dutch colonial officials and the local big men such as political leaders, sultans, 
kings and religious leaders. One can neutralise the political, so he averred, by 
highlighting equally other aspects (Sartono 2005a; 2005b). 
The way how the 1975 edition of the SNI is organised reveals the effort to 
conform to the structural approach. Every volume, in varying degrees, is framed 
whereby different aspects -social, cultural, economic and political-are discussed 
parallel or entwined with one another. For instance, Volume 4 discusses the 
geographic features, bureaucratic and political framework, trade and other 
economic activities, cultural development and social organisations. This has been 
done either by allotting a specific sub-section for each aspect or by weaving several 
aspects together in discussing each kingdom (Mataram, Banjar, Aceh and others), 
or period (that is, liberal period, 1870-1900) or a set of socio-economic practices 
(culture-system, social movements and revolts). 
Another example is Volume 1 that deals with pre-history. Under each stage 
(hunting and gathering, agriculture and others) aspects such as geography, 
technology, social organisation and culture are given ample space: Even Volumes 
5 and 6 that cover the most recent periods (1900-1942 and 1942 to 1965)-peri()ds 
when there are preponderance of "exciting" political developments (nationalism, 
revolution, among others)-also follow, at least in general form, the same 
apportioning of space whereby the 'political' does not by any means 
disproportionately dominate or crowd out the rest. There is one exception here 
though. Volume 6 allots about a third (the first of the three chapters) of its space 
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explicitly to a narrative approach, emplotting chronologically events from 1942 to 
1965. The two other chapters conform to the structural approach as other volumes. 
One can raise a question to what extent the SNI-1975, as it was published, 
actually fulfilled the requirements of the Indonesia-centric perspective and the 
structural approach. Short of identifying all the deficiencies evident in the outputs, 
something that is at once tangential to my purpose and a formidable task for which 
I am not equipped, I shall note here a number of observations, culled from my 
own as well as those of other commentators. These can provide a glimpse of how 
adequately these approaches/perspectives were employed. 
There is an impression that the SNI-1975 had fallen well short of what was 
expected or hoped for. 14 Sartono (2005a), for one, frankly admitted that he was 
unhappy about the output as it was far from the Indonesia-centric and multi-
dimensional approach that he envisioned- an approach that observers have 
agreed he employed well in his books such as the Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 188815 
and Pengantar Sejarah Indonesia Baru 16 (Introduction to New History of Indonesia) 
The reason, he said, for writing the two-volume Pengantar (1987 & 1992) precisely 
lay in his disappointment with the SNI-1975 ( Sartono2005a). He wanted to 
produce an alternative to the SNI and he aimed at showing what SNI could have 
been, had the authors successfully followed his vision. That the problem had 
persisted was evident in the output of a seminar held in 1984 (to commemorate the 
27th anniversary of the First National History Seminar in 1957) wherein speakers 
reached a sobering conclusion: that the community of Indonesian historian was 
still a long way off carrying out the multi-dimensional approach,17 which at leas! to 
14 In Abdurachman Surjomihardjo's intimation, the SNI constituted a 'shameful chapter' in the history of 
Indonesian historiography. ( 1980) On another occasion he declared that only the Volume I (Pre-History) 
approaches the benchmark of scholarly standard. 1978b ). Taufik Abdullah echoes the same view but he was 
quick to point out, followed by a hearty laugh, that it was probably because "we don't really understand it" 
(Abdullah 2005). 
15 This book received favourable reviews. See Smail ( 1967); Friend ( 1970) Hobsbawm ( 1968) 
16 For a useful overview and favourable assessment of the first volume, see Moedjanto ( 1988) 
17 The title of the news article was telling: 'Penulisan Sejarah Indonesia Belum Perhatikan Fakta dan Multi-
dimensional,' (Writing of Indonesian History has yet to Pay Attention to Facts and the Multi-dimensional 
approach) Kompas (1984). It is noteworthy that not only historians closely identified with UGM, such as 
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certain groups, remains a 'methodological Holy Grail.'18 Recently, in a talk he 
delivered on the occasion to celebrate the UGM History Department's 55th Year 
Anniversary and Sartono's 85th birthday Bambang Purwanto argued that state of 
Indonesian historiography, in general, and Sartono's contributions in particular, 
have stagnated after a certain point. Up to now, he claimed, it remains not 
sufficiently understood, even misused by those who purported to apply it. 
(Setyadi and Saptono (2006) Things may not be as bad as Purwanto painted it, but 
such an observation suggests that the approach seems still far from being widely 
and adequately understood 
The first observation points to the inadequacy of basic research. A cursory 
glance at the lists of materials reveals that the authors relied on disproportionately 
huge number of secondary and foreign-authored sources,19 which were written 
with few exceptions by foreign scholars. As Diah observed, referring to specific 
volumes, one can count with one's fingers the sources written by Indonesian 
scholars (1976/1987: 9).20 This is understandable considering that no money was 
Taufik Abdullah and Abdurachman Surjomihardjo, had this perception. Richard Leirissa as well who was 
with the UI concurred with the same assessment. As noted elsewhere, Ul has been closely identified with 
the narrative-chronological approach, often juxtaposed as antithesis of UGM's multi-dimensional approach. 
In an article by Sarto no in the 1990s (and published in 2001 ), he states that works of second generation of 
Indonesian historians as being in the right direction toward fulfilling the requirement of the social science 
approach to history but was quick to point out that "there is no reason to claim that they (second generation 
Indonesian historians) are fully engrained in the social scientific methodology" (2001 a:2 I). 
18 In the freer atmosphere of the post-Suharto period, it was not just the New Order 'official' historiography 
that came under scrutiny. Sartono's School has also been bitterly attacked for its being 'apolitical.' In 
Kuntowijoyo's view, the neutrality of the multi-dimensional approach is amenable to whoever is in power: 
"history contributed nothing and contradicted nobody, history was safe for everybody'' (2000, 81 ). 
Bambang Purwanto (2000, 200 I a, 200 I b, 2000c) has also criticised the Sartono approach and launched 
efforts to reform, not reject, it. For an overview of this effort, see Curaming (2003). These criticisms 
notwithstanding, Sartono's approach remains the benchmark that many Indonesian historians who want to 
pursue 'scientific history.' Even activivist-historians find use in at least name-dropping Sartono and his 
approach in support of their advocacy. See Syamdani (2001, ix-vx) for example. 
19 Editorial introductions by Tjandrasasmita (Vol. 3) and Sutjipto (Vol. 4) are forthright and apologetic about 
this. The editorial introduction for Volumes 2 and 5 are silent about this while that of Volume I was written 
not by the volume editor (Soejono) but by the over-all editor (Sartono) whose concerns naturally covered 
the entire project, not just Vol. I. 
20
• The reviews that appeared at Prisma (1976) and Sinar Harapan (Zain, 1976) were sensitive to these and 
were quick to forgive if not gloss over the resultant weaknesses. Others, hwoever,such as B. M. Diah, were 
not as forgiving. BM Diah bewailed the fact the one can count with one's fingers the sources written by 
Indonesian scholars (1976/1987: 9) and this to him constituted a sufficient basis to conclude that "Western 
views" seemed still dominant. Diah's critique is a bit unfair as he tended to base such observations on a 
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allotted for 'real' research and that much of Indonesian social sciences were by then 
still barely out of the infancy stage. The thinness of evidence, for instance, of the 
supposed dominance of indigenous elements vis-a-vis foreign influences that I 
referred to earlier in relation to the discussion about the coming of Indain 
influences (in Volume 2) may be partly attributable to lack of research. The same is 
the case, as earlier noted, of looking at the Agriculture Stage (Volume 1) from the 
lenses of what happened in the neighbouring countries, thus violating the 
Indonesia-centric perspective. These examples coincide with Leirissa' s observation 
that due to a serious lack of research, the treatment of the 17th and 18th centuries in 
Volumes 3 and 4 unduly gave a very lopsided focus on the activities of the VOC at 
the expense of the more interesting and relevant things. (Siswadhi, Leirissa and 
Atmakusumah, 1976, 86) Consequently, the primacy of internal dynamics, the 
essence of Indonesia-centrism, gave way to Neerlando-centrism that, ironically, 
the whole project was supposed to neutralise. 
Another observation focuses on the unevenness of writing, that is, within 
most of the volumes the quality of writing in one chapter is not sustained in 
another. This situation, it seems to me, does not just reflect lack of actual writing 
experience on the part of members of the team, as pointed out by Sartono, but also 
lack of understanding of Indonesia-centrism and the multi-dimensional approach 
and how these might be properly applied. Looking at an example, say in Pengantar 
Sejarah, of how Sartono employed the multi-dimensional approach, this approach 
entails an astute demonstration of how various aspects-social, economic, cultural, 
political, institutional-interact and how such interaction helps clarify or explain a 
phenomenon, say, uprisings or social movements. In the case of SNI, it is, in my 
view, in parts of Volume 4 that the approach has been satisfied more satisfactorily, 
compared with other Volumes. The chapters for instance on uprisings against 
colonialism and social movements stand-out as good examples of this approach 
fairly limited and selective reading of the voluminous work. However, he also has a point. There are indeed 
parts of the 6 volumes that hardly qualify as having been written from an Indonesia-centric standpoint. 
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(SNI-4, 1975, 123-227).21 The same thing definitely cannot be said of Volume 2 
where a significant part is littered with little more than epigraphic accounts based 
on numerous inscriptions or Chinese records or what scholars say or argue about 
those inscriptions/records. Grossly insufficient effort seems to have been expended 
to arrange or frame these accounts to clearly demonstrate how social, economic, 
political, religious and cultural factors interact to form a unified explication of the 
life in early Indianised states in Java, Bali, Kalimantan and Sumatra (SNI-2, 1975, 
29-129). Even the chapter on Singhasari and Majapahit which is evidently much 
better written does not faithfully conform to the structural approach (SNI-2, 1975, 
252-282). It is mostly a narrative of political developments-the rise and fall of 
Majapahit. It is only the chapters about Mataram and the kingdoms in Bali and in 
Sunda that an effort to follow the prescribed approach is discernible, but even in 
these cases, the writing style of the assigned authors, exacerbated by a lack of data, 
may have hamstrung their efforts (SNI-2, 1975, 75-252). Non-political aspects such 
as culture, religion and socio-economic dynamics are discussed along the political 
but the inter-connection among them never approached the clarity evident in parts 
of Volume 4. 
Be that as it may, whether the SNI-1975 was successful or not was less 
important than the fact that this constituted the scholars' concrete response to their 
perceived needs or problems of the time, both political and historiographic. As 
such, it was useful as a showcase of the manner in which they grappled with the 
challenges at hand; and it can provide a glimpse of the conditions that made such 
undertaking, and its success or failure, possible. The whole context and the entire 
process are much more relevant than the extent of success attained, al though this is 
not to deny that the success-failure question carries its own significance. In 
particular, this question occupies a central position in efforts to address the often-
21 In his review of the volume 4, Leirissa notes that in comparison with volume 3, which he also reviewed, 
volume 4 was much more integrated, in a sense that parts fit well into a discernible framework of analysis. 
He is not explicit about how well multi-dimensional approach has been employed but he is categorical in 
praising the analysis of social movement. He claims it is new and seldom found in other published works. 
He also said that the way how the author formulated the classification of these social movements is very 
interesting (Siswadi, Leirissa & Atmakusuma 1976, 84-86). 
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assumed inverse correlation between the level of scholarship and the extent of 
politics in the SNI.22 
The SNI project took off with the scholars harbouring good faith and high 
hopes in it (Surjomihardjo 1980; Abdullah 1994). Sartono and others claimed that in 
the beginning there was not an iota of suspicion about whatever political motive 
there might be behind the Project. It was only when the Project was well underway 
that, observing Nugroho's behaviour, they began to be suspicious (Sartono 2005b). 
At the very beginning, as far as they were concerned the Project was purely a 
scholarly undertaking and that despite enormous challenges it entailed, they 
would do it because it was their patriotic duty to do so. Only to the extent thus that 
nationalism was considered political, were they willing to grant the Project's 
political intent. In the context, however, of the independent Indonesia, to be 
nationalistic was hardly considered a political act. It assumed the status of being a 
moral responsibility and it was seemingly as natural as early morning air. 
Political Terrain 
Reading Nugroho's foreword in SNI-6 (1975), one can readily sense that he 
anticipated readers would find a good deal of controversy in the volume. He 
emphasised, for one, what he readily and consistently declared in many of his 
writings (Notosusanto 1964; 1971b; 1978) and public declarations (Zain 1976; Sinar 
Harapan 1980a; l 980b; Sumantri 1982), that is, that contemporary history was by 
nature contentious because many people who were still alive had different 
experiences or perceptions from what the historian's accounts' presented. This 
seemed to be an invitation to regard 'selectivity' and 'subjectivity' in histor~cal 
work as natural. At best, one cannot but be subjective, he pointed out. One possible 
interpretation of this statement was that Nugroho seemed to be preparing the 
readers, conditioning their minds not only to regard contemporary history as 
22 Taufik Abdullah, for instance, in an interview with Sinar Harapan ( l 980a) noted that aside from the moral 
or ethical stance of a historian, capability or skills also matter in resisting influences of prevailing politics. 
Edi Sedyawati (in Kompas 1996) express a similar vi1!w claiming that political pressure on scholarship can 
be parried by adept use of conceptual and analytic tools in history. 
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naturally controversial but also to accept the version he proposed as a product of 
his own selection and interpretation.23 
The main political factor that I think is very relevant in explaining the shape 
of and in stimulating the responses to the SNI is the effort to justify the regime. 
This factor rests on a number of pillars: demonising the communists; eulogising 
the military; discrediting Sukarno; and 'Othering' the Old Order. The following 
discussion will focus on volume 6 because these pillars are most relevant within 
the period covered by this volume. 
The New Order regime emerged from a set of mysterious, irregular and 
bloody events in 1965-66. These were preceded by a sharply contested and 
protracted struggle for political supremacy among forces that included the 
Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) and the military. 
Central to the story of the birth of the New Order was the gruesome events 
collectively associated with the September 30 Movement (Gerakan 30 September, 
hereafter G30S). The importance of this event is gleaned not only from what 
happened immediately afterwards-collapse of the PKI, massacres of hundreds of 
thousands of people, the fall of Sukarno and the rise or Suharto, among others-
but also from the lingering state of terror that followed in its wake, haunting 
Indonesian society up to this day.24 (Heryanto 2006; Budiawan 2004; Kasianto 2003; 
Goodfellow 1995; van der Kok et al 1991) There is a medium-sized and still 
growing corpus of published works discussing the controversial character of this 
23 B. M. Diah, one who wrote the earliest and a damning critique of the SNI, had a different interpretation. He 
likened Nugroho to a sharp-eyed eagle that flies high in the sky and that despite keen eyesight was 
oblivious of a hunter who was about to shoot him. (Diah, 1975/1987, p. 18) In my view, the simile is 
inappropriate. I think Nugroho knew full well that he would be attacked for his interpretation and his 
invoking of the supposed inherence of selectivity and subjectivity in history was meant to provide some 
hedge. However, it could also be a plain expression of intellectual honesty. 
24 Heryanto in his book State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia (2006) and Budiawan's 
Mematahkan Pewarisan lngatan (2004) clearly demonstrates the lingering impact on the life of the people 
of the anti-communist witch-hunts that followed the G30S. For a useful analysis of media coverage of 
highly contentious debates surrounding Gus Dur's proposal to abrogate anti-communist laws, see Kasianto, 
Mendamaikan Sejarah (2003). For earlier attempts at understanding the roots and/or the manifestations of 
anti-communist discourse, see Goodfellow (1995) and van der Kok et al (1991) 
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event25 so I would just focus first on how SNI-6 (1975) treats certain relevant 
persons or events. These include the supposed centrality of the role of the 
communists in the G30S and the corresponding minimal involvement of the 
military. Because of the fairly significant variations in the treatment offered m 
different editions, comparison will follow. 
The SNI-6 (1975) starts its discussion of the G30S with emphasis on the 
alliance between Sukarno and the PKI. The two were blamed for the sharp 
polarisation of the political field between friends and enemies; 26 the friends were 
nurtured and the others were set aside or neutralised. (SNI-6 1975, 119) The sins of 
the PKI since 1964 are enumerated: aggressive and vitriolic propaganda, wilful 
provocation, unlawful acts, infiltrating the military threatening national unity, 
fomenting social unrest, deception, and attempts at a power grab (Ibid., 119-121) . 
It denounces the acts of seizing lands (aksi sepihak or unilateral act) 27 in the name 
of land reform claiming that in Java there was no more land that should be 
subjected to a land reform program. Transmigration, it adds, is the only way to 
give poor peasants land (Ibid., 119). The PKI is also blamed for allegedly 
influencing Sukarno toward a wayward foreign policy, and it is castigated for 
belligerently imposing its politicised standards on arts and literature.28 
The volume describes the double-faced strategy of the PKI whereby its 
participation in the parliament is depicted as a deceptive front for legitimacy and 
25 For the reviews of historiography of G30S, see Hermawan Sulistiyo (2000, 46-89); Cribb (1990; 2002). For 
a much more comprehensive and very detailed review, specifically aiming to find out,Soekamo's 
involvement, see Beisi (2004). For a review strikingly favorable to Suharto's position see Elson (2001, 99-
119) For the earlier versions see Anderson & Mc Vey (1971 ), Nugroho & Saleh (1968) Crouch ( 1978) 
26 It states: "Dalam suatu aliansi dengan Presiden Sukarno mereka telah membagi kekuatan-kekuatan politik di 
Indonesia atas kawan dan lawan" (119). " ... PK! hendak mencapai kekuasaan Negara denganjalan 
parlementer, terutama setelah padajaman Demokarsi Terpinpin memperoleh dukungan penuh dari Presiden 
Sukarno" (120). 
27 Unilateral action refers to efforts of PK! mass organization such as BT! (Barisan Tani Indonesia, 
Indonesia's Farmers' Front) to enforce land reform regulations (SNI-6 1975, I 08). 
28 See p. 108 (SN I, 1984 ). This relates to the attempt by the left-leaning artists and cultural workers to assert 
the primacy of the 'political' (captured in the slogan "Politics is in Command") in all aspects of life, 
including art-related matters. It elicited a response from a group of artists who signed the Manifesto 
Kebudayaan (Cultural Manifesto) asserting freedom of artistic expression. For a perceptive, insider's view 
of the issues, events and personalities surrounding this incident, see Goenawan Mohamad The 'Cultural 
Manifesto' Affair: Literature and Politics in Indonesia in the 1960s: A Signatory's View ( 1988). 
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respectability, while they were allegedly preparing themselves for an opportune 
moment to seize power by forceful means such as a coup d'etat (Ibid., 120). 
Infiltration of the military ranks through the efforts of the Biro Khusus (Special 
Bureau) is part of the grand strategy. It claims that the PKI had learned from the 
debacle in Madiun in 1948 that it was not enough to have their own troops but they 
also needed to neutralise the military leadership neutralised, and if needed 
liquidate it. It also claims that a PKI document was found in 1964, allegedly stating 
that the year 1966 would be the time when the condition was 'ripe' for a forceful 
take-over (Ibid., 120). Why 1966 and which particular document is neither specified 
nor the source of information about the presence of such document cited. It also 
notes that by August 1965 Sukarno had fallen ill and that this condition could 
result in paralysis if not death. This was supposed to be a pretext for Aidit to 
decide on the hastening the shift from peaceful parliamentary approach to a 
forceful tactic (Ibid., 121). The whole treatment seems to aim at laying the 
groundwork for presenting the G30S as the long-planned handiwork of the 
communists. 
The. names of the military personnel who were supposed to be agents of the 
Biro Khusus were identified-Untung, Sunardi, Atmodjo, Anwas-and they were 
also pinpointed as responsible for setting the targets for liquidation. They were 
among the members of the group, the Gerakan Sepuluh September (G30S), that 
kidnapped, supposedly tortured and killed the generals whose bodies were 
eventually thrown into a well in Lubang Buaya. The narrative then notes briefly 
that Suharto decisively acted to crush the coup. The whole coverage of the event, of 
the history of Indonesia in fact, ends simply by noting that Suharto sent troops to 
quell the rebels in Central Java (122-123). There was no mention whatsoever of the 
reaction of the people and the subsequent events that would lead to the rise of the 
New Order and the demise of the PKI. 
That the SNI-6 (1975) authors were bent early on to present a negative view 
of the Old Order and Sukarno is evident in a paper by Ariwiadi, one of the 
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members of the team and a protege of Nugroho's in the Pusjarah. This paper was 
presented in the planning workshop in Tugu, Bogor in June 1972. In his paper, he 
strongly emphasises the need to differentiate clearly between the Old and the New 
Order. The ideas were obviously in an incipient stage but a persistent trope is quite 
discernible: that the Old Order represents the negative things- economic crisis, 
paralysing politics, whimsical rules, chaos, poverty-and the New Order was the 
opposite-economic development, orderly politics, systematic laws, etc (Ariwiadi 
1972)29 
One clear manifestation of the effort to paint a negative picture of Sukarno 
and the Old Order in the 1975 edition is the highly skewed treatment of Sukarno 
and his government. There is, for instance, only one sentence in the whole chapter 
on Guided Democracy that expresses a positive tone about Sukarno and there is 
another one about the government.3° In the sentence favourable to Sukarno, he was 
credited, alongside the TNI, for his decisive effort to break the supposedly 
paralysing political impasse that emanated from endless party-bickering during 
the period of parliamentary democracy (SNI-6, 1975, p. 103). For the government, 
on the other hand, the SNI-6 (1975) referred to its effort to increase exports. The 
sentence was quick to point out, however, that this effort did not succeed 
(1975:109). These sentences would have not stood out if most of the others were 
balanced descriptive statements, but they were not. Many were loaded with 
insinuations which even if true were nonetheless posed in a tendentious manner. 
They were made without supporting information or without citing the source of 
information. Examples of these statements are presented in Table 6.1. 
29 lt's is notable that Ariwiadi's colleague, Moela Marbun, who was assigned to the period of Guided 
Democracy wrote the paper apparently without much desire to paint an overly negative picture of the 
period. See Marbun ( 1972). 
30 Sukarno was credited, alongside the TNI, for his decisive effort to break the supposedly paralyzing political 
impasse that emanated from endless party-bickering during the period of parliamentary democracy. See 
SNl-6, 1975, p. I 03). The government's effort to increase exports was noted, although the sentence was 
quick to point out this effort did not succeed. See SNl-6 (1975: I 09). 
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Table 6. 1 
Examples of Statements Unfavourable to Sukarno 
STATEMENTS 
"Atas petunjuk President Sukarno, PKI dan 
ormasnya dapat dengan aman melakukan 
intimidasi dan teror politik terhadap pihak-
pihak dan tokoh-tokoh yang dianggapnya 
law an ... " (108) 
" ... ternyata Presiden Sukarno iµeriafsirkan 
terp~pin itu dengan pilnpipan p~~dcP1Y'<1 · 
sehfku J:'empinan B~sar Revo~\lst~'seltfugga 
peilgertiannya· menjadi demokraSi yil:ng 
dipimpin oleh Sukarno/! (1~) · 
Dalam prakteknya ekonomi terpimpin berubah 
menjadi sistim lisensi yang menguntungkan 
segilintir orang-orang yang dekat di istana (110) 
"Sebagai presiden nampaknya:tidafe rnl\11 
dijadikan symbol belaka ... ia mau mehganggap 
dirinya ... pemimpin rakyat.;' ( .101)'. . 
TRANSLATION 
With the instruction of President Sukarno, the 
PKI and its mass organizations could intimidate 
or terrorise groups and personalities they 
considered as enemies 
' ' ,, 
• n'tl\~ fact is PreJi(jentSuk~o il}terl'reted 
. 'Gt(ide4tea<letsltip' ~s his.<>*.lllea.dership 
})eing thet;~e~t Le~~er ~f ti\¢ Rev9lu'tion •. In his 
U,~aer~taJ;lding, it l?eea;nie.f{e,~o~ra~y :gi.i~e(j by' 
· ···· '" ·· · · · .. ·:·stl]J<arn.~; · · ··· ·· · · · · · 
~,·.'•, . <; _,.·; . ' x'. . ,) " 
·'·, ~.:' /I\· 
.~ ~~ .. 
In practice, the economy during Guided 
Democracy period came to operate as a system 
of licensing that benefitted only a small group of 
people close to the palace. 
As. th~ president, ff seems l\e •• dtcln' Uike to be · 
just a symbol. .. Ht? wanted to forisider himself ... 
·. a~ the leader ~f the p~ople," 
Efforts to demonise the PKI and to discredit Sukarno often go intricately 
together. The purportedly wayward behaviour of Sukarno, for instance, is often 
attributed to the influence of the PKI31 and the PKI' s supposed notoriety, its 
aggressive actions and posturing were all attributed to the protection of Sukarno. 
Such a rhetorical trick, it seems to me, is quite ingenious. On the one hand, efforts 
to demonise PKI can be reinforced by emphasis on Sukarno's faults whereas efforts 
to tarnish Sukarno can easily be enhanced by associating whatever he did with the 
31 The Konfrontasi with Malaysia and the subsequent withdrawal from the UN, the dissolution of the Murba 
Party, Sukarno's distrustful attitude towards the TN!, all these and more were blamed on the influence of 
the PK! on Sukarno (SNI-6, 1975, 110-111, 115). 
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influence of the PKI. Besides, to the many who were fanatical supporters of 
Sukarno, passing the blame to the PKI caimot but be a welcome move. On the other 
hand, the subliminal message that Sukarno was weak because he allowed himself 
to be influenced by the PKI can hardly escape the non-'Sukarnois.' Either way, it is 
beneficial to the interest of the regime. 
There are a number of notable points about the treatment as summarised 
above. First, there is a deliberate effort to emphasise the partnership of Sukarno 
with the PKI and to blame the partnership for many problems. Second, the 
coverage may be described as relatively scanty, being just a little over four pages 
for the G30S, and nothing after that event. Third, the involvement of the military in 
the G30S as well as in kidnapping and killing of the generals is explicitly stated. 
Fourthly, there was no mention of the role of the Gerwani, Pemuda Rakyat and 
other PKI-affiliated groups in the killing. And finally, there is something puzzling 
about the hasty manner by which the coverage ended so abruptly. The last four 
points would have not been notable had the other versions of the SNI not offered 
sharply different renditions. Let me start with the version of the SNI for the high 
schools, the SNI-SMP. (Notosusanto and Yusmar Basri 1976; heafter SNI-SMP) This 
textbook is not, in the strictest sense, part of the SNI project. It was supposedly an 
offshoot of the project. However, the circumstances surrounding its writing can 
provide valuable insights into the dynamics within the SNI project itself. 
Almost simultaneous with the official launching of the SNI in late 1975 the 
version for high schools came out in early 1976.32 The first set (three volumes) was 
entitled Sejarah Nasional Indonesia untuk SMP (for junior high school, hereafter SNI-
SMP) and the second set, published in 1979, was simply called Sejarah Nasional 
Indonesia untuk SMA (for senior high school). 33 It was prepared by a team led by 
Nugroho Notosusanto and Yusmar Basri. According to the preface, it was based on 
32 The foreword is explicit that as early as 28 October 1975, the textbook was already completed. The first 
printing was done in 1976. See SNI-SMP (1976, 2-6). 
33 In Indonesia, high school is divided into two stages, three years each. Names changed through the time but 
in the 1970s, the first stage was called the SMP, or Sekolah Menengah Pertama. It corresponds to Junior 
High School. The next was SMA, or Sekolah Menengah Atas, what amounts to the Senior High School. 
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the newly published SNI, reworked supposedly to suit the pedagogical needs of 
high school students.34 Syaref Thayeb, the Minister of Education then, described 
the textbooks as "making use of scholarly, objective facts and is in agreement with 
the national interest"(Zain 1976). 
Pertinent things about this textbook, in so far as this study is concerned, 
include the (1) timing and the context within which it was prepared and the (2) the 
contents which hardly qualify as mere summaries of the SNI. 
That it was published just few months after the SNI and it was used in the 
public schools starting 1977 was a remarkable case of urgency. It means it was 
being prepared while work on the SNI was still underway. That it was done 
exclusively by a team led by Nugroho, with members he personally picked, 
seemed to be irregular. It was a violation of the previous understanding with 
Sartono and other historians which, broadly speaking, posited that the textbooks 
for high school that would emanate from the SNI would be prepared by a team of 
historians and history teachers appointed on the basis of merit and chosen 
following a set of more or less transparent criteria and procedures. At the very 
least, the composition of the team would be determined by a collegial body, not by 
a single individual such as Nugroho (Sartono 2001b; 2005a). 
Contrary to Nugroho's declaration, the SNI-SMP was not a mere a 
summary of the SNI, simplified or adjusted to suit the need of high school 
students. It was substantially different, both in form and in content. For one, the 
SNI-SMP followed a chronological, narrative approach while the SNI (1975) as, 
noted above, subscribed to a structural, multi-dimensional approach. This 
34 See Foreword, SNI-SMP, p. 5. That these textbooks were just summaries of the SN! has been widely 
believed. One indication of this was that while the SN!, as shown in Chapter 5, had been fiercely attacked 
since 1976, SNI-SMP would not be noticed by the critics until middle late 1980s. Klooster (1985, 212-213) 
and Kuntowijoyo (2003) are just among the better known observers who took Nugroho's declaration at 
face value. Even a recognized expert in social studies education, Prof. Dr. Helius Syamsuddin, declared in 
his paper written in 1997 that SNI-SMP (and its sister SNI-SMA) was just based on the SN!. (Syamsuddin, 
1998) One possible reason for this was that there were only few people who actually read SN! and SNI-
SMP together. Textbook writers, in Indonesia and the Philippines as in many countries as well, tend to find 
the easy way out. They tended to merely paraphrase information from the most accessible source. 
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approach can be very well justified by pedagogical imperatives, as Nugroho in fact 
did (SNI-SMP 'Prakata,' 5). A structural approach, is no doubt much more difficult 
for high school students to understand. There is, however, evidence indicating that 
Nugroho preferred a narrative approach because of the greater ease by which it 
could convey the propaganda message (Saleh As' ad Djamhari, 2005a). 
A more important difference was that the SNI-6 (1975) paled in comparison 
with the SNI-SMP in the intensity and clarity of its propaganda messages. Why 
Nugroho and his team produced almost at the same time two versions of history 
with very different temperament? Let us look at the contents of the SNI-SMP and 
compare it with SNI-6 (1975) to find some clues.35 
The Madiun Affair, for one, is categorically described as a betrayal 
(pengkhianatan) by the PKI, and it is emblazoned as the title of a sub-heading at 
that (SNI-SMP, 105). It plainly states that it was aimed at bringing down the 
Republic, at that time in the middle of its struggle against the Dutch. It continues, 
thus (SNI-SMP, 106): 
The rebels controlled the whole residency of Madiun and parts of the 
neighboring areas, especially Pati. Government officials, military (TNI) officers 
and party leaders or groups they considered enemies they killed with impunity 
and the bodies of some them were put in wells. Such cruelty elicited anger from 
the people in general. That was the reason why they (PKI) did not get a 
widespread public support. Such gruesome or barbaric acts were remembered 
by the people especially those in East and Central Java 17 years later with the 
outbreak of the G30S. The ways of killings, including the act of putting the 
dead bodies inside the well, were the same. 
In SNI-6 (1975), there is nothing like this. For one, it is plainly called-an 
uprising in Madiun and the only mention of it in relation to the G30S is made in 
two plain sentences, stating that the PKI already tried in 1948 to seize the 
government but this attempt failed, and from that point on the PKI struggled 
underground (SNI-6 1975, 119-120). There is no feeling of bitterness in such a 
35 The one I utilized is that published in I 985. It constituted the seventh printing, the first having been done in 
1976. No revision was done, only reprinting. See SNI-SMP (I 976, 2-6). 
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declaration that is common in other versions (1984 and 1993). The only other 
mention is made in two paragraphs describing the event in an unadorned way, 
summarised as follows: The rebels seized the city of Madiun and Djokosuyono 
who installed himself as the military governor made a speech on the radio whereby 
he called for the purge of colonial and reactionary elements from the TNI. It is 
followed by the enumeration of charges raised by Musso against the nationalist-
leaders such as Sukarno and Hatta. After plainly stating that the government 
immediately crushed the rebellion, it closes with an expression of regret that those 
involved were not brought to trial because the Dutch were once again on the 
offensive. What stands out in this exposition was not the alleged betrayal by the 
PKI, as highlighted in the SNI-SMP and other versions of the SNI-6, but the 
justifications of the communists for launching the ill-prepared uprising (Ibid. 58-
59). 
On account of what happened at the Lubang Buaya, the SNI-SMP is 
different from SNI-6 (1975) in the mention of the doctors' supposed post mortem 
according to which the victims experienced heavy torture (siksaan berat) before they 
were killed. Mentioned likewise, a detail omitted by SNI-6 (1975), is that the bodies 
were already decomposing by the time they were taken out from the well (SNI-
SMP 1975, 161). More striking, howeover, is the reference to the alleged reaction of 
the people to what happened in Lubang Buaya. Not only is SNI-SMP quite 
straightforward in mentioning the killings of many people that happened in the 
wake of the coup, something that the 1975 version totally omits, while others (1984 
and 1993 editions) are visibly hesitant to do.36 It also avers that the killings of the 
PKI leaders (no mention of members, sympathisers and suspected affiliates) that 
ensued after the G30S in 1965 was the people's initiative, allegedly at least partially 
as a reprisal to what the PKI did in Maditin (SNI-SMP, 166). 
36 Observers tend to be blinded by the reality-effect of the SN! being an official history. While it is true that it 
is to the regime's interest to gloss-over the mass-killings and SNI-1975 is in fact totally silent about it, the 
1984 edition is hardly silent and the SNl-SMP is definitely far from being discreet about it. For an example 
of an observer I referred to above, see Nordholt (2004, 8) 
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President Sukarno's indecisive attitude gave rise to the impatience of the 
people. In a lot of areas, especially those that have experienced mass killings by 
the PKI in September-October 1948 (Madiun Uprising), the people took the 
initiative against PKI leaders. Many leaders of the PKI were killed by the 
people in armed encounters in the villages. 
The authors are silent who these people were. The generic and nebulous 
terms 'rakyat' and 'masyarakat' are always deployed to hide the real perpetrators. 
It does not surprise that there is not a iota of hint about the role of the military and 
some Islamic groups in these massacres. 
Another aspect where SNI-SMP clearly exceeds SNI-6 (1975), in terms of 
propaganda intent is in the image of the military. The 1975 edition is also emphatic 
of the good image and the pivotal roles of the military37 but it does not go to the 
extent of obliterating the role of the military in the G30S, something the SNI-SMP 
does. After enumerating groups-PNI, Murba, trade unions and others--that the 
PKI allegedly infiltrated and eventually neutralised or won over, the SNI-SMP 
authors highlighted that it was the military that remained the only institution 
capable of withstanding the 'PKI conquest.' Perhaps it was in the spirit of this 
claim that the authors tried very hard to conceal the fact that the armed forces itself 
was infiltrated by the PKI, and they imply that no part of it became sympathetic, 
much less became close to it.38 The height of this effort can be seen in the depiction 
of G30S as a purely PKI-affair. Even Untung, the leader of the coup attempt, was 
not mentioned! As noted above, by contrast the SNI-6 (1975) is forthright about the 
involvement of the military. It is not a hyperbole to assert that <;>nly a very faint 
37 For example, the TNI was emphasized as Sukarno's partner in restoring order and in breaking political 
impasse caused by the supposedly unwieldy party-politics. P. 103.TNI is shown always to be in a rescue 
when something goes wrong. As p. I 06 enumerates: enormous contribution to the Perang Kemerdekaan, the 
crushing rebellions, cleaning up the mess of the failure of Konstituante, freeing of the Irian Jaya. 
38 There is in fact only one sentence that connects the PKI and the armed forces in terms other than one being 
the anti-thesis of the other. It reads: "It's because of such a reason that the PKI focused its attention on 
achieving control of the TNI from within by developing networks of cadres and sympathisers within its 
rank ... " (SNI-SMP, 151). Note that the statement indicates merely the efforts or attempt of the PKI to win 
support from within the military. It occludes the fact that there were in fact a good number of military 
personnel who were at least sympathetic to the PKI, or at least to its cause. Comparing with Ichtisar Sejarah 
R.I., published in 1971, where Nugroho was very explicit about the role of some military men in the G30S, 
SNI-SMP's version is puzzling indeed. (Notosusanto, 1971, 108, 113-114) 
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trace of military involvement is hinted at in the SNI-SMP. This is found in a 
sentence whose function was merely to clarify what Biro Khusus was. It states: 
"Biro Khusus was a secret agency that was directly under the leader of the party 
(PKI) whose task is to infiltrate the military and to influence and create a group 
sympathetic to the PKI" (SNI-SMP, 160). Any student who had no prior knowledge 
and would read nothing other than the SNI-SMP would have no notion of military 
involvement in the coup. 
The tendency to demonise the PKI also abounds in SNI-SMP, and in a more 
virulent manner. For instance, notwithstanding that in the parliament there were 
many supporter of Sukarno who were not communists, the writers of the SNI-SMP 
exclusively blamed the PKI for the failure of these two institutions to respond to 
the Tritura39 (SNI-SMP, 1966). In contrast, SNI-6 (1975) is silent about this point. 
The PKI was also depicted as the cause of the abrogation of Murba (p. 151), and the 
splitting into two factions of the PNI (p. 151), one side supposedly taking the PKI-
line and the other opposing it. Likewise, the authors chided the PKI for forcefully 
taking land from legitimate owners (p. 152). Moreover, PKI' s influence was 
blamed for a good number of Sukarno's wayward decisions,4° thus creating 
impressions that are mutually destructive to Sukarno's and PKI's images: that is, 
that Sukarno was bad because he was too close to the PKI and that Sukarno was a 
weakling because he allowed the PKI to influence him. 
What can possibly explain these disparities? There are a number of 
possibilities depending on the kind of disparity. On the difference in the intensity 
of pro-regime interpretations, one possibility is that the two versions might have 
been written by different persons who despite being similarly employed by the 
39 Tritura was a shorthand for Tri Tuntuntan Rakyar or Three Demands of the People. The political fall-out 
from the G30S, exacerbated by economic crisis, proved too much for Sukarno to handle. The three demands 
were: (I) dissolution of the PKI; (2) massive restructuring of the Dwikora Cabinet; and (3) proper handling 
of economic crisis. 
40 The PKI was blamed for many things that Sukarno did or was: that is, anti-Western foreign policy ( SNI-6 
1975, 110), konfrontasi with Malaysia (SNI-6 1975, 115) and Sukarno's increasingly authoritarian 
tendencies as well as for deviating from many long-standing socio-cultural, economic and political practices 
(SNI-6 1975, 344). 
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military and despite being supervised by Nugroho Notosusanto simply had 
different views about historical events. Yusmar Basri admitted that he wrote 
volume 3 of SNI-SMP (the one under consideration here) under the close 
supervision of Nugroho (Yusmar Basri 2005). Yusmar Basri belonged to the team 
that wrote the SNI-5 (1975) whereas those who wrote SNI-6 were Yusmar's 
colleagues at the Armed Forces History Centre such as Saleh As' ad Djamhari, 
Rochmani Santoso, Ariwiadi, among others. 
Individual writing style, or writing ability, may also have something to do 
with it. The SNI-6 (1975) and SNI-SMP, for instance, both wanted to emphasise the 
sins of Sukarno and the Guided Democracy regime. SNI-SMP, however, appears to 
be clearer in its message. For instance, in its attempt to discuss the sources and the 
gravity of economic problems during the Guided Democracy period, the SNI-6 
(1975) merely cited the problems - hyperinflation, white elephant projects, 
corruption related to deferred payment-but there is no attempt to establish their 
causes and interconnections, nor even an explanation what those terms meant. 
Moreover, Sukarno's culpability is hardly referred to (SNI-6, 195, 109-110). One 
gets the impression that it was haphazardly written. The SNI-SMP, on the other 
hand, is able to define and explain more clearly, within comparatively lesser space, 
the connections between the monetary crisis, corruption, inflation and the suffering 
of the people (SNI-SMP, 152-154). 
The regime's political interest is another possible reason, and this is the most 
popular way to explain the nature of the the SNI. That the SNI-SMP was indeed 
intended to be a political tool right from the start became clear in 1982. Nugro.ho 
in an interview with a journalist declared: "Yes, I know that (referring to SNI-
SMP) was not perfect ... but its contents were already okay (sudah baik) and it 
satisfies the requirements set forth by Pak Harto."41 (emphasis mine) (Sumantri 1982) 
Many scholars in Indonesia, and perhaps every foreign observer, suspected this 
41 Nugroho was quoted as saying: "Saya tahu itu (SNI-SMP) tidak sempurna karena saya bukan guru SMP, 
tapi bahan isinya sudah baik dan memenuhi syarat yang dikehendaki Pak Harto" 
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but Nugroho was usually adamant in rejecting any suggestion that he was a lackey 
of the regime. He insisted repeatedly and tried hard to convince the public that he 
was a scholar, and that he deserved to be treated as such. Indeed, what he said in 
that interview was a very rare explicit admission that he wrote history in 
conf.ormity to the order or wish of the higher authorities. 
The key question here is that if political interest is indeed a primary reason, 
why would SNI-6 (1975) be any less effective as a vehicle? The possible answer lies 
in the contrasting set of constraints within which the two projects developed. 
Whereas the SNI-SMP was written with Nugroho and his team enjoying almost 
full freedom, there are reasons to believe that they were hamstrung by at least three 
strictures in writing the SNI-6 (1975). The first emanates from the pressure to 
conform to the structural, multi-dimensional approach agreed to by the group. The 
second was the attitude held at least by some influential members of the team 
towards contemporary history. Such an attitude springs from what I call, for lack 
of better term, the "contemporary-history-as-not-yet-history" mentality. And 
finally, the presence and the towering stature of Sartono himself who, despite 
Nugroho's audacity to overrule him several instances before, remained a 'force' to 
reckon with. 
Reading various papers presented in the workshop in Tugu, Bogor in June 
197242, one is struck by the strong pressure for everyone to conform to the 
structural, multi-dimensional approach such that Nugroho who was known to be 
not a fan of the approach could only concur.43 In his paper "Peribde Sedjak 1942: 
Pengantar" (Period Since 1942: An Introduction) he expresses agreement with !he 
structural approach, but insists on the need for a chapter that adopts a 
chronological or narrative approach as an introductory but integral part of the 
42 See the three-volume proceedings lokakarya Buku Standard Sejarah Indonesia, mimeograph, 1972. 
43 Interviews with several people close to Nugroho confirmed his preference for the narrative-chronological 
approach. Saleh As'ad Djamhari (2005a) (Yusmar Basri (2005), Irsyam (2005a) Manus (2005). One reason 
for this was perhaps Nugroho's literary background. For him history is a story. For another, if the objective 
is to convey a message (moral, exhortatory, propagandistic), it can be accomplished more effectively using 
a story-telling approach, rather than structural analytical approach. 
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whole effort. That is precisely what came out in the SNI-6 (1975) as described 
above. Nugroho's insistence on chapter specifically containing a chronological 
narrative as a prelude to the structural discussion seems to represent a 
compromise.44 If he could not fully have his preferred way, a straight narrative 
approach, at least there is one chapter allotted for it. 
This move had important consequences. Having confined the narrative 
approach to the introductory chapter one is left with little space for a detailed and 
passion-inciting narrative of what was supposed to have happened, especially in 
the crucial events of the G30S coup and after. This partly explains the rather weak 
character of the propaganda messages in the SNI 1975 edition. Likewise, being an 
overview chapter, it had to fit its time coverage and the intensity and density of 
narration to the level appropriate to the two succeeding chapters. Since the two 
succeeding chapters employed a structural approach to analyse the Japanese, 
Liberal Democracy and Guided Democracy periods, it calls for an overview (in the 
previous chapter) that covers these periods. It becomes a little clearer then why 
details about important events after the 1965 coup, especially those associated with 
birth of the New Order, and beyond were not covered. Supersemar,45 Tritura and 
the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto are all left out. They might appear 
misplaced or awkward given the nature of the two main chapters. Perhaps, if the 
New Order period was included in the coverage of the two main chapters, 
mentioning those events was necessary. Even in such a case, however, the primacy 
of the structural approach would likely preclude the need for so much details that 
could crowd out non-political aspects - elements that the structural approach aims 
to equally highlight. So here we have a case whereby the structural framework of 
44 In Nugroho's foreword in the 1975 edition, he justifies such a move by implying to the effect that unlike 
other volumes that dealt with the periods long time past-periods when lack of data makes it difficult to 
present a clear and detailed narratives-the period from 1942 to 1960s is different. There are simply 
numerous events that are so immediately important, and with enormous amount of data, that it would be a 
pity not to plot them in clear narrative. 
45 Supersemar is shorthand for Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, which means Letter of Authority 11th March. 
This a controversial document in which Sukarno was supposed to have given Suharto the authority to 
restore peace and order. It eventually led to the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto. 
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the project seemed to have restricted the ability of Nugroho and his team to convey 
more effectively their propaganda messages. 
That the birth and early years of the New Order were not covered in the 
1975 edition is really puzzling. Their absence cannot be purely incidental as there 
was a clear plan to include the period 1965-1970s. It is evident in the plan laid out 
by the team in the planning workshop in 1972 (Ariwiadi 1972). My informants who 
were members of the Volume 6 team cannot remember what actually happened in 
in the writing process in the early 1970s. So I can only speculate based on available 
pieces of evidence. I think one possible reason was Sartono's (abetted by other 
historians') sceptical attitude towards very contemporary history. According to 
him, writing about a period too close to the present carries considerable risks that 
emanate from the absence of a 'historical perspective.' By that he meant a sense of 
critical distance which historians need so they achieve an impartial assessment. 
There must have been pressure from Sartono backed by the group for Nugroho to 
back-track from his team's original plan to include the New Order period. 
Otherwise, it would have been included, as SNI-SMP shows. That there was 
disagreement among historians about this issue might be glimpsed from 
Nugroho's preface in the 1975 edition where he launched a broadside against 
undisclosed targets. He chided them for not being brave enough to face the 
responsibility of making people understand their most recent history (SNI-6, 1975, 
n.p). Such a thinly veiled innuendo is quite odd to anyone unfamiliar with the 
context. In fact when I first read it, it struck me as strange. It became quite clear to 
me only when I pieced it together with Sartono' s emphatic tone in talking about 
Nugroho in relation to the need for the passage of at least 15-20 years before a 
history could be written46 (Kartodirdjo 2001b). 
46 Also mentioned in his collection of essays, Indonesian Historiograhy, thus: " ... lack of distance that is 
needed for an objective historical investigation. Personal involvement is still strong, which means that many 
issues and personalities may still arouse partisanship on the part of the public. Foreign scholars are in a 
better position to deal with contemporary history since they need not take sides" (200 I a:44). 
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Despite Nugroho' s repeated transgression of the authority of Sartono, as 
described in Chapter 5, he seemed also cautious not to go too far. This caution 
seems reflected in his guarded and grudging obeisance to the structural approach. 
That he would do otherwise and abandon all strictures given a choice is clearly 
seen in the structure and coverage of the SNI-SMP as discussed above. 
Considering Sartono' s stature, it was not difficult to understand why 
Nugroho should be at least superficially deferential to him. It might not be only 
because Nugroho as a person was known to be very polite,47 or because Sartono's 
personality was (still is) truly respectable. It may also not just because Sartono was 
the most highly regarded Indonesian historian. More importantly, it may also 
because, being the only Professor of History during that time, Nugroho, who 
himself aimed at getting a PhD could not afford to reckless! y antagonise Sartono. 
He may have already contemplated that he might need to request Sartono to act as 
the promoter (supervisor) of his PhD. The rather unflattering details about 
Nugroho's quest for a PhD can be found in footnote 13 in Chapter 5. We can thus 
say that the limitations to Nugroho may have arisen not only from the structural 
approach but also from the presence and stature of Sartono. By looking at the SNI-
SMP, we saw what Nugroho would or could do outside of Sartono's shadow. 
The timing and the condition under which the SNI-SMP was produced, as 
well as its contents, suggest what the SNI-6 (1975) might have looked like had 
Nugroho and his team worked independently. I speculate that one possible reason 
for Nugroho's hasty move to form his own team to write the textbooks for high 
schools, without conferring with Sartono and other historian as earlier agreed, was 
Nugroho's realisation that with Sartono and his structural approach at the helm 
once again, the political objectives of writing history might again be difficult to 
meet, as happened with the SNI-6. The difference thus between the SNI-SMP and 
the SNI (1975) may be said to represent Nugroho's frustration with the SNI-6 
(1975). Such a disappointment might have driven him to produce the SNI-SMP and 
47 For description of the character ofNugroho, see Hoerip ( 1985), Mah bub Djunaidi ( 1985). 
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by a sleight of hand declared that it was just a summary of the SNI (1975). The 
people, including the critics, seemed to have believed this. Their attention was 
focused on the latter without realizing it was SNI-SMP (and its partner SNI-SMA) 
that was blatant propaganda. Only in 1985 was it first brought up in the media, but 
hardly anyone noticed (Kompas 1985). Unlike SNI that was talked about decades, 
SNI-SMP was ignored by critics, until later.48 This is evident in the fact that the 
editorial cited above (Kompas 1985) that contained information about the problem 
with the SNI-SMP did not generate as much debate as had SNI.49 
That Nugroho would have written the SNI-6 (1975) differently under 
unrestricted condition would become even clearer if we look at the 1984 edition of 
the SNI. By this time, Sartono was no longer involved because of his removal by 
Nugroho a few years back. It is striking that the 1984 edition is so much closer to 
the SNI-SMP than to SNI-6 (1975) in structure, tone and contents. 
The first obvious difference between 1975 and 1984 editions of the SNI-6 
was the structure that was consequent to the approach adopted. Just like the SNI-
SMP, the SNI-6 (1984) had abandoned the multi-dimensional in favour of the 
straight narrative-chronological approach. The 1984 edition constituted a massive 
overhaul of the volume, in stark contrast to the other volumes that through the 
years barely changed. (For list of changes, see Appendix E) The little of what 
remained of the multi-dimensional approach had been confined to a sub-section in 
each chapter, often just as appendices to a lengthy aacount of political 
development. See Table 6.2 below. 
48 Possible reasons for these include: (I) there are not many people who actually read SNl and SNl-SMP 
together, so most people don't know the difference. (2) textbook writers tend to find the easy way out. They 
tend to merely copy from sources that is popular and easily accessible. Rather than consulting the SNI, 
which is complicated and admittedly was badly written in many parts, it is much more convenient to just 
consult the SNJ-SMP (and its sister-textbook SNI-SMA). A cursory look at wide varieties of textbooks in 
the 1990s confirm this observation. 
49 I was looking for newspaper articles that might have picked up the issue raised in that editorial but nothing 
came. It was only in 1987 when the issue ofrevision of the SNI-SMP was mulled over by the Ministry of 
Education that the SNI-SMP became a topic of discussion. 
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Table 6. 2 
Comparison of Outlines 975 and 1984 Editions) 
/~.:" )i:>:O:?~~';g~~ 
1975 EditionSN'.I"'.6 
. ,;!~%~~)~(. 
Chapter I: Overview 
Narrative of political history from 
Japanese period up to I October 1965. (124 
pages) 
Chapter 2: Japaiie.se Pen9d'(50·· 
p~~t(S) ~;i; • >'. . . . x : . 
~:::Among four sections, o~lY: ,, for; 
politics: . < . · · ... ·· . :" 
.,c, A. Social Change ahcitMol:>ilty · 
·'J·s. ·war· E. conom·y· •'Y " ;•• 
, .;L<:· . 
• C. Gov~rnmefitStn,1 
Life ( 18 ou,t.$0 
. ·. ":'.\•. 
D; Edtication:'aad s 
Communication 
Chapter 3: Republic of Indonesia 
(158 pages) 
Among six sections, three for non-politics 
and three for political themes 
A. Social Mobility and Social 
Stratification 
B. Economic Development 
C. Governrt1ent Structure and Political 
Life (24 out of 158 pages) 
D. Education and Social Communication 
E. Foreign Relations (18 out 158 pages) 
F. National Security and ABRl's Dual-
Function (8 out of 158 pages) 
Note: A total of 50 out of 158 pages is 
devoted to political matters. 
'li1984 E~ftioJ:~SN~£§' 
.~;j~ '.~· . .... Jr; ;. • · : .; .··•· ~Yr~i. 
I. Japanese Period 
Among seven sections, two are non-political: 
Section D (War Economy) and E (Education, 
Social Communication and Culture). A total of 
19 out of 89 pages 
II:'\\yai'f ox; Jiidep6iiaen~e . ·~0·;; · ·. 
~\l,op~.~~e sect.ions, t~~rn~ar~,jl:i,o two}1Qn;. 
poUtics sectiops; S~c*m. H@con<:>m!c .. :\' · 
Blockade}a~d I (Education;Cultiifeand Social 
·Coiiimuj9;ition. A:iotal of;33 out:citJ l~I!flges 
7>~'"\ : .. ::· ,~!;;1ft:~. .·', · ·' - ··;,< ;;::. :, - ',..~1 - .·.>':.::rF' ·,< 
III. Liberal Democracy 
Among eight sections, only one is non-
political: Section H (Education, Culture and 
Social Communication. A total of26 out of 70 
· IV ;::Oui9~a q~m.ogi<if Y'. ,• > ',0 , 
Qne se(;tion am()ng6is.a~JottrdJornon­
political matters,· U pages out of 80. · 
V. New Order 
three sections for non-political: D 
(Economic stabilisation), E (5-Year 
Development Plans) and H (Socio-cultural 
Development. [Note that discussion on 
economic stabilisation and 5~Yr Plans (22 
pages) is heavily underlain by political tone 
and motive; it was meant to draw sharp 
dichotomy between the New and the Old 
order.] A total of41 out of 133 pages. 
Having been freed from the strictures of the multi-dimensional approach 
and Sartono' s 'contemporary-history-as-not-yet-history' stance, the 1984 edition 
pays huge attention to political themes and it pushes the logic of contemporaneity 
to its utmost, covering the years up to 1983. Out of 520 pages, only 130 (25%) were 
devoted to non-political matters whereas in the 1975 edition, 108 out of 158 pages 
(68%) were devoted for the same. 
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The free-flowing narrative-approach enables the 1984 edition to provide, in 
general, more clear-cut images of events and personalities, including a more 
sharply negative depiction of Sukarno, the PKI and the Old Order as well as a more 
clearly positive appraisal of Suharto, the military and the New Order. For instance, 
whereas the 1975 edition merely mentioned without elaboration the sources or 
manifestations of economic problems during the Guided Democracy, the 1984 (and 
1993) editions provide copious details about the economic crisis,so specifically the 
hyper-inflation, and its alleged relationship with Sukarno's erratic and profligate 
economic policies. More importantly, the effort to connect all these facts to the 
suffering of the people succeeds in conjuring a highly unpleasant image of 
Sukarno and the Old Order among the readers. 
The failure of the 1975 edition to go beyond early October 1965 effectively 
precluded the discussion of events important to the legitimation of the New Order 
regime. These include the reaction of the people to G30S, the skillful transfer of 
power from Sukarno to Suharto, the restoration of peace and order, and the early 
achievements of the New Order. To an extent this was accomplished in SNI-SMP, 
but the 1984 edition elevated the effort to a substantially higher level of clarity. The 
exposition began with a decidedly negative picture of the period 1950-1965-
gloomy, chaotic, hopeless, unstable-and then the tone gradually changed as it 
became more expectant and upbeat after Supersemar was secured in March 1966. 
The positive tempo continued until unbridled optimism was unleashed in the 
coverage of the post-1967 period when power was eventually transferred to 
Suharto. Panegyric descriptions of the gains in stabilising the economy, putting 
order in the society in general, and in strengthening the foundations of political 
stability were profusely detailed in over 100 pages (SNI-6, 1984: 4004-519). The 
1993 edition went even further when when a separate volume of almost 500 pages 
has been earmarked to serve purposes that included extolling or highlighting the 
accomplishments of the New Order (Leirissa & S. Ghazali 1993). 
50 Note that SNI-6 (1984) devotes 10-11 pages of compact and relatively well organized details about the 
economic problem, its alleged caused and impact (321-33 I) 
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To be more specific, the sub-section on the period of consolidation (since 
1968) in the 1984 edition starts with how conscientious the government was in 
partnership with the parliament in their effort to address law-related problems. 
Law, it states, is "an objective guarantee to normalize the situation necessary for 
development" SNI-6 (1984, 426). That was how such effort was justified. A few 
lines later, however, it becomes clear that this is aimed as a broadside against the 
supposed 'lawlessness' of the Old Order. It reports that many laws promulgated by 
the previous regime that were incompatible with UUD 1945 were repealed. It also 
claims that unlike the situation under the Old Order government officials and the 
people in general have now become more aware of and concerned about the laws 
(SNI-6 1984, 426-427). This clearly illustrates how the 'othering' of the Old Order 
was accomplished in the 1984 edition. 
The succeeding pages parade the specific efforts of the new regime to 
"repair"(Ibid. 426) the damage or "save" (Ibid. 430) the country from the ravages 
wrought by the former government. Highlighted are campaigns to wipe out 
corruption and to curb inflation; the rehabilitation of export-oriented industries 
and tax collection infrastructure; the recovery of 'ill-gotten' wealth; debt-
restructuring; the rationalised economic planning and the overhaul of foreign 
policy. Gains, big and small, in each of these areas contribute to creating a picture 
of progress, order and optimism that stood in stark contrast to the depressing 
portrait painted by the authors in the previous chapter. Suharto, without 
mentioning his name often, is cast as the hope for the futur~. And Sukarno 
repesents the ghost of the past. 
In relation to the PKI and the G30S, the 1984 edition also provides a more 
detailed and forceful rendition. The Madiun uprising, for instance, is more clearly 
linked up with the G30S, the latter being depicted as a continuation of the earlier 
attempt to wrest control of the government. The authors regret that G30S became 
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possible due to the failure of the government to capture and punish all the 
communist leaders in 1948.51 
Table6.3 
Treatment of the Link Between Madiun Uprising and G30S 
1975 Edifiori . 198.4Ei11tion 
"It is a pity that perpetrators were 
not punished because the Dutch 
attacked once again and many of 
them got away." 
("Sayang sekali belum sempat oknum-
oknum yang terlibat diadili, Belanda 
sudah menyerang kembali sehingga 
banyak diantara mereka lolos.) 
"It is a pity the perpetrators were 
not punished because the Dutch 
attacked once again. As a 
consequence, many of them got 
away and 17 years later they tried 
again to stage a revolt against the 
Republic, that is, the G30S." 
("Sayang sekali belum sempat oknum-
oknum yang terlibat diadili, Belanda 
sudah menyerang sehingga banyak di 
antara mereka lolos dan 17 tahun kemudian 
mencoba kembali untuk mengadakan 
pemberontakan terhadapl Republik Proklamsi 
yaitu (G30S/PKI).(italics supplied) 
Likewise, the 1984 edition is categorical about the role of Gerwani and 
Pemuda Rakyat in the purported act of torturing and killing the generals. Both the 
SNI-6 (1975) and SNI-SMP were silent about their involvement.52 Moreover, 
whereas the 1975 edition is silent about the reaction of the people, the 1984 version 
is explicit about it, describing it as 'angry,' a reaction supposedly reflected in the 
burning of the PKI headquarters at Kramat Raya (SNI-6, 1984: 395-396). Moreover, 
a fairly detailed description of the alleged effort of the PKI to 'come back' was 
provided in the discussion about 'Operation Trisula' in East Java, near Blitar in 
early 1968 (Ibid., 402-403)- a move that seems to highlight the 'latent danger' 
51 Actually, the only difference between 1975 and 1984 versions was the addition of the phrase: "and 17 years 
later they again rebelled or rose up again against the Republic, that is, through the G30S." (SNI-6 1984, 
156). However, the addition of this phrase was significant enough to establish the link between the two-a 
link which was essential in the propaganda that would proliferate in the wake of G30S in 30 September 
1965 onwards. 
52 The SNI-SMP is totally silent but in the SNJ-6 (1975), they are mentioned in the same sub-section but not in 
relation to the killings but as included among those arrested by the military in the wake of the G30S(SNI-6 
1975, 123). 
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(bahaya laten) that communism perpetually posed to Indonesian society.53 This is 
something that both the SNI 1975 edition and the SNI-SMP do not carry. 
While the 1984 edition is overall more systematic, detailed and forceful in 
rendering accounts favourable to the regime, it would be a mistake to assume that 
that there is always a linear progression from the SNI 1975 to SNI-SMP to the 1984 
editions, if one looks at the treatment of particular events or personalities. 
In efforts to conceal or minimise the involvement of the military in the G30S, 
for example, the 1975 edition appears to serve the purpose better simply by saying 
so much less about it than the 1984 edition. Whereas the 1975 edition allotted no 
more than a total of two pages (SNI-6 1975, 120-122 passim), in the 1984 edition 
there is a detailed description of military involvement spread out over as many as 
10-12 pages (SNI-6, 1984: 390-402). For another, while later editions pinpointed 
Untung as the leader of the movement, the 1975 edition named Syam 
Kamaruzaman, designated by the text as a PKI high ranking officer, as the leader 
(SNI-6 1975, 121). Untung was relegated to a minor position of being just one 
among military men involved. 
To the extent that the SNI-6 openly recognises that some military personnel 
were involved in the G30S, all editions were invariably careful to emphasise that 
these military men were misled or brainwashed by the PKI through the persistent 
effort at infiltration (penggarapan) by its Biro Khusus (Special Bureau) (SNI-6 1975, 
120; 1984, 399). Not an iota of space was allowed for the possibility that they (the 
military officers) may have subscribed to leftist ideas on their own volition. In 
comparative terms, the 1975 edition is more straightforward and emphatic about 
the alleged vulnerability of the military to PKI brainwashing than SNI-SMP and the 
1984 edition (SNI-61975, 120-121). It provides, for instance, some details as to how 
the Biro Khusus infiltrated the military, even mentioning specific middle-ranking 
officers who were supposed to be channels for the spread of communist ideas. The 
53 Heryanto (2006) shows that while the regime had a hand in keeping alive communism's supposed 'latent 
danger,' it has nonetheless assumed a life of its own apart from state manipulation 
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1984 editions, on the other hand, merely mentioned the function of the Biro Khusus 
(SNI-6 (1984, 387) and cited a number of brigades or battalions in Central Java as 
targets of attempted penetration (SNI-6 1984, 397). 
Likewise, despite the vehemence of the SNI-SMP, in general terms and in 
particular against the leftists, there are instances when it proves softer than the 
SNI-6, both 1975 and 1984 editions. The PKI, for example was not blamed for 
Indonesia's withdrawal from the UN and the confrontation with Malaysia, as was 
the case in the 1975 edition. Nor is there any mention of the pressures on the artists 
or literary figures to toe the "Politics is in Command" line favoured by the LEKRA 
and other leftist organisations. 
The foregoing tries to show that despite efforts to provide accounts 
favourable to the regime, the variations between the different versions and the lack 
of consistent progression from the earlier to the later edition suggest a less than 
systematic and overriding effort along this line. The presence of important 
contradictions reinforces this point. 
Before the 1975 edition closes, nestled in the middle of the last paragraph, 
far from the main narratives, the authors declare (SNI-61975, 345): 
With the coup attempt of the G30S/PKI that failed, the whole of ABRI opened 
their eyes about the consequence of inter- and intra-service (military) conflict 
due to the infiltration of ABRI by people who are agents of an outside political 
power. 
That such a statement can be found in the SNI is very significant. While this 
statement reiterates the blame on an 'outside political power' (read: the 
communists) for the cause, it also implies not only the involvement of the military 
in the G30S but it also puts the intra- and inter-service rivalries among the causes 
of the G30S. By doing so it undercuts not only the whole effort expended in the 
earlier parts of the book (denying or minimising military involvement). It also 
tends subtly to subvert one of major ideas behind the official explanation of the 
event as painstakingly laid out by Nugroho Notosuanto and Ismael Saleh in their 
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book The September 30 Moz1ement Coup Attempt. That is, that the G30S was not a 
product of internal dissension within the Army,54 as McVey and Anderson argued 
in a paper famously known as the "Cornell Paper," but rather a coup 
masterminded by the communists to wrest control of the government. Nugroho, 
under whose editorship SNI-6 was written, must be turning over in his grave. 
In the 1984 edition a similar passage is still there. In a re-phrased version the 
link between the intra-military rivalry and the G30S remains implicit but 
interestingly this version may even be downright more incriminating than the one 
above! Although no necessarily causal connection between the two is established, 
just like that in 1975 edition the phrasing sets the mood for interpreting the 
internal rivalries within the Army (or ABRI as a whole) as leading to the G30S. The 
authors declare: (SNI-6, 1984:456) 
Since 1962 ... the 'divide and rule' politics towards the ABRI reached climax 
such that the process of disintegration, rivalries and controversies between or 
within different branches or services of the ABRI accelerated until such point 
that the G-30-S/PKI broke out.55 (italics original) 
These statements were made in the 'periphery,' far removed from the 
chapters that dealt with the 'main' events/periods such as the G30S, Guided 
Democracy or transition to the New Order. It is thus understandable that few seem 
to have noticed.56 Ironically enough, this passage is mentioned in connection with 
the discussion to explain or justify ABRI' s dual function in a separate section where 
the authors enumerate the achievements and explain the specific steps undertaken 
by the regime to strengthen the foundation of economic development, political 
stability and social order. The important thing to note is that the presence of such 
54 In Nugroho's and Saleh's exact words: " ... the 'September 30 Movement' was not an internal Army Affair. 
The cases did not have the characteristics of internal Army squabbles. They were neither caused by 
difference between the Army and the Air Force, nor between any of the other within the Armed Forces." 
(1967: 145) 
55 Exact words: Sesudah tahun 1962 ... politik 'divide et impera' terhadap ABRI mencapai klimaksnya, 
sehingga terlihat adanya proses disintegrasi, rivalitas, kontroverse antar-Angkatan dan intra-angkatan yang 
berkembang dengan pesatnya sampai kepada saat meletusnya pemberontakan G-30-S/PKI." 
56 The 1993 edition was written by a different set of historians who, despite being in the same circle as 
Nugroho was (the UI-Pusjarah circle), worked in the post-Nugroho period. Nugroho died in 1985. 
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statements in an 'official history' indicates the fluidity within the otherwise 
monolithic perception of the SNI. 57 
The foregoing has identified specific instances wherein the interests of the 
New Order regime have impinged on the shape of historical knowledge. Given the 
preponderance of close parallelism, one can hardly deny that regime justification 
was among the concerns of the authors. It is no wonder then that the epithet 
'official history' as ascribed to the SNI carries , as almost always in similar 
instances, a pejorative connotation of being the 'official propaganda.' 
The significance, however, of the disparity among different editions cannot 
be set aside. The following observations highlight the salience of such variations. 
First, any variation points to the fluidity or multiplicity of powers that 
determine the shape of knowledge. It sends a stark reminder that these variations 
may have emanated perhaps from having been written by different persons, at 
different circumstances within differently nuanced power relations. The variations 
and inconsistencies could also arise simply as unintended products of negligence, 
accidental oversight or simply just pure luck. Such phenomena thus cast in doubt 
on the impression of singularity and monolithic power that the term "official 
history" carries. The fact that Nugroho and his team were on the payroll of the 
Armed Forces heightens the impression of "officiality" and solidity. Any evidence 
thus to the contrary could give us a glimpse of how various forces interact at the 
interstices between knowledge and power. 
Second, the two major editions, 1975 and 1984, were written by exactlyJhe 
same people.58 From this group also came the most important people responsible 
57 To cite a number of examples of this monolithic view: Vickers and McGregor (2005, p. 44-45) declared, 
"New Order hegemony was supported not by a set of reasoned arguments, but rather by statements which 
were to be accepted, not believed. In the compiling of state-authorised facts, from trade statistics to text 
books, the dominant principle was one 'as long as the boss is happy.' While Wood (2005, 17) categorically 
stated that "(t)he Indonesian history industry as a whole cannot be dismissed as being merely a reflection of 
officially sanctioned views" and that "it could not be described as simply a source for regime propaganda" 
he did not, unfortunately, pay attention to his own declaration. His whole book presents a monolithic view 
of what he calls 'official history.' 
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for writing the SNI-SMP. Both teams were led by Nugroho and, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, we know who he was and what he represented. Thus, notable variations 
in the output calls for an investigation of their possible sources. 
Third, among the four books -the 1975, 1984 and 1993 editions and the SNI-
SMP (1976)-the 1975 edition stood out as the most awkward from the viewpoint 
of propaganda, although there are specific instances, as pointed out above, where 
it could be more forceful. Aside from being awkward, it contains a statement that 
ran counter to the New Order official narrative, albeit in way that may not be easily 
noticed. One may say that being the first to be written-the authors being 
inexperienced-caused such a 'deficiency.' As noted earlier, however, the SNI-
SMP was written at the time that almost coincided with the writing of the 1975 
edition, and it proved far more direct and forceful than the 1975 edition. It was 
much closer to the 1984 edition in terms of potency as propaganda, sometimes 
even surpassing it. 
If that is the case, then what was the most salient difference between the 
1975 edition, on the one hand, and the three other books? This brings us to the final 
consideration I should note here. The defining difference lay in the micro-context 
within which the three books were written. That is, whereas the 1975 edition was 
written within the strictures set by Sartono and by the broader community of 
historians who took for granted that they were producing a scholarly work, the 
SNI-SMP and the 1984 editions were produced under the atmosphere of almost 
total freedom for Nugroho and his team. It is, as I will try to demonstrate below, 
the power of scholarship that made the difference. 
58 The 1993 edition was prepared by a mixed-group of new-comers and former members of the old team. The 
editors of Vol. 6 are Richard Leirrisa and Zulfikar Ghazali while those of Vol. 7 are Richard Leirrissa and 
Salaeh As'ad Djamhari. Volume 6 has six contributing writers while volume 7 has seven. The common 
denominator among these and the members of the old SNI-6 [1977 & 1984 editions] was that all of them 
were close identified with Nugroho Notosusanto, either employed in Pusjarah or in UI. 
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In the Service of Two Gods? 
To begin with, despite being employed or deployed by the military, 
Nugroho and his team at the Pusjarah were all professionally-trained historians. 
They were all reared in a high dose of historical philosophies and methodologies. 
Having been taught to pursue as much as possible "objectivity," juggling possibly 
conflicting demands that sometimes required contradictory loyalties posed as a 
challenge.59 Nugroho and Saleh As'ad Djamhari I consider as good examples. 
Nugroho, for instance, was adamant that he was a scholar-historian. He took pains 
to convince the public that he deserved to be treated as such. In more than a few 
instances, he displayed a mastery of historical methods and utilised them as 
weapons in his contentious debates with his critics. He was not always convincing 
but one can grant that he carried himself quite well in various instances. 60 On the 
other hand, Saleh, a very close aide to Nugroho and a member of the SNI-6 team, 
has been left feeling guilty for what they did. He described Sukarno as a 
"Grrrreaaatttt leader!" and he felt bad that he (Saleh) had joined the endeavour to 
to discredit him (Sukarno) and besmirch his memory (Saleh Djamhari 2005a). 
Perhaps as an attempt at self-redemption, after retiring from the Pusjarah in 1995 
he pursued a PhD in history (with a thesis on Diponegoro) notwithstanding 
advanced age and vowed to do a 'scientific history.' 
The ambiguities of military-historians' positions tended to pose certain 
limitations to what they could do or achieve. As historians they had to contend 
59 I asked for instance Saleh As'ad Djamhari a hypothetical question: What do they do when they were faced 
with evidence which contradicted the avowed interest of the military? Did they deliberately ignore or 
neglect (meng-abaikan) the contrary evidence? He said, "Oh no, we don't neglect them, we just select!" He 
implied that there was something in being a historian that held them back from deliberate manipulation qf 
evidence (Saleh Djamhari 2005b). 
60 This is clear in a number of newspaper articles written by Nugroho in defence of his work Proses 
Perumusan Pancasila Dasar Negara. In these articles, he exerted enormous efforts to parry criticisms and 
he relied on his command of historical methodology to refute the allegations and arguments of his critics. 
He was not always successful but, without prejudice to his reputation as a henchman of the military, he 
appeared persuasive in a number of crucial points being contested. See "Teori: Ajinomoto dan metode 
Sejarah," Kompas, 30 August 1981, pp, 8, 12 (Notosusanto 1981 a); "Metode Sejarah Prapanca dari abad ke-
14 terlalu kuno untuk abad ke 20," Kompas, 6 September 1981 (Notosusanto 1981 b); "Tulisan Tangan 
Bung Kamo Jadi Landasan Saya," Kompas, 21August1981(Kompas1981); "Tulisan Tangan 'Bung 
Kamo' Dasar Perumusan Nugroho Tentang Pancasila," Sinar Minggu Pagi, 23 August 1981 (Sinar Minggu 
Pagi 1981) (The latter two were from Yayasan Jdayu, 1981, pp. 80 & 87). For an overview of this debate, 
see Sutrisno (2003: 1-12). For a compilation of articles about the debate, see Yayasan Idayu (1981 ). 
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with the rules or conventions or the prevailing discourses of the professional 
community where they also liked to be recognised.61 One arena where these 
conventions or discourses were embedded was in the overall historiographic 
terrain as it was developing then in Indonesia. This was one of those spheres 
where, despite being backed by the supremacy of the New Order regime, they did 
not readily have pre-eminent power or influence. They had to wrestle, among 
other things, with scholarship in the 'purest' form of which politics lies in the 
practitioners' being avowedly non-political. The clash of the two domains of 
power was perhaps inevitable, and it is relevant to see how they negotiated their 
respective positions. 
Aside from the limitation emanating from their ambiguous position, the 
nature of history-used-as-a-propaganda also tended to pose considerable 
challenges to Nugroho and his team, or to anyone assigned to do the same task for 
that matter. Even if they consciously aimed at promoting propaganda, there 
remain a need to maintain at least a semblance objectivity and historical 
methodology. The power of history as propaganda depends to a great extent on the 
appearance of credibility. They had to strike a delicate balance between 
forcefulness and subtlety, immediacy and restraint. An overkill could defeat the 
purpose. While it is true that most of Nugroho's and his team's published outputs 
betrayed their crudity and lack of skills along this line, there were also instances 
when restraints upon them, self-imposed or otherwise, were apparent. Let us take 
a look at some notable examples from the SNI-6 to illustrate the point. 
61 Nugroho often emphasised that he was a 'historian' not a politician, and so insisted that criticisms of him 
should be at the academic level. Perhaps to make worthy of his desire to be treated as a historian he tried 
very hard to employ not just the rhetoric of history but standard historical methodologies to respond to his 
critics. See for instance "Tulisan Tangan Bung Kamo Jadi Landasan Sa ya" ( 1981 ). A similar effort may be 
glimpsed in Nugroho's foreword in the Volume 6. He took pains to emphasize that because not all facts can 
be included in the narrative, they did the best they could to examine them carefully "based on the 
requirements of historical methods." (See "Prakata" SNI, Jilid 6, n.p, 1975) 
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As already noted earlier the place called Lubang Buaya occupies a central 
position in the official narrative of the New Order.62 It eventually became a 
museum that served as a memorial to the alleged treachery, wickedness, and 
hunger for power of the PKJ.63 Considering the pivotal position it occupies in the 
official narrative of the regime, it is surprising that all versions of the SNI, 
including SNI-SMP, treated it rather mildly, in comparison with what had been 
popularly known. For instance, none among various editions of the SNI- 6 contain 
the grotesque lies that the members of Gerwani and Pemuda Rakyat gouged out 
the eyes of the generals, mutilated their genitals or danced naked around, even 
'raped,' them.64 It simply stated that the generals were tortured, a lie in itself, and 
how such a torture was inflicted. The extent of such torture, I should note, was 
treated differently in different editions. The first edition (1975) for instance merely 
states that they were tortured; it did not describe the torture as 'berat' (severe) or 
'kejam' (cruel or gruesome), as was the case in 1984 edition (SNl-61976, 122; SNI-6 
1984, 390). More surprisingly, the alleged culpability, even the mere presence, of 
the Gerwani and other PKI-affiliated groups in Halim or Lubang Buaya was not 
mentioned in the first edition. (see Table 6.1 for the comparison) 
Table 6. 4 
What Happened in Lubang Buaya? 
1975 Edition .. .1984 Edition 
"In Lubang Buaya, the officers who were 
still alive were tortured using sharp 
weapons and rifle butts. They were then 
sprayed with bullets and finally were 
thrown in an old well ... " p.122 
"In a gruesome or cruel (kejam) manner, 
they were tortured and finally killed by the 
members of the Pemuda Rakyat, Gerwani 
and other PKI-affiliated orgariizations. 
Satisfied with their cruelty, the bodies of 
dead officers were afterwards thrown in an 
62 See Drakeley (2000) for a concise and highly perceptive interpretation of what purportedly transpired in 
Lubang Buaya and for the importance of the event in the subsequent response to the PK! and the birth of the 
New Order. This brief article anticipates significant parts of Weiringa's important book Sexual Politics in 
Indonesia (2002) 
63 A valuable and detailed treatment of this and other military-sponsored museums in Indonesia can be found 
in McGregor (2002) 
64 Such gruesome details originated from news reports published by military-controlled newspapers such as 
BeritaYudha and Angkatan Bersendjata. The apparent intention of such reports were to incite the anger of 
the public towards the PKI. For a systematic and detailed account of the process by which the military 
deceived the public, see Saskia Wieringa, Sexual Politics in Indonesia. (2002, 310-317) 
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-no mention of the autopsy report. old well and covered with garbage and 
soil." (SNI-6, 1984 390) 
-"The doctors' autopsy revealed that the 
officers suffered severe (berat) torture" 
(p.394) 
The reason for this could be a simple oversight or carelessness on the part of 
Nugroho and his team. This is plausible in the case of 1975 edition where as noted, 
Gerwani and other PKI groups were not even mentioned, let alone blamed for the 
gruesome event in Lubang Buaya. As noted in Chapter 5, the first edition was done 
rather hastily. That it was rectified in the 1984 and 1993 editions makes the point 
clear. The case, however, of the ghastly details allegedly done by the women-
castration, forking out of eyes, dancing of naked women-is different. It cannot be 
an oversight. That such details remained unstated in the 1984 edition makes it 
obvious that there was really no intention to mention these in the 1975 edition. 
Asked why was the treatment of the event like that, one of the members of 
Nugroho's team hinted that that they could not find defensible or credible 
evidence for such alleged wrongdoings and that for educational purposes, 
inclusion of such details they deemed not appropriate. Stating that the generals 
were tortured (dianiayai) was enough. (Saleh As' ad Djamhari, 2005a) 
Another was the treatment of the Serangan Umum (General Attack) of 1 
March 1949. 65 All the three editions refrained from eulogising the role of Suharto in 
it. They uniformly stated simply that Suharto led the attack, which was in fact the 
case. There was no effort to exaggerate his role as the leader, much less as 
I 
supposedly the initiator of the attack, unlike the role claimed for him elsewhere 
such as his autobiography (Soeharto 1989). This dubious claim was even 
popularized in the films ]anur Kuning and Serangan Fajar.66 What is quite 
65 This refers to coordinated attack by Republican forces under the operational leadership of Suharto against 
the Dutch-controlled Yogyakarta which was held it for 6 hours. At the heart of controversy lay in Suharto's 
claim that it was his brainchild, side-lining Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX as the real initiator. 
66 It was through these films that Suharto's dubious claiin of having initiated the attack had been popularized. 
The first was made in 1979 with a huge budget and tile other one was in late 1980s. See Budi lrawanto's 
Film, ldeo/ogi dan Militer ( 1999) for a penetrating analysis of the pervasive military values reflected in the 
films. Aside from these two, another film was analysed, Enam Djam di Jogya. The sharp contrast in the 
ways how the roles of Suharto, Sudirman and Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX were shown (or omitted) in 
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exaggerated is the treatment of the extent or the importance of the event. This is 
evident in all versions, to a slightly varying degree. The attack, for instance is 
described in all versions as 'extraordinarily intensive' ('paling hebat') It led, the 
text continues, to the demoralisation of the Dutch forces (SNI-SMP, 108)) or to the 
turning of the tide of war that saw the initiative shifted from the Dutch forces to 
the TNI. The Dutch who were hitherto the attackers became the ones attacked 
(SNI-61975, 63; SNI-61984, 162). 
Still another example was the treatment of the Supersemar and the events 
leading to the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto. The first edition (1975) 
was totally silent about it. The narrative mysteriously stopped right after the G30S 
and the explanation for this was earlier discussed. The two later editions were 
notable for lack of any real effort to embellish the importance of the event, unlike 
the case in SNI-SMP. They simply stated that it was the beginning of the New 
Order. Compare the treatment below. 
Table 6. 5 
Treatment of Supersemar 
SNI-SMP 1975 Edition 
"Supersemar Silent. Not covered. 
constitutes a turning 
point in the victory of 
the New Order and 
because it was newly 
acquired must be 
defended and 
protected." (p. 169) 
Supersernar rnerupakan 
tonggak kernenangan Orde 
Baru di Indonesia. 
Kernenangan yang baru 
diperoleh illl harus 
dipertahankan dan 
dipelihara. 
1984 
Plainly stated: "11 
March 1966 was the 
start of the New 
Order" (p. 413) 
Tangal 11 Mare~ 1966 itulah 
yang sebagai titik awal 
Jarnan Orde Baru. 
the three films manifested interestingly the varying extent and styles of promoting military values, in 
general, and certain political interests, in particular. Many are convinced that JanurKuning was deliberately 
made to erase the lackluster image of Suharto as presented in Enam Djam di Jogya which was made in 
1951. For such a perception, see for example Adam (200 I, 18) 
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There are other instances when restraint on the part of the writers was 
apparent. However, I single out these three cases as exemplary because these were 
central to the interests of the regime, or of Suharto specifically. That the supposed 
"buku babon" would not go as far as other propagandistic tools could mean 
various things. However, these certainly include the conscious or unconscious 
'attempt' of the historians who wrote it to uphold some measures of historical 
methodology. Despite being dubbed as a mouthpiece or an 'icon' of New Order 
propaganda, and for that bitterly criticised, the SNI (especially the 1975 edition) 
was at best of limited forcefulness or efficacy. Perhaps, Suharto's call in early May 
1987 to take another look at the history of 1950-1965 and to formulate anew an 
official, "objective and honest" history of the New Order was in belated 
recognition of the limitations of the SNI. 67 
Notwithstanding the preponderance of regime's political motives in SNI-6, 
identifying the spaces where they do not dominate provides us a glimpse of the 
intersection where politics, scholarship and chance meet. The dialectic that ensues 
among the three posits that scholarship has its own set of powers that may or may 
not be compatible with those of political actors. The factor of chance or the 
unintended exercise of power does sometime play important role, too. The well-
spring of the powers of scholarship needs to be discussed. 
Roots of Scholarship-Politics Tension 
The tension between the scholarly and the political runs quite long but not 
particularly deep in the field of history in Indonesia. The early roots may be 
67 The official reason given for Suharto's call focused on the need of the younger generation to know more 
about the 'truth' about the periods 1950-1965 as well as the New Order. Considering the detailed treatment 
of the periods in the SNI 1984 edition, as well the long-standing presence of the SNI-SMP (and its 
accompanying texts for the SMA, SNI-SMA) the official reason given by Alamsjah, a high ranking 
minister, was unusual. Suharto's call elicited spirited public discussion in the media. See 'Pemerintah Perlu 
Menyusun Buku Acuan Sejarah Indonesia 1950-65' (Kompas I 987b); 'Sejarah Zaman Baru Indonesia 
Memang Perlu Ditulis Kembali' (Kompas I 987a); 'Beberapa Kendala Penulisan Sejarah' (Abdullah H. 
1987a); 'Demitologisasi Sejarah' (Moedjanto 1987); "Dilema Sejarawan Nasional' (Abdullah H. 1987b) 
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remotely traced to the spirited exchanges about, among other things, the question 
of objectivity and subjectivity within the 'club' of colonial historians, as Resink put 
it (Resink 1968c, 63). The Indonesian scholars did not participate; they were, as 
Resink noted in 1953, "totally ignorant of it" (Resink 1968c, 66). If the notion of 
'subjective history' had to be fought for in Europe, in the context of a deeply 
entrenched tradition of positivism and empiricism, the reverse was true in the case 
of Indonesian scholars. The subjective notion of history seemed to have easily 
found a fertile niche in the emerging community of Indonesian historians. Among 
the reasons for these, Resink spelled out, were the "pluralistic and 
polyinterpretable" character of Indonesian culture and the 'syncretistic traditions' 
that altogether nurtured the spirit of tolerance among the people.68 
In the earlier stage the question of subjectivity was not primarily linked to 
the influence of the 'obviously' political. It was rather tied to the impact of the 
Zeitgeist in general including the supposedly a-historical attitude emanating from 
traditional culture.69 The same culture had also nurtured and sanctioned the close 
ties between the rulers and the court poets/priests-a practice that, some would 
say, would be carried all throughout, perhaps in different forms, even up to the 
New Order period. In due time, coasting along the rise of nationalism, the notion 
of subjectivity would become decidedly political, both in tone and intent. The 
proliferation starting in the late colonial period of the purportedly historical works 
that were blatantly mythical, extolling the glories of the Indonesian past illustrated 
the extent to which intellectuals would allow themselves to be carried away by 
strongly nationalist atmosphere.70 
68 The other reason Res ink (I 968c) pointed out lay in the backwardness of historical theory as it developed 
among colonial scholars in /of Indonesia. That is, colonial historiography of the earlier days did not pay 
particular attention to the question of historical objectivity, so it was relatively easy to plunge into the notion 
of historical subjectivity. 
69 Soedjatmoko, among other, proved to be emphatic of the supposed adverse effects of traditional mindset 
on understanding history. See Soedjatmoko's "Indonesian Historian and His Time" (1965). See also 
Oetomo (1961) 
70 For a stand-out examples of this, see Yamin 6000 Tahun Sang Merah Puti (1951) and Gadjah Mada: 
Pah/awan Persatuan Nusantara (1953). It is surprising that whereas Yamin had been constantly criticised 
by both Indonesian and foreign scholars for his glaring nationalist biases, Casparis ( 1961) proved to be an 
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Against such a backdrop we can appreciate the importance of what 
happened on the fateful day of 14 December 1957. In the opening day of the 
historic first National History Seminar, Soedjatmoko71 and Yamin were the two 
presenters tasked to articulate their proposed philosophy of national history.72 The 
two spelled out what proved to be classic articulations of the two contrasting views 
on the philosophy of national history of Indonesia. The primary bones of 
contention were the question, "History for what?" and "What history should be?" 
If Resink, only five years earlier, bewailed the absence of Indonesians' participation 
in the debate, things would never be the same after the Soedjatmoko-Yamin 
encounter in December 1957. The friction between scientific and nationalist history 
was given eloquent expression, perhaps for the first time in Indonesia's public 
sphere. 
Muhammad Yamin argued passionately for the use of history to promote 
national unity and national pride.73 (Yamin 1958) Soedjatmoko, for his part, 
argued exactly the opposite. He warned against the use of history as a political tool 
and he called for a 'scientific' and open approach to the study of history, devoid of 
any preconceived political purposes. As far as he was concerned, talking about 
philosophy of history at a time when there was virtual absence of empirical 
research was premature and inappropriate. Let research be done, he urged, in an 
open space of scientific inquiry and the output would frame the shape philosophy 
would take afterwards (Soedjatmoko 1958). The whole idea of his paper revolved 
exception. In his comprehensive review of historical writings on Indonesia covering the period I 770s-I 956, 
he describes Yamin's books, Diponegoro and Gadjah Mada as "well written" and while "extremely · 
nationalistic" were nonetheless "free from distortions." Even 6000 Tahun Sang Merah Putih did not merit 
any negative comment from Casparis (148-149). This contrast glaringly with the unduly harsh evaluation of 
Bambang Oetomo (1961) of historical works by Indonesians before I 956, and the examples he discussed in 
some details were the works of Yamin, specifically Gadjah Mada and Diponegoro. 
71 For a useful biography ofSoedjatmoko, see M. Nursam, Pergumu/an Seorang lntelektual: Biografi 
Soedjatmoko. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2002. See also Kahin's perceptive observations in "In 
Memoriam: Soedjatmoko, 1922- I 989" ( 1990). 
72 It may be by a stroke of fate that Soedjatmoko spoke at that conference. He was not originally the intended 
speaker. It was Hatta. For an undisclosed reason, Hatta could not come, so Soedjatmoko was asked to 
replace him.(See Laporan Seminar Sedjarah 1958, 12) 
73 For a useful explication of the life and works of Yamin, see Gunawan (2005). See also Deliar Noer (1979) 
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around the urgent need to protect history from the impatient demands of 
nationalism. 74 
Soedjatmoko' s eloquent articulation notwithstanding, the mantra of 
nationalism seemed overwhelming. For instance, among the seven reactors 
(pendebat) invited to comment on Yamin-Soedjatmoko exchange, hardly anyone 
expressed agreement with the points raised by Soedjatmoko. These were either 
politely rejected, angrily engaged or flatly ignored.75 Such reactions were a portent 
of how in the succeeding decades Soedjatmoko' s ideas would be received or 
treated by the history establishment in Indonesia in particular, and the public in 
general.76 Like many of his other brilliant ideas, his message cannot but be 
confined, during much of Guided Democracy and New Order periods, to the 
undercurrents - considered by many, to put it in the most polite terms, as well-
ahead of its time.77 It would have to wait for the rise of Sartono and the multi-
dimensional school (sometimes called the UGM School) he led before a sustained 
effort materialised to bring at least a little part of Soedjatmoko' s message to the 
74 Kahin recalled that Soedjatmoko wrote to him sometime in the late 1950s that the latter felt it was his 
personal responsibility to protect history from the impetuous dictates of the nationalist atmosphere. See "In 
Memoriam: Soedjatmoko, I922-l 989," (1990) 
75 Two flatly rejected Soedjatmoko's proposal and one of them seemed to be deeply angered by it. See 
Kartawirana, (1958), Ave (1958). The others either implicitly denied Soedjatmoko's views by agreeing 
with Yamin or they appeared to politely ignore him. In his response Soedjatmoko tried to mollify Ave by 
anchoring the roots of their oppositional views on the unclear nature of the theme of the panel saying that it 
should not be about philosophy of national history but about issues on the writing of history. · 
76 There seems to be tendency among Western scholars to exaggerate the impact or influence of 
Soedjatmoko 's I 957 piece. A good example of this is Kahin (1990) who gushed about its supposed being 
widely read and influential. Interviewing a good number of Indonesian historians who studied history in 
Indonesia in the 1960s up to 1980s, it surprised me that not many considered it a 'hot' topic in their 
historiography classes. They often noted that the fact the Soedjatmoko-edited book (Introduction to 
Indonesian Historiography) was translated in Bahasa and published in Indonesia only in 1995 could point to 
its limited readership and influence before mid 1990s. In Frederick and Soeroto's introduction to the fir~t set 
of papers in their book Pemahaman Sejarah Indonesia, noted that while perhaps Soedjatmoko's views had 
some influence in the 1950s, by 1980s "it does not surprise that these were considered not apt" ( 28). 
77 Soedjatmoko was aware that he was going against very strong currents of the time. In his acutely perceptive 
essay "The Indonesian Historian and His Time" (1965) he identified the currents as, first, the pervasive 
ahistorical attitude of the people that emanated from the feudal, agrarian setting of much of Indonesia. The 
second was the impatient demands of nationalism that tended to subordinate everything to the quest for 
national strength, pride and unity. So the lukewarm response must not have surprised Soedjatmoko. In an 
obituary for Soedjatmoko written by Hannah Papanek and Goenawan Mohammad ( 1990) they called him a 
"voice of reason ... in a world too seldom has listened to such voices." (p. 449) They also noted that "his 
influence at home remained muted" (450). Jn the review of"Transfonning the Humanity: The Visionary 
Writings of Soedjatmoko," Leslie Palmier (I 996, 198) stated that "his country was too blinkered to 
appreciate him." 
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surface, allowing it a chance of joining the mainstream of historiographic 
development.78 
The scientific and the nationalist history were not necessarily antithetical, as 
Soedjatmoko suggested. Klooster rightly pointed out that a nationalist 
historiography can also be scientific, although he conceded that it may seldom 
happen. The difference between the two, he claimed, lay in the purpose. That is, 
while nationalist historiography aims at "cultivation of love and esteem for the 
fatherland," scientific historiography seeks to understand "the past in its own 
right." (Klooster 1982, 48-49) 
Parenthetically, I would like to note that while many foreign observers79 
were openly dismissive or bitterly critical of the politicised, nationalist 
historiography that developed in the Old and New Order periods, there are also 
others who were sympathetic, or at least tolerant. Sue Nichterlein80(1974) and 
Frederick (with Soeroto) (1982), and even ResinkB1(1968b; 1968d) to an extent, 
agreed that such form of history was a product of its time and it was not 
necessarily antithetical or inferior to "scientific history." Such a historicist 
assessment of nationalist historiography, while seemingly at home to most 
Indonesians, did not sit well with the views of the eloquent and the vocal few. The 
likes of Bambang Oetomo, Soedjatmoko and more recently Bambang Purwanto 
78 However, it would be a mistake to regard the Sartono School, despite looming large in most major accounts 
ofhistoriographic development in Indonesia, as central or dominant in terms of actual influence. The 
alleged dominance of the School may be a projection of a deep-seated desire rather than a representation of 
what was actually the case. If we take a look at the general map of historical outputs in Indonesia- be it in 
academic, popular or instructional terms-the quantity of those following the Sartono approach to historical 
writing occupy very little space. See Curaming (2003) for a more developed detailed argument along this 
line. 
79 For instance, see Vickers and McGregor (2005), Van Klinker (2002). 
80 In a characteristic historicist fashion, Nichterlein demonstrated that various ways or examples by which 
different Indonesian authors had given substance to the idea of history consistent with the demands of the 
time or their understanding of those demands. "Scientific" history, she claimed, was but one of the several 
possibilities by which history could be written. It was not necessarily the most applicable or acceptable. 
81 Resink declared: "Our national attitude has to an important extent been determined historically, and it will 
continue to develop as a response to the challenge of the extra-national, a-national, and in some case, anti-
national historical attitudes of many ... " (l 968b) ("Europocentric, Regiocentric, and Indocentric 
Historiography," p. I 2. His historicist views, however, are more clearly spelled out in his article "A Passe-
Partout Round Indonesia's Historians."(l 968d) 
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proved to be as harsh if not harsher than their foreign counterparts in castigating 
nationalist historiography. Mohammad Ali,82 Sartono Kartodirdjo,83 Abdurachman 
Surjomihardjo,84 Taufik Abdullah,85 Kuntowijoyo86 and Ong Hok Ham were also 
critical but their stance was somewhat tempered by their sympathies for or 
understanding of the inevitability of national (if not nationalist)87 aspirations. 
Altogether, however, they gave a clear, albeit muffled, voice in an atmosphere 
pervaded by the logic of nationalism. Their occasional articles, either or both in the 
press and/ or more scholarly venues, kept the tension between the 'scientific' and 
the nationalist scholarship alive all throughout the extended period when the 
pressure was enormous for the former ('scientific') to bow down to the latter 
('nationalist'). 
Where did Nugroho fit in all this? It is seductive to regard Nugroho as a 
carrier of the !ong tradition of the ruler-poet/ chronicler relationship that dates 
back to the pujanggas in the courts of Mataram, Majapahit and other old 
kingdoms. Not a few observers considered him as the Prapanca88 of the New 
Order regime. Nugroho doggedly resisted the epithet as he insisted that he was a 
scholar, not an 'intellectual prostitute.' Whether he succeeded is highly doubted by 
82 Mohammad Ali was emphatic about the need for a 'scientific history' but he was aware that such a kind of 
history can be realized only within the context of a "new culture suitable to life in the modem world." (See 
"Historiographical Problems," pp. 22-23.) 
83 Sartono Kartodirdjo, despite being considered by many as a sort of an icon for 'scientific history' in 
Indonesia, never failed to at least mention in his writings that history writing can never be divorced from its 
Zeitgeist and since national unity and identity he deemed among those needs of the time, he had no qualms 
in aligning history to serve those needs. (1982; 1994; 2001a; 2001 b) . 
84 Abdurachman Surjomihardjo proved to be the most vocal, and downright brutal, critic of the SN! and 
political influence on hi.>tory writing, but it is also evident in his articles that he recognized the 'obligations' 
of the historians to contribute to nationalist undertakings. See his collection of essays, Pembinaan Bangsa 
dan Masa/ah Historiografi (1978a) 
85 See for instance "Taufik Abdullah: Kita Harus Berikan Porsi Yg Pas Pada Sejarah & Mitos," Sinar 
Harapan, 20 January 1986, p. 8. 
86 See the introductory chapter to Metodo/ogi Sejarah (Kuntowijoyo 2003) 
87 The debates surrounding the philosophy of national history in the 957 national seminar gave rise to sharp 
differentiation between the terms "national" and "nationalist," the latter being associated with 
'chauvinistic' forms of nationalism. That Sartono's articles written as late as the 1990s, even teh early 
2000s, contained referred to such a differentiation attests to the enduring tension between the two concepts. 
See for instance "Sekali Lagi Pemikiran Sekitar Sejarah Nasional" (1970 pp. 33-34). 
88 Prapanca was supposed to be the author of Nagarakrtagama. It purportedly contained historical accounts 
about Madjapahit. He was a pujangga, or a court poet/cleric-literati. 
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many but I would argue in the next chapter that more complex judgments are 
needed. What makes, for instance, an effort to understand Nugroho doubly 
complicated was that in the context of much of 20th century Indonesia, a Prapanca 
has been a contested signifier. While C. C. Berg dismissed Prapanca as a 
manipulator of history to serve a political interest of his ruler (and also questioned 
the historical value of Prapanca' s purported work Nagarakrtagama alongside the 
Babad Tanah ]awi, Pararaton, and othersB9), Sutjipto Wirjusuparyo90 exalted, even 
installed him as the father of Indonesian history. While there have been more than 
a few Bergs in the past 3-4 decades, there seem to be many more commentators 
who identified with Sutjipto's ideas. 91 So any overly dismissive assessment of 
Nugroho as a modern day Prapanca, or as an intellectual prostitute, can only 
reflect one side in a highly contentious and continuing debate. In strict terms, it is 
just a case of asserting one's politics against that of others. Such a debate is 
embedded in, though by no means confined to, the historiographic terrain. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was four-fold: (1) to demonstrate the political 
and the scholarly context within which the SNI developed; (2) to examine how 
political and scholarly factors interacted; (3) to identify the outcome of such 
interaction; and, finally, (4) to account for the 'excess,' those things outside of the 
obviously political and the scholarly that also contributed to the process of defining 
the shape of the SNI. 
89 For an overview of the contrasting views on the historicity of these writings, see Hall (1965). See also van 
der Kroef ( 1958) for an overview and appreciative assessment of Berg's ideas and approach. For a useful 
overview of how differently Majapahit was depicted in Nagarakrtagama, Pararaton and Sabad Jawi and 
how such differences mattered in the Indonesian intellectual's effort to grapple with the place of Madjapahit 
in the overall nationalist eschatology, see S. Supomo (1979). 
90 Sutjipto Wirjosuparto was one of the respected scholars in Indonesia. He wrote in "Prapanca sebagai 
Penulis Sedjarah," (1960/1982) as a defense against Berg's ideas that cast doubt on the historical value of 
Nagarakertagama, among other babads. 
91 Frederick and Soeroto ( 1982, 176-177), for instance, described Sutjipto's piece as his 'best' as it offered a 
new perspective on the early history of Indonesia. Sutjipto, for instance, was said to have succeeded in 
demonstrating that contrary to what many foreign scholars believed, pre-modem Javanese had a historical 
consciousness and Prapanca was among the clearest proofs of that. 
212 
It has been shown that the primacy of the political factors, mani~ested 
specifically in the bitterly fought ideological contests in the 1950s and 1960s, had a 
deep and wide impact on the writing of the SNI. As almost everyone suspected, the 
shape of the SNI, especially Volume 6, coincided to a very significant degree with 
the interests of the regime. The epitaph 'official propaganda' given by the critiques 
of the SNI was not unwarranted. 
Notwithstanding the supremacy of political factors, however, they did not 
go unmolested. It has been demonstrated that contrary to the general perception 
that the scholars were almost totally helpless against the regime, the scholarly-
related factors such as the use of multi-dimensional-structural approach, the 
pressure emanating from the community of scholars and the stature of Sartono 
have, taken together, made a dent in the political designs of Nugroho. 
The dynamic interplay between the political and scholarly factors has 
resulted in equivocal, at times confused, sometimes even inconsistent, messages 
that tended to betray the ideas of singularity and solidity that are often associated 
with the concept of' official history.' Historical knowledge, as presented in various 
editions of the SNI, is far more fluid than often assumed. This fluidity points to the 
fact that even under a fairly controlled conditions, the fluidity of knowledge tends 
to assert itself and one possible reason for this is the multi-dimensionality of forces 
or powers that define its shape. 
To refine the previous point, it is too simplistic to assume that the shape of 
knowledge that came out of the SNI was determined only by the political interests 
of the state or state actors and that of the scholars. As shown, there were instances 
when neither of the two could adequately account for the shape of specific parts 
of the SNI. Factors such as haste, carelessness, the writing style of the writer, 
unintended omission, forgetfulness, personal idiosyncrasies of the authors and 
other factors did also contribute. There are two ways to interpret this. One is that 
knowledge is not really a function of power, and that highly refined scholarship is 
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precisely what is needed to minimise, if not totally eliminate, these non-scholarly 
factors in formulating knowledge. Another possibility on the other hand is that 
there is a multitude of possibly infinite and not always identifiable sources of 
power that shape knowledge, and scholarship is just one of them, albeit the least 
recognised yet one of the most potent. This study takes the latter path and the 
reasons for this will be explored in the next chapter. 
--oOo---
214 
CHAPTER VII 
CALCULUS OF KNOWLEDGE-POWER 
Historical sense and poetic sense should not, in the end, be contradictory, 
for if poetry is the little myth we make, history is the big myth 
we live, and in our living, constantly remake. 
-Robert Penn Warren (Brothers to Dragons/ 
I t all started as a wish. In 1967, Marcos expressed in public perhaps for the first time his wish to write a history. I surmise that hardly anyone on that occasion 
took him seriously. As in many previous instances when he expressed wishes 
that appeared unlikely, if not impossible, to be fulfilled, Marcos endeavoured to 
prove his doubters wrong. He did not actually write history, as others did it for 
him, but he tried hard to make it appear as if he actually wrote it. 
Two years later, in 1969, in the city of Yogyakarta in Java, Nugroho 
Notosusanto expressed a related, but different wish. To write history was not what 
he wanted; that the national history of Indonesia be written.soon enough was what 
he desired. Nugroho was not a head of a state as Marcos was, but he was (still is) 
widely believed to have stood for the interests of one. 
Both Marcos and Nugroho had some obstacles to overcome. Faced with 
fellow historians who were skeptical of the timing and the adequacy of available 
intellectual resources, Nugroho tried hard to persuade them. Th~ time had come 
for the national history to be written, he claimed (Notosusanto 1969). Armed with 
the support of the state machinery and pressed by the perceived acute need of the 
time, he succeeded. Just over a year later in 1970, the SNI project was on its way. 
The obstacles for Marcos proved more daunting. For about five years, he 
looked without success for historians who would spearhead the project. Despite a 
promise of full support and an unhampered movement, n:o one proved willing. It 
1 From Foreword to Brothers to Dragon, as quoted in Dupuy, E. (2003) 
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would only be in 1973-1974 that Marcos succeeded in finding a group of scholars 
who enthusiastically agreed to realise his dream. 
The stories of the two history-writing projects, the SNI and the Tadhana, 
have been told separately in the past four chapters. Now is the time to see one next 
to the other. The focus of this chapter will be on the features of the two projects that 
can demonstrate the intricate interrelationships between the embodiments of 
knowledge and power. What seems to make these projects very fertile as 
exploratory grounds are the directness or proximity and intimacy of interaction as 
well as the differentiated dynamics-sometimes obvious, at the other times 
subtle- between the scholars, knowledge and specific political actors. There are of 
course notable similarities as well, and these sharpen the backdrop against which 
the search for a nuanced characterisation of the knowledge-power nexus has been 
pursued in this study. 
Contexts and the Link Between Politics and Scholarship 
The contrasting manner by which Nugroho and Marcos overcame the initial 
impediments bespoke the different contexts in which they operated. Nugroho, for 
one, was himself a historian; thus talking about a history-writing project was not 
unnatural for him. Marcos, on the other hand, was a politician who aspired, among 
many other things, to be considered as a historian. In the eyes of many it was 
suspicious. Likewise, unlike in Indonesia of the 1970s where the relationship 
between the state and the scholars was fairly cooperative and amicable, that in the 
Philippines was not. The late 1960s and early 1970s were a time of ferment that saw 
segments of the intelligentsia, including historians, at the forefront of struggle 
against the government. Indonesia had its own share of political bickering, of 
course, and it was both sharper and bloodier, but that was a few years past. By the 
early 1970s, things had begun to stabilise. 
Another pertinent consideration was the status of development attained by 
the historical professions in the two countries. By the 1970s, history in the 
Philippines had already undergone almost 70 years of professionalisation, whereas 
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in Indonesia it had barely passed its second decade. One consequence of this 
discrepancy was that the professionally well-trained Indonesian historians were 
still few in number at that time. The project in fact needed more than what the 
existing pool, more in qualitative than quantitative terms, could adequately 
provide. On the other hand, their counterparts in the Philippines were but a small 
portion of a bigger, and less homogeneous community of scholars. With a longer 
tradition of autonomy from state tutelage, the Filipino historians' direct 
partnership with the state tended to be viewed by fellow scholars and the public in 
general with lesser tolerance and greater suspicion than was the case in Indonesia. 
Such partnership in Indonesia had almost been 'naturalised' by necessity: the 
history profession had to grow since the 1950s side-by-side with the rise of an 
authoritarian state, so there was hardly room for a non-restrictive, less dependent 
development of the profession. 
The set of factors that gave rise to the two projects were broadly similar. On 
the one hand were scholars who, imbued with nationalis:tn, believed that 
participation in the project was a contribution towards decolonisation efforts. They 
were led by scholars whose nationalism and academic interests urged them to 
push historiographic agenda as conscious or unconscious responses either to 
foreign or domestic, scholarly or political stimuli, or both. On the other hand were 
the two authoritarian regimes. Suharto's New Order was emerging from the 
politically and economically turbulent decade of the 1960s. Rocked likewise by 
tumultuous political contestations in the 1960s and early 1970s~ the Philippines 
suddenly found itself under Martial Law which Marcos justified as necessary to 
form a New Society. What accompanied these developments were the haunting 
problems of legitimacy for both regimes. The coup in 1965, the subsequent killings 
and the events leading to the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto were 
shrouded with layers of mystery that up to now have yet to be fully uncovered. 
Marcos' s declaration of Martial Law, for his part, was a gross violation of the rules 
of the political game which Filipino elites were long accustomed to. There must be 
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ways to justify them, and history was deemed potentially helpful in this 
undertaking. 
Nationalism in the Philippines, however, was less a unifying platform than 
it was in Indonesia. The Philippines underwent a pattern of colonial experience 
that was distinct for eliciting forms of nationalist responses that were ambivalent 
towards colonialism, among other things. The nationalist historiography that 
underpinned the Tadhana was clearly an assertion of an alternative to the existing 
well-developed nationalist historiographies. In Indonesia, on the other hand, the 
nationalist historiography Sartono aimed to develop through the SNI gained the 
support of other historians as most of them recognised the need to replace the 
colonial and the non-academic historiographies that they saw as problematic. In 
other words, the potential for divisiveness within the community of historians was 
simply much greater in the Philippines than it was in Indonesia. This set the tone 
for the more morally-loaded charges against those who took part in the Tadhana 
than was the case against those who participated in the SNI, with Nugroho, of 
course, being a notable exception. 
The Filipino scholars entered into a partnership with Marcos seemingly 
aware of the political risks it entailed. The years leading up to and after the 
declaration of martial law in 1972 saw a sharp polarisation among the intellectual, 
political and economic elites in the Philippines between those supportive of and 
those opposed to Marcos. The battle line was clearly drawn and, in the eyes of 
many, these scholars had decided which side they took when they agreed to write 
history for Marcos. 
The situation was vastly different in Indonesia. Early on, since the late 1950s, 
the trajectory of political developments in this country pointed towards the rise of 
authoritarianism. There were years, as noted above, when the political sphere was 
bitterly contested, but conflicts would be smoothed out almost completely by the 
cataclysmic events of 1965-1966. Among other things, these events effectively 
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weeded out scholars who held political views sharply divergent from that which 
the state promoted. These also set off an enduring atmosphere of fear that reduced 
considerably the possibility of developing any form of effective or strong 
opposition to the state. When the SNI was undertaken in the early 1970s, the 
scholars were one with the state. Their participation in state-sponsored writing 
project appeared to be a natural thing to do. There seemed to be no perception of 
irregularity in such a partnership, which was obviously in sharp contrast to the 
case of the Tadhana. 
It is striking that right from the start, the core group of the Tadhana scholars 
evinced a sense of confidence in what they were about to do and about what they 
might get out of the project. Not only did they seem to have a definite personal and 
scholarly agenda which they liked to pursue. They also appeared convinced of 
their ability to withstand or neutralise the political risks that working for Marcos 
entailed. This confidence was best exemplified by Salazar and Tan. Salazar, for 
instance, was forthright about his willingness to accept the support of anyone, even 
a criminal, to realize the need for writing a complete and 'truly' nationalist history 
of the Philippines. He declared that producing a good history far exceeded in 
importance the question of who or what enabled it to happen. (Salazar 2004b) Tan 
for his part believed that it was not Marcos who influenced the shape of the 
Tadhana; it was the Tadhana that influenced Marcos's views of history. (Tan 2004a) 
The confidence of Salazar and other Tadhana scholars could only be 
matched by Sartono' s doubts and Nugroho' s proven misplaced self-assurance. The 
SNI may have been completed while the Tadhana was not, but the quality of the 
published outputs appeared to weigh more heavily towards Tadhana than to the 
SNI. The level of historiographic advancement, conceptual coherence, quality of 
writing and the depth of actual research that characterised Tadhana as 
demonstrated in Chapter 4 found no parallel in the SNI, as evident in the 
problems-unevenness in writing, weak conceptual framework, lack of research, 
editorial lapses- that were spelled out in Chapter 6. The decades of established 
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historical scholarship in the Philippines, strengthened by a longer period of 
autonomous or less politically restricted development put the Tadhana scholars in 
an apparently more favourable position than their Indonesian counterparts, not 
only in embarking on a history-writing project in general, but also in doing it in 
partnership with the state that had its own political interests to promote. Whereas 
the key players in the SNI constituted the first generation of professional 
Indonesian historians, young and generally inexperienced and thus still struggling 
to lay the foundation of the historical profession, the Tadhana scholars were heirs 
to a relatively established tradition not jl.lst of "pure" scholarship, if ever there was 
such a thing, but also of politically engaged scholarly undertaking. The presence in 
the Tadhana team of the anti-Marcos activists such as Boquiren, Mangahas and 
Salazar exemplified the political engagement of many Filipino scholars. Against 
this backdrop, one may argue that while both groups disavowed any 
foreknowledge of their project's political intent, the Tadhana scholars seem to be 
more vulnerable to the suspicion of disingenuousness than their SNI counterparts, 
again, with a notable possible exception of Nugroho. 
Contrary to a commonly held supposition, however, the apparent imbalance 
between the strength of the state on the one hand, and scholarship on the other, 
does not necessarily t-ranslate into a clear cut opposition between scholarship and 
politics. Notwithstanding the relative 'strength' of the Filipino scholars vis-a-vis 
their Indonesian counterparts, their outputs seemed to be no better shielded from 
political appropriation. The highly scientific exposition of the geological and 
geographic formation of the Philippine archipelago, for instance, assumed a 
political meaning, if seen against the totality of the Tadhana and against Marcos's 
over-all interests. For the geologist, trained in Harvard, who wrote this, it was 
nothing more than an innocent, scientific rendition of the origin of the Philippines. 
For Marcos, however, it strengthened his eschatological claim of Philippines 
history which linked the New Society to the indigenous origins the search for the 
sources of which can be traced to the deepest possible roots-the geological 
process. If such a seemingly politically inert subject can be used for political 
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purposes, what else cannot? In the same way, whereas the Volumes 1-5 of the SNI 
had no clear political intent, they were ultimately implicated in the political design 
(or public perception thereof) of Volumes 6/7. That the entire 7-volume SNI had 
been officially withdrawn in 2002, points to this outcome.2 This happened despite 
the lack of a tightly integrated framework comparable to the Tadhana' s. Sartono 
planned the SNI to be a well-integrated whole but the actual output turned out to 
be disparate. Only in a very limited sense one can say that the volumes are unified. 
Apparently, the presence of the first five volumes made Volumes 6/7 more 
publicly acceptable as a standard work. In both cases, the political and the 
scholarly are closely entwined, and this happened not because individual scholars 
wanted it, but because the knowledge they produced takes on a life of its own 
depending on how other people, such as Marcos and Nugroho, or the public in 
general, use and interpret it. 3 
It is crucial that the scholarly quality of the content did not seem to matter as 
much as commonly assumed. That is, it did not follow that good scholarship 
neutralised politics. The case of Marcos is particularly instructive because rather 
than upholding the fairly common notion of the scholarly as antidote to the 
political, what he precisely wanted was for his political interest to be buttressed by 
the highest quality of scholarship possible. His ultimate interest, we may recall, lay 
in explaining or justifying himself to the people of the future. It could be served 
best if the history that would be written under his name was of high quality, 
presumably capable of withstanding critical scrutiny and the test of time (Cristobal 
2005). That was the reason for seeking the services of, as far as possible, the best 
2 As noted in the previous chapter, what used to be 6 volumes had become 7 volumes in the 1994 edition. This 
is because a separate, additional volume had been added specifically for the New Order period. So what 
was withdrawn in 2002 were 7 volumes, not 6 volumes. 
3Borrowing from Maus ([1938]/l 979, p. 22 cited in McCarthy, 1997, p. 49), knowledge is like "an invoked 
genie" that had the "life of its own; it in fact reproduces itself indefinitely." This is not the same as 
upholding the structuralist-poststructuralist dictum of the death of the author or the corollary view on the 
indeterminacy of meaning. It only says that the authorial intention is but one among array of possible 
determinants of meanings that can be ascribed to knowledge. This carries important implication on the 
process of legitimation. Bauman, for his part, declares: "Power/knowledge denotes self-perpetuating 
mechanism, which at a relatively early stage stops being dependent on the ·original imperus, as it creates 
conditions of its own continuous and ever more vigorous operation." (1987, 11) 
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credentialed Filipino scholars of the time. Good scholarship and politics, in short, 
are not necessarily antithetical. They could, and often do, go together. This idea 
corroborates one of Said' s main points in Orientalism (1978), that is, the quality of 
the Orientalist scholarship was one of the contributory factors that lent Orientalist 
discourses credibility and resilience. 
Sartono' s Indonesia-centrism and multi-dimensional approach employed in 
the SNI are also a good case in point. At first glance, Sartono's scholarship was 
simply a sophisticated attempt to provide an adequate reconstruction of the 
process of nation-formation. If seen, however, against the backdrop of a number of 
separatist efforts that punctuated Indonesia's postcolonial history, it provided 
strong, scholarly justifications for state-sponsored nationalism, inadvertently de-
legitimising the nationalist aspirations of certain groups such as those of the 
Acehnese and the Papuans. Historical efforts by the likes of Muhammad Yamin, of 
course, preceded Sartono' s and in fact laid the foundation. Considering the low 
level of scientific rigour put into earlier attempts, however, it is possible that these 
provided no more than tenuous groundwork. Sartono and his followers were those 
who provided a strong scholarly justification for state-centric nationalism, and the 
SNI constituted the official encoding of such a justification. Without consciously 
being political, the way Sartono' s approaches were appropriated or interpreted and 
the manner they became enmeshed within the nationalist discourses made them so. 
These examples do not intend to suggest that everything is political; it only points 
to the possibility that everything may be politicised. To politicise here refers to a 
conscious act (or an act perceived to be conscious) of empowering oneself, other 
group/s or institution/s that one represents. 
The case of the SNI seems instructive of the other side of the issue. Since it 
appeared in 1976, it has endured stinging criticisms. Two things stood out in the 
critiques: (1) scholarly weakness and (2) politics. From the standpoint of 
scholarship, Sartono's early doubts as to the readiness of the Indonesian scholars to 
undertake the project seems vindicated. The SNI, notably the 1975 edition, has been 
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viewed by many both in Indonesia and abroad as deficient in scholarly terms. 
Surjomihardjo' s (1980) categorical declaration in 1980 that the SNI did not satisfy 
scholarly standards seems warranted. Of importance for analytic purpose here is 
the tendency to link the elements of scholarly weakness to the SNI' s alleged 
susceptibility to political manipulation. The commonly assumed oppositional 
relationship between scholarship and politics was affirmed. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 6, there is no doubt that the SNI-6 (1975) was 
an attempt to promote propaganda. Efforts are evident to "shear (the nation of) 
Sukarno," to extol the military, and to vilify or discredit the Old Order, the 
communists and others opposed to the state. In comparison with other versions, 
however, it proved to be the least virulent as propaganda. What could account for 
this situation was, as argued in Chapter 6, the imposition of Sartono' s multi-
dimensional approach which restricted the space for political topics. This 
restriction hampered efforts at promoting political propaganda by limiting time 
coverage (SNI-6 did not cover events beyond October 1965) anq space allotted to 
each political topic, and more importantly by eschewing the narrative approach to 
writing which seemed to be more effective in conveying emotive propaganda 
messages. The point is clear in the versions such as the SNI-SMP and the 1984 and 
1993 edition of SNI-6 that abandoned the multi-dimensional approach. 
The apparent irony here lies in the fact that despite the relative weakness of 
the overall scholarship that underpinned the SNI vis-a-avis the Tadhana, the SNI 
1975 edition proved to be more resilient to political manipulation. This is in 
comparison both with the Tadhana and other versions of the SNI. The key role 
was played by the multi-dimensional approach and this, therefore, is an instance 
when the scholarly made a difference in restricting the exercise of the political. 
Unfortunately, this point seemed unrecognised by many, including those involved 
in the project themselves. 
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When the SNI-6 1984 edition came out, for instance, nobody seemed to have 
complained about the abandonment of the multi-dimensional approach. The focus 
of the complaints remained the treatment of Sukarno and the exclusion or 
misinterpretations of certain personalities or events. That B. M. Diah (1987, 1) re-
printed in 1985 the same review he did in 1976, claiming that the 1984 edition did 
not warrant revision of the said review, seemed to reflect a general perception that 
there was not much difference between the two editions. Even Surjomihardjo who 
was a student of Sartono, a frequent commentator in the newspaper, and who was 
a former member of the SNI team hardly noticed the change (Surjomihardjo 1984a; 
1984b; 1985; 1987a; 1987b). Sartono himself has no idea what difference his 
preferred approach may have made. As discussed in Chapter 6, Sartono initially 
developed the approach as a conscious, negative reaction to the dominance of the 
political as manifested in colonial historiography as well as in the tendencies of the 
Marxist-inspired intellectuals of the 1950s and 1960s. He did not seem to have 
entertained the possibility, however, that the very nature of the approach itself, 
notwithstanding its inadequate implementation in the SNI 1975, proved quite 
effective as a neutraliser of Nugroho's political intent. What remains in his mind to 
this day, and he is quite regretful about this, are three things: (1) the inadequacy of 
the implementation of the approach, for which he holds himself responsible; (2) 
Nugroho's 'hijacking' of the otherwise purely scholarly project for political 
designs; and (3) his failure to do something to prevent what Nugroho did (Sartono 
2005a; 2005b). 
The foregoing discussion suggests that there is no inherent opposition 
between politics and scholarship. The character of the relationship is determined 
by the meaning or value attached by individuals to historical knowledge. The 
dynamic configuration of the individual, group, and institutional interests as they 
interacted with the broader social forces set a frame within which the relationship 
between the two is defined. 
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Responses and Dynamics of Power Relations 
The contrasting characteristics of the two projects and the different contexts 
that gave rise to them set the frame for the dissimilar responses that the two 
projects elicited. The Tadhana was never completed and was never widely used. 
Out of the originally projected nineteen volumes only four were published and out 
of the two volumes of abridgement, only one saw print. The SNI, on the other 
hand, was not only completed but even underwent revisions and reprints. It was 
also used widely either as reference texts in the university, or as a basis for writing 
textbooks for high school and elementary school, at in official sense. Likewise, 
while the Tadhana project operated under a shroud of mystery, the SNI took shape 
under the watchful eyes of the media. Because of this the controversial character of 
the SNI had been publicly known whereas that of the Tadhana has been confined 
largely to the community of scholars. 
The more widespread utilisation and the sporadic but intense media 
coverage of the SNI that now spans three decades set the frame within which its 
controversial character has been constituted. This situation has resulted in a multi-
faceted, more fluid and more ambiguous picture of power relations which may be 
discernible in the SNI vis-a-vis the case of the Tadhana. Whereas the scholars who 
participated in the Tadhana were almost universally depicted in a negative light by 
those who know about the project, a perception that has barely changed, only a few 
members of the SNI team have been vilified. Moreover, the SNI has seen 
vicissitudes of fortune depending of a number of factors including the altered 
power structure wrought by the fall of the New Order regime in 1998. 
The official (and symbolic) withdrawal of the SNI in 2002 exemplifies this 
point. It was a government's response to the mounting public clamour occasioned 
by the proliferation since 1998 of stories of deliberate distortions of history that the 
media profusely covered. After enjoying for more than two decades the status of 
being the official, standard history text-apparently believed in by a large segment 
of the population-the SNI has been denigrated as a testament to the New Order 
225 
government's unscrupulous behaviour. Right from the very start, there were of 
course people who have always believed that the SNI (specifically Volume 6) was 
no more than government propaganda, but they were a small minority. For many 
others, especially the younger generation, there was no other history apart from 
what was inscribed in the SNI. With the demise of the regime, the situation has 
been reversed. The majority seem convinced of the 'engineered' character of the 
SNI, but there are those who remain steadfast in their belief in the truthfulness of at 
least parts of it. 
The case of Nugroho is another good example. The image of Nugroho 
varied through time depending largely on the prevailing political atmosphere. 
During the New Order, while he had his own share of bitter critics, he too had 
many admirers. His power and influence was largely due to his being a well-
known historian and a high-ranking government official. But side by side with 
Sartono, his standing in the community of historians paled in comparison. Because 
of his ties with the government, however, he seemed to occupy a more prominent 
position in the society in general than any other historians of the time. Such 
appraisal might not hold on the individual level, as certain individuals such as 
Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo and Taufik Abdullah certainly had a different 
valuation of Nugroho. One thing seems certain, though. After the demise of the 
New Order, even if there remained people who were appreciative of Nugroho's 
legacy, it looks like there have been far more who viewed him and his legacy in a 
·negative light. The power that he enjoyed while he was still alive-power that was 
reduced, but what remained of it nonetheless lingered through his influences after 
his death-has been considerably diminished due to the re-alignment of power 
relations in the post-Suharto period. 
In the case of the Tadhana, notwithstanding the scholarly value of the 
output and the impressive credentials of those who made it, Marcos' s claimed 
authorship has, from the very beginning, overshadowed whatever scholarly merit 
it might have. This is easily explained by the unpopularity of Marcos among the 
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intellectuals, a situation that has diminished only a little, if at all, by now. In other 
words, it is possible that so long as anti-Marcos sentiments remain rife, the 
Tadhana would not be received favourably. Probably, as Marcos hoped, things 
would be different a hundred years hence, but it all depends on the confluence of 
factors that only time will determine. 
As suggested earlier, scholarship and politics are not necessarily 
oppositional. They could go together. Why is it, however, that the intimate 
relationship between scholars and the state, such as exemplified by the Tadhana 
and, to a lesser extent, the SNI, is often unfavourably perceived? 4 Such framing has 
a fairly long history (Shapin 1991). Scholarship is equated to the pursuit of truth, 
neutral and liberating whereas politics is deemed as self-serving, constricting and 
inherently biased. This was clearly expressed by Soedjatmoko (1960, 18) in these 
words: 
... we should realize that history as a scholarly discipline is not and cannot be 
made the handmaiden of a particular ideology - can not that is, as long as it is 
true to its scholarly character ... 
The critics of both the SNI and the Tadhana operated to a varying extent 
within this premise. The different context and the varied features of the two 
projects, however, resulted in the different ways by which this dichotomy was 
deployed. In the case of the Tadhana, critics chided the participant-scholars for 
allowing themselves to be 'co-opted' by Marcos. Their criticisms carry a subtext of 
moral weakness, as if saying, had they been resilient enough as, one may add, ~ny 
scholar worthy of the name should be, they could have resisted the temptation of 
'selling' their service to Marcos, in exchange for some rewards. 
4 This has a parallel in the dichotomies between nature and society, human and non-human, objective and 
subjective, the rational and the social, etc. that bedevils analysis of the relationship between knowledge and 
societal forces. For a pointed critique of the first two see Latour; for the third, see Bourdieu, (1989) and 
Brubaker (1985, 749-754) and for the last, see Longino (2002, 77-96). According to Karabel (1996, 208-
214) a state-intellectual partnership is actually the no1m and the prototype of intellectuals-as-rebels are the 
exceptions that require explanation. 
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This also applies to the SNI but only to a more limited extent. Among over 
30 scholars who took part in the project, only Nugroho (and to a lesser degree 
members of his team) had been targeted by such criticism. Most other participants 
were faulted for other reasons, that is, the relatively weaker foundation of their 
academic training and lack of experience. 
The critics of the likes of Nugroho and Salazar are often scholars themselves 
who assume a moral high-ground in their avowed duty to preserve the integrity of 
the scholarly community. Their battle cry is that scholarship should be able to rise 
above partisan politics. In the words of Julien Benda, one should not commit 
"treason of the intellectuals."s (cited in Pels 1990; Jennings and Kemp-Welch 1997) 
Such a line of thought has a long lineage6 and is well-intentioned. It is meant to 
protect the individuals and the society in general from the danger which might 
ensue from the collusion between the politicians and the scholars. By occupying a 
position above politics, the scholars are supposed to act as guardians of conscience, 
as critics of abusive power and as protector of the common good. 
In the scheme of things, however, the scholars' claimed impartiality or 
objectivity is hardly an innocent position. According to Bourdieu, the scholars' 
symbolic power allows them to consecrate a perspective and lends it "an absolute, 
universal value, thus snatching it from a relativity that is by definition inherent in 
every point of view ... " (Bourdieu 1989, 22). Objectivity is at once a weapon and a 
repository of the scholars' enormous investment from which they expect to reap 
both intellectual capital and symbolic power (Scott 1997, 55). It is the anchor to 
which the whole institution of scholarship is tied and it is a 'corpor~te' 
responsibility of each member of the. intellectual class to contribute towards the 
5 His pamphlet la Trahison des C/ercs (1927) (translated in English with title The Betrayal of Intellectuals, 
1955) is often considered as classic statement of the supposed above-politics position of the intellectuals. 
See Pels (1990) and iennings and Kemp-Welch (1997) 
6 One of the landmark moments in the development of the idea of the intellectuals as a moral-political 
conscience of the nation was the Dreyfus Affair in France in late 1800s up to early 1900s. For an overview, 
see Jennings and Kemp-Welch (1997) 
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protection and growth of their investment.7 It is to their advantage as a class8 to 
maintain their autonomy as the gatekeepers of knowledge, and the notion of 
objectivity or impartiality is the key (Vandenberghe 2000; Scott 1997). Any 
challenge to their status, and this includes strong relativism and its proponents, 
would be met by symbolic violence, perhaps in the form of marginalisation if not 
expulsion. As Schubert (1995, 1009) aptly puts it: 
Transgression is violent. It can hurt. While it is dangerous for the transgressor, 
it is potentially dangerous to those who occupy privileged position as well. The 
legitimacy of privilege is placed in question by transgression. For that reason 
the transgressor can expect reactionary condemnation, in any of its various 
guises, of his acts. Privilege is not likely to be abandoned without a fight. 
In the case of Indonesia, it was not easy to identify the transgressor and the 
occupants of th privileged historiographic position. When Abdurachman 
Surjomihardjo on various occasions since the mid-1970s castigated Nugroho for 
relativism, along with its moral implications, he did so against a strong current of a 
long-standing tradition of historicist or relativist history writing in Indonesia (or 
elsewhere). Surjomihardjo's critique presupposed the ascendancy of an established 
set of standard or scientific historical methodology as the basis for assessing 
knowledge claims. His confidence in rebuking Nugroho rested, among other 
things, on his belief that the methodology he invoked was the right one and thus 
every historian worthy of this name should abide by it. The problem, however, 
was that it was a minority view in Indonesia at the time. His position was made 
more difficult by the fact that he represented a small group of pe9ple. Among the 
historians, he was almost alone in his public crusade against Nugroho and his 
relativism.9 By positing his preferred historical methods as given, Surjomihardjo 
7 Bourdieu is fond of using economic-business metaphors to describe the dynamics both of competition and 
cooperation within the intellectual community.In Pels's article Mixing Metaphors: Politics or Economics of 
Knowledge (1997), he exemplifies Bourdieu, along with Latour and others, as among those theorists who 
made use of economistic model in their analysis of power and knowledge. 
8 Bourdieu's concept of 'class' is not, as in Marxist sense, defined in largely economic terms. This refers to a 
loosely bounded grouping defined by certain commonality: common interests, jobs, shared geographic 
space. (\Vacquant 1989) 
9 He of course had allies in the likes of Sartono and Taufik and some journalists but based on published 
materials, newspaper and journal articles between 1975 and late 1980s, Abdurrachman seemed to have 
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has put under erasure the long history of the continuing struggle to install it (his 
preferred methodology) as the 'standard' historical methodology. I refer to such 
struggle not only in the development of Western historiography from Herodutus 
and Thucydides all the way to Ranke, Carr, Collingwood, Braudel, White and 
beyond, but also in the context of Indonesian historiography from the days of 
Prapanca and Muhammad Yamin to the time of Resink, Soedjatmoko, Nichterlien, 
Frederick-Soeroto, and Sartono. By doing so, he in effect was trying to offset what 
he lacked in number by invoking the convincing power of a modern, established 
scholarly tradition in which objectivity was one of the keystones. It should be noted 
that Surjomihardjo' s use of objective scholarship as basis of his public critique of 
Nugroho should not obscure the fact that Nugroho's defence of subjectivity was 
often interpreted by historians, including Surjomihardjo, as a hollow justification 
for Nugroho's close and suspicious ties with the government. 
Against the backdrop of these insights one can argue that upholding 
objectivity is the basis of the scholars' politics.10 When the likes of Nugroho and 
Salazar made explicit the side they were on, making clear the kind of politics they 
professed, they i11 effect transgressed their supposed responsibility as members of 
the scholarly community. They defied the injunction against partiality. The various 
names they were called--'intellectual prostitutes,' 'sell-outs,' 'mercenaries' -can 
only reveal the moral subtext of other scholars' reactions. That the critics' moral 
outrage is genuine I do not deny. What is significant is that such moral outrage 
tends to conceal the possibly more fundamental reason for the critics' furious 
reactions, that is, the self-interest of the scholarly class. 
For every critic of Nugroho during the New Order period, it may be safe to 
suppose that there may be more who either defended him, silently concurred with 
stood alone for the frequency, consistency, outspokenness and vehemence of his views against Nugroho and 
relativism. It was only BM Diah who seemed to come close to Abdurrachman during the same period. 
Beginning the early 1990s, others began to be more forthright and vocal (See Atmakusumah 1992; Baidlawi 
1992a, 1992b) 
10 According to Bourdieu, intellectuals have an 'anti-political' calling. Their 'anti-political politics' is 
constituted in the paradoxical need to guard their own autonomous interest and at the same time maintain a 
semblance of neutrality. See Pels, (1995, 92-93). See also Bauman (1987, 13-14). 
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him or just stayed neutral. In the case of Salazar et al, the ratio may not be as 
favourable for them as it was for Nugroho. The point here, though, is not the 
number, but that the terrain within which such criticisms and counter-criticisms 
were launched was highly contested.11 The moral framing of criticisms appears to 
be a rhetorical and strategic device employed by the critics. By invoking moral 
absolutes, the critics were trying to take the issue outside purely academic and 
social politics,12 the domains of which were both highly disputed, into the moral 
sphere where they might have believed they were ascendant. Who can argue 
against morality or ethics, they might have thought? Besides, allowing it to be seen 
as 'merely' an academic and social political conflict contravenes the image of the 
scholarship as above politics. Of course, there may be other fundamental reasons, 
but this could be a possibility. 
I should quickly add that this tendency is not always a conscious or a 
calculating move on the part of the scholar-critics. There are cases when the 
scholars and the society at large have long imbibed the moral imperatives 
attributed to scholarship as a supposedly neutral instrument. The moralist rhetoric, 
therefore, could be a naturalised response by scholars against those who violate the 
established norms of conduct. 
It is not just how the public (including fellow scholars) reacted to the 
projects that was instructive of the dynamics of power relations. The interaction 
between the scholars and the political sponsor (or a representative) as well as 
between members of the team can likewise offer important insights. The members 
of the Tadhana team were treated very well by Marcos. Not only were they gi~en 
ample provisions-good pay, access to scholarly materials, clerical assistance-but 
11 The idea of intellectuals as above politics is hardly a generally accepted notion. Pe ls (1990) and Jennings 
and Kemp-Welch ( 1997) discuss in their article the highly contested notion of what an intellectual is or 
should be. As Pels puts it: "Treason of the intellectuals is by no means a singular or transparent thing, but 
takes multiple forms according to competing conceptions about the content and solidity of particular claims 
of knowledge and morality." (I 990, 23) Jennings and Kemp-Welch for their part contrasted the widespread 
anti-intellectualism in Britain with the very different situation in France. 
12 By social politics, this refers to the competition for power and resources among groups in the society. 
Academic politics, on the other hand, refers to the same competition but specifically restricted within the 
scholarly and what is at stake for the scholars-academic rank, higher degrees, prestige, etc. 
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also were shown the utmost respect. Whether or not such an expression of respect 
was genuine is beside the point. What seems to weigh heavier was that Marcos 
could not afford to be less than respectful to the scholars. Considering that it took 
him a long time to persuade historians to enter into partnership with him, he 
seemed to have understood well that the slightest offence, or sign of manipulation, 
could lead the scholars to resign, and thus jeopardize the continuance and success 
of the project. 
Nugroho' s13 attitude towards at least some members of the team stood in 
stark contrast. Nugroho's treatment of Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo and Taufik 
Abdullah-printing their volume without allowing them to finish it-was bad 
enough. It was, however, his expulsion of Sartono from the project on account of 
Sartono's ethically valid request-to have their (main editors') names printed on an 
inner page rather than on the cover of the books-that was downright cruel. 
Sartono, who kept quiet about it for so long, endured in silence the ignominy of 
being treated so badly. That Nugroho never explained, much less apologised, is 
something that Sartono carries to this day. (Sartono 2005a; 2005b) These cases 
drove forcefully the point of how much more restricted, in comparison with the 
case of Tadhana, was the space the Indonesian scholars had occupied in the face of 
the representative of the regime. 
Nugroho' s power or influence, however, cannot be exaggerated. As 
emphasised earlier, the way the SNI-6's first edition (1975) was written reflected 
the extent to which Nugroho and his team were restricted by Sartono' s multi-
dimensional approach. The approach being backed by the group's consens_us, 
Nugroho and his team could not but abide by it, albeit half-heartedly. The contents 
of the history textbook, the SNI-SMP that appeared a few months later, stood as a 
testament to the kind of history Nugroho would have written without the 
constraints set by Sartono and other scholars. It seems possible that Sartono was 
13 Since Suharto appeared to be not directly involved in the project, Nugroho who seemed to have represented 
the interests of the state will be utilised for comparison here. 
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removed precisely because his presence made it difficult for Nugroho to have his 
way. Sartono might be more respected and influential than Nugroho within the 
scholarly sphere, and Nugroho seemed to recognise that, but the fact that the 
Nugroho could unseat Sartono in such a blatant manner indicated a different type 
of power play in which Nugroho proved more dominant. The foregoing 
emphasises the contextual and dispositional nature of power. In short, power as a 
generalised capacity or ability to make a difference partly depends on the 
configuration of contending or mutually reinforcing forces (both social and 
individual), interests and beliefs at a particular context and time. 
Contents and the Power of Scholarship 
The original designs of the two projects were drawn apparently without 
pressure or influence from the state authorities. Historians, following largely what 
they thought to be the best historiographic considerations, designed both projects. 
In the case of the Tadhana, Tan and Salazar produced a framework that was 
supposed to present a coherent picture of the complex process that led to the 
contemporary Philippines. This they did by combining their complementary 
interests on the integration of the minorities in the national narrative and the 
indigenous roots of the process of nation-formation. Sartono, who designed the 
framework of the SNI was also concerned about how the Indonesian nation was 
formed. Unlike Salazar, however, he did not have as much interest in the 
indigenous origins of the nation. In Sartono' s design, the colonial experience 
provided much greater impact on the formation of the nation than Salazar was 
willing to concede. 
The Tadhana and the SNI (1975) shunned the approach to history writing 
that focused primarily on politics. Both have adopted a multi-dimensional 
approach in the sense that all aspects-social, economic, cultural and political-
were given due consideration in narrative and analysis. Both were also organised 
chronologically wherein different aspects were discussed under each period. There 
is an important difference, though, in the way the multi-dimensional approach was 
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deployed in the two projects. Whereas the above-cited aspects were often explicitly 
used in the SNI as basis for organising a chapter or a section/subsection-that is, a 
particular section is allotted to the economy, another to culture, and so on-the 
Tadhana had tried to weave various aspects within a section or a chapter. The 
approach in the Tadhana, in other words, was not just multi-dimensional; it may 
also be called inter-disciplinary. 
One important question is that if the multi-dimensional approach as utilised 
in the SNI was able to restrain the politicisation of the project, why it was not the 
case for the Tadhana? The reason for this was that the Tadhana was designed as an 
integrated whole and that Marcos's political interest lay, among others, precisely in 
the coherence of such a design. On the other hand, Nugroho's political intent 
focused on a specific personality (Sukarno), groups (PKI, military) periods (Old 
and New Order) and events (G30S, Sepersemar), the piecemeal nature of which 
made Nugroho' s and his team's effort susceptible to the injunctions that 
accompanied the multi-dimensional approach. In order to enhance the efficacy of 
the propaganda message for instance, the SNI-6 writers needed a less restricted 
space to characterise in greater detail, and in an emotive and evocative manner, 
their target persdnalities, events and groups. Towards this purpose, the narrative, 
story-telling approach to writing was deemed more appropriate than the analytic-
style that went with the multidimensional approach as originally employed in the 
SNI. The nature of the propaganda intent and rhetorical devices it required had a 
bearing on whether the approach would make an impact or not. 
The contents of the two projects, notably the SNI-6, earned different 
characterisation depending on who looked at it. For Nugroho, Salazar, Tan and 
others, the projects were scholarly. For Surjomihardjo and a few other critics, the 
SNI hardly met an adequate standard of scholarship. For the New Order regime, 
the SNI was the official or the standard history, but for other groups it was 
propaganda, in the same way that many in the Philippines have regarded the 
Tadhana. More discerning observers were able to identify which parts qualified as 
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state propaganda and which did not, but as they were a minority, their perception 
seems to carry less weight. The perceptions of the public had much to do with how 
. the contents would be classified. 
The official withdrawal of the SNI in 2002 was a good case in point. Despite 
the lack of an integrated framework thci.t effectively linked the political intent of 
Volumes 6/7 to the other volumes, the very unfavourable public perceptions of 
Volumes 6/7 eventually implicated, by association, Volumes 1-5 which were 
previously thought to be innocent. In case of the Tadhana, its coherent design 
apparently makes each part liable to a suspicion of political intention, 
notwithstanding the protestations of those who wrote it. This is because each part, 
being part of an integrated whole, had a potential contribution to Marcos' s 
political design. In both instances, what appeared to be the real intentions of the 
authors (in Tadhana and SNI 1-5) ran counter to public perception and the clash 
exemplified a constituting process of power relations between the public and the 
scholars involved and between the public and the knowledge these scholars 
produced. For a public imbued with politically induced scepticism, the quality of 
scholarship or the truthfulness of a knowledge claim did not seem to matter. As far 
as they were concerned, it was propaganda. 
It seems that one fundamental way in which power relations are constituted 
lies in the formation of 'coalition of forces' and in the act of definition. One's 
definition of things might not coincide with that of coalesced forces but the 
difference, in so far as this study is concerned, is merely a reflection of the source/ s 
of power that produce the disjunction between the two. When Salazar, for insta!lce, 
implied that the task of a 'good' Filipino historian is to contribute towards the 
efforts at writing a 'truly' nationalist history, and his participation in the Tadhana 
exemplified such an effort, his definition of a Filipino historian's task and the 
meaning he attached to his participation in the Tadhana could be an attempt to 
cushion the impact of unfavourable social perception. This proposition might hold 
provided of course that there were enough people who agreed with such a 
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formulation. Apparently, however, not enough people have concurred with 
Salazar. Practically all Filipino historians would readily agree that it is their task to 
help develop nationalist historiography, but only a few would concede that doing 
it in partnership with Marcos, or any politician for that matter, was a legitimate 
way of doing so. It was the contrasting definition of how things should be done-
the unwritten code of ethics that forbids consorting with politicians, for one-that 
put Salazar and other members of the Tadhana team in unfavourable power 
relations vis-a-vis their critics as well as other observers. 
Likewise, it was the definition of a 'standard' history text that put the SNI in 
a privileged position during the New Order. Being officially proclaimed as the 
standard, it readily assumed authority manifested in the fact that the history 
textbooks used in public and even private schools, not to mention the examination 
questions given at the national level, were based on the SNI, at least in theory if not 
exactly in practice. So long as the New Order regime was in power, its power 
managed to form a 'coalition of forces' that made the SNI seemingly generally 
acceptable. With the sharp turn of events in 1998, what used to be a minority 
definition of what SNI was, gained more and more adherents raising public 
clamour for the withdrawal of the SNI. The battle for the definition of what 
standard history is, or what history should be, has been a primary fixture in public 
discourse in the post-Suharto Indonesia. 
Considering the centrality of definition in scholarly practice-defining the 
terms and concepts, the relationship between variables, the mode of analysis, the 
standard of scholarship itself-does this mean that scholarship is an esse11tial 
constituting device of power relations? And considering that history is the record 
of what happened in the past, does it mean that among the branches of human 
knowledge, history contributes perhaps potentially the most in the act of 
definition, and therefore in constituting power relations? 
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Marcos's intended use for scholarly history points to this possibility. It 
seemed that he believed in the power of a scholarly history to define what is at 
least perceptibly true, if not the truth itself. This was a history that could 
presumably withstand time and critical scrutiny. Through this kind of history he 
hoped he would be able to convince the posterity of the rightfulness of his decision 
to declare martial law, to extend his rule and to build the 'new society.' In other 
words, the rightfulness of his own definition of the trajectory of Philippine history. 
Apparently he hoped not only that he would be vindicated but perhaps even 
venerated for such decisions. Many of his contemporaries being bitterly critical of 
him, he seemed deeply worried that his dream definition of his position in history 
was being jeopardised by the hostile responses to his initiatives. Through the 
Tadhana, he cast his hope that the unfavourable power relations he had with his 
contemporaries would be reversed in the future. This exemplified how historical 
knowledge's power to define things or events may serve as a constituting device of 
a power relation. Whether the power relation would indeed be reversed in favour 
of Marcos would depend entirely on the fit between his and the future generation's 
definition of what history was and what history should be. 
Another possible example is the relationship between the authors and the 
commentators of the SNI. When many critics or ordinary observers saw the SNI-6 
as a self-serving 'official history,' they did so on the basis of a presupposition (for 
most of them did not read it) that it contained numerous one-sided interpretations. 
Their suspicious attitude tended to be reinforced by the fact that the SNI-6 was 
written by a team of historians under the employ of the military. The SNI's status 
of being an 'official history' created a reality-effect which set the dominant image, 
both among many Indonesian and foreign observers, that the SNI-6 is no more 
than undiluted propaganda. One consequence was (and still is) that their attitude 
towards the volume tended (and tends) to be dismissive, and to those who wrote 
it, a mixture of disrespect, disdain, grudging understanding, pity perhaps, or 
anything that reflects their morally or scholarly ascendant position. To be honest, I 
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was one of those observers and 1 was a witness to how seductive it was to see the 
project through the eyes of a judgmental public. 
A close reading of the SNl-6, however, affords a chance to see it in its 
complexity. Chapter 6 shows the fluidity, ambiguity, inconsistencies, even some 
measures of scholarly integrity in the interpretations. It is important to note that 
there is a paragraph in both the 1976 and 1984 editions that contradicts one of the 
main pillars of the regime's propaganda. Suharto and the military would have not 
been happy to read such a paragraph, and Nugroho might have found it difficult 
to believe that it was there. A number of interpretations are of course possible but 
one possibility is that such fluidity or contradiction indicates either a deliberate or 
accidental assertion of the writers' individuality. Others of course would dismiss 
those paragraphs as a slippage that in no way alters the overall one-sided character 
of the SNl-6, and I agree with this. But in so far as the point being raised here is 
concerned, it is of significance. Seeing the individuality of the members of the SNI-
6 team, recognising that they were not mere puppets constantly being 
manipulated, this alters somewhat the critic-observers' definition both of what 
SNI-6 is and what the individual author's power relations was vis-a-vis Nugroho 
and the regime. 
The power to define is, given the existing context, largely within the domain 
of scholarship. Notwithstanding the scholars' common protestation of their 
powerlessness or lack of influence, even the most powerful nations or corporations 
in the world cannot dispense with the services of the scholars or experts trained by 
scholars, or think-thanks run by people who were given an imprimatur by Jhe 
academic establishment. This does not mean that the scholars' definition of things, 
concepts and phenomena always take precedent over other definitions. No one has 
the monopoly of definition but given the scholars' grasp of the scholarly methods, 
their access to empirical data and their social standing, they have the advantage 
over non-scholars. Definition will often be contested for definition reflects its very 
nature as a locus of power and as a constituting device of power relations. That the 
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Tadhana was dismissed as propaganda despite its scholarly contents and that the 
SNI elicited conflicting evaluations from different groups at different times, 
exemplified the contestation for definition. 
What is being suggested here is that at the core of the scholarly act is an act 
of definition and that one of the elementary sources of the power of the scholars 
and scholarships lies in the presupposition that things can be defined or known. 
The very presence of the scholarly class, its scholarship and the universities serve 
as potent signifiers of the 'knowability' or 'definability' of things. Their presence is 
enough to make the act of definition, regardless of who performs it, whether it be 
Marcos or the scholars, potent as a device for constituting power relations. The 
potency of such a device, however, depends on many factors. As the cases of 
Tadhana and the SNI show, the power relations that underpin knowledge 
production are a complex combination of powers emanating from different sources 
at a specific place and time. To define is to know and the knowledge that we have 
about the real is no less than the definition of such reality. The definition of reality 
lends knowledge (especially history) enormous power and this makes the contest 
for definition among competing interests expected and understandable. The 
essential point here is, that the scholars have their own wellsprings of power and 
the power to define is one of them. This concurs with the classic formulation by 
Francis Bacon that 'knowledge is power.' Considering the enormous popularity of 
this dictum, it is puzzling that there has been a persistent urge to regard the 
mechanism-scholarship and scholars-that produces knowledge as anything but 
powerful. 
Many cases show that when the power-knowledge interface is broached, 
knowledge is considered the passive partner. The common perception that the 
Tadhana and the SNI are legitimating tools is a good illustration of this. The idea 
that memory is a counterpoint to history also points to the same direction. In both 
cases historical knowledge is the mediating device between two or more sets of 
actors. By asking "Why must legitimation or counter-legitimation has be to be 
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framed within history?" we open the backdoor and see that the use of knowledge 
(such as in legitimation) goes not just forward to a target audience, but it also goes 
back to prior presuppositions that are constitutive of the need for such a use. 
Let me illustrate this by recalling the case of Marcos. In Chapter 3, I pointed 
out that Marcos seemed to have a well-developed sense of history. In his diaries he 
mused and worried as to how history would ultimately judge him. It seemed he 
did not like to be 'weighed and found wanting' and this was the primary reason 
why he embarked on the Tadhana Project. We can only speculate about the 
possible sources of his sense of history. Being intelligent and widely-read, he may 
have developed his sense of history from his readings as well as from his 
understanding of events in his immediate environment and beyond. As Barnes 
aptly said, we can perceive the world only through the knowledge that we have. 
(1988, 49) Marcos's desire to legitimise his political move (Martial Law) and his 
decision to utilise history (among other means) to serve such a purpose had been 
prompted by what he knew, and by what he felt, which to an extent was 
conditioned by what he knew. Whereas in the cases above, knowledge sways 
along with the interests or power of the actors (both ruled and ruler), in this 
instance, it seemed that knowledge, in a sense of what one knows, served as the 
driving force. There could have been no Tadhana Project had Marcos not 
considered the judgment of history as important and such perception might have 
been instilled in him by what he knew about history. Rather than seeing, therefore, 
the Tadhana, or the SNI for that matter, as unequivocal indication of the ruler's 
superior power, we might better be reminded that it also manifests the recognition 
of the limits of such power. It was the sense of inadequacy of Marcos and the New 
Order regime-inadequacy that partly emanated from an awareness of history-
that gave rise to the two projects. In other words, the two projects suggest the 
ascendancy of history over Marcos and the New Order regime. By history here, I 
do not mean the knowledge processed by historians, but the knowledge about the 
past as understood by individuals or a collectivity. Scholarly history might form a 
large part of that understanding, but it depends on many factors, including the 
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individual's interests and cognitive ability and the standing of the history 
profession within the society. 
The extent that historical knowledge may have power over an individual 
depends partly on how an individual, reacting or negotiating with various forces in 
a specific environment, deals with it. There are those to whom history and 
historical judgment matters because, of their own volition, they believe in it. There 
are others, however, who were forced to believe by pressures from the society. To 
both groups, historical knowledge would indeed exert power. Marcos, as 
mentioned earlier, was a good example of the first; those who were associated with 
the PKI and their families, marginalised and ostracised during the New Order, 
exemplify the second. However, even among the PKI-associated groups or 
individuals there are those who by sheer force of their personal convictions refused 
to be cowed down. What they knew what had happened they believed was the 
truth, notwithstanding the publicly accepted history. In other words, the power of 
knowledge depends, on the one hand, on the constellation of social forces that 
come together to empower it and, on the other, the individual knower's position in 
the power-differential scale. An individual who agrees with socially defined 
knowledge in effect further empowers it, while those who refuse in an act of 
asserting their own personal power end up offering what may be to them was the 
truth (their knowledge), but this truth is easily dismissed by the rest of society and 
is called by various names: propaganda, apostasy, personal memory, and even 
gossip, idle talk, lies, etc. It is the lack of power of the individual or small group 
' 
that earned for their 'truth' these various derogatory terms. Once the structure of 
power changes, however, as what in fact happened with the demise of the New 
Order regime, we began seeing what used to be branded as lies, propaganda, 
gossip, personal memories suddenly assuming certain level or respectability. It has 
come to be known as pelurusan sejarah (straightening of history), a 'movement' 
whose proponents think they are out to uncover the truth that was obscured or 
distorted by the government. 
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While the flight of public trust away from New Order history has indeed 
taken place, there are those who remain faithful at least to portions of it. The strong 
public resistance against changing the long-held interpretation of PKI-related 
historical events attests to this faithfulness. For some people who have, for one 
reason or another, deeply internalised demonic images of the PKI, neither 
heightened conditioning by the media nor legislation by the parliament, not even 
refined historical methodology, can shake their faith in the New Order version of 
PKI history. Perhaps in the future, or it has been happening already, the 'truth' 
they hold would be dubbed as hearsay, lies, gossip, propaganda. But there is no 
certainty about it, as the battle rages on and the future alignment of power cannot 
be predicted. One thing seems certain, however. It is a complex of power relations 
that defines the contours of knowledge. This does not mean that good scholarship 
does not matter. It only means that good scholarship and the scholars themselves 
have their own power that is usually left out of the equation and should thus be 
factored in. 
Let me take a look at the scholars' relationship with the regime. Often 
enough, it is through the prism of powerless-powerful dichotomies that such a 
relationship is framed, the scholars being the powerless and the regime the 
powerful. This is misleading. Such a partnership is in fact at once a recognition of 
the limits of the power of the regime and the recognition of the power of the 
scholar. Marcos sought the service of brilliant scholars precisely because he could 
not do something that the scholars could. He entered into a partnership with them 
precisely because he recognized that the scholars had power that he lacked. That he 
wanted a scholarly history for his purpose indicated his recognition of the power of 
scholarship. 
The power of scholars, in a sense of their ability to make a difference, comes 
from two primary sources: their expertise and their standing in the society. The 
first emanates from the power that the entire scholarly community has 
accumulated through the ages and whoever becomes a scholar partakes in that. In 
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Bourdieu' s parlance, it is the symbolic power emanating from cultural capital such 
as intellectual expertise or academic credentials (Brubaker 1985, 755-758). The 
second is derived from the alignment of social powers, one indicator of which is 
the level of esteem received from the people. In the case of Marcos, it was largely 
on account of the first that he sought the service of the scholars. The New Order on 
the other hand seemed interested in both. What Marcos seemed to have missed, 
and the Tadhana authors as well, was that for the power of scholars to be 
maximised, the powers from the two sources of power must be combined. 
Expertise was not enough; favourable social perception of such expertise was also 
required. That Tadhana was rejected offhand despite its scholarly contents 
suggests that there are instances when favourable perception takes precedent over 
expertise in constituting the powers of the scholars. Favourable perception is an 
outcome of social alignment that enjoins the scholars to fit into socially defined 
expectations, which include upholding objectivity or impartiality. Whenever 
scholars are seen violating this injunction - by consorting, for instance, with the 
politically powerful- negative perceptions may be generated and the power of the 
scholars is diminished. The extent of the diminution of power depends on the 
depth of the first wellspring of power (expertise) as well as on the perception of the 
gravity of social offence committed. The contrasting fate of Salazar, Sartono and 
Nugroho illustrate this point. 
Salazar's involvement in the Tadhana Project hurt his reputation within the 
community of Fflipino scholars.14 Despite his creditable contribution to Tadhana 
' 
which makes it a notable contribution to Philippine historiography, his ideas rang 
hollow within the community so long as these ideas were within Tadhana' s 
confine. As mentioned already, the Marcos signature ensured that the Tadhana 
would be dismissed by many as mere propaganda. Upon leaving the Project, 
however, and having returned full time to the university, he developed similar 
ideas and approaches. In due time, not only did he emerge as a powerful figure in 
14 When I presented a paper on Tadhana in the 2004 Philippine Studies Conference in Baguio, Philippines, 
there were those in the audience who bitterly denounced Salazar and other Tadhana participants. 
243 
the historians' community but his ideas and approach eventually became the 
bedrock of Pantayong Pananaw, (The Us-Perspective) arguably the most dominant 
school in Philippine historiography in the 1990s. (Gaerlan 1998, 255-267) His 
impeccable academic credentials, his remarkable intelligence that even his enemies 
acknowledged, if grudgingly, coupled with very strong personality enabled him to 
rise above the political fall-out from his participation in the Tadhana. He remained 
bitterly criticized by some, but he exemplified nonetheless the case of a scholar 
who had a huge reservoir of power accruing from expertise (intellectual capital, in 
Bourdieu' s term), huge enough to offset the unfavourable social alignment. 
Sartono seems to share with Salazar a deep wellspring of power that derives 
from expertise. In terms of personality, however, they are very different. Sartono is 
well-respected, well-liked by fellow Indonesian historians and this contributes 
enormously to his favourable social standing. His involvement in the SNI hardly 
affected his standing and one reason was that he was perceived to have withdrawn 
from the project. Even if he did not withdraw, however, his stature in the 
community seemed secured not just because of his academic credentials but also 
because of his personality and integrity that perhaps almost everyone recognised. 
His power as a scholar, in short, was strengthened both by expertise and 
favourable social perception. 
Nugroho's was, again, a different story. He was as complex as perception of 
him has been. Critics always tend to point to the mediocrity of his scholarly 
outputs but for many of his former students and colleagues he 'was a scholar of 
respectable standing. (Irsyam 2005; Manus 2005; Santoso 2005; Yusmar Basri 2905; 
Zuhdi 2005) For them, he was perceived to be decent as well as intelligent. In the 
wider society during the New Order, it is difficult to approximate his over-all 
social standing but admirers seemed to have outnumbered the critics by a 
perceptible margin. In the post-Suharto period, with the changed political 
atmosphere, critics significantly increased but admirers by no means disappeared. 
The contrasting social alignment for and against him, as well as the temporariness 
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and temporality of such alignments, renders it difficult to pin down the 
configuration of his power as a scholar. 
In sum, Nugroho stands as a metaphor for the apparent complexity, 
mutuality or inseparability and inscrutability of knowledge-power relations. In 
him, the boundary between scholarship and politics is dissolved, so as between 
self- and national interest; between the credible and the suspicious; between the 
moral and the immoral; between gossip and knowledge. He defies clear cut 
characterisation. Any effort to paint him in black or white, in the same way as to 
define exactly what constitutes knowledge-power nexus, is bound to meet 
difficulties. He personified the calculus of knowledge-power relations. 
Conclusion 
The term calculus is used as the title of this chapter because it seems apt for 
describing the nature of power relations that are imbedded in knowledge 
production as well as those which informed the interaction among actors and 
factors involved. As a branch of mathematics, calculus refers to the study of 
continuously changing quantities (or combinations thereof) and it is characterised 
by infinite processes, in the same way that the power-knowledge nexus seems to 
operate. By that, I mean knowledge and power seem to be formed at the confluence 
of criss-crossing factors whose possible combinations are infinite and the process 
continuous. Any effort to present power as power, and a knowledge claim as 
authoritative knowledge (regardless of whether it is in fact truthful or not) cannot 
but be an act of 'freezing' an otherwise dynamic process. As suth it is definitely 
propped up by powers that need to be uncovered. 
What are the criss-crossing factors evident in this study that play significant 
roles in the calculus of knowledge-power relations? The first, of course, are the 
political power holders who by virtue of their position had enormous power or 
influence to pursue their interests. These include Marcos, the New Order regime 
and Nugroho who, aside from being a historian, seemed to have represented the 
interest of the regime. In so far as a calculus of power is concerned, it is important 
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to underscore that the configuration of power of these actors or institutions 
changed depe!lding at least partly on how the society in general viewed or 
regarded their position. Once the overall power structure was reconfigured, such 
as with the fall of Suharto, it also altered significantly the mechanism by which the 
existing power-structure influenced the shape of knowledge. What used to be 
official history or standard history, as SNI was, became political propaganda, as the 
power relations had been altered. 
The next factor is the scholar. The scholars' sources of power stemmed from 
their expertise as well as from the social esteem that they had earned through the 
years. To a great extent, the shape of the Tadhana and the SNI ensued from the 
power of the scholars to employ historiographic methods in analysing the data. 
Their expertise, however, was not enough in itself as shown by the case of the 
Tadhana scholars. A favourable social perception was also required. That Salazar's 
ideas became accepted, even became popular, outside of the contaminating image 
of the Tadhana signified the changing calculus of knowledge-power relations 
depending on the social, intellectual and political context. 
The third factor is perhaps the most fluid. It is a set of socially constituted 
powers, the configuration of which cannot be easily pinpointed. The complexity of 
the configuration of such powers emanates from the inherent fluidity of meaning. 
A particular event or personality may have been depicted in the SNI to serve the 
political interests of the New Order regime, but how individual consumers of 
knowledge interpret such a depiction could vary depending on the cognitive 
ability, value system, and many other factors that are both internal and external to 
the person concerned. Despite having been discredited in the post-Suharto era, 
parts of official history that were encoded in the SNI, especially about the 'sins' of 
the PKI, remain widely believed by the people. It seems that certain individuals, 
for one reason or another, would stick to this old version, notwithstanding contrary 
declarations by the scholars or by the new regime. There are aspects of meaning-
formation that seems to be highly personal. 
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The idea of calculus as a metaphor for knowledge-power relations suggests 
that any definition of such relations can only reflect yet another power relation. 
This thesis clearly exemplifies this point. It would be disingenuous if I do not 
admit that the narrative and analysis I present here can only be a manifestation of 
my power as an individual located within the matrix of power-relations called 
scholarship. At some point in the future, at least some of my informants might 
have a chance to read my account and they might find that my understanding is 
different from theirs. I can always defend myself by saying that I have talked to 
other participants, have read materials that they never did and have carefully 
analysed various viewpoints. My version, thus, is supposed to carry more weight 
than theirs. But how would I really know? What right do I have to suppose that I 
know better than people who lived through these controversial projects? Or how 
would anyone, in fact, be able to decide which version is closer to the real? 
Scholarly protocols are no doubt in place which can help decide, but such protocols 
are themselves within the ambit of power relations. At the very least, what I can do 
is to be transparent about my own position in the scheme of things and to 
apologise to those people, dead or still alive, who might be adversely affected by 
my scholarship. Scholarship is power and it can only empower to the 
disempowerment of others. 
--0000000--
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CONCLUSION 
WHEN CLIO MEETS THE TITANS 
History is not a web woven with innocent hands. Among all the causes which degrade 
and demoralize men, power is the most constant and most active. 
-Abigail Adams' 
O ften seen with an open scroll and a chest of books, Clio is known as the muse of history. In Greek mythology, the muses embody the lofty 
aspirations of arts and intellect. They represent dignity, finery, gentleness, 
knowledge, wisdom, eloquence and service. These are some of the qualities that 
define the good, the truth and the beautiful (Boecklin 1875). 
The Titans, on the hand, were a race of gods who ruled the cosmos for a 
long time. They personified many forms of power: natural, political, personal, 
among others. They were "composite deities, with several distinctive, though 
overlapping representations" (Theoi Project 2006). Their reign ended when the next 
generation of would-be rulers led by Zeus challenged and defeated them. The 
Titans were very powerful, yet not omnipotent. 
Clio has long been invoked as a sort of 'patroness' of historians. She signifies 
not just a noble pursuit of truth, but even truth itself. She sets the bar which 
historical profession aspires to reach and to maintain. The problem, however, is 
that, as Oscar Wilde (1995[1895]) said, "The truth is rarely 'pure and never 
simple." Often it has to be fought for. The 'history wars' alluded to at the beginnJng 
of this study were manifestations of this struggle. Clio has become a battleground. 
The battles are being fought between competing forces or interests, which 
may be varied. Irt many cases, however, the powerful state is the primary actor as it 
tries to impose its will on the others, who in turn react or resist in ways they like or 
1 The specific source is not specified, but I took this quote from "Zaads Beta," 
http://www.zaadz.com/quotes/topics/histo1y (accessed on 18 July 2006) 
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they can. The state, and its allied groups or individuals, constitutes the modern 
incarnate of the Titans. Both stand as a metaphor for strength, power and 
dominance. 
What happens when an embodiment of truth and goodness encounters a 
personification of supreme power and self-interest? This is the question that this 
study addresses using the cases of two state-sponsored history writing projects, the 
SNI and the Tadhana. While Clio's professional disciples ran these projects, they 
were funded by, and were meant to serve the political interests of the Titans's 
grandchildren. The encounter promises to be a showcase of exciting possibilities. 
In encounters like this, the fairly common tendency is to regard the state, or 
its representatives, as all-powerful. The notion of 'official history' is a good 
illustration of this. What usually goes with the label 'official' is the comfort of 
knowing whose interests are reflected in a history being offered. It often carries the 
burden of being perceived as less than 'true' history and is often dismissed as self-
serving. On the other hand, the concept is misleading for the same reasons. The 
transparent source of authority that gives rise to it (history) easily produces a 
general perception that there is not much in it other than the will of the patron/ s. 
The equation Power = Knowledge is made unequivocal, one-way and uni-
dimensional and this is precisely the source of the problem. As the role of the other 
players is downplayed, if not totally ignored, the result is often an unbalanced 
picture of otherwise very dynamic interactions. After all, to pursue the metaphor 
further, Clio's mother was a Titan. A Titan's blood ran through her vein, and so the 
opposition or separation between the two- state and historians, power and 
knowledge-is not as clear-cut as it seems. What needs to be done, therefore, is to 
formulate a more nuanced or differentiated characterisation of the relationship 
between the two. This study has aimed to contribute towards this end. 
The first major point being raised in this study is that there is no inherently 
oppositional relationship between good scholarship and political interests. 
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Whether the relationship would be antithetical, or complementary depends on 
many factors including the intention, meaning or value attached to a knowledge 
claim. The fluidity of meaning ensures that knowledge (scholarly-type or 
otherwise) takes on life of its own apart of the intention of the author. Marcos's use 
of a highly scientific treatises to bolster his politically-motivated claims pointed to 
this. The same is the case of Volumes 1 to 5 of the SNI that were implicated in the 
political character of Volumes 6/7. 
There is one sense, however, that scholarship (neutral or not) appears to be 
at its very core a political act-a deeply concealed political act. To re-echo 
Bourdieu' s idea , it is in the interest of the scholars to be seen disinterested; it is in 
their politics to appear apolitical. The scholars' pursuit of objectivity; their mastery 
of methods necessary for such an undertaking; and their exclusive control of 
adjudicating mechanism for establishing protocols and standards for evaluating 
knowledge-claims, have bestowed upon them an authority or power that nobody 
else, even supposedly the most politically powerful person in the land, possesses. 
The usefulness of the scholars to Marcos and the New Order regime rested 
primarily on their being the 'operators' or guardians of the scholarly enterprise. 
Their entry into the project (this is truer of the Tadhana than the SNI) was moved 
by a desire to pursue personal interests, among others. That Marcos had sought~he 
service of supposedly objective and highly credentialed scholars and that Salazar 
and Tan had a well-defined historiography agenda to pursue, exemplified this 
point. 
The foregoing suggests the second major point, that is, the scholars ~nd 
scholarship are in themselves a power to reckon with, and that they were not mere 
puppets at the mercy of the manipulative control or influence by the state. This 
point is most clearly shown in the ability of the multi-dimensional approach as 
employed in the SNI (1975) to restrict the parameter within which Nugroho and his 
team could pursue their propaganda intent. The scholars and scholarship, 
therefore, should be factored into the analysis of the knowledge-power nexus. 
250 
The third major point addresses another question. If scholarship and politics 
are not necessarily opposites, why are they often framed as if they are? What role 
does morality play in formulating such dichotomies? It appears that, aside from 
genuine moral outrage, the moral framing of the criticisms against the Tadhana 
scholars and N ugroho was not just a rhetorical device to strengthen the position of 
their critics but this also served to divert the attention of the people away from the 
apparently inherent ties between the scholarly and the political, between 
knowledge and power. By ostracising Nugroho, Salazar and others, by calling 
them derogatory names, their critics in effect declared them as apostates to the 
supposedly genuine cause of scholarship. This move in effect obscured the other 
possibility, that is, that they (Nugroho, Salazar and others) were castigated for 
endangering the interests of the scholarly class, for exposing the secret that served 
as a well-spring of the scholars' power: the myth of objectivity and the fiction of the 
inherent opposition between the scholarly and the political. 
The fourth main point concerns the character of knowledge and power. 
What was initially considered as knowledge in this study was the historical 
knowledge that was produced by the scholars. Power, on the other hand, referred 
to the ability of the state to impose its will as may be manifested in the shape of 
historical knowledge. The narrative and analysis presented in this study point to 
the fact that this formulation is over-simplified. What seems to capture more 
accurately the relationship between the two is the mathematical metaphor of the 
calculus, that is, knowledge and power are formed at the confluence of criss-
crossing factors whose possible combinations are infinite and the process of their 
formation continuous. Clear illustrations of this include the vicissitude of fortune 
that the SNI experienced along with the change of political atmosphere in 
Indonesia, regardless of the quality or tone of the contents. The same occurred in 
the case of the Tadhana which despite its scholarly content was rejected outright as 
propaganda, but what holds for its future is uncertain as revitalisation of the 
Marcos image cannot be totally ruled out. This point is also shown in the altered 
status of certain knowledge claims that used to be heresy or gossip during the New 
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Order but gained a level of respectability as they formed part of the movement for 
pelurusan sejarah ("straightening of history"). In the same vein, Salazar's ideas 
about indigenous history were ignored and denigrated as part of the Tadhana 
project, but essentially the same ideas became fairly well-accepted later and served 
as a foundation for what eventually became, outside the domain of the Tadhana, 
one of the dominant schools in Philippines historiography, the Pantayo Pananaw 
(Us-Perspective). 
Also suggested in this study, and this is the fifth main point, is the 
autonomous power of knowledge. At first glance this amounts to a restatement of 
the classic 'knowledge is power.' There is an important difference however. In the 
'knowledge is power' dictum, somebody or a certain group uses the power of 
knowledge for their purposes, including the control of nature or other people. 
Knowledge thus is seen as an instrument to advance the interest of an agent. The 
autonomy of knowledge referred to here, on the other hand, emanated from the 
fact that meaning, which is constitutive of knowledge, is continually being shaped 
by the interaction between the individual knower and the social forces with which 
he or she has to contend with. These forces are beyond an individual's control 
though h.e or she has the capability to influence the outcome of such interactions. In 
the case of Marcos, for instance, his desire to have the project seemed to indicate 
the power of the socially defined notion of history over him, power that was 
activated or strengthened partly by his recognition of such power. If he did not 
recognise the power of history over him, it would have been less likely that he felt 
the need to use Tadhana to explain himself to the people of the future. That he felt 
such a need suggested his recognition of a power above his own, and such 
recognition could have stemmed, at least partly, from (1) what he knew history 
was, or what he thought to be the society's understanding of what history was; 
and (2) what he thought his position in such history should be. Considering, 
however, the nature of my data, this point cannot be pursued far enough here. It 
calls for a further research on the psychoanalysis of the consumption of historical 
knowledge. 
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Finally, the two projects suggested a possibility that a similar logic 
underpinned the knowledge-power relationship and that it was in the logistics of 
power that pc!rticular cases may differ. This means that knowledge is a function of 
power and it is in the distribution, combinations, sources, and types of power that 
determine the differences between specific cases. The question thus of "Whose or 
what power shapes what form of knowledge?" is crucial. The political, economic, 
social, cultural and intellectual factors in each society determine the modes of 
distribution and combination that define the characteristics of a particular 
knowledge-power relation. This logistical difference is manifest in different 
names-gossip, memory, propaganda, history, and so forth-that are given to 
different forms of knowledge. As the case of the SNI showed, in terms of the truth-
content a rumour about the PKI, about certain personalities or events, for instance, 
cannot be readily assumed to be less true than history that paraded as 'official' or 
that which was presented in journals as 'scholarly.' What seemed to be the case 
was that a weaker constellation of power made a specific idea mere rumour, 
whereas lies or falsehood that are consistent with the interests of the powerful 
gained the status of' official' or' authoritative' knowledge. Of course, this study has 
dealt only with two cases and futher research on other similar cases or other types 
of knowledge may confirm or deny what amounts to as hypotheses being offered 
here. 
The points identified above suggest the possibly inherent link between 
knowledge and power as well as between their respective embodiments. If we take 
note of the very nature of knowing as a process whereby the power of human 
cognition comes in direct contact with reality, a formulation in standard treatment 
of epistemology (see Zabzebski 1999, and Appendix B for a detailed explication), it 
follows that at the most fundamental level, knowledge is formed by power. What 
can explain, then, the fairly common tendency to deny the very fundamental link 
between the two? And why, where such a link is recognised as the case of many 
poststructuralist scholars, their recognition stops right at the door of its most 
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logical conclusion, that is, strong relativism or nihilism? Why the refusal or fear of 
admitting that any knowledge is no more than a manifestation of power? 
For many scholars, the link between knowledge and power is a challenge to 
overcome, not a natural state to accept and live with. This position has its inherent 
value but it also contains danger for it conceals the self-interest of the scholars. One 
consequence of this concealment is that it could make scholarship an unwitting 
partner of political interests, as the Tadhana and the SNI projects showed to an 
extent. We may recall that the expertise and the supposed objectivity of the high-
credentialed scholars was what Marcos needed for his political interests. Likewise, 
the professional training and the standing in society of the team members of, say, 
the SNI Volume 6 lent its content, despite dubious scholarly quality and its obvious 
propaganda intent, certain level of acceptability. It seems that if the scholars would 
be true to their avowed desire to help their society, they had to be transparent 
about their own interests. By doing so they could help forestall the insidious 
marriage between knowledge and power. The first step, I think, towards this end, 
is to identify the obstacles to a full understanding of the relationship between the 
two. Some of these obstacles are philosophical, methodological, attitudinal and 
political in nature. What will be identified and discussed shortly are the attitudinal 
and political obstacles. For the philosophical and methodological hindrance, see 
Appendix D. 
The first obstacle is manifest in the anxiety towards the mixing of politics 
and scholarship. The assumption is that true scholarship equates to a genuine 
pursuit of truth and objectivity and, therefore, should not be 'contaminated' by 
politics or by power play. True, honest and good scholarship, in other words, is 
deemed to be politically neutral, or apolitical. If it is political, then it is not true 
scholarship. One problem with this formulation emanates from the too narrow 
definition of the political, which in turn is rooted in the restricted definition of 
power. If we broadly define power as a generalized capacity to make a difference, 
as is done in this study, then we extend the definition of the political to include any 
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exercise of power with a result, intended or not, of empowering one self or one's 
group at the expense of another. With this definition in mind, we can see that 
scholarship is in itself a political act, a deeply-concealed political act in fact.2 (See 
Appendix C for a more detailed discussion on the need to expand the definitions of 
'power' and 'political.') Whether or not scholars succeed in the pursuit of an 
objective or a 'true' knowledge is a different question altogether. The very act of 
formulating and validating knowledge-claims presupposes the exercise of power 
which only they have. As this study suggests, the usefulness of the scholars to the 
two regimes rested primarily on the power of their expertise and the effects of their 
social standing-forms of power that even Marcos and the Suharto did not have. 
At the same time, the case of Salazar, Tan and Sartono who have specific 
historiographic agenda to pursue indicated that their participation in the project 
constituted their quest for a greater empowerment, realised once other people 
recognise their approach or knowledge-claims as valid and once they (approach 
and knowledge-claims) assumed the performative function of influencing the life 
and thoughts of the scholars and the people in general. 
The other way the false dichotomy lurks is in the presumption that if a 
knowledge claim is true or valid in scholarly terms, then there is no politics in it. 
As clearly shown in the case of Tadhana, the high level of scholarship put into it 
did not preclude politicisation. Such a scholarly quality was precisely what Marcos 
needed for his political purpose. It seems that the intent of an actor, among other 
factors, politicises knowledge. The question of veracity is therefore divorced from 
the question of politics. Sartono' s case was also instructive. Many would agree that 
Sartono was (and still is) almost a paragon of personal integrity and his 
scholarlship was known for political neutrality (Kuntowijoyo 2000). However, his 
scholarship had unwittingly reinforced statist nationalism through his Indonesia-
sentrisme (Indonesia-centrism) as it had the effect of de-legitimising the nationalist 
aspirations of those aspiring to form their own nation-states, such as Papua and 
2 The expanded notion of the political is consequent to the corresponding reconceptualisation of power as the 
ability to make a difference. For an extended discussion of this, see Appendix C. 
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Aceh provinces. Without him being consciously political, the location of his 
scholarship within the existing discursive formation has inevitably made it so. 
Still another obstacle lies in the false dichotomy between the exercise of 
power (or to be political) on the one hand, and to be ethical or to be good, on the 
other. As Foucault (1980) complained about, too often is the case that power is 
associated with negativities: coercive, destructive, limiting, and controlling. People 
who aspire for power are suspected of questionable ethical credentials. Scholars, on 
the other hand, who are imbued with good intentions, genuinely believing in the 
liberating power of their scholarship, can only reject offhand any suggestion of a 
link between scholarship and power. This explains why, for instance, many 
scholar-participants in the Tadhana were quick to wash their hands of any political 
intent of the project. What is often missed is what Foucault and Nietzche had 
emphasized very well: that power can also be positive, creative and liberating 
(Foucault 1980). Power by nature is neither good nor bad. Power simply is, as 
Anderson nicely put it (Anderson 1972). Lest we forget, ethical standards are in 
themselves a function of power relations. The right and the wrong are defined 
subject to the fluid configuration of powers within the society. Conflicting 
definitions only mean that people are far from agreed on the standard to follow. 
What happened to Indonesia may be a case in point. The fall of Suharto ushered in 
changes that, among other, challenged what used to be a fairly clear-cut definition 
of the good and the bad in relation to the 1965-66 mass killings. It is fitting, 
therefore, to emphasise that the question of ethics does not override the question of 
power relations; ethics is subsumed under it. It does not take precedence over 
power, as scholars, owing to their claim to good intention and nobility of their 
profession, tend to assume. It does not mean a rejection of ethics, it only means that 
the ethical standard has to be fought for hard enough to make it the dominant 
standard. 
The last hindrance that I will discuss here, and perhaps the most formidable, 
is the scholars' self-interests and their well-meaning, but ultimately unfounded, 
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fear of epistemogical and political anarchy. As Bauman and Bourdieu argue, it is to 
scholars interests not to be seen as interested and it is to the extent that they are 
seen powerless that they are powerful. Any reference to the knowledge-power 
nexus tends to explode the myth that props up the appearance of their 
powerlessness, and thus endangers their power. They have conceded some forms 
of relativism but their uneasiness towards it is manifest in that any move 
approaching full relativism-the logical conclusion or implication of the 
knowledge-power nexus-is proscribed. As shown in the cases of Salazar and 
Sartono, the grasp of the methods, not to mention the possession of empirical data, 
constitute a stable source of scholars' power. The scholarly class seems to remain 
powerful on the basis of their expertise alone and there is no reason to suppose that 
they will be deprived of their power. What may happen is that their traditional 
reservoir of power could shrink because the transparency of the knowledge-power 
relations means that they could no longer partake automatically from the power of 
the scholar as a class who have the exclusive control of the 'knowledge machine.' 
For scholars who are truly honest about their avowed willingness to help other 
people, such a diminution of their power-sources should be a small price to pay. 
By extension, because of their expertise, the need for which is imbedded in 
the socially defined configuration of powers, the condition of anarchy is virtually 
impossible. Recognition of full relativism will not mean total chaos and disorder 
because various sources of powers will always align in accordance to the 
equilibrium compatible with the convergence of ever-changing competing 
interests, reinforced by highly differentiated and ever fluid access to social, 
economic, political and cultural capitals. The relativist position that is backed-up 
by the confluence of most powers will therefore emerge the most dominant among 
various competing relativisms. In the present set-up, that is called objectivity. If at 
this point, there is no epistemological chaos, there seems to be no reason why 
things would be different if scholars recognise fully the knowledge-power nexus. 
The only difference perhaps is that we are transparent about whose power shores 
up what knowledge. If that transparency is achieved, the road to 'communicative 
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competence' necessary to attain a well-oiled democracy that Habermas aspired to, 
might be achieved more easily. It seems ironic, therefore, that for all Habermas's 
biting critique of Foucault (Ingram 2005), what seems required to achieve 
communicative competence is precisely the recognition of Foucault's essential 
point about knowledge/power. The implication is dire. It seems to suggest that the 
role of the scholars and the position of scholarship in the scheme of things pose a 
serious obstacle to the full realisation of a true democracy. It could even be 
suggested that the power of the scholars and scholarship is perhaps a reflection 
and a pillar of such a lack of democracy. 
The problem with the notions of truth, objectivity and impartiality is that 
they all tend to clothe knowledge with metaphysical attributes that effectively 
invest it with msidious powers-powers that may be instrumental in causing, 
maintaining or justifying injustice, inequality and violence, both physical and 
symbolic. It is only in exposing the source of such insidious powers that we can be 
in the position to neutralise it. In the end, it is not just an epistemological or a 
political obligation; it is moral as well. 
The serious ethical problem that accompanies the notion of knowledge as a 
function of reality is that it elides the question of accountability. The scholars by 
claiming to be neutral, by claiming that they merely follow historiographic or 
scientific methods, effectively reduce the process of knowledge production to a set 
of technical or methodological questions. Such and such claim is true based on the 
established methods, they would say. By doing so, they can and often do remove 
themselves from the responsibility for whatever consequences their knowledge 
might have. This is evident in the disavowal by Salazar and others of any political 
responsibility for whatever use the knowledge they produce might serve because, 
anyway, they worked on topics far removed from the Marcos era. Since anyone, 
like a Marcos or a Hitler or a regime, can use any authoritative or 'objective' 
knowledge for whatever purpose they might have, often apart from the original 
meaning or intent of scholars who produced it, they could also easily absolve 
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themselves of responsibility by passing it on to the scholarly establishments. They 
could easily claim that what they did is based on truth because scholarship has 
validated it. This is more the case for the SNI than for the Tadhana whose 
authorship was solely claimed by Marcos. The point here though is that no one in 
the end might be held accountable. If scholars shall be completely honest about 
knowledge being power-driven, this can no longer be the case as the first question 
to ask is: "Whose or what powers, or confluence of powers, prop up this 
knowledge claim?" The question thus of accountability occupies a center-stage. If 
the constellation of power is more or less transparent, individuals will be in a better 
position to decide whether to accept certain claims as knowledge. Once they accept 
it, it will already be their own and they will be responsible for how such 
knowledge will be used. The individuals thus will have to share the burden of 
'knowing.' Before, they merely stood at the end of the transmission process, 
passively receiving the already processed 'knowledge.' Now, as the knower is 
actively involved, the terms 'translation' rather than 'transmission' better captures 
the whole process. 
There are times when certain knowledge, aimed at influencing policies that 
might adversely affect many people, circulates freely as a valid knowledge and its 
validity hinges on its scholarly attributes. Without seeing such a knowledge as 
power-driven, the question of accountability will time and again be ignored. If this 
happens, as it often does, the scholars and the university are in effect unwittingly 
being complicit in the act of oppressing or controlling others-exactly the thing 
that they believe they have been fighting against. (Bauman 1992) As shown in the 
case of Tadhana, even what seems to be very esoteric and highly technical 
knowledge that appear to be politically harmless, may be utilized for political 
purpose as knowledge, I would like to reiterate, assumes a life of its own. We can 
avoid such a situation by being honest enough to admit that knowledge is indeed 
power-driven and that it is just a matter of asking whose or what power props 
knowledge up: the scholars and the scholarly methods are but among those powers 
that determine the shape of knowledge. This will lead to everyone being 
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accountable for the knowledge they claim or profess. In other words, it is through 
exercising the ethics of accountability that everyone, most particularly scholars 
can contribute considerably to minimising the use of knowledge as a handmaiden 
of irresponsible power. As suggested earlier, knowledge has an insidious character 
and that is because it is in the 'prison-house' of power. The scholars, serving as the 
warden of such prison house are enormously empowered. By giving up the 
monopoly of their gate-keeping function, scholars pave the way for making 
knowledge production and adjudication a transparent process. It does not mean 
anarchy. It only means shared responsibility for the knowledge that we produce 
and for the freedom that goes with it. 
Earlier, I chided Abdurachman and others for moralising what seemed to be 
an academic-political issue in relation to their critique of Nugroho and the Tadhana 
scholars. I have argued that it was a rhetorical device to compensate for their 
seemingly weak position. I would be dishonest if I do not admit that what I have 
·just done here in the Conclusion is essentially the same thing. Whether my 
arguments are indeed weak such that I need assistance from ethics, let the readers 
decide. What seems clear to me is that any philosophical point, regardless of 
strength, has a corresponding counterpoint. Reason is its own limits and sound 
arguments alone might not suffice. That people, including me, resort to ethics 
might indeed be for rhetorical purposes. But it should be for more. It is a testament 
to our power to decide for ourselves what is right. At the end of the day what 
matters to us is what is good, and what is good is a power in itself. 
---oOo---
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APPENDIX A 
THE SCOURGE OF RELATIVISM? 
Relativism occupies a very uneasy and tenuous position in the philosophy 
and the social sciences.I This has been a long-standing and seemingly never ending 
point of conflict. As Brown notes, ever since Plato took exception to Protagora' s 
declaration that 'man is the measure of all things,' battle over relativism rages 
almost incessantly down to this day (Brown 1989, vi). 
Relativism refers to an idea, an attitude or an epistemological standpoint 
that recognizes the contextual factors in formulating a supposedly valid 
justificatory device to assess knowledge claims. That is, A is true based on 
standpoint B, but may not be true from standpoint C. It is easy to understand why 
relativism would not sit well with the scholarly community for it tends to 
undermine the very notion upon which scholarship is built-that is, that things can 
be known as they are.2 To the extent that relativism is recognized and adopted as a 
scholarly device, it is tempered with moderation, or is forced to moderate its 
temperament.3 Friedman and Kenney (2005, 2) nails the point when they declare: 
1 Many philosophers regard adjudication of knowledge claims the sole province of epistemology (Ben-David, 
1978, 1981 as cited in Shapin 1995, 296). So the very notion of 'sociology of knowledge' was met with 
strong opposition from the philosophers. See Dant ( 1991, 34-40) for a brief discussion of hostile responses 
from philosophers to Mannheim's project. For a full-length debunking, see Norris (1997) 
2 The grip of positivism and empiricism in the social sciences has been progressively relaxed with 
proliferation and accommodation of various approaches and theoretical standpoints. Nonetheless the 
objectivist (or 'impartialist') aspiration to be like 'hard-sciences' remains strong. In Scott's interesting take 
on Weber's idea of value freedom, he argues that it was not strictly a methodological principle nor a code of 
ethics but also "professional strategy of scholars" to advance their own interests (Scott 1997, 55-57). 
3 This moderation takes several forms. In the case of Mannheim he confined his relationism to social sciences. 
He excluded natural sciences (as cited in Pe ls 1996a) In the case of Barnes (1976) and Bloor (1991 ), they 
have what is known as "value-free" relativism. Lynch and Fuhrman (1991, 234) criticised the latter for 
bracketing normative consideration in the analysis of the production of natural scientific knowledge. For an 
assessment of 'value-free relativism,' see Kim (1994). Another case is Knorr-Centina (1982, 320-1), she 
defends her relativist stance by making distinction between epistemic and judgmental relativism. Epistemic 
relativism, she said of what she considers defensible type ofrelativism, is committed to the idea that the 
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"Although we argue that all history is subjective, this is not to suggest a kind of 
relativism." 
The history of sociology of knowledge is exemplary in this regard.4 
Emerging in the era of Weimar Republic in the late 1910s up to 1930s, Mannheim' 
sociology of knowledge had been met with a mixture of strong interests and 
disparagement.6 The latter prevailed as time wore on and the field suffered 
marginalization even within sociology itself. It's 'obituary,' as one scholar noted, 
has been announced for a couple of times already but it has found ways to 
regenerate itself.7 Writing in 1986, John Law notes that as early as the 1940s, 
sociology of knowledge was already foundering and he laid the blame on 
Mannheim's 'intractable epistemological problems'8 (Law19861). By this he meant 
Mannheim's relationism. This seems to be just another term for relativism but its 
subtle difference is instructive of Mannheim's uneasiness about relativism, despite 
basis for identifying 'objective' reality is "itself grounded in human assumptions and selections which 
appear to be specific to a particular historical place and time."[321] Another good example is McCarthy 
(1997). Even if he recognizes the social situatedness of knowledge, he is quick to rescue his appreciation of 
Levi-Strauss's contribution to SSK by saying: " ... to insist, after Levi-Strauss, that everything 'factual' is 
discursive does not require that one embrace a nihilism or an agnosticism about the moorings of these 
discourses .... As sociologists from Marx to Durkheim to Mannheim have argued, there is an institutional 
bases to 'cultural production.' (McCarthy 1997, 62). In the case of Basu and Das (2005), they make 
distinction between subjective partisanship and partisan history, the latter being clearly political in intent 
whereas the former employ judicious examination of evidences but nevertheless cannot but be ultimately 
subjective in making selection and inferences. 
4 For a detailed and interesting story of the formative decades of sociology of knowledge in Germany, see 
Frisby's The Alienated Minds (I 992). For an overview of sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), 
arguably the most successful and dominant form of sociology of knowledge, see Shapin (1995). 
5 Meja and Stehr (1990a) note that 'sociology of knowledge dispute' was one of the four most major 
methodological controversies that excited the scholarly community in Germany in the past hundred years. 
Unlike the 3 others (disputes on methods, value judgment and positivism), however, this was short-lived as 
it was prematurely halted by the rise of Nazism in Gemany. For a compilation of several reaction papers and 
reviews of Mannheim's key article "Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon," See Meja and Stehr (1990b). 
6 Mannheim has been the favourite 'whipping boy' of the sociologists of science. He is often cited in 
contemporary sociological discourse as the one who attempted to rationalise the irrational (see Stehr, 1997, 
773).That he is not mentioned even once in Shapin's (1995) comprehensive review is emblematic of the 
continuing disregard of his legacy. This may be because of Mannheim's categorical declaration that 'hard' 
sciences were not a proper domains of sociological examination. However, come of scholars have noted, 
even argued, for the centrality of Mannheim's ideas and that they could even provide antidote for the some 
of the problems the field faces. (See Pels I 996a, Kim 1994, Vandenberghe, 1999) 
7 Lewis Coser, "The Sociology of Knowledge is Alive and Kicking" (1987, 218-220). In a comprehensive and 
authoritative account of the state-of-the-art written in 1995, Shapin makes it clear sociology of knowledge is 
not just alive but has gained notable success. This time, however, it is in the form known as sociology of 
scientific knowledge or social studies of knowledge. See Shapin (1995) 
8 Rather than Mannheim, Merton is recognised as the 'father of sociology of science. (Shapin 1995, 294.) 
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strong conviction that its opposite, objectivity, is untenable. Dant explains that 
Mannheim himself wanted to avoid the 'nihilism of an unconditional relativism' 
(Dant 1991, 16). So his relationism was meant to eschew the evaluative element 
(truth/ falsity of knowledge claims) inherent in objectivism-relativism dichotomy 
in "favour of understanding the social context" within which a knowledge claim 
was formulated (Ibid., 17). 
Mannheim's uneasy attitude towards relativism seems paradigmatic. Not 
only practitioners of sociology of knowledge are anxious about it but also most 
other scholars. 9 Even many proponents of post-structuralism and other theories 
that are attuned to relativism are careful not to be too deep into it.10 Otherwise, one 
may be branded as 'anarchist' or 'nihilist,' terms that are disparaging within and 
beyond the academe.11 
Critics focus on the supposed intellectual, moral and political vacuity of 
relativism. In scholarly term, it is simply not right because truth cannot be more 
than one.12 In moral sense, the multiple truths that relativism gives rise to allegedly 
undermine the moral order, peace and stability in the society.13 From the political 
9 Longino seems to capture the deep-seated assumption harboured by many critics ofrelativism when she 
states, referring to a group of philosophers critical of social studies of knowledge, they "seem to assume that 
Western science represent the pinnacle of human intellectual achievement and that treat it as anything other 
than the expression ofa rationality guided by sound epistemic norms is to open the gates to the barbarians." 
[emphasis original] (Longino, 2002, 43) 
10 Spivak's classic tum-around from the critique of essentialism which resulted in 'strategic essentialism' 
while not about relativism is functionally emblematic of the attitude of many postie scholars of the 
uneasiness towards relativism. They would be relativists only to a certain point. 
11 The very hostile reaction to Paul Feyerabend's Against Methods represents a very good example of how bad 
things can get in one's effort to explain the limits of science and to expose its time-honoured 'pretensions.' 
Feyerabend is reported to have gone on depression and wished he had not written the book because his 
anarchist position cost him dearly in term of academic prestige (citen in Preston 2006). In the literature on 
sociology of science that I have read, he is depicted in very negative terms. ('anti-science philosopher,' 
'irrational,' etc) I have read parts of the book and I think scholars' maligning of him is largely undeserved 
and they are missing a lot of important insight by dismissing him offhand for his anarchism. For a review 
that is frank, level-headed while mildly hostile but unfortunately misses Feyerabend's most important 
arguments, especially its ethical vision for a freer, happier society, see Ge liner ( l 975). 
12 This is called monistic realistm, that is, "for any natural process there is one and only one correct account." 
(cited in Longino, 2002, 44) 
13 The "fascination with fascism" of intellectuals identified with poststructuralism such as Heidegger, Paul de 
Man, Nietzsche, among others, is often used to exemplify the moral and political danger being posed by 
relativistic, anti-foundational philosophies. See Wolin's The Seduction of Unreason (2004 xi-xv). 
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viewpoint, on the other hand, it purportedly tends to disarm well-meaning 
individuals in their struggle against social inequality and injustice.14 As Brown 
(1989, vii) opines, "relativism ... tend(s) to produce quietism and inaction rooted in 
a sense of hopelessness and pointlessness."15 
Of course, relativism is pitted against its opposite, objectivity-what Novick 
(1988) calls the 'noble dream' of professional historians. While the earlier is value-
dependent, the latter is supposedly value-free. The purported superiority of the 
latter is predicated on the neutrality of its standard, its freedom from spatial and 
temporal influences which are exactly the opposite of what relativism concedes as 
inevitable. 
Taking the cases of Nugroho and Abdurahman, if we ask a Martian (a 
hypothetically 'absolutely objective' person from Mars) to take an impartial look at 
these cases what could possibly happen? Let me create possible scenarios. 
The first possibility is that the Martian, I would call her Ms. Martian, would 
find the position of Nugroho more acceptable considering that there seem to be 
more people who agree with him. Abdurahman, however, would argue with Ms. 
Martian that number should not be the primary basis for judging. For one, it is not 
unlikely that a thousand people will get something wrong which one conscientious 
individual got right. The focus should then be on the rigour of the methods 
employed. That brings us to the next possible scenario. 
Ms. Martian examines all the works-newspaper articles, books, journal 
articles-of Nugroho and Abdurahman. At the middle of scrutiny, the Martian 
suddenly falls in deep thought. She asks herself, "How should I decide? What kind 
of assessing instrument will I use?" Then she has an idea. She calls in ardent 
defender of Surjomihardjo, I call Defender A, and another one, Defender B, an avid 
14 In Wolin's (2004. xiv) words: " ... postmodemism's hostility towards 'reason' and 'truth' is intellectually 
untenable and politically debilitating ... (I)ts practitioners are left ... morally and politically defenseless." 
15 Brown (1989, vii) for instance chided 'relativist-minded' sociologist for how they can fight social ills by 
saying "Yes, all theories are equally good; they merely serve different social interests?" 
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supporter of Nugroho. She asks them to explain their "master's" respective set of 
methods and guiding philosophy in writing history. 
Nugroho's defender explained first, detailing the tenets and the 
justifications of relativistic approach. He emphasized that history can never be 
objective because it entails interpretation and that the interpreter is a human being 
with all the idiosyncrasies brought about by highly differentiated and personal 
experiences.16 What a historian can do is just to apply the methods as best as 
possible and then be explicit of the fact that the resulting interpretation is his and 
his responsibility alone. It's up to the readers to decide if they accept such 
interpretation. So in instances when there are 12 historians writing about the same 
event, 12 sets of interpretations are not unlikely.17 Ms. Martian understood the 
explanations and after asking some clarificatory questions called in Abdurahman' s 
follower to render his side. 
Defender A highlights that among the community of historians, there are 
agreed strict procedures to follow in writing history. These procedures have a long 
pedigree, refined through long years even centuries of practice. While absolute 
objectivity may not be attainable, one is duty-bound to pursue it and uphold 
impartiality at all times. The 12-historian, 12-interpretations aphorism trivializes 
historical methods. While interpretations do vary, strict adherence to historical 
methodology precludes such fluidity. 
"Are you trying to imply," Ms Martian asks, "that one is being objective or 
impartial if one follows strictly historical methodology?" Defender A responds 
affirmatively. "Can strict adherence to the methods ensure that one captures the 
truth?" Ms. Martian asked further. 
"Not all the times. But most of the times, it is at least nearer to the truth than 
otherwise it might have been," Abdurahman replied. 
16 Nugroho's favourite example is the glass that is half-filled. One person describes it as half-empty, but the 
other one considers it half-full. Singe fact, two interpretations by two different persons. 
17 Nugroho actually gave the example of 12 historians. 
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"How can you be sure that you get at least near to the truth most of the 
times?" asks Ms. Martian. 
"Because historical methods entails finding verifiable evidences, cross-
checking it with other evidences and subjecting them to rigourous internal and 
external criticisms," Defender A reasons out. 
"Do you or can you get all evidences first before you write history, or you 
write history based only on available evidence?" 
"Getting all the evidences is the ideal situation. But history is written based 
only on evidences at haYid. When new evidences are found, then history will be re-
written to accommodate the possible changes." Abdurahman explains. 
"Does that mean that all histories are provisional or tentative accounts of the 
past based on each historian's reconstruction or analysis of available data?" 
"Well, yes you can say that." 
"Hmm, if that's the case, will I be right to say that your objectivity or 
impartiality only refers to the data at hand, and not to reality itself? There is no 
way we should confuse data with reality, is there?"18 
"The rigorous methods of external and internal criticisms are precisely 
aimed at weeding out invalid from valid data. But yes, distinction must be drawn 
between data and reality." 
"If all histories are provisional accounts based on historian's reconstruction 
and interpretations following what you call long-sanctioned historical methods, is 
it fair to say that you call a scientific or objective history is just an avatar of 
relativism? It seems to me that an account may be authoritative but nonetheless 
18 For an extended, honest, self-reflexive analysis of the limits of historical research and historical explanation 
by a historian, see Ged Martin's The Impossible Necessity of History (2004) 
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relative to the views of what you call objective or impartial historian.19 You seem 
to merely bracket out all relativisms aside from your own and install it as the 
objective yardstick. Can I say then that objectivism is not much other than a 
'sanctioned' or 'officialised' form of relativism, or relatixism in disguised?20 Isn't it 
better if historians would be honest enough about their interpretations which are 
relative to their own views rather than pretend that they are being objective or 
impartial? Where did the notion that objectivism or impartiality is necessarily 
better than relativism come from? Has it always been there?" asks Ms. Martian. 
"I am not sure, but the notion of objectivity seems to be closely tied to the 
development of modernity in Europe from Renaissance, Reformation, Scientific 
Revolution all the way to Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution."21 
Abdurahman retorts. 
"In that case, could it be that preference for objectivism within scholarship 
today is a product of long, subtle process of naturalization and conditioning arid 
that there is no reason to suppose that it is by nature preferable?22 If relativism 
presupposes the influence of value-system in evaluating knowledge claim, isn't 
objectivism also reflective of a certain value-system that developed in Europe from 
19 In very interesting studies done by Knorr-Centina on laboratory experiments in the hard sciences (high-
energy physics, molecular biology), she demonstrates, for instance, that physics relies for solidification and 
stabilization of its empirical findings on self-validated, self-referential, not on supposedly context- or value-
dependent, strategies and procedures. (cited in Pinch [2000, 14 73] and Longino [2002, 30]) If physics is 
like that, how much more history might be? For reviews of her important book, Epistemic Cultures: How 
Sciences Make Knowledge, see Markovsky (2000), Cutcliff (2001) and Pinch (2000) Knorr-Centina's 
observation is compatible with the coherence theory of knowledge pushed by Bloor (1991, chapter 2) which 
posits that the notion truth is sustained by internal coherence within a theoretical system. 
20 This echoes Bourdieu's declaration: "The legal consecration of symbolic capital confers upon a perspective 
an absolute, universal value, thus snatching it from a relativity that is by definition inherent in every point of 
view ... " (1989, 22) Changing the word 'legal' with 'scholarly' or 'academic' makes it applicable to 
historiography. 
21 This echoes Knorr-Centina's idea of epistemic relativism which refers to the type of relativism that is 
committed to the idea that the basis for identifying 'objective' reality is "itself grounded in human 
assumptions and selections which appear to be specific to a particular historical place and time."( 1982, 321) 
22 Latour's very provocative book We Have Never Been Modern ( 1993), argues that the penchant for 
objectivity is a product of modernity at the bedrock of which is human desire to control nature, political 
emancipation of the people and the strict separation between the two (science and politics). Such strict 
separation, he further claims, is a necessary precondition to the success of the first two. [as noted in Harbers 
(1995, 271) 
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the Renaissance to Industrial Revolution? Is it not that the primary difference lies 
only in the earlier' s admission and the latter's denial?" 
As Abdurahman kept silent, Ms. Martian continues. "I understand that my 
job here is to adjudicate as to which of your approach is more acceptable. I came 
from another planet and that presumably makes me an objective or an impartial 
judge. After hearing all the arguments, however, I think, it would require a high 
dose of pretension on my part to proclaim one approach as naturally more 
preferable than the other and at the same time call myself impartial. I believe one 
cannot be impartial; she can only be accountable for her partiality. Impartiality 
presupposes a set of standard whose transcendental character can only be 
assumed. And such assumption can only be derived from a set of necessarily 
partial propositions. Impartiality renounces humanity (or "martianity"). It is 
tantamount to denying human responsibility for a human-made decision. It 
absolves one from the need to be responsible for one's own action. Of course, I can 
say that relativism is superior to objectivism, or vice versa, but does the fact that I 
am from Mars makes my judgment necessarily better because it is supposedly 
objective? My judgment can only reflect my Martian preference, my own 
understanding and my own power to express and fight for my preferences and 
beliefs. In other words, my choice represents my own politics and I am duty-bound 
to be responsible for it. Whether my choice would eventually be upheld as correct 
is dependent ultimately on the network of powers beyond my own. The point is 
that I'd be hard-pressed to find an unquestionably value-free standpoint through 
which judgment about knowledge, or perhaps about anything can be made. I can 
only hide the value-system or be honest about it, and I'd rather be honest." so goes 
Ms. Martian' s parting words. 
Michael Williams tell us in his article 'Skepticism' in Blackwell Guide to 
Epistemologtj that in Western epistemology, skeptical arguments are grouped into 
two: Agrippan and Castesian. The first is very ancient as it goes back to classical 
Greece and the other one is attributed to Descartes. For my purpose here I focus on 
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the first, the well-known Agrippa's Trilemrna but I will draw on Cartesian 
scepticism as well. Agrippa's trilemma refer to three propositions that cast doubt 
on human beings' claim that they can really know: (1) Any justification rests on a 
previous justification and each can always be questioned. That is, infinite regress ; 
(2) Authoritative justification, one that does not supposedly regress, can be made 
only through dogmatic assumption, which in itself can in principle be questioned; 
and (3) One can justify only by using assumptions or other justifications that have 
been a priori established-circular argument. At the heart of Cartesian skepticism 
on the other hand is compatible with that of Agrippa's: that is, "there is no way to 
justify any belief about the external world, even that such world exists." In other 
words, epistemological justification is a 'complete illusion.' These sceptical 
propositions have been debated since then, Williams claims, but there is still no 
agreed solution(Williams 1999, 38-47).23 
If these epistemological paradoxes have not been really solved despite being 
recognised for centuries, what does it suggest considering that for the same length 
of time, we have been producing unquantifiable amount information and ideas we 
call knowledge? We cannot set these skeptical arguments aside as wrong, because 
they are rooted at the heart of our logic. On the other hand, we cannot say that 
knowledge we produce are false simply because of these skeptical postulates. 
Perhaps there is something wrong with the logic that we use and the system of 
rationality that gave rise to it, but entertaining such possibility invites considerable 
difficulties. Foucault has precisely done that in Madness and Civilization and he was 
rebuffed by Derrida's philosophically dexterous arguments.24 Can I then raise the 
23 Williams claims that by denying what he calls 'Prior Grounding Requirement' upon which Agrippa's 
trilemma thrives, Agrippa's skepticism can be 'defanged' (51-52). However, this seems to me an 
unsatisfactory solution for this only means that the burden of proof must be sharelboth by the claimant and 
sceptic. That is, the default situation consists in that both skeptical and knowledge have equal status and 
each claimant on both sides should provide rational justification for their respective claim. In other words, 
skepticism is not the natural state that must be proven wrong by knowledge claimant in order for knowledge 
to be justified. In effect this grants the possibility of true knowledge by installing a priori assumption that at 
least it is 50% possible. His solution therefore concedes (at least 50%) that Agrippa's 2"d postulate is 
correct. (50-54), still leaving Agrippa some 'fangs' with which to bite. 
24 Among the many reviewers of Foucault's Madness and Civilization, observers agree that it was Derrida's 
( 1978) critique that really hit the mark. Briefly, Derrida argued that no one can stand outside of Reason so 
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possibility that the amount of knowledge we have is a measure of the distance 
between the 'natural state' defined by skepticism and the product of our power to 
deny or prove skepticism wrong? Does it mean that we know only because we 
exercise power to do so? That knowing is not the primordial state, but a product of 
one's power? In other words, is it fair to say that at the very heart of knowledge is 
power and any suggestion to the contrary cannot but require application of a 
counter-power? Was Ms. Martian then justified in saying that there can be no non-
value-laden (non-power-based) platform upon which we can evaluate knowledge 
or anything? 
The ambiguous but largely rancorous reactions within the academe towards 
the rise of poststructuralism/ postmodernism/ postcolonialism (henceforth 
PS/PM/PC) illustrate the tension generated by abovementioned questions. 
Parenthetically, despite the differences among these theoretical projects, they are 
one in asserting or at least recognizing the possibility that knowledge is a function 
of power. This view is upheld by scholars, relatively small in number, who saw 
PS/PM/PC as liberating, sophisticated, stimulating, radical and eye-opening. On 
the other hand, it is viewed by many as destructive, counter-productive, 
contradictory, reactionary and regressive. The boundary between the two seems 
not as sharp as before for it appears that there is an increasing cross-fertilisation of 
theoretical appropriation between the two groups. However, the over-all attitude 
remains hostile such that many of those who appropriate PS/PM/PC concepts are 
careful to be very selective. They tend to discard or de-emphasize the most radical 
aspects or implications of these theories. Among these include the radical 
interpretation of Foucault's power/knowledge and Derrida's difference. 
The critics may be classified into three groups: (1) those who understood it 
and alarmed by it nihilistic or highly relativistic implications; (2) those who believe 
that it is not intellectually tenable because it cannot stand the test of reason; and (3) 
Foucault's exclusion of madness to signify the space outside of Reason is impossible. The Unreason can be 
apprehended only through Reason. See Boyne (1990, 53-89) for the explication of this philosophically 
exhilarating exchange. 
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those who think that it is plainly wrong because they largely misunderstood it. 
Proponents on the other hand tend to deny its alleged nihilistic elements and that 
with some adjustment, one can mitigate its self-refuting tendencies. 
In my view, one cannot apprehend the most radical and the most useful 
aspects of poststructuralism by denying or rejecting offhand its nihilistic 
implications.25 I believe that both critics and the proponents are bound to miss a lot 
by doing so. Since this is central to my argument in this study- that knowledge is a 
function of power-and, conversely, that this goes against what we scholars take 
for granted, I shall attempt to demonstrate the erroneous logical foundation of the 
tendency to utilize 'nihilism' or 'epistemological anarchism' as the proverbial 
intellectu8l 'boogeyman.' At the same time I will try to uncover what is being 
concealed when some scholars conjure up the specter of nihilism. 
Our Reason, our logic, demands that evaluative concepts go in pairs.26 
That there is such a thing as Reason presupposes the existence of Unreason. That 
we consider Reason as correct indicates that we take Unreason as wrong. 
Conversely, we reject Unreason as wrong on the basis of the presumption that 
Reason is right. The problem, however, is this, "On what platform independent or 
outside of Reason can we prove that Reason is correct?" Logic prohibits that we 
prove something based on itself. We thus cannot say that Reason is correct because 
it is reasonable. That constitutes Agrippa's third paradox-circularity. We cannot 
also say that Reason is correct because it has been tested for so long or that it has a 
long pedigree. This is because all these justifications, as Agrippa's first conundrum 
indicates, rest on a priori established reasonable assumption that in itself requires 
another justification-an infinite regress. We are left then with the last option 
possible in Agrippa's trilemma. That is, to install a 'dogmatic assumption' 
25 The following arguments are products of my own synthesis based on fragmentary ideas borrowed from a 
number of scholar. I have been toying with this idea for sometime and have been looking for books or 
articles that could support it. So far, however, I have not found any. I am sure there are published works on 
it. Perhaps I just did not know where to find. 
26 I got this idea from Derrida's critique of Western metaphysics. See 'Cogito and the History of 
Madness. '(I 978) 
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(Williams 1999, 39) and thereby stop regress. In other words, Reason is correct 
because people-the brilliant, the powerful, almost everyone-think and have 
proven (or so they thought) that it is. The foregoing has two far-reaching 
implications. 
First, nihilism cannot be exiled to epistemological oblivion as what many 
scholars have done in the most cavalier way. In the same that madness (Unreason) 
cannot be excluded from reason, as Derrida argued against Foucault on Madness 
and Ci'uilization, nihilism has a definite logical place at the opposite end of 
epistemological possibilities. It cannot be dismissed as an absolute wrong for it 
allows us to establish Reason as correct. Our logic demands that we cannot 
establish what is right based on what is wrong. If we insist, as many unwitting 
scholars do, it denies them the foundation for claiming that Reason is right.27 
Second, and this is more salient, it is perhaps too strong to use William's 
term of installing a 'dogmatic assumption' to establish the correctness of Reason. 
However, it captures an essential point: that Western rationality-the foundation 
of our Reason, logic and morals, etc. -developed as a product of historical forces 
and it has been installed as "the" basis of rational thinking through long process of 
collective and individual approbations. Reason is, in final analysis, human-made-
made by collective and individual powers of human subject. Any attempt thus to 
present it as if it is natural should be subjected to deconstructive analysis to 
uncover the hidden agenda behind such a move. All these are of central relevance 
to the power-knowledge nexus being explored here. 
I would like to raise another set of questions: Can there be a homologous 
relationship between the debates on objectivity-vs-relativity and Reason-vs-
Unreason? Is it the case that if Unreason cannot be dismissed offhand, so too 
27 I got the inspiration for this line of thoughts from Boyne's discussion of the very stimulating debate 
between Derrida and Foucault. As Boyne and others pointed out, among so many reviews and critiques of 
Madness and Civilization Derrida's critique proved to be the one that really hit the mark. The point of 
contention was Foucault alleged misinterpretation of Descartes's philosophical meditation on the exclusion 
of madness. See Boyne (1990, pp. 53-89.) See also Miller (1987, I 01-105) for a less comprehensive, less 
penetrating discussion of the same issues. 
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relativism? That if Reason has been installed as authoritative by a dogmatic 
assumption (Agrippa's Second point), so is the case the same for objectivity? In 
other words, does it mean that the two sides in the two debates are two faces of the 
same coin? That since one presupposes the other, then neither is necessarily 
superior and it is only through human intervention, human power, that one can be 
installed as more preferable than the other? 
--0000000--
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APPENDIX B 
CONCEPTUALISING KNOWLEDGE 
The starting point is to look at how knowledge is conceptualised in standard 
epistemology. In the article "What is Knowledge?" in Blackwell Guide to 
Epistemologtj, Linda Zagzebski (1999, 92) tells us that "(k)nowledge is a highly 
valued state in which a person is in cognitive contact with reality." It is, she 
continues, a relation whereby a conscious subject (knower) interacts with the 
"portion of reality to which the knower is directly or indirectly related" (Ibid.). 
Direct relation forms what she calls "knowledge by acquaintance" and indirect 
relation "propositional knowledge." The first is directly experiential while the 
latter is by way of a 'true proposition about the world.' (Ibid.) The key words here 
are "true proposition." She declares that "(i)n the state of knowledge, the knower is 
related to a true proposition" (Ibid., 93). 
She goes on to say that philosophers focus much of their attention on 
propositional knowledge rather than knowledge by acquaintance and that this may 
be due to two possible reasons: (1) knowledge takes the form of a proposition and 
this makes it transferable to another, something that knowledge by acquaintance is 
not, at least in a straightforward way; and (2) it is commonly assumed that reality 
has a propositional structure or that it is in such a structure that 'reality becomes 
understandable to human mind'(Ibid. 92-93). It should be underscored, for my 
purpose here, that the transferability of propositional knowledge is an important 
factor that pulls the interest of epistemologists away from knowledge by 
acquaintance. 
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Among philosophers, there are many complex theoretical issues involved in 
the quest for an adequate definition of knowledge. These are closely tied to how 
'true proposition' may be identified or established. This is not a place to engage 
these issues. Suffice to note that in much of these efforts, knowledge is restricted to 
those ideas and/ or information that have undergone or 'survived' a test of truth 
justification. Depending on the type or hierarchy of knowledge, the requirements 
of such a test vary, with the scholarly and scientific knowledge being the most 
rigorous. For knowledge to be considered as scholarly acceptable, it undergoes 
strict processing: documentation, verification, analysis, synthesis, peer review, and 
continual inter-subjective assessment. Those that cannot satisfy designated 
requirements are relegated to the dustbin and are called various names such as 
ideology, opinion, belief, hypothesis, myth, memory, superstition, hearsay, gossips 
or rumors, old wives' tale, folklore, etc - names that can only imply the extent of 
their distance from the ideal, that is scholarly knowledge.I 
The main problem with restricted definition of knowledge lies in what they 
occlude, and the repercussion of such occlusion. By limiting acceptable knowledge 
to those that have undergone the processing machine, called scholarship, we take 
for granted that the scholarship machine, and its scholar-operators, is a neutral 
instrument, with no interest (or power) to promote or pursue. There are reasons to 
believe that this may not be the case.2 The claim to neutrality of the scholars and 
scholarship and the privileged position of the knowledge they sanction should not 
be a priori accepted because they are included among the sites of power that need 
to be examined.3 How has scholarship been able for so long to maintain the veneer 
of neutrality upon which its authority is based is in itself an interesting question.4 
1 According to Longino (citing Ryle, 1946), knowledge is one of those 'success terms' ascribed to certain 
things that satisfy set ofrequirements. In other words, it is a also a normative concept, not just descriptive. 
See Longino, The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. JO. 
2 Since the publication of Said's Orienta/ism (1978) which elicited bitter polemics, the idea of innocent 
scholarship seems to be forever shattered. 
3 Bourdieu offers perhaps the most compelling exposition and critique of the powers of scholars in Homo 
Academicus (1988) For an extended and penetrating review of the book see Wacquant (1990). Barnes 
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One consequence of restricted definition of knowledge is that it prevents 
scholarly efforts from recognising and analysing an unrestricted field of powers 
that constitutes knowledge. We instead tend to divert all our focus to the 
methodologies or technicalities of knowledge production, on the one hand, and to 
the influences on knowledge of big, highly visible political power players, on the 
other.s This has resulted, for one, in incomplete and partial consideration of 
knowledge-power nexus best exemplified by most approaches in sociology of 
knowledge including its most radical version thus far, the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (SSK). 6 
Because of the need to start with a clean slate, I adopt a definition of 
knowledge that is inclusive of all attempts to represent or understand reality 
regardless of whether they are in fact true or not.7 Knowledge, therefore, as I define 
here, refers to an idea or information (or a set of ideas/information) that is believed 
to be true.8 By whom? By individuals or groups who willfully exercise power to 
( 1977) argues that knowledge is formed at the confluence of two 'great interests' -to predict and 
manipulate, on the one hand, and to rationalize and persuade, on the other. 
4 Interpreting Bourdieu, Brubaker claims: "the logic of ... self-interest underlying certain practices (including 
scholarship) is misperceived as a logic of disinterest ... this misperception is what legitimates these practices 
and thereby contributes to the reproduction of the social order in which they are imbedded." (1985,755) I 
should note that this is different from the Marxist notion of 'false dichotomy.' In Bourdieu's view, analyst 
may see it as 'misperception' but the actual agents do not necessarily share such view. To suppose that they 
think similarly is to commit what he calls the "scholastic fallacy," that is, the scholar should assume that the 
cognitive process that goes agent's actual practice is the same as that of the scholar while doing analysis. 
(Bourdieu, 1990, 112) 
5 The dominant ideology thesis in Marxist parlance points to the fit between the interests of the dominant class 
and the shape of ideology (or widespread knowledge) pervasive in the society. See Abercombie, Hill and 
Turner (1980) 
6 Mannheim, for instance, regarded natural sciences as exempt from the vicissitudes of historical forces and 
thus cast it outside ofthe concerns of sociology of knowledge. (cited in Dant, 1991, pp. 16-7) Lynch, M. 
(1992, 228) notes that Mannheim's refusal to include science and mathematics was precisely the challenge 
that sociologists of science took up. While the field often called sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) is 
largely a reaction to Mannheim's paradigmatic refusal to include hard sciences in sociological and 
epistemological analysis, and for that considered by many as a radical reinvention and reinvigoration of the 
sociology of knowledge, it remains enmeshed in partial consideration of knowledge-power nexus. See 
Shapin ( 1995) for a comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art. 
7 By doing this, I follow a long tradition in the sociology of knowledge that goes back to Mannheim. As far as 
he was concerned the truth-value of statement is secondary to understanding the social context in which 
knowledge has come to be considered as knowledge. 
8 This is very close to Berger and Luckman's definition (1966, p. I). This is also compatible with Durkheim's 
(1909, 238 a cited in McCarthy, 1997, p. 2) declaration that "the world exists only in so far as it is 
represented to us." However, I diverge from Berger's and Luckmann's and Durkheim's too much emphasis 
on the sociality of knowledge. While I recognize the enormous influence of social elements, I also recognize 
277 
believe and/ or assert that they know. Here I do not a priori assume that the social 
takes precedent over the individual, or vice versa. This is to allow space for each 
circumstance to determine which one carries more weight.9 Certainly, putting 
history, social sciences and others side by side with the so-called opinion, ideology, 
myth, gossip, memory, folklore, etc. will horrify many but this is necessary as a 
strategic analytic move. lOThis will allow us to see the types or sources of powers 
that sustain classification and 'hierarchization' of different knowledge claims. As 
McCarthy aptly puts it, ideas and knowledge are produced through cultural 
practices which are contentious: 
The contentious feature of cultural practices is not, at any given moment, ex 
equo: some of it is 'knowledge,' other things are 'facts' or 'opinions,' still 
others are 'ideologies.' The status of these designations are tenuous and because 
of that, negotiable. 11 
The following cases will give us idea why there is a need to reject the a 
priori assumption about knowledge: 
One cannot deny that there are instances when what we call gossips or 
personal memories contain more truth than history books would ever tell us. A 
good example of this is the case of the knowledge about mass killings of 1965-66 
(and related events) in Indonesia that for so long had been repressed by political 
imperatives. The first hand knowledge of the villagers who may have witnessed 
the capacity of individuals to think and decide for themselves. In this instance, Latour (1986) would be very 
useful. His aversion towards over-socialized conception of human in the social sciences led him to 
formulate what is now called Action Network Theory whose basic premise is that "societiety is not what 
holds us together, it is what is held together. Social scientists," he further declares, "have mistaken the effect 
for the cause." (1986, 276) 
9 Methodological wholism versus methodological individualism is a long-standing dispute in the philosophy 
of social sciences. I need not take side here. In the concluding chapter, I will raise the possibility that the 
long disputed antinomies such as nomothetic-ideographic, agency-structure, objective-subjective and many 
others become a problem only because scholars refuse to admit the artificiality and inherent limitations of 
these concepts vis-a-vis the complexity of reality that these concepts aim to capture. Scholar's refusal, I 
think, is closely linked to their denial that knowledge is a function of power. 
10 Durkheim in Elementary Forms of Religious Life argues that science is not fundamentally different with 
other forms of knowing, such as religion. He claims that just like other forms of knowledge, science comes 
from a particular combination of social forces. (cited in Kaufman-Osborn, 1988, 130-132) 
11 E. Doyle McCarthy, Knowledge as Culture: The New Sociology of Knowledge (London and New York 
Routledge, 1997), p. 26. 
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the events circulated as mere 'gossips' while official lies paraded for long as 
history, even up to now. In the post-Suharto period, the situation has radically 
changed. Scholarly efforts have tried to make those 'gossips' as history, and the 
former history as lies, and they succeed to a certain degree. However, as far as 
many Indonesians are concerned, at least part of the old history remains to be the 
proper history and outside of it are mere lies or gossips cooked up by people with 
political interests to promote.12 
Another case in point is the whole idea behind what is popularly called the 
Sub-Altern Studies. For the people who are marginalized (generalized as the sub-
alterns) the information or idea they have about themselves and the means through 
which they express them-perhaps in the form of epics, poetry, songs, folk lore, 
sayings, etc-all constitute what to them as knowledge. It has been there for so 
long as their ways of making sense of the world. It is a wonder of wonders, then, 
that it requires a sub-altern scholar to collect, document, analyze and synthesize 
those ideas or information to validate them to become acceptable knowledge. And 
in this form, a hypothetical sub-altern actor might be surprised that he cannot 
recognize himself in it, but since it already has the stamp of scholarly imprimatur, 
then it becomes authoritative. Relevant questions include: Why can society not take 
sub-altern knowledge on its own term? Why do we need Sub-Altern scholarship to 
make their knowledge considered as knowledge? What enables Sub-Altern 
scholars to feel that they can know better than those people who actually live 
reality?13 
These two cases suggest that knowledge is not necessarily about the truth. 
It is about what people think to be true. What gave the sub-altern scholars a head-
start is not necessarily that they knew things more accurately, but their privileged 
12 In the past few years, there has been increasing number of scholarly publication detailing and discussing 
relevant issues. See Budiawan (2004), Heryanto (2006), Zurbuchen (2005), Roosa, Ratih & Farid (2004) 
13 Bourdieu calls this the "intellectualist or theoretist fallacy" which refers to the common mistake committed 
by scholars evident in the claim: "I know better than my informant." Interview with Loic Wacquant, see 
Wacquant(l989,34) 
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position as scholars.14 In short, the different names given to different knowledge 
claims-history, ideology, memory, gossip, etc.-represents not necessarily their 
distance from the truth but more fundamentally the strength of the constellation of 
powers that backs each of them. 
14 Following Bourdieu, scholars have symbolic power which is based on symbolic capital-a "power granted 
to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition." Scholars have 
through a long process of institutionalization have gained the symbolic power to "consecrate or to reveal 
things that are already there." (1989, 23) 
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APPENDIX C 
RE-DEFINING POWER AND THE POLITICAL 
The concept of powe is ambiguous. Mark Haaugard (1997, 2) tells us that 
power is among those considered by Wittgenstein as 'family resemblance concept.' 
By that he refers to the variety of interrelated connotations attributed to the concept 
used in a day-to-day speech but just like different members of a family, one can 
hardly expect that one (usage or individual member) is exactly the same as the 
other. 
Not only is the concept of power ambiguous, it is also highly contested.1 
(Lukes 1974, 9; Wartenberg 1990, 12-17) Haaugard explains that what was at stake 
in the power debates in the 1960s and 1970s involving C. Wright Mills, Dahl and 
Bachrach & Baratz, Lukes, among others, was the legitimacy of the liberal 
democratic practices and institutions. A definition of power that is narrow, with 
the domain of the political confined to the public sphere, legitimises the liberal 
democratic perspective. That is, liberal democracy such as what is being practiced 
in the US may be taken as a model of democracy. On the other hand, a broad 
definition of power, as Lukes' is, will uphold the position of the left-wing as the 
'true democrat.' (Wartenberg 1990, 10) 
This is not a place to review the multi-pronged debates about the nature or 
properties of power, both as operational concept and as a social or political force. 
1 Lukes and Wartenberg concur but for different reasons. For Wartenberg, the reason for confusion is the 
misunderstanding by other scholars of the nature of power and the consequent misappropriation ofit. Lukes, 
on the other hand, suggests that reason could because the way how power is defined has a far reaching 
implication on the question "Who is a more democrat or who is more radical?" 
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Literature on this abounds.2 What I shall do is to extract certain conceptual and 
analytic elements from these debates that will serve the purpose of this study. 
In the conventional sense, power is associated with the influential political 
institutions, and individuals or interest groups that operate within or against 
them.3 It is often considered as a sort of 'thing' possessed and exercised by actors 
and groups with the view to acquire, maintain or enhance it further.4 It is likened 
to an instrument that enables a few to coerce, control or limit the thoughts or 
behavior of the many.s (Lukes 1974, 13) This conception of power is often referred 
as "power-over." 
Another conception is known focuses on the legitimate capacity to act, that 
is "power to." Among theorists who subscribe to this are Parsons (1963/1969), 
Arend (1970, as summarized in Wartenberg 1990, 37-49) and Barnes (1988). 
Hindess (1996, 1) notes that while this concept of power is often seen idiosyncratic 
in power theorizing, it is in fact central to much of western social and political 
theory. 
Lukes, Wartenberg and Foucault, among others, argue that that no longer is 
it sufficient to regard the 'powerful' as only those highly visible political 
2 For collections of various notable articles discussing various facets of the power analytics, see Olsen and 
Merger (1993) and Lukes (1986). For a theoretical approach that also include summaries of contending 
points, see Digeser (1992) Wartenberg (1990), Barnes (1988), Wrong (1979), Luke (1974). For a more 
recent, see Dyrberg ( 1997) for what seems to me a sophisticated attempt to synthesize and interpret 
Foucault's power analytics and to recast it in the light of theoretical efforts by Laclau, Moufe and Zizek. 
This also includes a very rigorous philosophical analysis of positions and assumption of various 
participants in the power debate (Chapters I & 2, pp. 20-84) 
3 This is the state-centered conception of power and this restricts the domain of the political within the 
activities of the state institutions and actors and those who oppose or support them. A paradigmatic example 
of this is de Jouvenal's On Power (1945). It equates power to the activities of the governments. Foucault 
categorically opposed such conception of power. As Foucault's pithy call goes, there is a need to cut the 
head of the king in political theory. See Miller and Rose's article Political Power Beyond the State (1992) 
for an eloquent review of the state-of-the-art in the theory of power which pushes for a beyond-the-state 
conception of power. 
4 This refers to the concept of power as "power to" (as legitimate capacity). Among theorists who subscribe to 
this include Parsons (1963/1969) and Arend (1970, as summarized in Wartenberg 1990, 37-49) and Barnes 
( 1988). Hindess ( 1996, I )notes that while this concept of power is often seen idiosyncratic in power 
theorizing, it is in fact central to much of western social and political theory. 
5 Associated with Hobbes, Lukes (1974, 13) tells us that this conception is central to the attention of power 
theorists for so long. 
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institutions, interest groups or individuals who occupy vital positions in them. In 
so far power-knowledge interplay is concerned, a narrow conception of power 
misleads us into assuming that the state or the elite, or certain key individuals 
(such as, say, Nugroho Notosusanto) as the only or the primary key to 
understanding the shape of knowledge. Since often are the cases when the interests 
of the visibly powerful do not coincide neatly with the shapes of knowledge, it 
gives observers a prima facie reason for dismissing offhand knowledge-power 
nexus. The key is to expand the notion of power to encompass generalised 
capacities of individuals or groups or anything. Simply stated, power is a capacity 
or ability to make a difference. 6 As ability, power is at once a cause and an effect of 
a confluence of social interactions. As Dyrberg (1997) eloquently demonstrates in 
his book, power is circular in structure and Barnes (1988) argues that knowledge is 
one of the nodal points that make such circularity possible. 
Such a definition of power carries far-reaching implications on the concept 
of the political.7 Traditionally, the domain of the political has been confined to 
activities of the state and the responses of the 'civil society' to these activities. Carl 
Schmitt's well known article The Concept of the Political defines the political based 
on the distinction between friends and enemies. (1996, 26-36) Such a definition has 
been considered as keenly insightful but it has also been criticised for being narrow 
or exclusionary. Agnes Heller, for one, offers an alternative. She claims, thus: "The 
practical realization of the universal value of freedom in the public domain is the 
modern concept of the political" (1991, 340). In my view, Schmitt's stress on conflict 
and Heller's emphasis on freedom (or any interest for that matter) can be 
combined together to produce a more adequate conceptualization such that 
attainment of freedom (or any interest) may be achieved in the context of a struggle 
between two or more opposing groups. Both Heller and Schmitt, however, give 
6 Dyrberg in his effort to interpret or synthesise Foucault power analytic defines power in this way. The 
essence of his definition, however, is very different from what I mean here. Along with many scholars such 
as Weber (1978 as cited in Hindess, I 996, 2), Parsons, Barnes (I 988), and others, this capacity is agent-
based, unlike Foucault and Dyrberg who rejects subject as sources of power. 
7 The ideas in this paragraph I have previously discussed in my earlier paper, "Behind, Between and Beyond 
Politics" (Curaming 2005) 
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premium to the public as the domain where the political is operative. If power 
permeates the society,8 if it is conceived as ability to make a difference and thus 
everyone has this attribute, then the private or personal sphere is equally liable to 
politicization. As feminists happily proclaim 'the personal is the political'. In short, 
the field of the political encompasses practically all facets of human interaction. I 
should emphasize though that it does not follow that everything is political. It only 
means that everything can be politicized and this is contingent on the 
configuration of social forces. 
Foucault's oft-referred regicide- i.e. the metaphorical cutting of the head of 
the king in political theory9 - no doubt contributed significantly to this effort. By 
rescuing the concept of power from the confines of the question of sovereign 
power, he not only destroyed the walls that for so long restricted the sphere of the 
political, as separate from the social.10 (Dyrberg 1997, 86-88) He also sets power 
analytics that allows analysis of wide-ranging phenomena that previously were 
thought to be inherently non-political, including knowledge itself. This is far from 
saying that knowledge was never an object of social and political analysis before 
Foucault. As early as Greek philosophers, perhaps even earlier, social and political 
influences on knowledge production have been mulled over. A more systematic 
approach such as sociology of knowledge, for instance, dates back to early 1900s 
(Frisby 1992) The importance of Foucault (and Derrida) rests, among other things, 
on making it possible to push the effort to understand knowledge-power nexus to 
its logical conclusion. 
8 While it is Foucault who is well known to be associated with the concept of power that is all pervasive in the 
society, similar view has been advanced by many scholars of different theoretical suasion. See for instance 
Lukes (1974), Barnes (1988). 
9 Foucault (1980, 121). In his words, "We need to cut the King's head: in political theory that has still to be 
done. 
10 One of Foucault's provocative points is that the political is in the social. (cited in Dyberg, 112) According 
Foucault, he did not mean to say that State is not important but "for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, 
(it) is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations,and further because (it) can 
only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations." (Foucault, 1980, 122) 
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APPENDIX D 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONCEPTUAL OBSTACLES 
The first major philosophical obstacle is evident in this question: Does the 
fundamental assumption that underlies the effort to demonstrate that power is a 
function of knowledge and vice versa, rest on a firm philosophical foundation?l If 
knowledge, a critic would say, is indeed shaped by power, then this claim cannot 
be true or acceptable for power is a dubious epistemological justificatory device 
(Taylor 1984). That facts are now routinely established and that we have a rigorous, 
time-tested set of criteria for truth verification, the critic would aver, indicates that 
knowledge is tested against verifiable facts and it is its ultimate measure (Norris 
1997).2 In other words, the knowledge-is-power-driven proposition does not, or 
cannot rest on a firm epistemological standpoint, which only means that it is 
invalid as a knowledge claim. There are a number of possible solutions to this. 
The first solution I suggest is philosophical in nature. Allow me to explain 
this by referring first to a functionally similar problem: the paradoxical statement, 
"Everything is relative." Critics of relativism often point out that to the extent that 
such statement holds true, it refutes itself, which serves as a proof that there is 
something absolute.3 Such an assertion, however, rests on a false premise: that 
language can 'exist' only on one level, as correspondent to a referent in reality 'out 
there.' It seems, however, that language is, if not by nature at least by function, a 
1 Many critics pose this question and respond in the negative. See for instance, Digeser (1992), Taylor (1984). 
2 Norris's Against Relativism (1997) is a comprehensive and rigorous critical evaluation of various anti-
realist, cultural-constructionist theories that challenge the standards of truth verification in the sciences. See 
specifically Chapter 9 that discusses the science of aerodynamics as a test-case for various forms of 
relativist doctrines. 
3 One ofHabermas's main critique against Foucault rests on this paradox. Foucault, he thought, cannot 
account for the 'normative basis of his critique' because of its implications for the knowledge-power nexus 
(cited in Keenan, 1987, note no.3, p. 33). Much of criticisms against Manheim also focused on his 
relativism (in his term relationism). See Grunwald (1970, 239 cited in Dant, 1991, 35) and Popper (1966 
also cited in Dant, 1991, 36-7). See also Hollis (1982) who bewailed 'the social destruction ofreality" by 
the relativists. 
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meta-language (Mauntner 2000, 305). It is a higher-order description of reality, and 
such ordering could theoretically spiral out to infinity. This means that a referent 
may not only be an object 'out there' (first-level ordering) but also a set of signs 
that referred previously to an object (second-level), and yet another set of signs 
referring to the signs at the second level (third level), and so on as the principle of 
referentiality applies to an infinite number of levels of possible ordering, 
depending on the need for it. This idea is functionally similar to Derrida's idea of 
differance, only taken in reverse. The proposition thus that 'everything is relative' 
"exists" as a higher level description of the 'everything' in a lower level, making it 
non-self-refuting on its own level.4 
In the same way, the power = knowledge proposition is a postulate of a 
higher order. It posits the relationship operative at the lower level between power 
and knowledge using an epistemological yardstick applicable to that level. Many 
might complain of the artificiality of such differentiation. They may argue that 
logic is logic and it either applies to everything or not at all (Putnam 1987, cited in 
Prado 1995, 46).5 However, it is precisely the hard-and-fast, black-and-white nature 
of logic that makes its efficacy limited. Reality is much too complex to be captured 
by logic. The logical reality and the existential reality may not be one and the same, 
and conflating the two is as foolhardy as it is dangerous.6 The analysts (historians, 
social scientists, any scholar), thus, have no choice but to make use of logic and 
language (in which logic is operative) and this makes it necessary to formulate a 
device, artificial it may be, to address the problems inherent in their tools. What 
may be fruitfully invoked is the "meta" property of both language and logic. Le 
4 This conundrum is addressed a little differently by Haugaard (1997). In his defense of Foucault against 
critiques ( Habermas, Taylor, among others, see Hoy 1986, 93-94) who claim that archaeological and 
genealogical methods are self-refuting, he also invokes also the need to differentiates level of analysis. He 
claims that critics tend to conflate philosophical and sociological levels of analysis and this results in 
contradiction. 
5 Putnam ( 1987) argues that reason can not be historicised because history itself, or historical accounts 
presuppose reason. As a regulative principle, it sets the platform that allows critical evaluation of 
everything. 
6 There is a very strong current in Continental philosophy that posit the limits of Reason. The works of 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida are outstanding examples. 
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me illustrate this complicated point by referring to an example of how I have done 
the analysis here. 
That the SNI and the Tadhana are examples of power-determined forms of 
knowledge has been demonstrated in this study using various kinds of evidence 
such as interviews, published articles and the content analysis of the books. This 
evidence constituted the first-level ordering of the phenomenon cited above. My 
own effort to analyse and synthesise this evidences to form my own arguments 
represents a second-level order effort. Anyone in the future who might use my 
study for his or her own purposes would constitute third-level attempt, and the 
chain goes on. In each level of these attempts at representation, language and logic 
are utilised with the view to capture what is thought to be real, in my case the 
proposition that knowledge is a function of power. That I use tools-language and 
logic-that are, admittedly, by their very nature power-determined does not 
necessarily negate the possibility that I can validate the proposition I aim to 
establish. It only means that in order to find out whether or not I in fact succeed in 
my attempt, it requires a set of criteria or standard of truth verification that is 
established to be valid for this particular level, in which case, the existing scholarly 
conventions. The proposition that knowledge is a function of power, in short, is 
not necessarily refuted by itself. It may even be self-validating if we recall that 
scholarship itself is a set of an organised but concealed power relations. Let me 
explain this further. 
What is often referred to as the 'time-tested set of criteria for truth 
verification' seems to be ultimately power-determined. It represents a composite of 
all powers-negative, positive, good, bad, creative, restrictive-that came into 
play and installed it as a valid standard. This means that before epistemology, 
scientific methods, historiography, among others, have been installed as a valid or 
acceptable basis of producing knowledge, they have undergone centuries of 
history of struggle among competing claims. In the case of the two projects 
discussed here, this struggle was manifest in the historiography war in the 
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Philippines which Tadhana' s indigenous historiography wished to engage with, as 
well as in the biting critiques by Soedjatmoko (1958, 1960) and Oetomo (1961) of 
the 'unscientific nationalist' history and Surjomihardjo's (1980) rebuke to 
Nugroho's relativism. Struggles such as these are often regarded as a process of 
weeding-out what is true from what is false or what is effective and what is not, 
and thus regarded as nothing to do with power a struggle. The resulting 
outcomes-epistemology, science, historiography as we know them today-are 
taken as the refined, authoritative version. One thing, however, cannot be denied. 
The scientific method itself undergoes continuous evolution as it reflects the 
acceptable paradigm of the time. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific 
Revolution (1962) is clear on this. Of course, Kuhn and others did not regard the 
existing paradigm as a manifestation of contemporary power relations within the 
scientific community, but how else did they manage to establish the norm or the 
standard protocol other than through consensus, which seems just another term 
for the confluence of powers emanating from several competing and 
complementing sources? Foucault's idea of discourse makes explicit the power 
relations that underpin the formation of such a consensus. Within the sphere of 
scholarship, therefore, the proposition that knowledge is a function of power is 
self-validating, not self-refuting. 
The other philosophical obstacle is that analysis of the knowledge-power 
nexus tends to presuppose what it seeks to prove which results in a circular or 
tautological explanation. That is, the conclusion that knowledge is a function of 
power is already presupposed in the premise that knowledge and power are 
intimately linked. I will note here two aspects. First, considering that in the strictest 
philosophical sense any explanatory statement can only fall into three problems-
what is known as the Agrippan Trilemma:7 infinite regress, dependence on 
dogmatic a priori assumption and tautology-that this one seems tautological is not 
7 The Agrippan trilemma is a set of sceptical statements that since classical Greece has yet to be fully solved. 
At the heart of these trilemma is the 'illusion' of epistemological justification (Williams I 999). For a more 
detailed explanation of this please see Appendix A. 
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so bad at all. According to the coherence theories of knowledge, knowledge is a 
system and justification may be sought not based on foundation but on the 
interrelationship between knowledge claims. Tautology, therefore, which seems 
built-in in the systemic nature of knowledge, is not easy to avoid (Kvanvig 2003). 
The two other problems could be worse, especially the implicit dependence on 
dogmatic a prioris.s (For a more detailed discussion on this, please see Appendix B) 
The second point to emphasise in relation to the issue on tautology is 
methodological rather than philosophical in nature. This study does not seek to 
establish causal connection between knowledge and power. Such a relationship is 
already posited in the theoretical postulate that gave rise to this study. What it 
aims to do is to explore or demonstrate the various possible ways by which such 
relationship may be constituted and manifested. The idea is to determine whether 
there are sources of power that are left out in the conventional analysis of 
knowledge-power relations. As it turned out, there are in indeed; and among these 
is the power of the scholars and scholarship. 
The leaving out of the power of the scholars and the scholar is a 
consequence of the restricted definition of the concept of the powerful and power 
itself. The powerful often refers to the big political and economic figures such as 
the rich, the oligarchs, leaders, regimes and others. Too often we easily assume that 
if indeed power shapes knowledge then the interest of the 'powerful' - dominant 
class, the state, certain sectors-should coincide considerably, if not perfectly, with 
the shape of knowledge. Sometimes, that is the case, but in other instances that is 
not so. This tends to cast doubt on the purported inalienable relationship between 
power and knowledge, and occasions the assertion that at its best, knowledge 
corresponds to reality and it was just a matter of using proper methods to achieve 
such correspondence. If we define power broadly and simply, and regardless of 
8 Much of what we call authoritative knowledge -sciences, history, philosophy, etc-fall into this category. 
They are held true because in the final analysis there is a dogmatic a priori upon which they stand on. The 
trenchant problems, therefore, that emanate from knowledge-power nexus are precisely consequent to the 
essence of Agrippa's second postulate. 
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interest, as the capacity to make a difference, and not, as in many instances, as a 
relational difference between the 'powerful' and the 'powerless' (a tautology at its 
worst), we in effect broaden the bases of who or what are the potentially powerful 
that could influence the shape knowledge. It is often at the confluence of the 
unpredictable combination powers of persons, institutions, situations, prior 
knowledge, and other indeterminate factors that knowledge takes shape. This is to 
an extent evident in the SNI where the fluidity, inconsistencies and even 
contradictions in narration and interpretations are found. Sometimes, as in the 
case of personal memories, through a will-power of a single individual knowledge 
may also be constituted. In other words, power resides in many agents and there 
may even be types of power that are not based in specific agents but in the 
confluence of various and even indeterminate agents. The notion of social ontology 
is derived from this type of agency. In other words, the metaphor of the Titans 
being embodiments of many types of power is particularly apt. Likewise, being 
powerful yet not omnipotent, the Titans represent very well the authoritarian 
regimes of Marcos and Suharto. 
The narrow definition of knowledge is also an obstacle. By limiting 
knowledge to those that have undergone the processing machine, called 
scholarship, we take for granted that the scholarship machine, and its scholar-
operators, is a neutral instrument, with no interest (or power) to promote or 
pursue. As argued earlier, scholarship is hardly an innocent or apolitical act. By 
expanding the definition of knowledge, as is done in this study, to include all 
attempts to represent or understand reality, it opens the door to the examination of 
the various types or sources of power that gave rise to knowledge claims that carry 
different names such as gossips, superstition, propaganda and so on. Certainly, 
putting history, social sciences and others side by side with myth, gossip, memory, 
folklore, etc. will horrify many. As shown in this study, however, one cannot deny 
that there are instances when what at one point are called gossips or personal 
memories contain more truth than history books would ever tell us. Scholars tend 
to dismiss such instances as either as fault of the scholars or as 'collateral lapses,' as 
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isolated cases that do not in anyway invalidate the overall efficacy of scholarly 
methods. This is not, I think, a question of validity of scholarly methods, the claim 
for which neither do I nor can I reject, but a question of why in instances when 
these scholarly methods fail to capture reality, their output remain (at least until 
proven patently wrong and that takes time) considered as the 'knowledge,' more 
acceptable than rumors, personal memory and others. The answer, of course lies, in 
the power relations between those who have access to the mechanisms for 
knowledge production and distribution and those who do not. The SNI was a case 
in point. What for so long was considered 'history' proved to be distortions of 
reality whereas the 'truth' which certain marginalised groups held had been 
considered as lies for so long. 
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VOLUME 
Volume I 
Volume2 
Volume 3 
Volume 4· 
Volume 5 
APPENDIX E 
CHANGES IN DIFFERENT EDITIONS 
CHANGES· 
• Not much change. Most of the sentences, for instances, are 
the same to letter. 
• The changes: added new data from new researches up to 
1978 about East Timor; added glossary, index, photos and 
tables (see Soejono's Foreword, p.xxv) 
• ".:.additional data and sharpen th~ analysis but overall the 
changes clo no really alter the ge'ueral pi~ture." (Fore word to 
Volume,Bambang Sumadio, pp. xvii-xviii) · 
• Stibstantfal reworking was done on the chapters on Srivijawa 
and Matatam especially about Wangsa S~ilendra in Java 
• Overall, the changes were quite substantial, but far from the 
extent of change in Vol. 6. There are chapters or sub-chapters 
that were added or almost completely re-written. These 
concerned the processual or chronological parts. Chapters that 
are 'structural' in approach remained the same. 
• The index and bibliography that the 1st edition did not have, 
have been added. 
• Note: The editor, Uka Tjandrasasmita, noted in the Prakata 
for the first edition that most of the materials used were 
secondary sources and thus the book contains a lot of 
weaknesses. 
• Absolutely there was no change in the content of the second 
edition (he said it was dated 1976 but I think it was 1977), 
except typographical errors and bibliography. 
• 1984 edition also underwent no meaningful changes. Changes 
"were limited to adding of index and a few editorial changes 
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Volume 6 • First, seconcfand third editions (1975, 1977 and t980)are 
very simila,r .. ·.. .·· .· . .• . .···. :· . . 
• The .1984 edition constutes a total overhaul of previous• 
editions. .·. . .. 
• Th~ 1993 .edition is. in tnany respect just copied from 1984, 
but the .it is also significantly different More materials and a 
new volume .(V-0lllme 7) was add~d, specificallyjust for the· 
New Order period. 
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